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This dissertation examines the ideological evolution of the Darul Islam (DI) movement in 
Indonesia. It argues the movement was defined by two core ideas: hākimiyya and jihad. While these 
ideas are not unique to Indonesian militant Islamists, this dissertation aims to examine how each 
concept was understood, interpreted and transformed by key DI leaders from the Indonesian 
independence struggle to the final years of the Suharto regime. 
 
Beginning with Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo’s bid to establish an Islamic state in opposition 
to Dutch rule, this dissertation assesses how DI defined and promoted an understanding of 
hākimiyya and jihad through the works of classical ideologues to form a cohesive doctrine. 
Following Kartosuwiryo’s death in 1962, this thesis outlines how these ideas were reinterpreted by 
subsequent leaders, ultimately resulting in a split within the movement and the formation of 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 1993. 
 
This dissertation argues the accelerated globalisation of the 1970s gave Indonesian Islamists 
unprecedented exposure and access to the teachings and works of hard-line Salafist groups and 
Wahhabi preachers and organisations in the Middle East. The selective adoption of their 
interpretations of hākimiyya and jihad, and the introduction of related concepts such as takfīr and 
al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, reinvigorated DI after Kartosuwiryo’s execution. While the material for this 
ideological revival largely appeared from foreign sources, the movement’s new intellectual leader, 
Abdullah Sungkar, with help from his close friend, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, largely applied these ideas 
in response to growing state repression and the perceived secularisation of Indonesian society. 
 
Finally, this dissertation argues the ideology of DI was shaped through participation in conflict. 
Periods of struggle against the Dutch in the 1940s, the Republican government in the 1950s and 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1991 led to significant transformations in the 
beliefs of DI members. Notably, the Afghan conflict cemented the increasingly takfīri outlook of 
Sungkar’s faction, narrowing their conceptualisation of jihad. These ideological transformations 
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Amīr (Ar./In)   A leader, ruler or commander 
‘Aqīda (Ar.)   The core beliefs of the Islamic faith 
Bay’ah (Ar/In. Bayat)  Pledge of allegiance to a caliph or amīr 
Bid’a (Ar.)   Heretical or deviant innovation  
Bughāh (Ar./In Bughat)  Transgressors or rebels who oppose a legitimate Islamic authority 
Dakwah (In./Ar. Dawa) lit. Call; Proselytisation  
Dar al-harb (Ar.) Abode of war; usually refers to areas that are not under the control 
of an Islamic ruler 
Dar al-Islam (Ar.) Abode of peace; usually refers to areas under the control of an 
Islamic ruler 
Fatwa (Ar.) Legal opinions, which are often non-binding, issued by a mufti 
Fiqh (Ar.) Islamic jurisprudence 
Hadīth (Ar.) The compendiums of the actions, sayings, teachings and traditions 
of the Prophet Muhammad 
Hijrah (Ar.) lit. Migration; primarily refers to the Prophet Muhammad’s flight 
from Mecca to Yathrib, later renamed Medina, in 622 
Hākimiyya (Ar.)  Securing Allah’s rule and sovereignty on earth 
Hudud (Ar.)   Punishments prescribed under Islamic law 
Hukum Islam (In.)  Islamic law 
Ijtihād (Ar.)   Independent reasoning 
Iman (Ar.) lit. Belief or faith; refers to the six articles of faith of Islam, namely 
belief in the existence of Allah, angels, prophets, books of which 
God is the author, the day of judgment and predestination  
Jihad (Ar.) lit. Struggle or to exert effort; often used to refer to a war or 
physical confrontation against enemies of Islam 
Jāhiliyyah (Ar.) The state of ignorance in which the people of Arabia lived before 
the advent of Islam in 610 
Kafir (Ar.)  Disbeliever 
Kufr (Ar.)  Disbelief 
Kitab Kuning (In.) lit. Yellow books; refers to religious texts, so called because the 
originals were published in Arabic rather than Romanised script on 
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paper that had aged having been brought back from the Middle 
East. Often sold in bookshops known as toko kitabs 
Majelis shūrā (Ar./In.)  Consultation council  
Mantiqi (In.) Regional administrative units, which are in turn subdivided into 
smaller districts known as wakalah  
Masyumi (In.) Org. Masjumi (Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, Council of 
Indonesian Muslim Associations); refers to the main Islamic party 
in Indonesia between 1945 and 1960  
Mujahidin (Ar.)  Plural of mujahid; those who engage in jihad 
Munafiq (Ar.) Hypocrite; someone who purports to be a Muslim but hides their 
disbelief or fails to fully implement or follow Islam’s teachings.  
Murtad (Ar.) Apostate; someone who has consciously renounced their Islamic 
faith 
Negara Islam Indonesia (In.) Islamic State of Indonesia  
Pancasila (In.) The five principles that form the ideological basis for the 
Indonesian state and were introduced by President Sukarno in 1945 
Pesantren (In.)  Islamic boarding school 
Refomasi (In.) lit. Reformation; refers to the period after the fall of General 
Suharto’s New Order regime 
Shari’a (Ar.) Islamic law; derived from the Qur’an, sunna and other sources of 
jurisprudence 
Shirk (Ar.)   The sin of idolatry or polytheism 
Sunna (Ar.) Actions, experiences, sayings and teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammad, which are recorded in the hadīth 
Taghut (Ar.) A false god or idol; usually applied to tyrannical rulers or 
governments 
Takfīr (Ar.)   The excommunication of a fellow Muslim 
Taūhid (Ar.) Monotheism; The oneness of God and core belief of the Islamic 
faith 
Ulama (Ar./In. Ulema)  Plural of alim; refers to religious scholars or clerical authorities 
Ummah (Ar.)   lit. Community; refers to the global community of Muslims 
Usroh (In./Ar. Usra) lit. family; refers to a cell-like organisational structure or small 
groups 
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Walā’ wa-l-barā’, (Ar.) Loyalty and disavowal; devotion and denunciation for the sake of 
Allah 
 
A Note on Transliteration and Translation 
 
A thesis primarily concerned with ideology, Islam and Indonesia will unavoidably use terminology, 
jargon and proverbs in Arabic and Indonesian. This thesis has generally followed simplified 
guidelines provided by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES), except for where 
there are common spellings of personal names, places, etc. in English. Where Arabic words are 
cited in other English-language texts, the source’s own transliteration is used.  
 
The thesis has largely adhered to the conventions of modern Indonesian spelling, introduced 
through the 1972 reforms, unless quoting directly from a source. Dutch-influenced spellings of 
names or titles are retained where individuals have expressed a strong preference for them or 
where an organisation is more commonly known through these spelling conventions. In 
accordance with Javanese and Sundanese practices, this thesis uses an individual’s first name after 
the initial mention of their full name. For those of Arabic heritage, this thesis uses their surname 
in subsequent references.  
 






‘I am a child of DI/NII who is ready to sacrifice myself for Islam. Remember, o mujahidin of Malingping, 
how our imam, SM Kartosuwiryo built and upheld and proclaimed the independence of the Islamic State 
of Indonesia with the blood and lives of martyrs…’1 
Iqbal, Jemaah Islamiyah member and Bali bomber, 2002 
 
This statement by one of the perpetrators of the bombings in Kuta, Bali on 12 October 2002 is 
revealing in spite of its brevity. In justifying his attack, the bomber hints at the complex and 
mutable ideology that underpins and motivates militant Islamists in Indonesia. Iqbal, alias Arnasan, 
alias Acong, was a member of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. Founded by Abdullah Sungkar 
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Indonesian clerics in self-imposed exile in Malaysia, on 1 January 1993, 
the JI sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.  
 
Unlike numerous other Indonesian Islamist political parties and civil society groups, JI members 
were willing to use violence to achieve their goal. The network was responsible for some of the 
deadliest attacks in the country, including the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange on 13 
September 2000, a series of attacks targeting churches on Christmas Eve 2000, the bombing of 
the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004, another coordinated attack in Bali on 1 October 
2005, and the explosions at Jakarta’s JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels on 17 July 2009. Their 
willingness to attack both domestic and foreign state and military targets and civilians – including 
fellow Muslims – illustrates the JI’s expansive definition of a legitimate target and shows that 
violence was central to their mission to create an Islamic state. 
 
This embrace of violence helped to shape JI into one of the deadliest and most effective terrorist 
organisations in post-colonial Southeast Asia. However, as Iqbal’s last testament demonstrates, the 
network was not the first to try to establish an Islamic state through force. Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
created the network after breaking away from Darul Islam (DI), a movement created by Sekarmaji 
Marjan (SM) Kartosuwiryo in West Java between 1947 and 1948. DI fought to liberate Indonesia 
from colonial rule and, subsequently, to replace the Republic led by President Sukarno and other 
nationalists with the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia). 
 
 
1 Iqbal, alias Arnasan, alias Acong, ‘Final Testament’, in Chiara Formichi, Islam and Asia: A History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2020), p.225 
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While the revolt led by Kartosuwiryo began in West Java, it expanded to encompass Central Java, 
South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. These regional rebellions are interesting in their own 
right, but not the concern of this thesis. None of the other insurgencies were actively part of the 
DI for the entire duration of its conflict with the Dutch and subsequently the Republic of 
Indonesia. As Greg Fealy notes, ‘the period when all five areas were actively part of the DI 
movement was less than four years…from 1953 to 1956-7’.2 The beliefs and motivations of those 
participating in the regional revolts were varied, complex, and thus difficult to examine cohesively. 
As this thesis is concerned with development of Islamist militant ideology, the West Java DI 
movement offers the clearest case study of the role of Islam in shaping the beliefs of the 
participants. 
 
Kartosuwiryo not only founded the DI but was the primary architect of its belief structure, 
producing significant works that would determine the movement’s ideological trajectory long after 
his death. He began his career as part of Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI, Islamic Union Party) in 1927, an 
anti-colonial political party that arose out of an Islamic labour organisation, the Sarekat Dagang 
Islam (SDI, Islamic Trading Union). While Iqbal lionised Kartosuwiryo as the father of an 
uncompromising militant Islamist movement, Kartosuwiryo began his career as a mainstream anti-
colonial Islamic nationalist who often cooperated with Sukarno and other Republicans. His path 
to leading a protracted rebellion against the state and his adoption of a severe interpretation of 
Islamic principles is a clear example of the non-linear development of DI’s ideology.  
 
This pattern of both working with the Republican state while simultaneously opposing its 
foundational principles continued long after Kartosuwiryo’s death and the movement’s military 
defeat in West Java in 1962. Senior DI militant commanders often reached accommodations with 
the Republic rather than carrying on an unyielding but ultimately futile fight for a true Islamic 
state. Framing this as a pragmatic decision to preserve what was left of their movement, these men 
subsequently participated in violent pogroms against suspected members of the Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) and other enemies of General Suharto, who took 
power in 1965. Despite DI leaders espousing a doctrine deeply rooted in purity of belief, these 
choices illustrated the malleability of their ideology in practice. 
 
 
2 Greg Fealy, ‘Half a century of violent jihad in Indonesia: a historical and ideological comparison of Darul Islam 
and Jemaah Islamiyah’ in Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville, eds. Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia: myths and 
realities (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2005), p.17 
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This period of co-optation quickly came to an end when factions within the movement proved 
unwilling to accept the paradox of working with a regime that they sought to replace. The Suharto 
government’s crackdowns on religious freedom, alongside the introduction of new Islamist ideas 
from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, helped to spur DI’s resurgence by reinvigorating the commitment 
of members who had once fought for an Islamic state and attracted a new generation of recruits.  
 
With the DI too weak to launch a new insurgency, its fragmented leadership – which now included 
both old hands and new members like Sungkar, a newcomers from the Dewan Dakwah Islamiya 
Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), a non-violent Islamist group – 
focused on proselytisation efforts and small-scale, sporadic attacks against government facilities, 
businesses and minority religious groups.  
 
Propelled by internal frustrations over its past collaboration with the government, new foreign 
ideas, and an energised and restored membership base, the DI was slowly revived in the 1970s. 
Various DI groups conducted sporadic, small-scale attacks on entertainment venues and churches 
and conducted fa’i robberies (the confiscation of property from non-believers or enemies of Islam) 
throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, waves of arrests decimated the group and 
led to numerous leaders fleeing the DI’s strongholds in West Java. Sungkar and Ba’asyir, who had 
been in and out of legal trouble since 1978, fled to Malaysia in 1985. The men maintained close 
links with their comrades back home while establishing a new pesantren (religious boarding school). 
Despite this newfound energy, the DI made little tangible progress in reviving its insurgency or 
achieving its ultimate goal of replacing the Indonesian Republic with an Islamic state.  
 
Thing began to change when Sungkar and Ba’asyir met with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent 
Afghan mujahidin commander during in 1985 trip to Peshawar, Pakistan. Working with the 
Palestinian ideologue Abdullah Azzam, Sayyaf had begun running training camps for foreigners 
willing to join the mujahidin in their fight against the Soviet Union. The two Indonesians 
capitalised on this opportunity to gain military training and combat experience for DI members. 
By the end of 1985, the first cohort of DI cadres had arrived in Pakistan. Although many individual 
participants spoke of a desire to help their fellow Muslims defeat a godless invader, Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir saw the opportunity primarily as a means of strengthening DI in its struggle against the 
Indonesian government.  
 
 14 
In total, ten groups of DI members, varying in size between ten and fifty-nine, trained in Pakistan 
and later, Afghanistan, between 1985 and 1991. This amounted to about 200 Indonesians, 
including Imam Samudra, Huda bin Abdul Haq, alias Ali Ghufron, alias Mukhlas, and his brother, 
Ali Amrozi bin Haji Nurhasyim, who would go on to plan the attacks in Bali. The Afghan 
experience was transformative for DI participants, hardening their interpretations of jihad and 
forging an internationalist outlook as the men met militants from across the Middle East and South 
Asia. This growing sense of transnational solidarity coupled with increasing tensions between the 
DI’s core leadership in Indonesia and the exiles in Malaysia over the conceptualisation of an 
Islamic state and how best to achieve it, ultimately led Sungkar and Ba’asyir to break away, 
establishing JI on 1 January 1993.  
 
These conflicts over the scope of an Islamic state, its membership, and crucially, the process for 
realising it have always been at the core of the battle for control of the ideology of the Islamist 
movement in Indonesia. Assessing the origins of these ideas and examining their relative 
importance are thus critical in order to understand the group’s belief structure.  
 
By beginning with Kartosuwiryo’s first forays into the anti-colonial Islamist political scene in 1928, 
this thesis investigates the origins of the DI’s ideological tenets and situate their creation within a 
period of considerable activism and contestation amongst opponents of the colonial regime. While 
Islamist groups remained on the fringes of the nationalist movement, Kartosuwiryo’s 
contributions to PSI were prolific and established his core beliefs; namely that Indonesian 
independence could only be attained and its future ultimately secured by placing Islam at the heart 
of the anti-colonial struggle and by establishing a state founded on shari’a (Islamic law).  
 
In choosing to conclude this study with the splintering of the movement and formation of JI in 
1993, this thesis covers a complete arc of its ideological development across the final decades of 
colonial rule and near half-century of Indonesian independence. The breakaway of Sungkar’s 
faction cost DI significantly. The men, who provided scholarly prestige and charismatic leadership, 
took the majority of the movement’s Afghan war veterans with them, depriving DI of its most 
skilled combatants. While their new group retained significant elements of the DI’s original 
ideological framework, the men continued to modify its core and ancillary tenets, eventually 
dropping NII as the name of their desired state.  
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While the DI remains an active organisation in Indonesia today, its role and capabilities have been 
substantially diminished. It has not claimed responsibility - nor been blamed by the authorities - 
for any attacks in three decades. The group has failed to successfully transition into an influential, 
non-violent political organisation. As such, the 1928-1993 period represents the movement’s 
heyday and is crucial to the study of the origins and development of its ideology. 
 
With these themes and timeframe in mind, this thesis identifies the core concepts that underpin 
the ideology of the DI movement and explores their evolution from 1928 to 1993. It will analyse 
the ideational origins of the DI’s worldview and each tenet’s significance to the group’s 
overarching belief structure. Additionally, it will provide a diachronic study of these concepts, 
examining their evolution as different leaders come to the fore. As such, it explores how DI 
commanders distinguishing their ideology from that of their predecessors and how they 
incorporated and indigenised ideas promulgated by foreign ideologues.  
 
This research is premised on two notions: first, that DI’s leadership was not irrational but rather 
held a broadly coherent set of scripturally-grounded beliefs; second, that this ideology was central 
to the movement’s foundation and its survival in post-colonial Indonesia. In order to analyse this, 
this thesis asks the following questions: How did the leaders of the DI movement define particular 
concepts at various points in the group’s history? How and why did they arrive at these 
interpretations? How did these particular conceptualisations effect the DI’s actions? In order to 
answer these questions, this thesis will examine the construction and evolution of the movement’s 
ideology from its foundations to its eclipse by JI. In centring DI’s ideological arc, this thesis 
differentiates itself from much of the existing literature, which largely studies the movement 
through the lens of social movement theory.  
 
Thesis arguments  
 
The central contention of this thesis is that the concepts of hākimiyya (securing God’s sovereignty 
within the political system) and jihad (holy war) form the core tenets of the DI’s ideology. While 
the precise interpretation of these two ideas shifted throughout the group’s history, their 
importance to the leadership, made clear in their writings and sermons, did not wane. Bolstering 
these core concepts were two adjacent beliefs; al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ (loyalty and disavowal for the sake 
of God) and takfīr (excommunication), which are primarily concerned with the protection of the 
faith. While less prominent in the works of the movement’s key ideologues, these nevertheless 
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served to reinforce the core concepts, particularly jihad, by more clearly defining the DI’s 
membership, its enemies, its conventional practices, and crucially what beliefs were deemed 
acceptable within the ideological frame.  
 
Although DI leaders referenced other ideas often taken to be foundational Islamic beliefs such as 
‘aqeedah (doctrinal belief), imān (faith), tauhīd (belief in the oneness of God), and other concepts 
with deep significance for Islamic jurisprudence, notably ridda (apostasy), bid’a (heretical 
innovation), they did not discuss them with any rigor or regularity. Additionally, when these ideas 
were mentioned, DI members’ interpretation did not stray meaningfully from those of other 
Muslim groups. This lack of focus, coupled with unoriginal conceptualisations, suggests that these 
beliefs played a marginal or peripheral role in the DI’s ideology. As such, any discussion of these 
concepts will be subsumed under the broader analysis of the core and adjacent ideas.  
 
In order to explain the core position of hākimiyya and jihad in the hierarchy of concepts that make 
up the DI’s ideology, this thesis begins with the two premises mentioned earlier: that DI leaders 
held a clear belief structure grounded in religious scripture; and that these beliefs, configured in a 
particular order, helped the group to survive and adapt through periods of significant repression. 
After clarifying these points, this thesis will put forward three arguments to elaborate how these 
ideas were derived and interpreted by DI leaders at various points in the movement’s history how 
they affected the group’s aims and operations.  
 
First, this thesis argues that the interpretations adopted by DI leaders were often the result of 
intertwining global and local dynamics. Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar were aware of trends and 
developments in the Middle East and South Asia, and quickly imported new ideas promulgated by 
the leading contemporary ideologues. However, these concepts were not imbibed wholesale nor 
the importation driven by a desire to create or join an established transnational group. DI leaders 
were selective in incorporating concepts into their group’s belief structure and adapted foreign 
ideas to local contexts in order to legitimise them and ensure buy-in from Indonesian supporters.  
 
As such, this thesis will largely focus on how DI writings and sermons constructed and articulated 
the ideas of hākimiyya and jihad differently from how they were understood by Islamist ideologues 
in the Middle East and South Asia. It will highlight shared ideational foundations derived from 
core Islamist texts relied on by most  militant Islamist groups as well as unique deviations arising 
from local circumstances. It will be argued that the DI’s adoption of foreign ideas accelerated as 
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globalisation facilitated faster travel and communication. As such, Kartosuwiryo’s early 
conceptualisation of hākimiyya and jihad appears to have fewer foreign influences than his 
successors’, who not only had access to the publications of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt or Wahhabi scholars from Saudi Arabia but could also travel to Middle Eastern religious 
institutions. This also illustrates the need to assess each idea in relation to its specific historical and 
social context. 
 
The second argument advanced by this thesis contends that conflict drove significant shifts in the 
movement’s understanding of its core and adjacent beliefs. The struggle for independence against 
the Dutch and Japanese in the 1940s, the protracted insurgency against the Republican state 
between 1948 and 1962, and the war in Afghanistan from 1985 all resulted in the narrowing of the 
movement’s conceptualisation of an Islamic state, its understanding of jihad, and the boundaries 
of acceptable behaviour for its followers. Arbitrary persecution and disproportionate penalties 
issued by the authorities also radicalised the thinking of DI leaders. Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar 
seem to have been transformed to varying degrees by their experiences of state harassment and 
mistreatment, leading them to leave non-violent Islamist groups and embrace violent action. 
Regardless of whether DI initiated conflict, the presence of conflict in its members’ daily lives 
undoubtedly shaped their worldview and bolstered a belief that jihad was not only a religious 
obligation but necessary for achieving an Islamic state given the futility of non-violent approaches.  
 
The final argument put forward by this thesis is that the ideology of the DI movement was an elite 
project. The group’s belief structure was ultimately shaped by its leaders; primarily Kartosuwiryo 
from 1928 to 1962 and Sungkar from 1978 to 1993. According to DI and JI members interviewed, 
it was Sungkar rather than Ba’asyir who contributed to the later evolution of the group’s ideology, 
and he took the lead in making consequential decisions for his faction. Academic research supports 
this view with Greg Fealy, Sidney Jones, Quinton Temby, and Solahudin among others, crediting 
Sungkar (rather than Ba’asyir) with JI’s formation.3 Furthermore, it was Sungkar, rather than 
Ba’asyir who took the time to record sermons, thus detailing his thoughts on concepts like takfīr, 
for posterity, before his flight to Malaysia in 1985.  
 
 
3 Fealy, ‘Half a century of violent jihad in Indonesia: a historical and ideological comparison of Darul Islam and 
Jemaah Islamiyah’, p.25; Sidney Jones, ‘New Order Repression and the Birth of Jemaah Islamiyah’ in Edward 
Aspinal and Greg Fealy, eds. Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy: Essays in honour of Harold Crouch (Canberra: ANU E 
Press, 2010), p.40; Quinton Temby, ‘Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah 
Islamiyah’, Indonesia, 89, (April 2010) p.36; Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema’ah 
Islamiyah (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp.149-151 
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Rank and file members of the group had little influence on the group’s ideological tenets. Even 
other senior figures, like Aceng Kurnia only made contributions to the group’s understanding of 
ideas like tauhīd, which were limited in their analysis and propagation. Significantly, these ideas 
were not taken up by subsequent leaders, and remained marginal in the hierarchy of concepts that 
made up the movement’s ideology. Other top commanders, like Ajengan Masduki, who became 
the group’s imam (leader) in 1987, appear not to have published or proselytised their own 
interpretations of the group’s ideological tenets. As such, the group’s ideology was designed by an 
elite few within the upper echelons of the organisation.  
 
This is not to say that lower ranking members shared an identical understanding of the ideology 
espoused by their superiors, or were manipulated into believing them unquestioningly. They were, 
of course, able to ascribe their own meaning to events, notably in rationalising their decisions to 
fight in Afghanistan. However, these minor deviations were largely confined to individual 
members, who lacked the wherewithal to broadcast any new interpretations they may have had. 
The dominant voices within the organisation maintained their hegemony over the construction of 
the ideology through their respected status as scholars and in their capacity as competent leaders. 
Their control was reinforced by the hierarchical nature of the militant organisation itself. As such, 
this thesis is primarily concerned with the belief structure consciously created by Kartosuwiryo 
and subsequently Sungkar through their writings and sermons, rather than the diffused 
understanding held by the rank and file. 
 
These arguments are rooted in the belief that militant Islamist leaders in Indonesia had significant 
intellectual agency in designing their ideology. In other words, it rejects the notions that these men 
were incapable of rational thought,  unwitting pawns of larger groups in the Middle East, or are 
simply mentally ill. While their ideas are outside mainstream political thought in Indonesia, DI 
leaders frequently displayed the ability to reason and eloquently contest the views of non-violent 
Islamists and the government. 
 
Related to this, the writings and sermons of DI leaders throughout the movement’s history 
demonstrate that the centrality of religion to their goals and its role as the foundation of their 
ideology. Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar, and others continually justified violent actions with reference to 
Islamic scripture and saw their faith as a means of addressing the social ills of the day. While they 
responded to political events around them, Islam was a sincerely-held foundational principle rather 
than a rhetorical tool to motivate supporters or gain recruits.  
 19 
Original Contribution  
 
In identifying the core and subordinate concepts that make up the ideology of the DI and charting 
their evolution, this PhD establishes a new historical narrative that deepens scholarly research in 
several fields. First, it advances a more thorough and comprehensive understanding of the DI as 
an organisation driven by a coherent set of scripturally-grounded beliefs. Few accounts of the DI 
offer a complete overview of the group’s arc, let alone its ideological development, from its 
conceptualisation by Kartosuwiryo to the breakaway of Sungkar and Ba’asyir. Existing research 
often focuses largely on DI leaders’ grievances and operational tactics and ends with its military 
defeat at the hands of the Republican government. Whenever the DI is acknowledged as a 
forerunner to JI, the links between the groups are only sketched out in broad terms. 
 
As such, this thesis enriches the existing scholarship by providing a comprehensive overview of 
the group’s ideological trajectory. It situates the group’s leaders as reacting to both classic Islamic 
scholarship and contemporary domestic and international circumstances. By isolating the concepts 
that influenced and drove the DI’s establishment, this thesis shows that this form of militancy was 
rooted in modern concepts of nationalism, anti-colonialism, and Islamism.  
 
In explaining the development of these ideas, this research shows how the group prioritised certain 
ideas over others, creating a systematic, hierarchical, and complex belief structure. This structure 
guided and shaped its aims and actions, motivated new recruits – particularly those without pre-
existing kinship links to the group – and sustained existing members in times of hardship. 
Ultimately, it facilitated the DI’s fragmentation. This thesis is unique as no study of the DI or JI 
has established the core features of their ideology, explained their order and relationship to each 
other, or offered concrete assessments of the individual components of this ideological 
framework. Moreover, in contrast to the few pieces that do attempt to tackle and explain the role 
of ideology in the group, this thesis provides a rationale for the selection of the group’s primary 
beliefs and how they work to reinforce each other.  
 
Furthermore, in centring the Islamic roots of DI’s ideological tenets, this thesis counters depictions 
of DI as driven by material grievances, devoid of religious knowledge, or lacking intellectual rigor. 
It contests the notion that DI leaders’ use of Islamic concepts was merely a recruiting device or 
an attempt to gain legitimacy. Not only did they have a clear understanding of religious scripture, 
they were capable of modifying these concepts in accordance with political circumstances. By 
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highlighting the DI’s grasp of religious teachings and the evolution of these concepts, this thesis 
also undercuts the notion that the JI’s formation was predominantly a product of internal 
personality clashes, foreign ideas or a product of an international militant network. Instead, it 
advances a more complex conceptualisation of the group as having synthesised a unique belief 
system by both drawing on a long legacy of domestically-produced religious knowledge and 
engaging with new ideas and debates originating from the Middle East and South Asia. 
 
Using the lens of intellectual history, this thesis enhances our understanding of how Islamist 
militant groups mobilise and sustain themselves over long periods. Studies on the ideological 
development of Islamist militant and terrorist organisations are limited by comparison with 
analyses of their operations, recruitment methods, and mobilisation processes, and this research 
lays the foundation for moving beyond these conventional paradigms. In this respect, the DI’s 
longevity makes it a useful case study as it demonstrates how ideology both guided the group’s 
aims, operations and targeting patterns and was responsive to and shaped by external 
circumstances. In exploring the limits of its rigidity, this thesis complicates the existing 
understanding of the role of militant groups’ ideology, which largely ignores or fails to demonstrate 
how beliefs are translated into concrete aims and actions.  
 
Investigation into the role of ideology in militant groups outside of the Middle East, North Africa 
and South Asia rare in the available literature. In focusing on the ideological development of a 
group founded in South East Asia, this research challenges the notion that militant organisations 
based in the so-called ‘periphery’ of the Islamic world – an ironic and inaccurate term, since 
Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim country – are merely passive consumers of ideas 
generated in intellectual centres like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Instead, this research will 
demonstrate how DI leaders used ideas first conceptualised abroad and interpreted them for a 
local context. Additionally, it will show how these leaders sometimes arrived independently at 
similar conclusions to counterparts abroad due to similar political circumstances including anti-
colonial struggles, autocratic dictatorship, and state repression. As such, it furthers the 
development of a broader international history of Islamist militancy, in which ‘peripheral’ groups 
like the DI bolstered and contributed to the intellectual traditions of a wider global movement.  
 
The occasional convergence of thought between DI ideologues and their contemporaries overseas 
also highlights how a society’s material circumstances can fuel the adoption of some of the 
ideological tenets of militant Islamism. In understanding how the DI was able to successfully 
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embrace and fuse domestic and foreign concepts, this research has contemporary relevance for 
governments attempting to prevent domestic groups from aligning themselves with beliefs 
promoted by global Islamist militant organisations such as Islamic State or Al-Qaeda. 
 
Additionally, this thesis adds to the understanding of the DI’s place in a broader discourse on 
Islamist organisations and activism in Indonesia and Islamists’ response to state repression. While 
often treated as a separate phenomenon due to its eventual rejection of the political system and 
embrace of violence, the DI’s trajectory shows how an ideology rooted in Islamic precepts can be 
a powerful mobilising and radicalising force within Indonesian society.  
 
In numerous ways, the group’s ideas reflected the beliefs of other, larger Islamist organisations. In 
the aftermath of the Second World War, the DI, the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII, Indonesian 
Islamic Union Party), and Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi, Council of Indonesian 
Muslim Associations) both advanced anti-colonial ideas, supported a state-building project 
informed by Islamic principles, and advocated armed resistance to returning Dutch forces. By the 
1970s, the DI leadership’s ideas regarding takfīr and their anti-Western and anti-Christian values 
were similar to those of leading figures in state-backed organisations like Muhammadiyah. As such, 
this research makes the argument for acknowledging the commonalities between the non-violent 
and violent forms of Indonesian Islamism, which helped to facilitated DI’s revival and recruitment.  
 
The DI’s embrace of violence serves as a useful rebuke to the woolly notion that Indonesian 
conceptualisations of Islam are somehow  inherently more tolerant, liberal or apolitical than those 
elsewhere. While it is tempting to see the radicalisation of Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar as the result 
of Western imperialism or indoctrination by foreign ideologues, this process cannot be divorced 
from ideas developed and injustices felt domestically. Their stories illustrate the phenomenon of 
‘glocalisation’, the process by which foreign narratives resonate with pre-existing worldviews and 
local political conditions and are contextualised and adopted into the domestic discourse.  4 
 
 
4 For a full account of the concept of glocalisation, see Roland Robertson, ‘Mapping the Global Condition: 
Globalisation as the Central Concept’, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol.7:2 (1990), pp.15-30; Olivier Roy, Globalised 
Islam: The search for a new Ummah (London: Hurst, 2004), Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Kirsten E. Schulze and Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Making jihadis, 
waging jihad: transnational and local dimensions of the ISIS phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia’, Asian Security, 
15: 2 (2019), Bryce Liodolt, ‘Managing the Global and the Local: The Dual Agenda of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 34: 2 (2011), Jean-Luc Marret, ‘Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A “Glocal” 
Organization’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31:6 (2008) 
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Finally, the significance of this research crosses disciplinary boundaries. While relevant to 
scholarship on militancy and terrorism, it also has implications for Indonesian and intellectual 
history, and for the study of Islamism. It contributes significantly to understanding the role of 
ideology in the emergence and development of a militant Islamist group fighting anti-colonial, 
anti-state, and eventually transnational struggles across the second half of the twentieth century. 
As the DI’s successors continue to pursue the creation of an Islamic state, explaining their 
predecessors’ belief structure and trajectory is essential in comprehending the dynamics of militant 




At the heart of this thesis are the ideas embraced and developed by two men, Sekarmaji Marjan 
Kartosuwiryo (1905-1962) and Abdullah bin Ahmad Sungkar (1937-1999), who led the DI and its 
successor. Their contemporaries and subordinates saw them as charismatic leaders and fiery 
preachers. Deeply committed to the promotion of Islam in Indonesia, both were willing to use 
violence to achieve their ends. Decades after their deaths, militant Islamists and their supporters 
continue to use hagiographies published on internet forums, books, and even Facebook fan pages 
and Instagram hashtags  to commemorate their contributions to the cause of bringing about an 
Islamic state in Indonesia. This section will give a brief overview of their lives.  
 
S.M Kartosuwiryo  
 
Kartosuwiryo was born in Cepu, a small district in Central Java, into a relatively middle class family 
- his father was an opium trader.5 Details of his early life are sparse with few credible biographies 
to draw on. 6 Chiara Formichi attempts the most comprehensive and thorough research of his life 
but only focuses on his religious thought and political activism after he joined PSI in 1927. 
Nevertheless, the sources generally agree that Kartosuwiryo received a bilingual education in 
Dutch and Indonesian but had no real Islamic education to speak of. A bright student, he was 
eventually admitted to the Surabaya Medical School, the Nederlandisch-Indische Artsen School 
(NIAS) in Surabaya when he was eighteen.7   
 
5 Chiara Formichi, Islam and the Making of a Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia (Leiden: Brill, 
2012), p.1 
6 As explored more fully in the historiography section of this thesis (see: Analytical Framework), there exist only two 
biographies of his life, both riddled with factual errors. Additionally, both pieces were explicitly funded by the 
Republican government seeking to discredit Kartosuwiryo, thus compromising the neutrality of their research. 
7 Idem, p.18 
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It is unclear what exactly resulted in Kartosuwiryo’s expulsion from his medical training around 
1926, but around 1927 he began frequenting the home of Umar Said Crokroaminoto, a prominent 
nationalist. Crokroaminoto hosted a renowned salon in Surabaya where budding Muslim 
intellectuals and anti-colonial activists would gather and debate.8 Crokroaminoto had founded the 
SDI, a batik traders’ union, in 1911. By the time of Kartosuwiryo’s arrival, the organisation had 
evolved into a budding political party, the PSI. Kartosuwiryo quickly rose within the ranks of the 
PSI, becoming a committed Islamic nationalist, despite his lack of formal religious training. 
 
The PSI embraced a Modernist Islamist worldview under the leadership of Crokroaminoto’s 
successor Agus Salim. Islamic modernism is a school of thought that grew out of a Muslim 
reformist movement largely based in Cairo. Its key thinkers, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-
97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), called for the use 
of Western scientific advances to strengthen of Islamic societies in order to resist colonialism. 
Simultaneously, they advocated the strengthening of Islam by purifying its practice. They believed 
that the basis of laws in society should be rooted in direct readings of the Qur’an and the hadith, 
the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, rather interpretations set out by the four schools of 
Islamic legal scholarship.9 
 
Given the paucity of information, it is only possible to speculate about what drove Kartosuwiryo 
to embrace Islam, particularly its role as a political force, at this point in his life. As a young man 
from the lower priyayi class (as Formichi notes, ‘a status earned through [his father’s] employment 
in the colonial administration’), it is likely he was an abangan (literally, the brown or red ones), ‘a 
Javanese term used to describe those Muslims whose adherence to Islam was seldom more than a 
formal, nominal commitment’.10 It may simply be the case that at some point in his education in 
Dutch schools or medical college that Kartosuwiryo encountered friends who were more 
religiously inclined, or that he simply chanced upon Modernist literature that was increasingly in 
circulation in Indonesia, often brought back by pilgrims returning from Mecca. According to 
Kevin Fogg, this literature was growing in circulation because there was a marked increase in 
 
8 Formichi, Islam and the making of a nation, p.25 
9 A full account of Sarekat Islam’s trajectory from its origins as a batik trader’s union to a Modernist, Islamist 
political party will be explored in Chapter 1.  
10 Formichi, Islam and the making of a nation, p.1 and M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 
(Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), p.207 
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Muslims performing the hajj to Mecca between 1920 and 1929 as well as a substantial rise in the 
numbers of young Indonesians studying in Egypt and Arabia in that same period.11 
 
Few scholars have been able to pinpoint any dates of Kartosuwiryo’s belated religious education. 
In some instances, it appears that he either taught himself ( ‘mostly through Dutch-language books’ 
since he could not speak or read Arabic) or perhaps received tutelage from Crokroaminoto, Salim 
or others at the salon.12 Regardless, his inability to engage with the core texts of Islam in its original 
language – the language of the Prophet – would have been anathema to Modernist Islamists, who 
increasingly made up the ranks of SI. The Modernists saw engaging directly with Revelatory texts 
as the key route to attaining a proper understanding of the faith.  
 
Kartosuwiryo also received lessons from several Traditionalist religious scholars, such as Yusuf 
Taujiri, Mustofa Kamil and Ramli.13 In contrast to the Modernists, Traditionalist Islamic teachers 
advocated an ‘[acceptance] of the four Sunni Schools of Law as valid guides to knowing 
Islam…[recognising] that these legal traditions are subject to change and redefinition. It commonly 
involves tolerance towards locally derived cultural expressions, acceptance of mysticism and a 
gradualist approach towards greater Islamisation’.14 Complicating things further, Solahudin claims 
that Kartosuwiryo  ‘studied Sufi teachings, possibly becoming a follower of the Qadariyah Tarekat, 
a Sufi order’, though he does not provide any further information regarding the content of these 
teachings, details about Kartosuwiryo’s level of involvement, or explain when this occurred.15  
 
Collectively, these accounts suggest that in the years following Kartosuwiryo’s expulsion from 
medical school, he became curious about Islam and set about studying it from a variety of angles. 
This has led many scholars to believe that this varied background somehow compromised 
Kartosuwiryo’s commitment to SI’s and later DI’s strict Modernist worldview. This stance is 
particularly curious given Kartosuwiryo’s actions and the thoughts he consistently expressed in his 
writings in the year’s following his membership of SI.  
 
It is likely that, while Kartosuwiryo dabbled in various forms of Islam in the 1920s, by the end of 
the decade he had largely settled in the Modernist camp. By 1928, Kartosuwiryo was the editor of 
 
11 Kevin Fogg, Indonesia’s Islamic Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p.34 
12 Solahudin, The roots of terrorism in Indonesia, p.29 
13 Idem, p.30 
14 Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opposition in Java, p. 514 
15 Solahudin, The roots of terrorism in Indonesia, p.30 
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Fadjar Asia, PSI’s newspaper, which aimed to convince readers of the need to end colonial rule 
and the create an independent Islamic state of Indonesia. It is unlikely he would have attained this 
position within the SI movement without being committed to their ideas and interpretation of 
Islam. Given how much discretion he had in exercising editorial judgement over the four years 
that the paper ran, it is notable that he does not appear to have written articles or published pieces 
by others promoting Sufi ideas (or indeed non-Modernist ones).  
 
Solahudin, who wrote an excellent and comprehensive account of the DI and JI, nevertheless 
asserts that Kartosuwiryo’s ‘understanding of Islamic mysticism would greatly influence his later 
thinking’.16 It is unclear what Solahudin means by this because he fails to provide any explanation 
or evidence of how Sufism factored into Kartosuwiryo’s ideological development during his years 
in SI or when he established the DI. Neither Kartosuwiryo’s own writings nor foundational DI 
documents mention Sufi scholars, highlight Sufi thinking on jurisprudence, or include any other 
ideas unique to this form of Islam. If it is indeed correct that Kartosuwiryo had any personal 
connection to these traditions, then he seems to have kept them private and not to have let them 
undermine his commitment to Modernist thought. 
 
Following the closure of Fadjar Asia  in 1932, Kartosuwiryo kept a lower profile and a spate of ill 
health kept him away from public advocacy. The SI movement had little success in advancing the 
cause of decolonisation and was wracked by intra-party disputes as to how best to move forward. 
Nevertheless, by 1936, Kartosuwiryo was back to publicly advancing the case for the creation of 
an Islamic state, putting forward programmes of action and making speeches in West Java. While 
these gained traction in Islamist circles, they still had little or no tangible success in weakening 
Dutch rule.  
 
The SI movement’s continued failures and its decision to join an alliance with secular, nationalist 
parties to petition the Dutch government for self-rule in 1938 were a source of great frustration 
for Kartosuwiryo. His pronounced opposition to the pact resulted in the party leadership expelling 
him in 1939. His activities between 1939 and the invasion of Indonesia by Japan in 1942 were 
limited. According to Solahudin, he established the Suffah Institute, a Traditionalist Islamic 
boarding school which was ‘an unrealised PSI program intended to be a “place of education, 
 
16 Solahudin, The roots of terrorism in Indonesia, p.30 
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teaching and training for party leaders to implement the law and commands of Islam”’.17 However, 
the project was shut down by the invading Japanese forces in March 1942. 
 
The invasion marked a watershed moment for the Indonesian independence movement by ending 
nearly 400 years of Western imperial interference and domination. While the Japanese denied 
Indonesia outright independence, they allowed anti-colonial leaders to participate in daily 
governance and propaganda efforts, thus giving them the opportunity to gain significant 
experience. Exiled nationalist figures were allowed to return, provided that they did not oppose 
Japanese dominance. Ultimately, the occupation was important in undermining local perceptions 
of Dutch superiority. As Elson writes, through practical and symbolic acts, such as the removal of 
Dutch as an official language and reforms to the legal system, the Japanese helped to strengthen 
feelings of anti-Westernism and foster a sense of Indonesian solidarity.18 
 
Despite the Japanese authorities’ initial hostility to Kartosuwiryo’s project, he was allowed to 
return to his initial career as a journalist and advocate. He published numerous pieces for Soeara 
MIAI (The Voice of MIAI), a political magazine run by the Majelisul Islamil a’la Indonesia (MIAI, 
Indonesian Muslim High Council), a Japanese-backed organisation for Islamic groups. MIAI 
would form the basis of the Islamic political party Masyumi following the end of the Japanese 
occupation. While these writings for Soeara MIAI were undoubtedly subject to much censorship, 
Kartosuwiryo appeared willing to make compromises with a new regime that had theoretically 
promised self-governance and had successfully ousted the hated Dutch. His writings were largely 
confined to the extolling the virtues of Islamic charity and other non-controversial topics.  
 
This brief period of mild political advocacy ended abruptly as Allied forces made headway in Asia. 
Sensing that Japan’s defeat was imminent and that there was the potential for real independence, 
Sukarno and other nationalists began drafting a constitution for an independent Indonesia. This 
constitution saw a future Indonesia as a federation, guided by the principles of Pancasila, a concept 
created by Sukarno that affirmed a belief in God, but did not specify Islam as the basis of the state. 
There were no provisions for the implementation of shari’a or Islamic governance structures. The 
Islamist movement’s failures to secure Indonesia’s future as an Islamic state during the constitution 
writing process and the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch, radicalised Kartosuwiryo.  
 
 
17 Solahudin, The roots of terrorism, p.31 
18 R.E. Elson, The Idea of Indonesia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.101 
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By 1946, Kartosuwiryo and other Masyumi leaders frustrated with the lack of progress in 
negotiations with the returning Dutch colonialists, began calling for a holy war. Initially 
Kartosuwiryo interpreted this as an internal, spiritual struggle, and encouraged Indonesian 
Muslims to better the practice of their faith in order to resist the Dutch. However, the increasingly 
brutal tactics of the Dutch forces in 1947 and 1948 pushed Kartosuwiryo away from this pacificist 
approach. In March 1948, he along with senior Masyumi officials moved to Cirebon, West Java to 
establish a consolidated Islamic military force called the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian 
Islamic Army), which he believed could take control of the republic.  
 
As the TII gained limited success in establishing a base in West Java, Kartosuwiryo released the 
Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia (Constitution of the NII) on 27 August 1948, seemingly hoping 
that it would serve as the eventual basis for the Indonesian state at the conclusion of the 
Indonesian Revolution. The document served as a culmination of Kartosuwiryo’s beliefs in the 
need for an Islamic state in an independent Indonesia, based on a Modernist, Islamist principles. 
The NII/TII’s limited success at keeping the Dutch out of their stronghold stood in stark contrast 
to the failures of the nationalist leaders led by Sukarno. By 1948, most nationalist leaders had been 
rounded up and arrested, leading Kartosuwiryo to remark that there had been ‘only two groups at 
war: the Islamic State of Indonesia and the state of the Netherlands’.  19 The nationalists’ failure to 
expel the Dutch confirmed in Kartosuwiryo’s mind that only an Indonesian Islamic State could 
successfully lead the people of Indonesia to freedom.  
 
However, the nationalists were quickly released following increasing pressure on the Dutch by the 
UN and the United States in early 1949. By May 1949, Sukarno had secured an agreement for the 
transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia (RI). The basis of the RI would be the 
constitution drawn up by the nationalists at the end of the Second World War, effectively creating 
a pluralist, largely secular Republic.  
 
With few options remaining other than to continue his struggle for an Islamic state, Kartosuwiryo 
gathered his remaining followers in West Java, and on 7 August 1949 declared the formation of 
the Negara Islam Indonesia known in other words, as ad-Daulatul Islamiyyah, or Darul Islam’.20 
The declaration effectively marked the start of the DI’s 13-year struggle against the Republic of 
 
19 S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 7’, 23 December 1948, Arsip Penumpasan DI-TII 
JaBar, folii, AABRI 
20 Cornelius Van Dijk, Rebellion under the banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1981)p.3 
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Indonesia. While difficult for the nascent Republican government in Jakarta to subdue in its 
entirety, Kartosuwiryo’s forces were largely confined to rural strongholds in West Java.  
 
Through a series of pacts with other disaffected groups, with varying levels of commitment to 
Kartosuwiryo’s interpretation of an Islamic state, the NII grew to encompass other rebellions in 
South Sulawesi, Aceh, and South Kalimantan. However, as van Dijk points out, the motivations 
of the leaders of these subsequent rebellions were disparate, and frequently rooted in local or even 
personal grievances against the Sukarno and the government in Jakarta.21 Kartosuwiryo did not 
meaningfully lead these varied and geographically separate groups, nor was he able to impose his 
constitution, much less interpretation of Islam on these rebellions. Resultantly, as mentioned in 
the initial section of this introduction, it is not useful to treat these as a unified whole.  
 
While Kartosuwiryo’s forces held out successfully against the Republicans for over a decade, 
Sukarno’s forces were eventually able to consolidate their hold over Java by 1962. Kartosuwiryo 
was captured in June 1962 and swiftly executed by a firing squad on 5 September that same year. 
While his death marked the end of Indonesia’s longest Islamist rebellion, surviving DI members 
and a new generation of Islamist activists kept alive his dream of creating an Islamist state.  
 
In the years following his death, several biographies and academic studies reopened the question 
of Kartosuwiryo’s commitment to Islamism and Modernist principles. Military-sponsored 
biographies by Amak Sjariffudin and Pinardi, as well as scholars such as Cornelius van Dijk and 
Karl Jackson routinely made the point of highlighting Kartosuwiryo’s inclinations towards 
‘traditional’ beliefs and his embrace of Javanese mysticism.  
 
However, their accounts of Kartosuwiryo’s religious beliefs are wholly inadequate. Sjariffudin and 
Pinardi, for example, do not examine Kartosuwiryo’s written texts. Instead, their critique of his 
religious practice has largely been confined to noting that he carried amulets with him to ward off 
evil spirits alongside other traditional symbols of power and influence such as a keris (dagger, 
usually with a curved blade) and cundrik (a smaller dagger with a straight blade).22  
 
By emphasising these aspects of Kartosuwiryo’s apparent embrace of syncretism, Sjariffudin and 
Pinardi appear to be trying to undermine his commitment to a ‘pure’ conceptualisation of Islam 
 
21 S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 7’, 23 December 1948, Arsip Penumpasan DI-TII 
JaBar, folii, AABRI 
22 Sjariffudin, Kisah Kartosuwirjo, pp.20-21 
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and thus his aim of building an Islamic state in Indonesia. However, given that they were writing 
biographies commissioned and supported by the military which had arrested Kartosuwiryo just a 
year prior to their publication, it is unlikely that these arguments came from a place of good faith. 
The biographies appear to be attempts to delegitimise Kartosuwiryo and his movement, rather 
than an honest or compete appraisal of his thoughts and actions.  
 
A slightly more comprehensive critique is attempted by van Dijk and Jackson. Van Dijk writes that 
Kartosuwiryo ‘professed [an] ability to assure invulnerability to bullets through special 
incantations’,23 collected allegedly magical swords and believed that spirits roamed the forests 
around his camps.24  These syncretic practices alongside his Sufi beliefs, van Dijk argues, ‘definitely 
does not seem to fit into the atmosphere’ of SI’s Modernist approach to Islam.25 Instead, Van Dijk 
argues support for Kartosuwiryo’s cause was not due to his religious beliefs or a desire for an 
Islamic state, but rather the material concerns and discontent among the peasantry about the level 
of inequality.  
 
Jackson similarly argues that Kartosuwiryo’s Sufism is evidence that he was not truly Muslim, 
instead positing that Islam supplies ‘a panoply of symbols that can be used to legitimize the leaders 
and ignite political action’.26  Kartosuwiryo’s desire to defend Muslims through the establishment 
of a state was merely ‘a cry that can be used to galvanise’ action.27 Thus, Jackson argues that the 
motivating factor in the conflict was not religion, and that people were compelled by traditional 
authority figures or coerced by physical threats into participating.  
 
Both men are right that Kartosuwiryo never embraced a strict Modernist approach in his 
presentation to DI members on the battlefield, and that he seemingly incorporated syncretic and 
animistic beliefs, as was customary in Javanese society and his priyayi background. However, an 
embrace of these practices should not be grounds for invalidating his overarching commitment to 
the Modernist principles that underpin his ideology or his calls for the establishment of an Islamic 
state of Indonesia.  
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27 Ibid 
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Moreover, the explicit content of these ‘Sufi’ beliefs are never explained or elaborated on. It is 
unclear from both texts the degree to which Kartosuwiryo understood or articulated Sufi theology 
or how it influenced his political project. Additionally, both men entirely fail to engage with the 
state-building project and ideological framework set out by Kartosuwiryo in the years preceding 
the outbreak of the rebellion, seemingly ignoring his many writings and proclamations about the 
need for an Islamic state. 
  
Given Kartosuwiryo’s years of participation in nationalist-Islamist organisations, his advocacy in 
SI publications, and subsequent DI documents that attempt to lay out a framework for this nascent 
state, it seems disingenuous to argue that Islam was simply a post-hoc explanation for a power 
grab by Kartosuwiryo or, in Van Dijk’s words, a convenient ‘rallying point for resistance rather 
than a political project’.28 As Formichi rightly points out, Van Dijk only asks why individuals fought 
against the Indonesian Republic rather than why they fought for the DI. This analysis ignores the 
movement’s aims and ideological development.29 
 
Despite this blind spot, van Dijk’s work is still a worthy study as the first academic text on DI. He 
provides a comprehensive assessment of power-relations through the impact of agricultural 
reforms on the living standards of West Javanese peasants and brings into focus the wider social 
factors that affected support for Kartosuwiryo. Jackson’s work, on the other hand, is riddled with 
methodological errors. Jackson claims to be able to accurately map political attitudes through an 
intensive series of surveys. At least 19 local village administrators and some 200 villagers 
participated in three-hour long interviews conducted in 1969.30 While  claiming that this method 
is comprehensive due how long it took to complete, Jackson does not appear to acknowledge the 
potential that the data he gathered was compromised in any way by the participants’ incomplete 
memories of the movement, personal biases, unwillingness to be wholly truthful, or fear of 
disappointing authoritative-seeming researchers who descended on their villages. 
 
His treatment of the villagers’ religious understanding is similarly dubious, broadly categorising 
them into four groups (Modernist, Traditional orthodox, nominal Muslim and syncretist) based 
on their responses to six multiple choice questions.31 Putting aside the issue of whether six multiple 
choice questions can allow a researcher to meaningfully grasp an individual’s religious worldview, 
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the text does not clearly define these four categories, which Jackson seems to have invented 
himself.32 Furthermore, fewer than ten pages are devoted to the study of DI ideology or the beliefs 
held by its members and leadership.  
 
Instead, as succinctly noted by Ruth McVey in her article skewering Jackson’s work, he seems 
‘almost entirely concerned with the contradiction between religious and modern (that is, western 
liberal) elements’ and ‘[it] is taken as axiomatic that there is a contradiction, for religion – or at 
least Islam – cannot be modern’.33  Worryingly, Jackson appears to be arguing that ‘whatever its 
adherents might think, Islam is form without content – a vehicle for something else’.34 Given these 
methodological flaws and misunderstanding of Islam, it is unsurprising that Jackson concluded 
that neither religion nor Kartosuwiryo himself played a significant role in the outbreak of violence. 
Although van Dijk and Jackson’s works are regarded as key texts in the study of DI, their decision 
to downplay or ignore the religious motivations for the conflict appears unfounded and ill-judged.  
 
Abdullah Sungkar  
 
Far less has been written about Abdullah Sungkar, despite the prominence of the militant group 
that he founded. The lack of written sources and comprehensive biographical data until his rise to 
prominence in the DI movement makes it difficult to paint a complete picture of his early life or 
to precisely date events. Nevertheless, in the course of researching this thesis, numerous DI and 
JI members who knew him all remarked on his intelligence, wit, and charm. This hints at his 
personality, suggesting that he was a charismatic leader and skilled orator, capable of motivating 
supporters to lay down their lives in service of the creation of an Islamic state.   
 
Sungkar was a product of the schools established by Indonesian Modernists at the turn of the 
century. Born in Solo in 1937, he attended a primary school run by the al-Irsyad movement and 
was a member of their scout troop as a teenager.35 He would continue his affiliation with the 
organisation throughout the early years of his career as an Islamist activist, indicating that he 
believed that dakwah (proselytisation) would be the key to changing the hearts and minds of 
Indonesians and garnering support for creation of an Islamic state.  
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The al-Irsyad movement was established in 1914 by, and largely composed of, members of the 
Hadhrami community: individuals from the Hadhramaut region in Yemen and their descendants.36 
Al-Irsyad promoted reforms to the practice of Islam in Indonesia, with a particular emphasis on 
education. This was because the organisation’s leadership began ‘from the basic premise that 
Muslims in general, and Hadramis in particular, found themselves in a state of backwardness and 
ignorance’ and thus needed ‘instruction or guidance’.37 Al-Irsyad schools ‘stressed Arabic language 
and Islamic education’ and used ‘textbooks imported from the Middle East’, even when teaching 
non-religious subjects such as history.38 Older students read ‘Abduh’s works, eschewing traditional 
‘classical texts of Islamic jurisprudence’.39  
 
Sungkar left the al-Irsyad network briefly. After primary school, he completed his secondary 
education at the Modern Islamic School, another Modernist institution, in 1951. During that time, 
Sungkar held leadership roles in the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (GPII, Indonesian Muslim 
Youth Movement), an Islamist youth group with close ties to Masyumi.40 Upon graduation in 1957, 
he worked selling batik to support his family.  
 
During his travels around Java, he met Abu Bakar Ba’syir, another Hadrami, who would go on to 
become his lifelong friend and collaborator in the DI and JI. Interviews with DI and JI participants 
as well as material in the secondary literature indicate that Ba’asyir played a subordinate role to 
Sungkar, and made only nominally contributions to the ideological development of the movement. 
 
Sungkar’s stint as a batik salesman was short-lived. Together with Ba’asyir, Sungkar returned to 
the al-Irsyad movement in the mid-1960s and served on its board as part of its religious outreach 
division while Ba’asyir acted as its general secretary in Solo.41 The two men were a natural fit for 
the organisation as members of the Hadhrami community themselves.  
 
As part of his work with al-Irsyad, Sungkar, Ba’asyir and their friend, Hasan Basri, established a 
radio station called the Radio Dakwah Islam ABC (al-Irsyad Broadcasting Commission Islamic 
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Proselytisation Radio) in 1967. This venture appears to have been short-lived; Solahudin writes 
‘[other] members of al-Irsyad in Solo were not fond of the trio because they considered their 
preaching to be too hard-line’.42  
 
Forced out, Sungkar and Ba’asyir subsequently established Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta 
(Radis; Surakarta Islamic Proselytisation Radio) with the assistance of Abdullah Latif, the founder 
of Yayasan Pendidikan Islam dan Asuhan Yatim/Miskin (YPIA; the Al Mukmin Islamic Education 
and Shelter for Orphans and the Poor Foundation). Another of Sungkar’s confidants, claimed that 
the men preached about the issues of the day, but said in an interview that he could not recall 
specific details as to the content of their sermons. However, a Tempo magazine report gives some 
indication of the provocative nature of their sermons, quoting Ba’asyir as saying:  
 
We Indonesians live as if we were riding an air-conditioned bus. It’s all cool and 
comfortable but we are actually heading towards hell. And the driver is... Suharto!43 
 
Despite these strong words, the authorities did not shut the station down until 1975.44 This 
suggests that government and security officials did not see the broadcasts as a significant threat 
for the majority of their time on air and therefore unlikely that Sungkar, or even Ba’asyir, was 
explicitly advocating violent interpretations of jihad on air or speaking of the need for Muslims to 
take up arms against perceived oppressors in more general terms during this period.45 
 
In addition to their work with al-Irsyad, Sungkar and Ba’asyir taught in local religious schools, 
once again showing their faith that dakwah would be the key to building support for an Islamic 
state in Indonesia. Sungkar and Ba’asyir ran a daily religious study group at the Solo Grand 
Mosque, continuing to spread their interpretation of Islam.  
 
In line with this commitment to proselytisation, the men joined the DDII shortly after its 
foundation in 1967. Established by former Indonesian prime minister Mohammad Natsir, the 
organisation was a vehicle to advocate for an Islamic state amidst increasing hostility to Islamist 
groups by the Sukarno regime. The regime had already banned Masyumi in 1960, and thus Natsir 
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had to find new avenues to continue his propagation efforts. Mentored by Natsir, Sungkar rose 
through the DDII’s ranks and was appointed head of its Solo branch in 1970. Ba’asyir followed 
along, acting as Sungkar’s deputy there. 
 
Despite these early commitments to non-violent activism, the political repression of the Sukarno 
and Suharto governments appears to have slowly pushed Sungkar to his breaking point, causing 
him ‘to find common cause’ with DI.46 As noted above, while Sungkar moved on to work with 
the al-Irsyad network following the banning of Masyumi, the event was still a source of grievance. 
Sungkar even mentioned it in his defence plea at his 1982 trial, criticising the government for its 
‘manipulation’ of political parties and civil society organisations to serve their own ends.47 Sungkar 
renounced his DDII membership in 1976, fully embracing the DI’s militant Islamism.  
 
His entry into the organisation facilitated a change in the group’s ideology. Steeped in the teachings 
of the Egyptian Modernist Sayyid Qutb and the Arabian ideologue Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, Sungkar 
concretised the group’s belief in the need for violent jihad to bring about an Islamic state. He 
championed new concepts like takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ that would justify and expand the 
group’s range of legitimate targets.  
 
Barely two years into his membership of the DI, Sungkar was arrested on 10 November 1978 on 
charges of subversion and for failing to adopt the national ideology of Pancasila.48 A few days later, 
Ba’asyir was arrested as well. The men spent the next few years in and out of prison awaiting their 
trial in 1982. They were eventually convicted, but their sentences were subsequently reduced to 
three years and ten months, the equivalent to their period in detention before the trial.49 However, 
in 1985, prosecutors successfully appealed the reduced sentences, paving the way for Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir’s re-arrest.50  
 
In this period of uncertainty, Sungkar seemingly recorded a series of sermons before fleeing to 
Malaysia to avoid a return to prison in 1985. The precise date of these recordings is not known as 
they were uploaded anonymously onto the website, Internet Archive. The few political events 
mentioned in the recordings, such as references to foreign and Afghan mujahideen fighting the 
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Soviet Union, suggest that they were made sometime between 1984 and 1985, but this is difficult 
to determine with total accuracy.51 What is clear from Sungkar’s statements is that he believed that 
he was being watched by intelligence officers, saying in one recording that ‘there is an intelligence 
officer here, investigating preachers like me’, and that he was still in Indonesia at the point of the 
recordings, referencing recent trips to cities like Solo and Surabaya.52  
 
Nevertheless, given the lack of written documents by Sungkar, the recordings are some of the only 
sources available that provide direct insight into his political thought and beliefs. Sungkar does not 
appear to have left behind a comprehensive written record of his political ideology, at least in his 
initial years as an activist. Fellow DI and JI members, even those considered to be close friends, 
do not appear able to provide much insight into his beliefs prior to his membership of these 
organisations. These men largely met Sungkar for the first time while in DI or JI pesantren (religious 
boarding schools) and were often significantly younger and occupied subordinate positions within 
the group’s hierarchy. They seem to have been unwilling to probe into the backgrounds of their 
elders and superiors.  
 
However, this lack of written material is not particularly unusual or unique to Sungkar. Few, if any, 
of Indonesia’s leading militant Islamists appear to have committed their political philosophies or 
ideologies to paper. Separatist leaders who joined the DI movement such as Daud Beureueh and 
Kahar Muzakkar did not leave behind a large corpus of written work.53 Similarly, DI leaders such 
as Aceng Kurnia, Syahirul Alim and Abdullah Muhammmad Masduki (alias Ajengan Masduki) 
neither produced a substantive corpus of written work themselves or even oversaw the publication 
of significant volumes detailing the group’s ideological beliefs.54 Kartosuwiryo, through his 
writings for PSI and Masyumi, was an exception to this trend. When probed in interviews about 
the lack of written records, several DI members simply shrugged or said the production of texts 
was ‘not necessary’.55  
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These men were reluctant to commit their ideas to paper: they had pragmatic concerns, and 
believed in the power of oratory over the written word. It is likely that these individuals viewed 
the cost and effort of producing pamphlets and books too onerous for little pay off in terms of 
their proselytisation efforts; perhaps believing that potential supporters would be disinclined to 
read lengthy texts. The men may have had concerns that printing such incendiary material might 
engendered further repression from the security.  
 
Instead, DI leaders strongly believe that they wielded the greatest influence through preaching, 
and – like those who received a religious education in pesantren – placed great ‘emphasis on the oral 
transmission even of written texts’.56 AK, a close friend of Sungkar’s said in an interview that 
Sungkar was ‘more convincing when he spoke… quite powerful’ and that he ‘did not like writing’.57 
This disinclination towards writing and a belief that they were better able to persuade potential 
recruits through preaching in mosques, schools or small study groups ultimately resulted in a 
paucity of write sources for historians to assess. Bearing this in mind, this chapter makes a unique 
contribution to the study of DI’s ideology upon the entry of Sungkar into its leadership circle as it 
examines some of the only existing material directly produced by Sungkar himself.  
 
The content of Sungkar’s 1980s sermons relates to the personal conduct of Muslims, the 
denunciation of heretical behaviour, the Republican government and other enemies of Islam, as 
well as the need for an Islamic state and the implementation of shari’a, and thus illustrate the 
influence of salafi and Wahhabi ideas on his thinking. It is not clear why Sungkar recorded these 
sermons when he did. Temby, citing an anonymously recorded interview with Adung, Sungkar’s 
driver, posits that he may have been trying to inspire a revolution similar to the 1979 uprising in 
Iran.58 Given the timing of their alleged recording, it is also plausible that he simply wanted to 
spread and preserve his message in case he was made to return to jail. Nevertheless, these 
recordings provide a clear overview of Sungkar’s thinking, particularly on the issues of takfīr and 
al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ during his initial years as a DI member.  
 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir left Indonesia in April 1985. The men set themselves up in a rental house in 
the Bandar Baru Bangi area of Kuala Lumpur with help from Natsir. Numerous DI members went 
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with them, establishing a small community of exiles.59 Sungkar was soon connected with Abdul 
Wahid Kadungga, a former personal secretary of Natsir’s who told him about a potential 
opportunity to further his struggle against the Indonesian state.60 Kandugga had recently been to 
Afghanistan and had met Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian ideologue and leader of the foreign 
mujahideen fighting the Soviet Union. Kandugga told Sungkar that Azzam was running military 
training programmes for foreign fighters.61According to Solahuddin, Sungkar leapt at the 
opportunity to equip his followers with the skills necessary for armed conflict against the 
Indonesian state.62   
 
While sympathetic to the plight of the Afghans, Sungkar first and foremost saw his decision to 
send DI cadres to Afghanistan through the lens of his own struggle against the Indonesian 
government. Sungkar swiftly organised a meeting with Abdul Rasul Sayyef, an Afghan militant 
leader in Peshawar to nail down the details of this plan. Sayyaf’s organisation, the al-Ittihad al-
Islamy would pay for travel of DI members and their accommodation. The men would then train 
alongside Sayyaf’s camps on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but would not participate in front-
line combat against Soviet forces.63 Sungkar was ecstatic and by the end of 1985, the first DI 
members flew to Peshawar. In total, ten batches of DI recruits would train in Afghanistan between 
1985 and 1991, learning valuable combat skills to further their jihad in Indonesia. 
 
Despite this progress, Sungkar simultaneously faced problems back in Indonesia with the senior 
DI leaders who did not join him in his flight to Malaysia. In 1987, the organisation’s consultative 
council appointed Ajengan Masduki as the new DI imam over Sungkar. The men did not get on 
personally but had significant disagreements over the best way to achieve an Islamic state.  
 
Sungkar, frustrated by the DI’s lack of progress since its rebellion was crushed by the state in 1962, 
believed that a change in tactics was necessary. Influenced by Egyptian ideologues, Sungkar began 
to believe that the DI’s organisational structure, which was largely unchanged from Kartosuwiryo’s 
Islamic state with ‘ministers’ and ‘battalion commanders’ stationed around the country, was not fit 
for purpose given the DI did not have a territorial base. Instead, he advocated for the creation of 
a clandestine group, organised into various cells that would preach, wage jihad against the 
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Indonesian state, and facilitate the creation of small communities where members could lead lives 
in line with group’s ideology. Repeatedly rebuffed by Masduki, Sungkar – along with Ba’asyir, and 
numerous members who had fought in Afghanistan – officially left the DI in 1992, and announced 
the formation of the Jemaah Islamiyah on 1 January 1993.  
 
Sungkar died of natural causes in 1999. He had returned to Indonesia a year earlier following the 
collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the beginnings of Indonesia’s latest democratic 
experience. While he had laid the ground work for a successful jihadist organisation, he did not 




This thesis is organised into seven chapters. The initial chapter focuses on the thesis’ analytical 
framework. It outlines key issues in the historiography of Islamism and Indonesian militancy and 
explains the methodology that underpins this thesis.  
 
The subsequent chapters each focusing on a different aspect of the DI’s ideology between 1928 
and 1993. Chapter One focuses on the foundational idea of hākimiyya and its conceptualisation 
and understanding by Kartosuwiryo. It analyses the broader roots of hākimiyya in Islamist discourse 
and how Kartosuwiryo came to see it as the solution to colonial oppression. It thus establishes the 
core objectives of DI and how the group attempted to actualise this belief with the establishment 
of the NII in 1949.  
 
Building on this, Chapter Two examines the concept of jihad, which Kartosuwiryo saw as essential 
to the formation and security of the NII. In his early career as an Islamist activist and politician 
Kartosuwiryo initially embraced the plurality of meanings associated with jihad, but his definition 
narrowed to a purely physical struggle with the onset of the Second World War. Kartosuwiryo 
understood jihad as a defensive war to ensure the freedom of Indonesian Muslims and as the only 
means of establishing the Islamic state. It was thus an obligation for all Muslims to participate in 
this conflict against foreign invaders and subsequently against nationalists and co-religionists who 
failed to uphold God’s will on earth. 
 
Chapter Three then examines the adjacent concepts of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, which serve to 
protect and preserve Islam. Kartosuwiryo belated embraced these concepts to facilitate compliance 
 39 
and loyalty among members. This chapter explores how these ideas resonated with a new 
generation of recruits, particularly Abdullah Sungkar. It examines the similarities and differences 
between these men’s interpretation of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ and identifies the points at which 
foreign ideas were incorporated amid a period of growing Islamisation in Indonesia. 
 
Chapter Four returns to the concept of jihad, and how the group embraced a broader, non-violent 
understanding of the term in order to account for their comprehensive defeat by Sukarno’s troops 
and the death of Kartosuwiryo. The chapter then goes on to examine how the group slowly 
returned to a conceptualisation of jihad as the sole means of achieving hākimiyya following 
increasing repression by Suharto and the induction of Abdullah Sungkar into the group. It focuses 
on the impact of Sungkar’s salafi-influenced ideas, which led the group to revert to physical 
violence against the state and civilians deemed to be enemies of Islam. 
 
Chapter Five continues to examine the concept of jihad in light of Sungkar’s decision to send DI 
members to participate in the conflict against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It will examine the 
apparent impact of participating alongside the mujahideen and the influence of the teachings of the 
Palestinian ideology Abdullah Azzam on the DI’s understanding of jihad.  It demonstrates that 
despite these developments, DI leaders remained focused on Indonesia as their primary theatre of 
conflict, largely reinforcing the conceptualisation of jihad as a means to hakimiyya initially forged 
during Kartosuwiryo’s leadership.  
 
Finally, Chapter Six re-examines the conceptualisation of hākimiyya under Sungkar’s leadership in 
order to account for his decision to leave DI. The group had lacked a territorial stronghold since 
Kartosuwiryo’s death and its members were scattered across Indonesia and Malaysia. This 
fundamentally altered the group’s understanding of how best to achieve an Islamic state. Coupled 
with this, tensions between Sungkar and DI amīr, Ajengan Masduki (also known as Abdullah 
Muhammad Masduki), over what constituted an Islamic community, an Islamic state and its 
actualisation, eventually saw the breakdown of the organisation and the establishment of JI as an 
alternative path to realising hākimiyya. 
 
Across these chapters, this thesis advances new arguments in the scholarly research on Indonesian 
militant Islamism and the role and conceptualisation of ideology in the DI movement. Through 
examining the various components that make up the group’s belief structure, it challenges the 
conventional understanding of Islamist groups operating outside the so-called core of the Middle 
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East. It illustrates their ability to create a unique ideological framework, influenced as much, if not 
more, by domestic circumstances than foreign events, and thus is relevant for not only Indonesian 

































Analytical Framework: Historiography and Methodology 
 
The primary focus of this thesis is an exploration of the core and secondary concepts that make 
up the DI’s ideology, namely hākimiyya and jihad as well as takfir and al-walā wa-l-barā. In order to 
account for how these ideas were interpreted and adapted by Kartosuwiryo and later Abdullah 
Sungkar, an analytical framework must first be established. This chapter will thus explore the three 
key concepts that ground the arguments across this thesis, namely Islamism, theories of ideology, 
and the practice of intellectual history. The precise definitions and conceptualisations of these 
terms will be outlined in the initial section of this chapter.  
 
This chapter will then examine the relevant historiography. It will look at the debate over whether 
the JI should be considered a product of global Islamist militancy or a domestic phenomenon, the 
role of ideology in Indonesian militancy, and the debate regarding whether the DI was a truly 
religiously inspired movement. It will also situate the DI within the wider political Islamist 
landscape in Indonesia, contrasting the group with non-violent movements. Finally, this chapter 
will evaluate the key sources used in this thesis and elaborate on its methodology, highlighting the 




The analysis undertaken in this thesis is grounded in the concept of Islamism and its relationship 
to militancy, ideology, and intellectual history. The analytical framework of this thesis is 
constructed using particular conceptions of these complex terms and practices, drawing on the 
theories outlined below. 
 
Islamism and Militancy 
 
This thesis has thus far described the DI as a militant Islamist organisation. In doing so, it has 
deliberately eschewed using terms like terrorism, Wahhabism, salafism or salafi-jihadist to define the 
group’s political outlook, aims, and actions. While the DI’s ideology contained elements of these 
concepts, they rarely manifested consistently across the entire period under study. By contrast, 
Islamism, sometimes referred to as political Islam, sufficiently broad as to encompasses the 
evolution of the group’s ideology from its inception to its fragmentation. Simultaneously, the term 
retains enough specificity to avoid being a meaningless descriptor.  
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In conceptualising Islamism, this thesis draws heavily on the work of Mohammad Ayoob, Quintan 
Wiktorowicz, and Gilles Kepel. Islamism is ‘a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, 
groups and organisations that pursue political objectives’.64 It is underpinned by the belief that 
Islam should be the primary, or indeed sole, basis for constructing and organising the state and 
society. At its core, it views the establishment of an Islamic state – often within the territorial 
boundaries of an existing nation-state – and the implementation of shari’a as the sole means by 
which God’s temporal power can be secured on earth. Only through an Islamic state can Muslims 
practice their faith and live truly in accordance with God’s will.65 
 
Islamists include a wide variety of civil society organisations, trade unions, political parties, as well 
as violent, non-state actors. These groups do not agree on tactics, but they share a desire to return 
to the past in order to shape the present and future. As Guilain Denoeux notes, Islamism attempts 
to provide ‘political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations 
for which rest upon reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition’.66 
This reinvented past relies on a romanticised notion of a largely mythical Islamic golden age. 
Islamists have largely dehistoricised and decontextualised Islam by separating its beliefs – and the 
development thereof – from the political and social milieu of the time of the Prophet Muhammad 
and the first four righteous caliphs.67 
 
Islamism’s intellectual origins are, in fact, quite modern. Writing in response to both the decline 
of the Ottoman caliphate and British and French colonisation of the Arab world in the nineteenth 
century, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and 
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), argued for Islamic revival and reform in order to fend off 
the Western threat and secure Muslim political autonomy.68 Their doctrine, which came to be 
known as Islamic Modernism, conceded that the West had achieved scientific and technological 
superiority, and that ‘the Muslim religion has tried to stifle science and stop its progress’.69 
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As such, they argued that Muslims should learn from and adopt these advances while 
simultaneously stripping Islam back to its fundamentals, removing innovations and superstitions 
in order to strengthen and purify the faith.70 These aims were not necessarily at odds with each 
other, with the Modernists arguing that the original teachings of Islam accorded with scientific 
rationalism and positivism and that the Islamic state established by the early caliphs had institutions 
akin to those of modern liberal democracies. Finally, Islamic Modernists saw Islamic unity as the 
first step to defeating Western imperialism and reconstructing an Islamic polity. Ultimately, these 
men had a highly political understanding of Islam’s role in society and its ability to bring about 
societal change.  
 
Afghani, Abduh and Rida 
 
Nikki Keddie, Elie Kedourie and Rudi Matthee have been instrumental in analysing the ideas of 
Afghani. In particular, Keddie’s seminal work, Sayyid Jamal Ad-Din “Al-Afghani”: A Political 
Biography presents the most thorough and comprehensive overview of Afghani’s life and political 
thought. Born in either 1838 or 1839 in Iran (though he would later claim Afghanistan), Afghani 
came to prominence as a vocal opponent of Western imperialism.71 He ‘was impressed by the 
power of the West’, particularly its scientific and technological advances, and believed the Muslim 
world should ‘revive its former openness to intellectual innovation, including borrowing from non-
Muslims’ in order to restore itself and regain its independence.72  
 
However, Afghani was wary of completely aping the West. He instead attempted to find Islamic 
origins for the reforms he promoted, arguing that ‘the Koran hinted at such things as railroads and 
the germ theory’ in order to illustrate that Muslims were capable of scientific advancement and 
military conquest.73 In harking back to an idealised version of the days of the Prophet Muhammad 
and the early caliphs, Afghani not only tried to inspire Muslims with their past glories but made 
the argument that it was only through wider unity and solidarity that they could defeat Western 
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imperialism.74 Nevertheless, as Keddie points out, Afghani’s commitment to pan-Islamic solidarity 
often vacillated over the course of his life. Particularly during his time in India, Afghani would 
advocate strongly for Islamic nationalism, encouraging Indian Muslims to form a domestic 
political union rather than rallying together with the co-religionists abroad.75   
 
Elie Kedourie is more circumspect about Afghani’s contributions during his lifetime to Islamic 
revivalist thought. Instead, Kedourie argues that Afghani’s ideas were largely spread posthumously, 
as he spent most of his career as an obscure and ‘middling official in the Egyptian public service’.76  
Instead his protégé Abduh, and indeed Abduh’s own student, Rida, worked to ‘magnify Afghani’s 
position’ in society and through their own writings created a comprehensive biography.77 
Moreover, Kedourie casts doubt on the view that Afghani was primarily concerned with the 
reform of Islam. Kedourie highlights Afghani’s penchant for indulging in brandy, associating with 
people of a variety of religious backgrounds and the incorporation of Sufi thought in his writings, 
which all imply that his place in the cannon of Muslim orthodox reformers may be misplaced.78 
While it may be the case that some of his personal behaviour might be castigated by hard-line 
salafis, that should not diminish the importance of the ideas he helped to establish and promote, 
nor should it be a sufficient basis to fully undermine Afghani’s commitment to Islamic reform.  
 
Afghani’s desire to promote Muslim unity and the restoration of a strong caliphate was apparent 
during his exile from Egypt. Together with Abduh, he established a secret society, ‘Al-Urwa al-
Wuthqā (The Firmest Bond) in Paris in 1884.79 In the society’s journal, the men promoted a ‘return 
of Islam to a pure and pristine state as embodied by the early community of the pious ancestors 
(al-salaf al-sālih)’.80 To Abduh, unity amongst Muslims was a significant cause of this early 
community’s success, because once members do not ‘follow its shared beliefs and pursue their 
own egotistical interests’, collapse is inevitable.81 Resultantly, Abduh saw Muslim unity not only as 
a good in and of itself, but as a key defensive instrument against future foreign incursion.  
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Additionally, Abduh made the case that religion must be at the centre of an Islamic revival since 
without their beliefs, Muslims would not be able to ‘stimulate their thirst for knowledge’, and thus 
would fall behind their non-Muslim rivals.82 In this respect, Abduh makes the case that Islam is 
essential for the continuation of progress – particularly scientific advancement – and plays a central 
role in inspiring Muslims to better themselves and their communities.  
 
Like his predecessor, Abduh saw the necessity of not only reforming education, but modernising 
religious authority. Oliver Scharbrodt and Mark Sedgewick both note that ‘Abduh feared that the 
ulama, stuck in their traditional scholasticism, would become intellectually isolated… if they did 
not open their education to modern subjects’.83 Resultantly, Abduh not only called for significant 
reforms at the University of Cairo, but when appointed Grand Mufti he overhauled the shari’a 
court system. In both instances, Abduh advocated for the use of modern textbooks, standardised 
training for teachers and judges, and attempted a clear codification of shari’a.84 These efforts to 
improve religious education and the judiciary through the adoption of ‘Western’ administrative 
practices highlighted Abduh’s belief that Islam was not antithetical to modernisation.  
 
As Malcolm Kerr notes, these reforms were not conducted simply to strengthen the state, improve 
the efficiency of the judiciary, or boost the quality of education. Instead, underpinning Abduh’s 
efforts was a belief that a strong Islamic state capable of administering justice, enforcing laws, and 
educating its citizenry would enable believers to enjoy ‘the material rewards of 
righteousness’.85While he infrequently references an Islamic state as the guarantor of the ability to 
lead a life truly in line with the Islamic faith, his argument is clear: this ‘structure did exist in the 
Golden Age of early Islam, and can exist again when Muslim society is transformed’.86 In this 
regard, Abduh’s Islamism sees reform as a means of enabling Muslims to actualise their faith 
completely in the temporal realm.  
 
Moreover, Abduh’s Islamic state is a top-down affair. Rather than mobilising grassroots support 
for change, Abduh’s writings – and indeed most of the Modernists – indicate a belief in the power 
of a reformist agenda enacted by a religious political elite. These efforts required experts like well-
trained judges, teachers and functionaries, whose implementation and enactment of reforms would 
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benefit the masses. Abduh’s focus on state reform from the top probably reflected the conditions 
of his time. With most Arabs relatively poor and uneducated, he believed that it was thus necessary 
to mobilise religious elite to bring about change.  
 
Rida, Abduh’s direct disciple, continued these arguments into the early twentieth century. Rida 
was not only the most prolific of these scholars, but was clearest in his attempt to create a 
systematic framework for the revival of a caliphate. As Kerr argues, while Abduh ‘paid little 
attention to the classical doctrines of the Caliphate and the technical aspects of legal methodology’, 
Abduh’s key contribution to Modernist Islamist thought was to encourage Muslims to ‘re-examine 
traditional institutions of government and law as they had presumably existed in the great days of 
the Caliphate’.87 More explicitly in Al-Manār, Abduh argued that ‘it is religion that was the cause 
of [Muslim] sovereignty and well-being, turning away from it was what landed them in misery’.88  
 
Rida believed that an ‘awakening of the Arab was an essential prerequisite for the renaissance of 
Islam’, and ‘only through an Arab nation could the strength of Islam be restored’.89 Rida’s focus 
on the Arabs was due to his belief that it was Arabs who had developed Islam. Elizier Tauber 
highlights the explicitly Arab-chauvinist attitudes inherent in Rida’s proclamations, stating that he 
believed that Arabs had created the great caliphates only to have non-Arabs ‘introduce all the 
foreign influences and spoil it’.90  
 
In his book, Al-Khilāfa au al-Imāma ‘l-Uzmā (The Caliphate or Supreme Imamate), Rida provides a 
detailed account of what this Arab state would look like. He lists the various qualities a potential 
caliph must possess, his duties (‘to protect Islam from innovation and promote its laws and 
beliefs’), the process for electing a caliph and the qualifications of the electors, and the obligation 
of the Muslim community to create a caliphate.91 Additionally, he believed that a revived caliphate 
would require a ‘seminary for the training of qualified jurists and potential caliphs’, various 
bureaucracies to conduct everything from the writings of fatwas to the collection of zakat and the 
creation of propaganda and missionary work.92 Rida’s detailed descriptions of his prospective state 
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highlight not only his belief that a caliphate is necessary for the spiritual well-being of Muslims but 
also his ability to incorporate ideas from Western state administrative structures.  
 
Despite their best efforts to modernise Islam and revitalise the Muslim community in the face of 
European imperialism, the modernist project ultimately failed. These earnest attempts at reform 
and calls for change amounted to very little by the end of Rida’s life in 1935. Nevertheless, many 
of their ideas – particularly their belief that the early days of Islam provide solutions for the present 
– have found significant purchase among conservative Muslims, violent and non-violent alike. 
 
In calling for a return to a ‘pure’ form of Islam, some Modernists, most notably Rida, were often 
referred to as salafis, a term derived from the first three generations of Muslims (al-salaf al-salih), 
who knew the Prophet personally and experienced the birth and early growth of Islam. Salafis see 
this as a time where the most authentic and orthodox form of Islam was practiced. This is largely 
predicated on a much-quoted hadīth (the compendiums of the actions, sayings, teachings and 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) where the Prophet Muhammad describes these cohorts as 
‘the best of [his] community’.93  
 
Like Islamism, the term salafism is broad. It encompasses groups that reject the state entirely and 
seek to overthrow it with violence, those willing to participate in the state in order to change or 
challenge it through non-violent means (like civil society groups or unions) and quietists, who may 
advise or challenge a government in private or eschew political engagement entirely.94 Regardless 
of their approach to politics, salafis share similar beliefs, seeing tauhīd (the unity of God) as the 
singularly most important aspect of their creed and ‘rejecting a role for human desire and intellect 
in understanding how the immutable sources of Islam should be applied to the modern world’.95 
 
While all salafis support the creation of an Islamic state, its establishment is not necessarily the 
primary focus of their activities. As Noah Salomon argues, Islamists believe that the creation of a 
devout Muslim society is the logical outcome of the establishment of a state rooted in Islamic 
structures of governance and the implementation of shari’a. By contrast, salafis see the Islamic state 
as only possible after society is already sufficiently ‘reverent and doctrinally pure’.96 This leads to a 
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greater focus on individual behaviour in order to ensure that tauhīd is protected. Adherents must 
personally emulate the Prophet and the first three generations of believers, copying their actions 
as laid out in the Qur’an and hadīth. Crucially, this also means interpreting the Qur’an in a manner 
that ‘emphasises a direct interface with the text of revelation’ and ensuring that the manifold forms 
of unbelief, including interpreting portions of the revealed texts as metaphorical, are contested and 
defeated.97 This strict interpretation of these texts means salafis are significantly less tolerant of 
different readings or doctrinal debates, and comparatively more willing to engage in takfīr (the 
process of excommunication) than their Islamist counterparts.98 
 
DI leaders do not consistently conform to salafism’s emphasis on reproducing the behaviour of the 
Prophet and his followers or to the strict textual interpretation of revealed texts. Instead, it would 
be more accurate to consider them Islamists who saw the state as an instrument of the divine. DI 
leaders sought to establish an Islamic state through the capture and transformation of the existing 
Indonesian polity. They intended to use state structures, like an Islamic education system, the 
leadership of an amīr (leader), a governing consultative council, and above all, the implementation 
of shari’a, to teach, encourage, and compel Muslims to lead pious lives. The DI’s willingness to use 
force to overthrow foreign occupiers or illegitimate governments is what set them apart from other 
non-violent Islamists.  
 
Maududi and Qutb  
 
According to Kepel and Wiktorowicz, this acceptance of violence has been largely shaped by two 
key ideologues, Abul A'la Maududi (1903-1979), and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who carried the 
Islamic Modernists’ legacy into the twentieth century. The men departed from non-violent 
Islamists by developing an intellectual framework that clearly divides ‘true’ Muslims from self-
proclaimed Muslims who were really kuffar (disbelievers, or infidels), thus legitimating the killing 
of fellow Muslims, particularly national leaders, on the grounds of apostasy.  
 
Moreover, both men made the explicit case for the promulgation of an Islamic state as the means 
by which Muslims could truly exercise freedom of religion and ensure God’s sovereignty on earth. 
They argued that Muslims are obligated to bring about this state through jihad in order to both 
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ensure the primacy of God and to demonstrate their loyalty to their faith. While they had 
significant success in bringing many ‘educated youths with a secular background’ to their cause, 
their teachings failed to have a significant impact on convincing traditional ulama to adopt their 
ideology and support their cause.99  
 
Maududi, a Pakistani journalist and politician, believed that the decline of the umma (global Muslim 
community) was the result of Muslims practising a corrupt interpretation of Islam, soiled by un-
Islamic concepts and practices such as nationalism and democracy.100 In adopting forms of 
government where men rule over men or tolerating non-Islamic forms of government in their 
communities, Muslims had insulted God. This was due to Maududi’s belief that the ‘domination 
of man over man… was the origin of all the troubles of mankind’, as a result of man’s usurpation 
of God’s position as the sole object of worship.101 This usurpation was tantamount to disbelief as 
it saw man desiring to act as a god and thus contravening the very notion of tauhīd.  
 
Resultantly, Maududi came to believe that Muslims now existed in a state of jāhiliyyah. According 
Jan-Peter Hartung, the term in Islamic scholarship refers to the ‘period of ignorance, heathendom 
and polytheism (shirk) before man came to know about the conclusive revelation of God’s 
fundamental oneness and His commandments’.102 Maududi broadened this definition, writing that 
‘jāhiliyyah in Islam comprises every course of action which runs counter to the Islamic culture, 
Islamic morals and conduct, or Islamic mentality’, illustrating that his definition of jāhiliyyah meant 
any ‘ignorance towards God, His Prophet, and the revelation, or the pre-Islamic period of 
“lawlessness”’.103 In addition to a broad ignorance of God, Maududi ‘subsumed polytheism, as well 
as monasticism, and finally every panentheist tendency’.104 
 
Maududi saw Islam as a totalising belief structure that encompasses all facets of life, and thus 
which could ‘never coexist with jāhiliyyah’.105 Maududi believed that the present period of decline 
dated from the first fitna (rebellion) following the assassination of the caliph Uthman in 656. In 
order to overcome this state of ignorance, Maududi, like the Modernists before him, called for an 
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Islamic renewal. However, his proclamations for reform were quite vague. This was probably 
because Maududi was far less optimistic than Rida, Abduh and Afghani about the potential for 
successful reform. As Hartung notes, Maududi was quite pessimistic, believing only an ‘Ideal Man’, 
who was ‘better able than all preceding mujaddid (renewers) could truly bring about change.106 
Given this belief that only a truly extraordinary Muslim could end this state of jāhiliyyah, it is 
unsurprising that Maududi gave little thought to the process of reform itself.  
 
Instead, his primary contributions to the development of Islamist thought revolved around 
diagnosing the problems with Muslim societies in his own time and defining the conditions under 
which Muslims could truly flourish. In Maududi’s understanding Muslims could only truly actualise 
their faith when they ‘individually and collectively, surrender all rights and overlordship, legislation 
and exercising authority over others’ and ‘[authority] rests with none but Allah’.107 Maududi saw 
God’s absolute sovereignty (hākimiyya) on earth as thus fundamental for Muslims to be able to 
practice pure Islam. According to Maududi, ‘the prime function of the Creator, after calling the 
universe into being, was to issue rules and regulations for its functioning’.108  
 
More importantly, Maududi believed that Muslims had to demonstrate their faith by striving for 
the creation of an Islamic state. Like many revivalist thinkers, Maududi believed that it was 
insufficient for Muslims to simply profess their faith, but that they were required to demonstrate 
it through action.109 As God’s representatives on earth, the community of believers had to work 
to ensure that shirk and other forms of disbelief were vanquished and had no room to thrive. The 
creation and development of an Islamic state was thus a duty incumbent on all Muslims as a 
profession of their faith and ensured salvation in the afterlife.  
 
In order to achieve this state, Muslims’ first step would be to engage in jihad to ‘destroy all States 
and Governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and 
programme of Islam’.110 Once these foes have been eliminated, a true Islamic state could be 
established, initially in a few countries. This would then be expanded until a ‘universal revolution’ 
is successful.111 Ultimately, Maududi saw Islam as ‘a militant ideology and programme which seeks 
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to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and 
ideals.’112  
 
In this respect, his ideological contribution is significant because he explicitly linked the attainment 
of hākimiyya to engagement in a physical jihad against the enemies of Islam. As noted above, as 
Muslims were required to demonstrate their faith by working to bring about an Islamic state, 
Maududi believed their participating in a physical struggle was a religious duty, joining ‘the usual 
five so-called “pillars of faith” (arkān) as the sixth and besides the Islamic creed, the most 
important one’.113   
 
In line with classical scholarship, Maududi justified these conflicts on the grounds that they were 
legitimate wars against unbelievers. However, Maududi departed from classical scholarship on jihad 
in that he did not confine his definition of jihad to defensive war. Instead, Maududi argued that, 
since Muslim authority is ‘self-evident’, the promotion of an Islamic state through an offensive 
war is thus justified for the ‘sake of the common good’.114  
 
In this respect, Maududi’s contributions to the development of Islamism are significant as he sees 
the development of a political Islam as a revolutionary endeavour, explicitly linking the promotion 
of an Islamic state to physical combat. Moreover, he articulates clearly that Muslims are duty bound 
not only to support the creation of an Islamic state to ensure God’s sovereignty on earth but to 
participate in jihad in order to demonstrate their faith.  
 
Like Maududi, Qutb believed that Muslims, particularly nationalists, had lost their way, and existed 
in a state of jāhiliyyah.115 Qutb had read Maududi’s works, namely Jihad in Islam, The Principles of 
Islamic Government, and Islam and Jāhiliyyah, which had been translated into Arabic in the early 1950s, 
and extensively quoted them in his own writings.116 He similarly argued that Muslims’ failure to 
follow Islamic law and their ‘subservience to man rather than to Allah… denotes rejection of the 
divinity of God and the adulation of mortals’ rendering them no longer Muslims.117  
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As William Shepard notes, Qutb was affronted by societies governed by men because he ultimately 
saw jāhiliyyah as the ‘hākimiyyah of humans’ while true Islam ‘is the hakimiyyah of God’.118 Qutb’s 
understanding of hākimiyya, was not only freedom from the rule of men, but freedom from 
ignorance of God. As Sayed Khatab argues, to Qutb hākimiyya ultimately represented liberation 
through complete submission to God.119 Resultantly, to Qutb, hākimiyya was the basis of Muslim 
faith. As he argued in his trial: 
 
There is no hakim (sovereign) other than Allah, there is no hukum (rule) except the hukum 
of Allah, and there is no shari’a (law) except the shari’a of Allah.120 
 
Qutb’s writings go on to describe various types of jāhili societies. In addition to rejecting God, he 
argued that these ‘backward’ societies included those that ‘put material concerns above all others, 
whether in a theoretical way, as the Marxist do… or in a practical way as the Americans and others 
do’, those which were ‘characterised by uncontrolled sexual expression’, and those that encouraged 
‘women to abandon their families and children for jobs’.121 These societies not only have usurped 
God’s authority but perverted the course of mankind. More explicitly than Maududi, Qutb went 
on to decry the complicity of so-called Muslims in the creation of modern jāhiliyyah. He argued 
that while ‘they do not formally worship beings other than God, in practice they give political and 
social authority to others than God’, merely respecting religion but failing to give it authority.122  
 
While Qutb argued that these jāhili societies were un-Islamic, he refrained from explicitly labelling 
the leaders of these fallen places kafirs (apostates) for failing implement Islamic law and institute 
an Islamic state.123 Regardless, as John Calvert argues, describing these leaders and the societies 
they presided over as ‘ignorant’  ‘was a serious indictment’.124 He went further than contemporary 
ideologues like Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and even Maududi, in 
asserting that Muslim societies had ‘completely given over to modern forms of paganism’.125  
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Given these transgressions, Qutb justified jihad against these regimes for failing to bring about true 
Islamic states. Like Maududi, he believed that Muslims were obligated to participate in jihad in 
order to end the period of jāhiliyyah and bring about an Islamic state. He saw this as a defensive 
conflict to ‘[emancipate] human beings from the shackles of false and fabricated masters’ thus 
ensuring God’s sovereignty.126 Muslims had to participate not only to ensure their ability to fully 
actualise their faith in an Islamic polity but to demonstrate their commitment to God. Jihad in 
Qutb’s understanding was the practice of a ritual duty, a kind of worship to ensure God’s will.127  
 
While Qutb agreed with classical scholarship that jihad was permissible as a defensive war when 
Muslims were under threat, he argued that Modernist readings of Islamic texts were incorrect in 
putting forth ‘apologetic definitions that regard jihad as primarily a spiritual struggle aimed at the 
taming of base desires and inclinations’.128 Instead, like Maududi, he believed that these definitions 
of jihad as a defensive or spiritual struggle undermined Islam’s mission to proselytise and expand. 
In Milestones, one of his key texts completed in prison, Qutb argued that jihad was the instrument 
of Islamic revolution and ‘the means by which people will attain their freedom’ as it would clear 
all obstacles preventing the implementation of shari’a and the creation of an Islamic state.129    
 
Once again echoing Maududi, Qutb saw jihad as rooted in the concept of hakimiyyah. It was a 
fundamental duty given that he believed that hakimiyyah to be the foundational concept of the 
Islamic faith. Jihad to bring about or sustain hakimiyyah was thus a fundamental obligation like the 
other five pillars of Islam. He argued that Muslims thus had an individual and collective duty to 
participate for the struggle to defend and expand an Islamic state around the world.  
 
Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab  
While Qutb drew heavily on Maududi, both men heavily referenced the works and ideas of two 
pre-modern ideologues, Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Ibn Taymiyya and 
Wahhab contributed significantly to the later thinkers’ understanding of what behaviour 
constituted disbelief and how these transgressions contributed to a state of jāhiliyyah. Resultantly, 
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they were deploy concerned with the purification of Islam. Moreover, both men established for 
later salafis the primacy of tauhid, and the duty of Muslims to worship God exclusively.  
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s writings were not only hugely significant to salafis of Qutb and Maududi’s era, but 
remain prominent today among Islamist militants from al-Shabaab to Islamic State. Ibn Taymiyya 
was a Sunni scholar, jurist and activist who notably developed a robust interpretation of tauhid and 
promoted jihad against the Mongols during their invasion of Arab lands in the early fourteenth 
century. Jon Hoover’s work is the first substantive English language text to examine Ibn 
Taymiyya’s beliefs. Ibn Taymiyya wrote widely, but as Hoover observes, several themes recur:  
 
his struggle against innovation in religious practice and theology, his reform-minded appeal 
to the foundational sources of Islam, his Sunni-sectarianism over Shi’ism and Christianity, 
and his apologetic conviction that Islamic revelation corresponds to reason.130     
 
Ibn Taymiyya argued that Islam could not be practiced without state power, because God’s 
commandments such as the declaration of jihad, the enforcement of penalties for transgressions, 
economic redistribution, and so on, could not be exercised without  a caliph.131 Resultantly, 
Muslims were duty bound to establish and uphold and Islamic state as it was the only mechanism 
by which their religion could be properly put into practice, thus ensuring ‘perfect spiritual and 
temporal prosperity’.132  
 
Ibn Taymiyya believed that the Muslim societies of his time were prone to incursions by non-
Muslims because they had failed to practice a true version of Islam. Instead, he lamented that 
innovations such as rituals, superstitions and a ‘lax observance’ of Islamic law were to blame for 
the collapse of Islamic regimes.133 As such, Ibn Taymiyya’s work stressed the purification of Islam, 
particularly practices of worship. He took aim at Sufis, describing practices such as worshiping 
shrines as innovations, and routinely criticised the ruling Mamluks for falling short of Islamic 
ideals, particularly through the inconsistent application of shari’a. He argued that failure to adhere 
to and implement God’s laws consistently, and instead enacting man-made ones, was tantamount 
to disbelief or at least a contravention of obedience to God and God alone. 
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This was because he believed that, above all, Muslims need to worship God and God alone (tauhid 
al-ilahiyya) as God is the sole creator.134 By participating in spiritual retreats, visiting graves, 
practicing ancestor worship, or asking for the intercession or veneration of saints or other pious 
people, Sufis and others who transgress were ultimately worshiping things or people other than 
God alone. This expansive interpretation of what could be considered an un-Islamic practice 
contained the seeds of the appeal of Ibn Taymiyya’s writings for the nineteenth century 
Modernists, who would seek to emulate the alleged purity of the righteous caliphs and the Prophet.  
 
Despite his misgivings about the practices of the Sufis and the Mamluks, Ibn Taymiyya refrained 
from declaring either group apostates outright.135 Conversely, he denounced the Mongol invaders 
as apostates and called for a jihad against their invasion and governance. He wrote three fatwas 
decrying the Mongol incursions, which serve as a significant development in the understanding of 
jihad among salafis since he was justifying a rebellion against (nominally) Muslim rulers.  
 
In his first and second fatwas Ibn Taymiyya declared that true Muslims had an obligation to resist 
the Mongols for they had failed to adhere to or uphold Islam despite their self-proclaimed 
conversion to the faith. Jihad was justified on the grounds that they must be fought until their 
conceptualisation of Islam was sufficiently purified. While Ibn Taymiyya largely agreed with 
classical scholarship that life under a tyrannical, albeit Muslim, ruler was preferable to living amidst 
civil strife or non-Islamic rule, he nevertheless justified rebellion against Muslim rulers when their 
actions compromised the sincerity of their commitment to their faith.136 His reasoning illustrated 
that ‘takfīr of Muslim rulers is an important, if not essential part in legitimising rebellion’.137   
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s conceptualisation of jihad saw it as a concept that served to protect Islam from 
innovations or the worship of something other than God alone. He understood jihad to have ‘both 
inner and outer aspects’, a jihad to control oneself and a jihad against external enemies. Both were 
conducted to ‘punish omission of duties and forbidden acts’.138 This understanding of jihad was 
ultimately defensive, and it was incumbent on the whole community to participate, particularly 
when an invading force enters Muslim lands, ‘commits well-known atrocities’ and ‘refuses to abide 
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by any clear and universally accepted Islamic law’, after being called upon to implement it.139 Those 
who failed to participate in this defensive or ‘involuntary’ jihad would be criticised by God, and 
denounced hypocrites.140 Those who were unable to fight, such as women and children and the 
disabled, were encouraged to ‘fight with words and acts’.141  
 
Nevertheless, Yahya Michot cautions that Ibn Taymiyya’s conceptualisation of jihad is far from 
straightforward as it also includes a link with hijrah (literally, departure or migration, referencing 
the Prophet’s flight from Mecca to Medina in 622 to escape persecution). Michot correctly points 
out that implicit in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings is a calculation of when to fight and when to flee as he 
disavows ‘ill-considered and risky ventures’.142 
 
Given the constant incursions the Mamluks faced, Ibn Taymiyya’s conceptualisation of jihad as an 
all-encompassing struggle for an Islamic community is unsurprising. However, stripped of this 
context, the clarity of his call and the universal obligation he appears to impose on Muslims to 
engage in jihad against the enemies of Islam, broadly defined, has resulted in his writings gaining 
significant traction among modern jihadist groups. Instead, Ibn Taymiyya did not see a failure to 
engage an enemy in jihad as consistently a sin. He offered a more nuanced view of jihad that saw it 
ultimately a force for eradicating sin and saving Islam. This could be achieved through physical 
conflict but by the ‘quitting of sin’, thus legitimising flight as a form of jihad.143 
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s writings – particularly his disdain for innovation – greatly influenced the ideas of 
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a religious scholar from central Arabia. Like Ibn Taymiyya, Wahhab 
believed that Islamic societies had regressed as a result of the widespread practice of innovation. 
This brought Muslim societies back to a time of jāhiliyyah and thus required purification and a 
‘restoration of the true meaning of tauhid’.144 Wahhab saw God as the sole lord and creator of all 
worlds and thus required direct worship, ‘unaccompanied by any attempt at interpretation’.145 
Moreover, Wahhab saw the declaration of belief in God as insufficient for one to be considered a 
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Muslim, and instead argued that this proclamation ‘must be expressed in worship, which must be 
dedicated only to God, with no intermediary’.146  In this respect, he went beyond what most 
scholars believed about the requirements for being a member of the Muslim community.  
 
Given his central belief that Islam requires the worship of God without interference, Wahhab was 
far less accommodating than Ibn Taymiyya of minority Muslim sects or individuals who practiced 
ancestor worship, asked for intercessions, and other such innovations. Wahhab denounced those 
as violations of the faith, referring to those who did so as polytheists or apostates, and thus enemies 
of Islam and potential targets of jihad.147 Like Ibn Taymiyya, Wahhab wrote extensively about what 
practices constituted a violation of tauhid. Wahhab decreed that the practice of intercession, the 
‘seeking of blessing by saints, martyrs and other exalted persons’, visits to tombs, the construction 
of domes over such tombs, all constituted shirk.148 As Algar surmises, Wahhab decreed that 
‘whenever an action of devotion involves, in any fashion at all, an entity other than the worshiper 
and God’, the individual has failed to practice his primary duty to worship God and God alone.149 
 
Olivier Roy has been particularly critical of Wahhab, and to a lesser degree Ibn Taymiyya, for their 
broad-brush approach to decrying a range of practices un-Islamic. According to Roy, Wahhab’s 
limited and unnuanced scholarship facilitated and indeed legitimised anti-intellectualism amongst 
his followers and discouraged centuries of scriptural interpretation and debates.150 
 
Nevertheless, this sweeping definition meant that Wahhab saw a sharp delineation between 
Muslims and kufr, as well as tauhid and shirk, erasing the prospect of tolerance or the existence of 
‘grey areas’, within the practice of the Islamic faith. He articulated this through the principle of 
‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’, which demanded that ‘Muslims must encourage their 
coreligionists to follow the principles of Islam and must admonish them when they stray from the 
right path’.151 As Stephane Lacroix notes, the principle ‘has obvious subversive implications if it is 
used against the political and religious authorities’.152   
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Wahhab, unlike any of the ideologues explored before, had unusual access to political power and 
the means to implement his ideology. As Olivier Roy notes, Saudi Arabia is unique for being both 
a ‘tribal patrimonial estate (the only country in the world to be named after its ruling family) and 
the centre of an official transnational religious movement (Wahhabism)’.153 Initially, Wahhab had 
an agreement with the amir of ‘Uyaynah, who agreed to introduce his reforms, including most 
controversially, the payment of zakat, calculated on the basis of ‘apparent wealth (such as 
agricultural produce) and concealed wealth, stored in gold and silver’.154  
 
However, Wahhab was soon exiled following pressure on the amir by local chiefs. He quickly met 
and formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud in Dir’iyyah, central Arabia in 1744. Crudely, 
the pact granted Wahhab control over religious affairs, while Saud led political and community 
matters. Ultimately, the pact gave Saud religious legitimacy with Wahhab’s ideas eventually forming 
the basis of the Saudi state. In the initial development of this alliance, Wahhab’s willingness to 
denounce those who failed to adhere to his strict interpretation of Islam often justified Saud’s 
expansionist ambitions, leading the latter to declare jihad frequently against large areas of Arabia 
on the grounds that rival tribes were heretics or unbelievers.  
 
Wahhab’s direct access to the power of his nascent state reinforced his conceptualisation of Islam 
as a religion imposed and regulated from the top. In this respect, Wahhab reflects Ibn Taymiyya’s 
understanding that only through an Islamic state and leader can the beliefs and practices of 
Muslims be regulated and consistently enforced, thus ensuring against the proliferation of shirk. 
Wahhab’s influence has endured, with his descendants holding in posts in the religious leadership 
of the first Saudi realm (1744-1818), its successor (1824-91), and the current state of Saudi Arabia 
(1932 to present).155 
 
While these men all helped to provide the intellectual framework militant groups use to justify 
their actions, Ayoob, Kepel, and Wiktorowicz stress that the formation of these organisations can 
also be linked to non-ideological factors. All three stress that the adoption of this framework was 
the result of a combination of disillusionment and repression, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Across the Muslim world, many were disappointed by the lack of economic progress and the 
concentration of political power following the end of colonialism.156 Given both the failure of 
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Arab states to successfully challenge external enemies like Israel and Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s crackdowns on Islamist organisations, many turned from nationalism to a 
radicalised form of political Islam as a means of rectifying these inequities.157  
 
Ayoob, Kepel, and Wiktorowicz have used their conceptualisation of Islamism with its 
‘preoccupation with capturing the state in order to change society’ and its drift towards violence 
following state repression and disillusionment with conventional politics, to assess groups 
operating in the Middle East and South Asia. This thesis adopts and applies their ideas to the DI, 
contending that while the group operated on the so-called periphery of the Islamic world, its 




Since the investigation of the DI’s ideology forms the backbone of this thesis, an attempt must be 
made to first define the concept. ‘It’s almost a routine’ as Teun A. van Dijk notes, to begin the 
study of ideology with ‘a remark about the vagueness of the notion and the resulting theoretical 
confusion’.158 True to form, this thesis acknowledges the disparate notions and conceptualisations 
of ideology as well as the debates that surround its study in a variety of academic fields, but 
contends that - despite this mess - ideology remains a necessary and important means of studying 
the individual components that shape political thinking.  
 
This thesis’ assessment of ideology is informed by Michael Freeden’s work on the morphology of 
ideology. As such, it rejects the conceptualisation of ideologies as static structures, but instead 
views them as combinations of concepts arranged in a cohesive system. As argued by the the 
Cambridge School and proponents of transtemporalism, the meanings of these concepts may 
change over time. Ideologies are necessary to give direction to entire societies, groups or even to 
individuals; socialising and integrating them into a large whole. They also serve to legitimise a 
particular leader, social structure, or belief. As such, ideologies are ‘produced by, directed at, and 
consumed by [social] groups’.159 Finally, in legitimising and motivating groups to action, ideologies 
are undoubtedly linked with the concept of power and form the bridge between political thought 
and action.160 
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Ideologies are made up of core and adjacent concepts.161 As this thesis will demonstrate, the ideas 
that make up the core of DI’s ideology – hākimiyya and jihad – are crucial to the establishment of 
its belief structure. These fundamental concepts are buttressed by adjacent ones, takfīr and al-walā’ 
wa-l-barā’. The adjacent concepts derive some of the particulars of their meaning through their 
association with the core beliefs. For example, the linguistically ambiguous term, al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ 
broadly means loyalty and disavowal for the sake of Allah, and has often been used to guide the 
personal conduct of Muslims.162 However, when placed in DI’s ideological frame, with hākimiyya 
and jihad at its core, the group has conceptualised al-wala ̄’ wa-l-barā’ ̄ to mean a collective obligation 
to God and fellow group members, and a responsibility to confront those who disavow or insult 
God. Since this requires members to take up arms in service of their faith, it reinforces the 
obligation to engage in jihad.  
 
This differs from a Marxist conceptualisation that views ideology as a product of class and power 
structures. Marx and Engels argued that, by controlling the physical means of production, the 
ruling class of a society also controlled ‘the means of mental production’.163 Resultantly, the 
narratives generated were distortions of reality, that expressed contemporary economic power and 
enabled the ruling class to assert and maintain power over the masses. Their content, as such, was 
unimportant. 
 
The Marxist scholars Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and Terry Eagleton build on this 
interpretation, emphasising ideology’s function as a tool of legitimation and influence.164 While 
these thinkers agree that ideologies are used by elites to legitimate their power, they argue that – 
since these ideologies are rooted in the real structure of the state – the content of these beliefs is 
worthy of study on its own terms.165 
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While modern scholarship on ideology agrees with the Marxists’ view that that ideologies reflect 
the political, social, economic and cultural forces of their time and accepts that ideology serves the 
function of influence and legitimation, a Marxist framing is ultimately a narrow conceptualisation. 
Ideology, as this thesis demonstrates, can be created by groups without access to formal state 
power and fulfils more roles than simply perpetuating the worldview of a ruling class. As Freeden 
notes, ideology is ‘the most basic of political phenomenon’, undertaken by a variety of groups and 
who are attempting to organise their ‘perceptions, beliefs and pre- and misconceptions about the 
political world’.166 
 
Despite the extensive research on the subject of ideologies, few scholars have attempted to 
properly analyse its role within militant or non-state groups. This thesis applies some of the 
approaches used by Shiraz Maher, Thomas Hegghammer, and Joas Wagemaker to assess the 
construction and development of DI’s belief structure.  
 
Drawing on the works of Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss and particularly Karl Mannheim, Shiraz 
Maher’s ground-breaking work, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea was the first to attempt a 
comprehensive overview of the conceptualisation and role of ideology in militant Islamism. While 
not grounded in the ideology of any particular militant Islamist organisation, Maher’s approach 
traces the creation of salafi-jihadism, examines its core components and their evolution and 
accentuates its differences from other forms of Islamism. Maher sees salafi-jihadism as: 
 
a total ideology, given the universality of its nature – based, not least, on Islamic 
universalism – towards a desire to consume and aggregate the entirety of both human 
existence and organisation within its systems 167 
 
This is akin to totalitarianism with tendencies towards Leo Strauss’ concept of brutal nihilism due 
to ‘its desire to forcibly replace everything other than itself’.168 Maher thus illustrates how this 
absolutist ideological framework guides the actions of its adherents as they seek to obliterate not 
only their detractors but the very idea of relativism and ambiguity for adherents of Islam.  
 
Like Maher, Thomas Hegghammer and Joas Wagemakers stand out as some of the few scholars 
to have attempted to systematically interrogate the ideology of militant Islamism. Unlike Maher, 
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Heghammer and Wagemakers each focus on a single individual. Hegghammer analyses Abdullah 
Azzam, the Palestinian scholar responsible for the mobilisation of foreign militants to Afghanistan 
during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, while Wagemakers addresses Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi, the Jordanian ideologue and mentor to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, later leader of Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI). Both works focus on the development of an individual’s ideology, its impact on the 
formation of Al-Qaeda and AQI and the global jihadist movement. Maher’s, Hegghammer’s and 
Wagemarker’s work reflects a renewed focus on the role of ideology in the study of Islamist 
militancy and terrorism and underlines its applicability to the study of individual groups. 
 
While scholars including Kepel, Olivier Roy, Fawaz Gerges, and Marc Sageman have explored 
aspects of Islamist or salafi-jihadist thought and its effect on the actions of militant groups, their 
approaches conceptualise ideology as immutable and unresponsive to the prevailing political, 
economic and cultural climate. Additionally, they assume that groups simply cherry-pick 
particularly violent passages from Qur’anic scripture or alternatively single out or misinterpret texts 
from Islamic scholars and ideologues, rather than building a cohesive and responsive structure. 
For example, Kepel writes that these groups ‘[used] texts of the faith to further their own 
objectives’ without ever exploring how particular passages were selected and interpreted by the 
groups themselves or explaining how this differs from other political organisations.169 While these 
studies assert they are interested in the role of ideology, they often fail to do the basic work of 
establishing the components of the ideology, explaining how these were agreed upon, or assessing 
how a group’s ideology evolves. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, Kepel, Roy, Gerges and Sageman are notable for their willingness to 
conceive of ideology as an important concept worthy of research. The study of ideology has been 
largely side-lined in favour of a focus on operational capabilities, practical objectives, the 
radicalisation process and network formation.170 This lack of exploration highlights the limitations 
of the current literature. This should not be taken to imply that this thesis sees ideology as the 
primary casual factor of militancy and terrorism in all circumstances. Instead, it sees ideology as 
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an important, and overlooked, lens through which groups should be examined in order to provide 




In order to properly assess the construction and evolution of DI’s ideology, this thesis relies 
primarily on methods advanced by intellectual historians. The study of intellectual history, 
sometimes referred to as the history of ideas, generally examines ‘what people in the past meant 
by the things they said and what these things “meant” to them’ and explores the evolution of these 
concepts and potential patterns or trends over time. 171  
 
This attempt at a simple definition elides the significant debates over what constitutes intellectual 
history as well as the numerous and rancorous methodological conflicts within the field. As 
Richard Whatmore notes, ‘[there] has never, however, been any unanimity about the use of this 
term.’ 172 Nevertheless, the complexity of these debates is unsurprising given the field has existed 
‘[under] various labels – the history of wisdom, the history of thought, the history of the human 
spirit and so on… for over two centuries’.173 Adding to this complexity, as Allan Megill notes, 
‘intellectual history has more often than not appeared as a hybrid genre crossing disciplinary 
boundaries’.174 However, the refusal to be bound by any one discipline is often paired with 
grandiose claims like ‘all history is the history of ideas’, which have created tensions with more 
widely-studied strands of historical research.175  
 
The field grew in prominence in the middle of the twentieth-century, thanks in large part to Arthur 
O. Lovejoy, an American philosopher at Johns Hopkins University. Lovejoy advanced a pragmatic 
doctrine, where ideas served primarily, if almost exclusively, as answers to philosophical 
problems.176 His conceptualisation of the history of ideas thus saw the reduction of larger, ‘trouble-
breeding and usually thought-obscuring’ concepts into smaller components known as ‘unit 
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ideas’.177 These foundational ‘unit ideas’ were ‘definite and explicit’ and could be isolated and 
tracked through time.178 In this sense, Lovejoy saw these elemental ideas somehow always existing, 
transcending time itself, and ‘not always, or usually corresponding to terms which we are 
accustomed to use in naming’.179 As such, this version of the history of ideas lent itself to the study 
of ‘big history’ where historians could trace a grand narrative of a particular concept over large 
swathes of time. 180 
 
In contrast, Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, Richard Tuck, James Tully, J.G.A Pocock and the others 
who make up a loose group of intellectual historians known as the ‘Cambridge School’ disputed 
Lovejoy’s methods, and called for a synchronic approach instead. Skinner’s landmark work, 
‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ excoriates Lovejoy’s diachronic methods, 
and advances a form of historical contextualism. While there are differences within the Cambridge 
School, its proponents largely agree that a historical text can only be understood within its 
intellectual and linguistic context. As Skinner writes, scholars must: 
 
confront, in studying any given text, what its author in writing at the time he did write for 
the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been intending to communicate 
by the utterance of this given utterance.181 
 
Resultantly, true understanding of a work can only be gleaned by examining the language used by 
the author. While language is a resource giving authors the opportunities for action, it is also 
constrained by the political, economic, social, cultural factors of its time.182 For the members of 
the Cambridge School, language provides both structure and agency for its historical subjects.183 
 
Skinner’s critiques of Lovejoy’s approach hold valuable lessons for the study of intellectual history. 
In assuming that an ‘ideal type’ of any given doctrine exists, with unchanging, ‘unit ideas’, scholars 
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are likely to pay ‘insufficient notice to the determinative role of context for meaning’.184 Moreover, 
defining an ‘ideal type’ assumes that there is some form of logical progression or growth towards 
an end state. This teleological framework may draw readers towards the view that earlier thinkers 
‘hit upon’ but did not fully articulate ideas that later become crucial, thus imbuing them with a 
form of clairvoyance or simply misreading what they were in fact saying. This view deprives 
scholars of the agency to advance or create their own arguments, leaving them as mere conduits 
for concepts. 
 
Additionally, scholars ought to be wary of assuming the universality of any concept since they are 
likely to bring their own expectations of the culture they are studying into their assessment. Finally, 
they should be careful not to create a cohesive narrative from disparate remarks made by a 
particular thinker where one may not have existed, nor credit a writer for advancing an argument 
simply because they used similar words to another. 185 
 
Although the criticisms advanced by the Cambridge School are valid and important contributions 
to the study of intellectual history, they too inevitably have limitations. In arguing that ideas are 
context bound to their particular time periods and language structures, Skinner and his colleagues 
appear to deny the existence of universal concepts, going as far as to claim that ‘there are no 
perennial questions in philosophy’.186 This poses two distinct problems. First, as Robert Lamb 
notes, ‘[whether] or not philosophical problems “last a long time” is something that cannot simply 
be asserted’ but instead can and should be proven empirically, ‘not least because it seems so 
obvious that many such problems or questions do occupy philosophical attention for a long time’. 
187 This is problematic when applying the Cambridge School’s doctrine to the study of Islamic – 
or indeed, any religious – political thought. Questions of interpreting the Qur’an and hadīth have 
circulated since the death of the Prophet in 632. 
 
Second, as Peter Gordon argues, the contextualists assume that there is ‘only one native context 
in which [an idea] is properly understood’ to the exclusion of all others.188 Islamic theological 
scholarship – while by no means alone in this regard – often faces the challenge of translating and 
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transliterating, which take place cross various geographies and time periods. By assuming  there is 
only one point at which the ‘true’ meaning is unearthed, historians would lose the plurality of 
contexts that give the idea its meaning, in favour of ‘one particular holistic and self-contained 
environment’.189  
 
Given these limitations, this thesis draws largely from more recent scholarship that welcomes the 
return of ‘big history’, while heeding some of the warnings of the Cambridge School. This 
approach, pioneered by historians like David Armitage, Samuel Moyn, Darrin McMahon, and 
others, calls for a rapprochement between Lovejoy’s methods and the Cambridge School.  
 
This is achieved through the examination of concepts through the lens of transtemporal history, 
which traces ideas across ‘temporal frontiers, paying due attention to the key moments at which 
they shift their shapes and change their colours in different local settings, while still retaining a 
recognizable form’.190 In this respect, it recognises the impact of the language of a particular time 
period, the goals of the speaker or writer to persuade or to legitimatise a particular idea, and their 
agency to do so while also ‘reconstructing contexts across time – transtemporally – to produce 
longer-range histories, which are neither artificially punctuated nor deceptively continuous’.191 The 
debates surrounding each concept may take place in a particular context, but collectively they form 
bridges that create a narrative that stretches through decades.  
 
With regards to this thesis, the examination of the conceptualisation of ideas such as hākimiyya, 
jihad, takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ takes place in specific moments. These ideas were defined and 
articulated by individual DI leaders, who were both constrained by their domestic political 
circumstances and in dialogue with their contemporaries and predecessors in the wider Muslim 
world. Rather than treating each concept as eternal and each set of actors as unable to imbue them 
with their own specific interpretations, this approach uses historical moments like leadership 
changes and political or military setbacks to illustrate how each idea was approached and shaped 
across time with provable links to its forerunners and future incarnations.  
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While these approaches are useful, they have, like Lovejoy and the Cambridge School, largely 
focused on European intellectual history, particularly studies of Enlightenment thinkers. 
Scholarship of Islamic intellectual history, while robust, has remained largely on the side lines of 
these methodological debates. This marginalisation is likely due to a combination of Eurocentrism 
on the part of the established proponents of these schools as well as the difficulties caused by 
efforts to treat Islamic intellectual history as a   cohesive whole. While this predicament is not 
unique to the field, it is a reminder to consider Islamic intellectual history on its own terms with 
its own traditions and debates. Crucially, it is necessary to be wary of attempts to reduce the 
multiple strands of Islamic intellectual histories, each in turn made up of numerous movements, 
to a homogenous bloc.  
 
Bearing this in mind, this thesis draws on the work of Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’ to provide some 
structure to these innumerable topics. Focusing on the study of Islamic intellectual history from 
the nineteenth century onwards, Abu-Rabi’ identifies four movements as having defined debates 
within the field, namely; nationalism, Islamism, Westernisation, and state ideology.192 These 
currents are all affected by specific national circumstances, unique colonial and decolonisation 
experiences, and other specific factors. But they all largely revolve around the larger question of 
the purpose and structure of the state in contemporary Muslim society.193 While Abu-Rabi’s work 
remained at the theoretical level, this thesis will illustrate how these four currents went on to shape 
the development of each tenet of the DI’s ideology. 
 
Finally, the works of Carool Kersten, Michael Laffan and Chiara Formichi are instructive guides 
to researching Islamic intellectual histories in Indonesia. All three point out that scholars of Islam, 
particularly Westerners, often fail to acknowledge Islam as an important force in the country’s 
political landscape. Many either assume that other identities – like ethnicity – take precedence or 
that Islamic practice has been sufficiently bastardised through the influence of animism, Buddhism 
and other local traditions. As such, researchers should remember that:  
 
Islam has been reformulated by every community which has ever embraced it. In the 
process, they have added their own particularisms to the Muslim world and compounded 
the multiplicity of the living forms of religion. 194 
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It is fairly obvious that Islamic thought in Indonesia should not be judged as more or less authentic 
or accurate on the basis of how closely it accords with the views espoused by thinkers in the 
traditional Islamic centres in the Middle East. But these scholars raise a more subtle and significant 
point; the reformulation of Islam in Indonesia is a constant and non-linear process. As Kersten 
notes, ‘tradition, modernity and postmodernity are not necessarily successive stages in intellectual 
history or bound by linear progression’.195 In keeping with such approaches, this thesis assesses 
how DI leaders’ ideas shifted with changing political circumstances, despite their claim to espouse 




Indonesian militant Islamists have often been relegated to the margins of the literature on the 
global jihad and Islamism. Terms like ‘second front’ and ‘periphery’ are routinely used to describe 
their position (alongside other Southeast Asian militants) in this discourse, thus emphasising the 
notion that militant Islamism was imported from a central core rather than produced 
indigenously.196 This designation ignores the fact  that Indonesia has a long history of indigenous 
militant Islamist movements, including the Padris in western Sumatra, who opposed Dutch 
colonial encroachment in the 1820s and 1830s. As Kirsten Schulze and Tom Smith argue, it is 
better to conceive of Indonesia as an ‘alternative centre’ for Islamist violence, discarding biases 
that see Middle Eastern clerics and militants as sole source of beliefs that guide Islamist militancy.  
 
Jemaah Islamiyah: Global Islamist Militancy or Home-Grown Phenomenon? 
 
From occupying a ‘marginal position within mainstream academic circles’, the literature on 
terrorism and militant Islamism grew exponentially in the aftermath of the September 11 th 
attacks.197  As Andrew Silke points out, ‘over 90 percent of the entire literature on terrorism will 
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have been written since 9/11’ with Islamist militancy accounting for 57.3% of those studies.198 
This growth has resulted in an abundance of comprehensive and critical work on all aspects of the 
subject as well as many cultural objects, including films, books, and other media articles.199 
 
A significant portion of this academic interest has focused on understanding the causes of 
militancy (particularly the tensions between individual, group and societal level explanations), 
groups’ recruitment, and the means by which states can combat this phenomenon. As noted 
earlier, this has often come at the expense of other areas such as ideology.  200 Martha Crenshaw 
accounts for this emphasis, arguing that ‘[theories] of conflict usually focused on causes rather 
than outcomes, and research on terrorism followed this tradition’.201 Less charitably, Alex Schmid 
and Albert Jongman characterised this research agenda as ‘counterterrorism masquerading as 
political science’.202  
 
Regardless, the vast majority of this literature has focused on al-Qaeda and more recently, the 
Islamic State. In his overview of the terrorism studies literature between 2007 and 2016, Bart 
Schuurman laments this overemphasis, pointing out that al-Qaeda remained the most frequently 
used keyword in the 2,552 articles he surveyed. Its pre-eminent position only declined in 2016 
when it was finally overshadowed by Islamic State.203  
 
This narrow focus on a small set of actors is compounded by an equally tight geographic focus. 
Schuurman’s study finds that the Middle East and North Africa received the lion’s share of 
attention from scholars, accounting for 43.8% of all articles on terrorism and militancy produced 
in that period.204 Asia, defined broadly as the space between Afghanistan and Japan, was the focus 
of just 19.1% of the scholarship over the same period. However, Schuurman points out that 
articles on Afghanistan and Pakistan dominate the literature on Islamist militancy in that region, 
rather than Southeast Asian states. Most significantly, the 19.1% figure represents an average over 
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the period. As he notes, ‘the percentage of articles looking at Asia has decreased somewhat, going 
from 21.7% in 2007 to 10.7% in 2016’.205  
 
Given the outsized focus on al-Qaeda and terrorism in the Middle East in this field, it is 
unsurprising that research on Islamist militancy in Indonesia has been limited, and frequently 
framed in terms of its relation to the former. In the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings, 
Indonesian militants have been largely cast as creatures of a violent, global Islamist movement led 
by al-Qaeda with its roots in the jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Exemplifying this so-
called ‘globalist’ school of thought are Rohan Gunaratna, Zachary Abuza, Bilveer Singh, as well as 
journalists like Maria Ressa and Mike Millard. 
 
Abuza refers repeatedly to the JI as ‘Al-Qaeda’s regional arm’ and part of al-Qaeda’s ‘global 
network’, rather than an entity with its own distinct history and agenda.206 Similarly Rohan 
Gunaratna acknowledges that the group’s ‘roots can be traced back to the Indonesian rebellion in 
the 1950s led by Darul Islam’, he does not, despite his paper’s title, actually explore the links 
between the two groups, ideological or otherwise.207 Like Abuza, he credits the war in Afghanistan 
with giving JI members ‘a sense of belong to an international Islamic brotherhood’ which 
‘increasingly “Arabized”’ their outlook ‘and developed a strong orientation towards the Middle 
East, most notably towards Saudi Arabia and Egypt’.208 In an interview with Millard in his book, 
Jihad in Paradise, Gunaratna went on to explicitly claim the JI ‘were al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian 
network’.209 Millard’s book never once mentions DI, much less any Islamist militancy in Indonesia 
prior to the 2002 Bali bombings.  
 
Greg Fealy and Carlyle Thayer point out that while these researchers argue that the JI is a creature 
of Al-Qaeda, ‘Rohan Gunaratna, Zachary Abuza... devote little or no space in their texts to 
defining [these links]’.210 Instead, Fealy and Thayer argue that that the JI ‘was not subordinate to 
Al-Qaeda’ since ‘JI leaders [made] their own decisions about operations, neither receiving nor 
seeking direction from the Al-Qaeda central leadership’.211 Instead, they highlight the legacy of the 
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Darul Islam rebellions, indicating the history of using violence to attempt to create an Islamic state 
in Indonesia. They note the operational links between the two groups with JI leaders often coming 
from ‘strong Darul Islam families’.212 
 
This focus on the kinship ties between the DI and JI movements are significant and well-trodden 
territory.213 Indeed, there is a tendency to overemphasise these linkages, suggesting that it was 
somehow inevitable that these individuals would become part of the movement rather than 
acknowledging the agency of the individuals involved and the appeal of the group’s evolving 
ideology to those outside the families of Darul Islam participants.214 
 
The most extensive investigations into the JI’s origins have been pursued by researchers in think 
tanks and non-governmental organisations. Sidney Jones and Solahudin’s work at the ICG and 
now at the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) provides rich detail on JI members who 
are descendants of Darul Islam cadres, the complex marriage network that binds the organisation 
together, and the personal rivalries that lead to the factionalisation of the movement.215 These 
reports give academic researchers substantive source material, but often fail to provide a frame or 
narrative structure for this information. While often fascinating, the sheer amount of detail 
presented leads to an overemphasis on the rivalries and relationships between individual 
personalities and hyper local developments, such as the impact of the appointment of a village 
imam. Though important in their own right, these often come at the expense of an exploration of 
overarching ideologies, policy developments or consideration of the influence of foreign events. 
 
Ideology and Indonesian Militancy 
 
Using this research background, Solahudin published his ground-breaking book, The Roots of 
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Terrorism in Indonesia, in 2013. It remains one of the few substantial explorations of the ties between 
the DI and the JI. Solahudin goes beyond the operational and familial linkages to tackle the role 
of ideology in the JI’s formation, providing significant detail on the intra-group conceptual debates 
and the material that was referenced by those involved. His unprecedented access to group 
members resulted in substantive interviews and gave him access to material published by DI 
leaders, providing new insights into the development of the group’s ideology during understudied 
periods in the movement’s history. For example, Solahudin was able to procure a document 
detailing Aceng Kurnia’s – one of Kartosuwiryo’s deputies and close aid – doctrine of tauhid in the 
years following Kartosuwiryo’s death, demonstrating that the latter ‘gave rise to a strong takfiri 
strand in Darul Islam thinking’.216  
 
However, as a journalist and researcher, the work is ultimately descriptive rather than analytical, 
lacking assessments of how the Dutch authorities, Japanese occupying forces, and the Indonesian 
state influenced the group’s ideology. Additionally, Solahudin does not provide a framework to 
interrogate the hierarchy and relationship between the concepts that make up DI’s belief structure, 
explain how and why these evolved under various leaders, or thoroughly investigate the role played 
by domestic or foreign ideologues or Islamist groups. 
 
Quinton Temby’s as yet unpublished dissertation and article, ‘Imagining an Islamic State in 
Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah’, builds on Solahudin’s work, providing a 
comprehensive account of the group’s evolution. While his dissertation takes a geographical 
approach to explaining the mobilisation of jihadists in Southeast Asia, he persuasively demonstrates 
how a combination of ‘overwhelming Suharto regime repression’, ‘the emigration of key leaders’ 
and the rapid globalisation and Islamisation of Malaysia led to the transnationalisation of a 
previously domestic movement.217    
 
His article, however, also goes into the beliefs of the movement in greater detail, arguing that 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s contribution to the movement was the introduction of salafist beliefs honed 
during their time as activists in the non-violent Islamist movement. While packed with interesting 
detail about the group’s development, he does not fully engage with the conceptual origins and 
content of the ideas espoused by JI leaders, instead simply attributing them to the usual suspects 
of Maududi, Qutb and other leading Islamist thinkers. This is not unusual for works purporting 
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to engage with the ideology of the DI or JI. Numerous scholars will correctly note that thinkers 
such as Ibn Taymiyya and Abdullah Azzam played some role in developing the JI’s ideology, but 
only insofar as name dropping those thinkers or very superficially outlining the content of a belief 
or set of beliefs. 
 
The DI and Islam 
 
The debate among scholars of the JI tends to revolve around the degree to which they see Islamist 
ideas as indigenously produced or the product of foreign ideologues and experiences. By contrast, 
those writing about DI, particularly its initial manifestation as a rebellion or insurgency, have 
tended to downplay the role of Islam or ideology more generally in the conflict.  
 
Research on the group in this phase is significantly less developed, with only a handful of 
individuals publishing on the subject. Cornelis van Dijk’s Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The 
Darul Islam in Indonesia, published in 1981 remains the only academic text to offer an assessment 
of the movement across Indonesia. Edward Aspinall’s Islam and Nation, Karl Jackson’s Traditional 
Authority, Islam and Rebellion, and Hiroko Horikoshi’s article ‘The Dar-ul-Islam movement in West 
Java (1942-62): An experience in the historical process’, provide accounts of the rebellions in Aceh 
and West Java respectively. There has been little significant academic research on Darul Islam 
fighters in South Sulawesi.  
 
Nevertheless, these partial accounts of the rebellions as well as van Dijk’s book argue that the 
rebellion was not motivated by a religious ideology, but rather ‘opposition to the increasingly 
pervasive influence of the Central Government’ and a ‘conflict over territorial autonomy’.218 
Jackson, for example, claims that participants of the conflict were more likely to be ‘mobilized by 
an appeal to traditional authority than to ideology, economic interests, or even basic value 
differences’. 219 As discussed in the previous chapter, Van Dijk offers a marginally more generous 
interpretation of the role of Islam, arguing that while it was a motivating factor, the content of the 
religious beliefs of DI leaders and followers was insufficiently puritanical and did not ‘[live] up to 
the standards of orthodox Islam’.220 However, his assessment of the nature of the beliefs of leaders 
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like Kartosuwiryo was not grounded in any of Kartosuwiryo’s own words, but instead relied 
entirely on hearsay spread by his critics that he allegedly engaged in mystical Javanese practices.  
 
Thus far, only Chiara Formichi’s work, Islam and the Making of a Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political 
Islam in 20th Century Indonesia has successfully challenged this reductive narrative. Formichi 
convincingly argues that by ‘failing to take seriously the role of religion’, many scholars have missed 
its role in conferring legitimacy on rebel leaders, motivating recruitment and of a genuine desire 
among large swathes of the population to create an Islamic state.221 Most importantly, she appeared 
to be the first scholar to engage with Kartosuwiryo’s writings as a PSI newspaper editor through 
to his political pamphlets and eventual declarations as leader of the NII. As such, she successfully 
‘[brought] religion back into the analysis’ of the movement through Kartosuwiryo’s writings and 
framing of his anti-colonial movement.222  
 
Political Islam in Indonesia 
 
A full account of the political Islamic landscape in Indonesian in the twentieth century would fill 
several books. Given Indonesia’s size and diversity, it should be no surprise that Islamist 
movements run across the Indonesian political spectrum. While this thesis’ focuses on the most 
violent, it is important to remember that the vast majority of Islamic groups are not, and use the 
ballot box and civic activism to promote their cause.  
 
M.C. Ricklef’s masterful Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: c.1930 to the Present provides the most 
comprehensive overview of the developments and groups that have attempted to drive political 
change in Indonesia without resorting to violence. The country’s oldest mass Islamic organisations, 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the Revival of Islamic Scholars), are the leading 
examples of this non-violent approach to Islamic activism. Founded in 1912 in Yogayakarta, 
Muhammadiyah ‘grew to become the foremost Modernist Islamic organisation in Indonesia’.223 
While keen to promote the view that Islam should be purified through a return to understanding 
the faith directly from its original Qur’anic scripture, rather than through interpretations in the 
four Sunni schools of law, the organisation has holistically ‘eschewed political involvement’.224 
Instead, Muhammadiyah’s leaders believe that they could best influence Indonesian Muslims and 
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purify their faith through the provision of education and social services. They had not been without 
success; by the mid-2000s the organisation had 25 to 30 million members.225  
 
In many ways, Muhammadiyah’s mirror is NU, which was formed in 1926 to defend 
Traditionalism in response to the rise of Modernism. Traditionalists believe that Islamic laws 
should include interpretations beyond Qur’anic scripture and be ‘sensitive to social conditions’.226 
They are also largely tolerant of local Javanese practices and frequently ‘[defended] religious 
practices under attack from reformers’.227 While initially based in Java, NU has become Indonesia’s 
largest Islamic organisation. 
 
In addition to Muhammadiyah and NU, smaller Islamic political organisations sprung up during 
the interwar period. These include Sarekat Islam (which will be examined separately in Chapter 1) 
and Persatuan Islam (Persis, Islamic Union), which was established in Bandung West Java in 1923. 
Persis argued against growing communist forces in Indonesia, claiming that the ideology was 
incompatible with Islam. The group also fomented anti-Christian sentiment.228 Persis’ leadership 
appears to have thrived on entrenching social cleavages within Indonesian society, and issued 
numerous polemics about the various threats to Indonesian Muslims.  
 
As Kevin Fogg notes, the rise of Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis and Sarekat Islam in the early 
twentieth century illustrated both the increased organisation of pious Muslims as well as the 
politicisation of Islam in Indonesia.229 These groups appear to have responded to growing 
concerns among Indonesian Muslims who felt the need to safeguard their beliefs against an array 
of forces. Fogg argues that these groups ‘connected Muslims to co-religionists beyond their village 
in a concerted way’, introducing them to a national, or potentially global, community and 
fundamentally changing the practice of Islam in Indonesia.230   
 
Opportunities for participation in formal politics during Dutch colonial rule were obviously 
limited. While Muhammadiyah was seemingly content to avoid participation in formal politics after 
independence, many other Islamic political movements were keen to try their hand at governance. 
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Numerous Islamic political parties, including NU, Masyumi – an amalgamation of Islamic political 
parties established during the Japanese occupation in 1943 – and PSI, participated in the country’s 
first elections in 1955.  
 
Despite their enthusiasm, Islamic political parties got slightly less than 44 percent of the vote.231  
This turned out to be the high point of electoral success for Islamic political parties. Greg Fealy, 
Virginia Hooker and Sally White make the important observation that throughout Indonesia’s 
history ‘Islam’s impact upon politics and the state…has been far less than its statistical dominance 
might suggest’.232 While Indonesian Muslims make up nearly 87% of the population, the country’s 
Islamic parties have never bested this performance in subsequent general elections, ‘nor have they 
succeeded in their efforts to Islamise’ the nation.233 
 
Formal political participation grew increasingly difficult for Islamic political parties in the 1960s, 
70s and 80s. Sukarno’s embrace of authoritarianism and turn to ‘Guided Democracy’ in 1957 and 
Suharto’s subsequent coup reduced the ability of Islamic parties to have any input in government. 
Sukarno disbanded Masyumi in 1960 and in 1973 forced the merger four Islamic political parties 
to create the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party). According to 
Fealy, Hooker and White, the regime ‘stripped the party of its Islamic symbols and content’.  234 
 
In 1982, Sukarno went on to decree that all Indonesian organisation should have ‘only a single 
ideological foundation which must, of course, be Pancasila’.235 Most organisations had little choice 
but to cooperate. NU, for example, accepted these realities and chose to compromise with the 
state. In 1983, the organisation withdrew from the PPP and opted to retreat from parliamentary 
politics, returning ‘to the original socio-religious purpose of the organisation’.236   
 
Nevertheless, Suharto’s repression had unintended consequences for political Islam in Indonesia. 
While he successfully throttled formal political participation, Islamist groups had significant 
success in spreading their message through grassroots organisations. The 1970s and 1980s saw the 
rise of ‘campus Islam’, with numerous university-based movements arising including the Gerakan 
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Tarbiyah (Education Movement), Hizbut Tahrir (Liberation Party) and Jemaah Tabligh (Preaching 
Community).237 Revivalist movements like DDII, which is examined more fully in Chapter 3, and 
the Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (LDII) were established in 1976 and 1982 respectively.238 
These movements promoted a Modernist worldview, publishing, sharing and facilitating the 
discussion of texts from clerics based predominantly in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The campus 
organisations in particular modelled themselves on the cell structure pioneered by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt. They prioritised dakwah, often promoting the faith in small group settings, 
thus avoiding close scrutiny by state authorities.  
 
By the time the Suharto regime collapsed in 1998, many of these groups, notably Hizbut Tahrir, 
had established far-reaching networks across the country as well as links with branches abroad. 
According to Ken Ward, Hizbut Tahrir was able to fully exploit the democratic freedoms on offer 
in the immediate aftermath of 1998.239 In contrast to the DI and JI, the group has been able to 
conduct a ‘sustained, peaceful campaign to convince Indonesia’s Muslim population of the need 
for a caliphate’ and the imposition of Islamic law.240  
 
The group has also managed to achieve significant influence in state organisations such as Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of the Ulamas), has staged effective campaigns against 
minority Muslim groups like the Ahmadiyahs, and helped to promulgate conservative laws 
targeting religious and sexual minorities.241 In many respects, Hizbut Tahrir and other radical, non-
violent organisations in Indonesia today have had far more impact on Islamising society that DI 
or JI ever did.  
 
Sources and Methodology 
 
Charting the ideological history of a clandestine, militant group is unsurprisingly difficult. The 
ongoing nature of militant Islamism in Indonesia makes it an especially sensitive topic that must 
be approached with due regard for the privacy of DI members and participants in conflicts, 
possible interference by the Indonesian state, and pragmatic considerations of physical security. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that many of the members of these organisations are still alive, with 
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some living in a legal grey area due to their participation in conflicts abroad or in illegal activities 
in Indonesia itself.  
 
Given these circumstances and the fact that the DI operated as a clandestine organisation, this 
study is fundamentally limited to interviews with group members and to their writings, sermons, 
and other non-archival sources. These must often be assessed carefully since they are, by nature, 
works of propaganda. As a highly hierarchical and secretive movement, the group obviously did 
not maintain a structured archive. Moreover, many DI members, even senior figures, did not have 
access to records, if any were kept, nor were they privy to all facets of the organisation.  
 
This incomplete record is compounded by a lack of access to information stored in conventional 
archives much of the government’s assessments of the DI and militant Islamist activity remain 
largely classified. The available government records – namely military documents regarding 
surveillance and encounters with DI militants, interrogations conducted by police officers, and 
court transcripts of indicted DI members – are also deeply problematic having been created by an 
authoritarian regime subject to limited legal oversight and scrutiny. 
 
Resultantly, this thesis has balanced fragmentary – and frequently contradictory – sources against 
one other to piece together a cohesive picture of the organisation’s ideology. Indeed, this thesis’ 
methodology is part of its originality. It employs a comprehensive assessment of the oral histories 
of DI members and non-archival sources such as sermons and texts produced by the group. These 
are supplemented by traditional archival sources produced by the government, military, non-
violent political organisations, and newspapers, that fill in the gaps and provide context for the 
documentary evidence created by DI members. Bolstering traditional historical research methods, 




In order to clearly assess how ideas were formed and developed by DI leaders, this thesis relies on 
non-archival documents produced by the organisation itself. These included websites hosting 
collections of Kartosuwiryo’s writings and DI’s foundational documents, autobiographies (or 
hagiographies) published by DI or JI members, and translated collections of key Islamist 
ideologues primarily based in the Middle East. 
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Much of this material was explicitly designed as propaganda to inspire followers, recruit and 
radicalise new members, or justify the group’s actions. Resultantly, it is clearly biased to favour the 
organisation’s, and particularly the leadership’s, point of view. While this would make them 
problematic sources for assessing an organisation’s actions, this thesis focuses on how the DI’s 
ideas were created and altered over time. As such, these obvious biases do not prevent the 
documents from providing insight into how DI leaders understood and sought to present the 
group’s worldview to lower ranking members and to outsiders. Whether or not the beliefs 
presented in this material reflect real material conditions is inconsequential insofar as this project 
is concerned with assessing the leadership’s internal struggles over its belief structure.  
 
Another challenge posed by the sources is that much of the material created by DI leaders can 
only be found online. For example, speeches and pamphlets written by Kartosuwiryo during his 
time as a member of PSII and Masyumi have not been maintained by traditional archives but 
instead hosted on blogs, social media accounts, and websites run by individuals who appear to 
support establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. The identities of those running these sites, their 
affiliations, and their motivations are difficult to ascertain. Nor is it clear how they obtained these 
pamphlets or transcripts of speeches.  
 
As such, this material must be approached with care in order to ascertain its authenticity and 
trustworthiness. This thesis attempts to overcome some of these limitations by using multiple 
websites, rather than just a single source, to obtain the same document. While it is possible that all 
of these sites are sharing the same erroneous or falsified documents, these odds are lowered by 
cross-checking sites run by a variety of users. Additionally, ascertaining the credibility of these sites 
was another means by which these sources could be verified. Highly trafficked websites or social 
media pages provided some assurance that outright forgeries would be spotted, or at least debated 
and discussed. Furthermore, if these sites hosted some documents that could be checked against 
physical copies, this again improved the probability that the other sources were legitimate. Finally, 
some of this material can be verified through some secondary sources, which reference the same 
content, and may quote identical passages.  
 
While there is no fool-proof method for ascertaining whether sources found online are real and 
authentic, this thesis is ultimately interested in investigating the trends and debates about the DI’s 
core ideological concepts. Although an individual source, like a pamphlet, may not be wholly 
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accurate, it is unlikely to deviate significantly or undermine the trends found in more substantive 
sources produced by the organisation, nor challenge an overarching trend.  
 
Some key documents were also obtained from the Islamic publishing industry affiliated with DI 
and JI in Jakarta. These publishing houses are small businesses, often run by individuals, that 
market their wares on Instagram and blogs and sell books via e-commerce websites like Tokopedia 
or small bookshops called toko kitabs. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report 
published in 2008, these publishers are mainly based in the city of Solo and are not directly run by 
either group. Instead, they function as a loose syndicate, publishing material from a wide variety 
of Islamic viewpoints. They appear to be motivated more by a desire to conduct dakwah 
(proselytisation) than by a profit motive.242 Indeed, these publishers often produce books in small 
quantities for limited periods. Few, if any, ship oversees, often confining themselves to their local 
communities. This requires researchers to either have considerable luck in being close by when a 
book is released or to have a network within the community which is willing to purchase the book 
and hold on to it until a research trip can be arranged and the material collected. Resultantly, 
sourcing books from the time period under consideration was often not possible.  
 
Popular texts such as Tarbiyah Jihadiyah (Jihad Education), the collected writings and lectures of 
Abdullah Azzam, are still in print and easy to obtain. The twelve-volume text is particularly 
significant both because Azzam was an important figure in global Islamist militant ideology, and 
because his role in the Afghan jihad and personal interactions with Indonesian fighters who trained 
in the camps during the conflict mean that his writings had an outsized impact on the DI’s belief 
structure in the 1980s. Furthermore, the collection was published by Al-Alaq, a publishing house 
established by Ikhsan Miarso, the JI wakalah (territorial subunit) commander of Solo and a former 
Afghanistan veteran. Al-Alaq has been responsible for the publication of texts that make up the 
core curriculum of JI pesantrens and training programmes, thus providing some insights into the 
key influences on the group’s ideology.  
 
While these texts are useful in understanding the sources that made major contributions to 
Indonesian militant thought, Martin van Bruinessen notes that the majority of the nine hundred 
or so kitab kuning (religious texts) used in pesantren curricula across the country are small (quarto-
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sized) and unbound, with only a fraction available in print from the publishers.243 Furthermore, it 
is unclear which of these smaller texts were used in DI-affiliated pesantrens and considered 
significant by teachers. In interviews, DI members who taught or were schooled in these institutes 
remembered the titles of major works by high-profile foreign salafi ideologues, but few recalled the 
names of these kitab kunings or suggested they were significant in comparison to the well-known 
thinkers such as Maududi or Qutb. As such, this thesis can only speak to DI’s thought as shaped 
by these more established texts. This is not necessarily problematic since the writings of DI leaders 
indeed reflect this bias towards these famous ideologues, but it must be acknowledged that some 
nuance in the assessment of its ideology is potentially lost without the input of these smaller texts.  
 
Finally, this thesis relies on autobiographies written by DI and JI members. These works are usually 
published by the same set of Islamist publishers with relatively small print runs. Popular works are 
readily available and remain in print today, including Aku Melawan Teroris (I Fight the Terrorists) 
and Satu Jihad Sejuta Vonis: Mengungkap Al Haq Menghalau Al-Batil (One Jihad One Million Verdicts: 
Revealing the Truth and Banishing the Wrong) by Imam Samudra, and Mimpi Suci Di Balik Jeruji 
Besi (A Sacred Dream Behind Bars) by Mukhlas (alias Ali Ghufron, alias Huda bin Abdul Haq), 
another JI member convicted for his role in organising the Bali bombings. However, works by 
low-profile members are difficult to obtain after their initial print run since these small publishers, 
with their precarious financial model, are unlikely to be willing or able to stock publications that 
did not sell. As such, it is important not to overstate the importance of any one of these texts, 
which may represent only that particular individual’s belief structure. However, taken collectively, 
the works still provide a shared understanding of the group’s ideology and the trends and concepts 
that preoccupied its members at a given point.  
 
These works were often written while their authors were in detention and provide insight into 
their understanding of concepts such as jihad. They also offer first-hand accounts of their 
experiences travelling to Pakistan and Afghanistan to train in the camps during the late 1980s. As 
with any memoir, particularly one designed to also function as propaganda, these works can be 
blighted by inaccurate memories, outright dishonesty, and retrospective bias, whereby accounts 
are influenced by later events or developments. As such, they must be approached with some 
scepticism and a clear understanding of their intended purpose. For example, Imam Samudra and 
Mukhlas are prone to overstating their friendships and connections to more famous militants like 
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Osama bin Laden or Abdullah Azzam, and embellishing their combat experience and bravery. 
However, these are easily clarified or challenged in interviews with other DI members who were 
also present at the time. Despite these flaws, these works give some sense of what motivated these 
individuals; their understanding of the movement’s ideological precepts; and what they read and 




In addition to these non-archival written sources, this thesis relies extensively on oral histories in 
order to fully understand and assess the ideology of DI. Like memoirs, oral histories are potentially 
marred by faulty recollections of events, retrospective bias, lies, or an unwillingness to discuss the 
full scope of an event with someone the interviewee does not fully trust. Nevertheless, given the 
clandestine nature of the organisation, the lack of a traditional archive, and the fragmented nature 
of the available published documents, oral histories are essential to fill in the gaps on the record.  
 
This thesis relies on the testimonies of a dozen DI members, the vast majority of whom were 
active in the 1980s and 1990s, and most of whom defected to JI in 1993. Interviews were often 
conducted with the same interviewee more than once in order to build trust, to gain nuance and 
further details, and to ascertain the consistency of their responses. All of the interviewees had 
experience in speaking with either journalists or academic researchers, and so were familiar with 
the ethics conventions for obtaining consent, indicating when comments were on or off the 
record, and requesting anonymity. Even so, time was taken to repeatedly clarify the differences 
between journalistic and academic practices, particularly around the purposes of the interview, the 
intended readership, and the scope of the research agenda. 
 
While efforts were made to interview more of the older members and those that stayed with DI, 
these interviews were few and far between due to the difficulties of building trust, finding suitable 
interlocutors to make introductions, and the time constraints imposed during research trips. As 
such, the biases of those who were interviewed must be weighed carefully to reflect their 
allegiances and thus interpretation of events, particularly those relating to the DI’s breakup.  
 
The hierarchical nature of the organisation means that this thesis prioritises the perspectives of 
leaders and senior members of the organisation over lower-ranking personnel, which goes some 
way in accounting for the small number of interviewees. While the absence of regular members’ 
 83 
voices may pose problems for accurately assessing how the ideology was received more widely, DI 
– and Islamist militant organisations in general – was not a particularly plural or democratic 
organisation. The creation and dissemination of the group’s belief structure was almost exclusively 
the responsibility of leaders like Kartosuwiryo, or at broadest a small cabal. While the insights of 
junior members and their personal interpretation of the ideology imposed from on high are 
interesting, this ultimately lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
In addition to these interviews, this thesis relies on an archive of sermons recorded by Abdullah 
Sungkar in the 1980s. As Charles Hirschkind notes, ‘Islamic cassette sermons are commonly 
associated with the underworld of militants and radical preachers’, serving as ‘a tool of ideological 
indoctrination and a vehicle for the transmission of militant directives’.244 This is because 
recordings are able to ‘proliferate beneath the radar of law enforcement’ and are a powerful means 
of disseminating  messages since ‘sermon listening recruits the body in its entirety, requiring one 
to pay attention’ and respond to the rhetoric.245  
 
Islamic scholars (and indeed ordinary Muslims) have engaged in an oral tradition since the advent 
of the religion, through sermons, music, and recitations of the Qur’an among others. Cassette 
sermons are not only a continuation of these traditions but an important means by which those 
without those without access to formal education can engage with ideas and arguments in Islam. 
As Hirschkind points out, this has often led elites to look down on cassette tape sermons due to  
‘their association with the lower classes’ and the assumed risk that they might manipulate and 
exploit of these individuals.246   
 
 Since the 1970s, the production and consumption of sermon tapes has been widespread among 
Islamic revivalists, militant or otherwise, as a ‘vehicle of contestation’.247 These types of sermons 
flourished in Egypt, pioneered by preachers such as Abd al-Hamid Kishk, who forged new 
relationships with their congregants and potential congregants through the mass production and 
commoditisation of his sermons.248 As state control extended over religious institutions in Egypt, 
the ability to record oneself gave preachers the opportunity – regardless of whether they wanted 
to critique the state or not – to avoid oversight and establish a direct relationship with listeners.  
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A comparison can easily be made with Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s as the Suharto 
government cracked down on Islamists’ participation in political life and pushed for ideological 
hegemony through the promotion of the state ideology of Pancasila. This centralisation of religious 
authority, coupled with greater control over the dissemination of mass media, likely made the 
recording of sermons one of the few means by which preachers critical of the state could reach 
their followers and spread their messages.249   
 
Moreover, the cassettes give listeners significant options as to when and how to engage with 
sermons. Hirschkind writes that the tapes ‘may be listened to alone in the relative silence of one’s 
bedroom or in aurally saturated environments’ outside.250 Listeners have the ability to curate their 
experience by absorbing their preachers words well beyond sitting in a mosque. As such, the tapes 
potentially have the power to reach and influence listeners more effectively as listeners can pick 
moments where they are most amenable to receiving its messages.  
 
Sungkar’s recordings should be seen as part of this tradition within Islamic revivalism. His 
sermons, replete with personal asides, the occasional joke, and passionate denunciations of the 
state, not only provide listeners with insights into his worldview, but serve as a form of 
entertainment. They are engaging and compelling sources. This is enhanced by the fact that 
listening is a deeply personal activity, which helps to forge an intimacy with the speaker and gives 
his thoughts authenticity and immediacy.  
 
Ultimately, these sermons, which largely cover issues of personal behaviour, are some of the only 
sources that give a direct account of Sungkar’s beliefs since, as noted in the introduction, he did 
not appear to write much down and expressed a preference for the oral transmission of his 
thoughts. Though largely undated, references to contemporary events suggest that they were 
recorded before his flight into exile in Malaysia in 1985.  
 
Matters are further complicated by the fact that the sermons are hosted on the Internet Archive 
(archive.org). This website aims to be a digital library providing ‘Universal Access to All 
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Knowledge’, and allows any individual with an account to upload material.251 While several 
interviewees (and other researchers familiar with Sungkar) have attested to the veracity of the 
recordings, it is unclear who uploaded this material, how they obtained it, and why they uploaded 
it. Even so, the tapes provide us with the clearest view of Sungkar’s understanding of hākimiyya, 




Finally, this thesis relied on conventional archives in Indonesia to ground the analysis of the DI’s 
ideology. These archives often acted as supporting rather than principal sources of DI leaders’ 
interpretations of their ideological tenets by virtue of being run by the Indonesian state, which 
unsurprisingly centred its own beliefs and perspectives rather than those of the insurgent force it 
fought to destroy.  
 
Moreover, individual ministries and institutions – particularly those involved in domestic and 
foreign security operations – have significant discretion over the management and release of their 
archival files. For example, many documents relating to the DI during its early years as an 
insurgency under Kartosuwiryo and the government operations against it remain classified in the 
military archives. Police and military records relating to the group’s subsequent incarnation as a 
clandestine militant group, including those covering the surveillance of its members, potential co-
optation and alliances, and security operations targeting DI personnel, have also not been released. 
Nevertheless, government archives do contain some documents written by DI leaders themselves, 
thus giving us an opportunity to hear from these men in their own words.  
 
The Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia’s (PNRI, National Library of the Republic of 
Indonesia) periodical collection was of huge relevance to this thesis, housing a nearly complete 
collection of Fadjar Asia, a PSI publication. Kartosuwiryo began writing for the paper on 2 April 
1928 as a regular columnist before becoming editor a year later. He published his final piece in 
May 1930. Over this brief period, he published over 120 pieces, mainly on the need for 
independence and the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The articles are the earliest 
surviving writings by Kartosuwiryo and show his early political development within PSI and the 
non-violent Indonesian Islamist movement. Moreover, these pieces form the basis for his thinking 
on the concept of hākimiyya, the key tennet of the DI movement’s belief system.  
 
251 Internet Archive, ‘About’, https://archive.org/about/, Date Accessed: 21 March 2020 
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Similarly, the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI, National Archive of the Republic of 
Indonesia) in Jakarta provided significant resources for understanding the initial phases of the DI 
movement. The Pemerintah Darurat RI, 1948-1949 (Emergency Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia, 1948-1949), the Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia Serikat, 1949-1950 (Cabinet of the 
President of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, 1949-1950), and the Kabinet Presiden, 
1950-1959 (Presidential Cabinet, 1950-1959) collections held key documents published by DI as 
the group concretised its formation. These include its founding constitution and penal code and 
illustrate how Kartosuwiryo sought to realise his ideology. While the vast majority of the records 
in these boxes were available, some appeared to have not been declassified or are simply missing. 
However, the catalogue suggests these were documents related to the government’s response to 
the movement, rather than materials authored by Kartosuwiryo or other DI members. 
 
Finally, a small selection of supporting files were obtained from the Arsip Angkatan Bersendjata 
Republik Indonesia (AABRI, Military Archives of the Republic of Indonesia) archive. These were 
interrogation depositions of several of Kartosuwiryo’s subordinates between August and October 
1982. While they mainly contain accounts of the operations allegedly conducted by the suspects, 
they provide a small glimpse into their motivations and beliefs as the men justify their actions to 
their interrogators.  
 
However, these sources are only useful in limited circumstances. First, they provide only a small 
snapshot of the whole investigation since most of the documents associated with the arrests and 
portions of the interrogation remained classified for security purposes. Second the information 
contained within must be treated with great care as it was likely gathered under significant duress 
or even torture. This need not render the source wholly illegitimate, but it requires further work 










Chapter 1 | Hākimiyya: The Need for An Islamic State of Indonesia, 1928-1949 
 
The Qur’an states that there are two acceptable sources of legitimate political authority. Firstly, 
authority resides with the Prophet Muhammad due to God’s anointment of him as His chosen 
and loyal messenger.252 In addition to this designation, the Prophet’s authority flows from the free 
covenant (bay’ah) made by his followers, who pledged to ‘obey God and obey the Prophet’.253 
However, in the absence of the Prophet’s physical rule, Muslim thinkers in recent centuries have 
had to grapple with the question of how the umma could manifest God’s sovereignty on earth.   
 
These questions took on considerable urgency for Islamists in the nineteenth century with the 
advent of European colonialism and the decline of the Ottoman caliphate. The Islamic modernists, 
the most important thinkers of which were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and 
Muhammad Rashid Rida, led the intellectual effort to revitalise political and legal thought among 
Muslim scholars, in the hope of creating strong states that maintained their ‘nation’s religion, 
culture, laws and language, and its national character’.254 As discussed in the introduction, their 
works had a profound impact on global Islamist thought, shaping anti-colonial discourse and 
influencing the structure of independent Islamic states.  
 
This chapter examines the Kartosuwiryo’s understanding and application of the concept of 
hākimiyya to the Indonesian political context from his beginnings as an Islamist politician in 1928 
to his decision to establish the NII in 1949. While Kartosuwiryo did not explicitly use the word  
hākimiyya, the ideas he promoted and described align closely with the popular conceptualisation of 
the term as developed and advanced by Rida, Maududi, and Qutb. Resultantly, despite the term’s 
absence from his writings in this period, it is nevertheless the most relevant concept to summarise 
his beliefs on the necessity of constructing an Islamic state to ensure the primacy of God in the 
temporal realm. He argued that only through living in a totalising religious state, guided by shari’a 
and Islamic legislative structures could Indonesian Muslims lead lives truly in line with their faith.  
 
This chapter then explores the impact of Islamic Modernism on his understanding of the term 
during a period when major events, including the Japanese occupation in 1942 and the Indonesian 
Revolution against the re-imposition of Dutch colonial rule between 1945 to 1949, cemented his 
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belief in the need for an Islamic state in Indonesia. This chapter’s overarching claim is that 
Kartosuwiryo was primarily motivated by a desire to protect Islam and secure hākimiyya through 
the creation of an Islamic state and enactment and enforcement of shari’a. The implementation of 
God’s sovereignty on earth thus formed the central tenet of the DI’s belief structure.  
 
This chapter argues that Kartosuwiryo believed that Muslims could only truly realise their faith in 
the temporal realm and secure their passage to the afterlife by living in an Islamic state governed 
by shari’a. Securing God’s sovereignty ensured Muslims’ temporal empowerment, allowing them 
to live free from the oppression of foreign forces, including colonialism and Western culture. It 
advances the argument that Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of an Islamic state in Indonesia 
became less welcoming and inclusive over time. The establishment of the NII marked the 
culmination of this trend, with Kartosuwiryo believing that Islam could only thrive when free from 
foreign influence. Finally, this chapter posits that Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of an Islamic state 
was grounded in territorial nationalism rather than pan-Islamism. 
 
These arguments will be presented in three sections. The chapter will begin with a brief 
examination of hākimiyya in the Islamist thought of the nineteenth century and its adoption by 
Islamists in the Dutch East Indies in early 1900s. Building on this understanding, it will go on to 
show how Kartosuwiryo interpreted hākimiyya during his years as an Islamist activist as part of the 
Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, SI) movement. Finally, it will examine how his understanding of 
hākimiyya was shaped by periods of significant conflict with the Japanese, Dutch and finally, the 
Indonesian Republic, resulting in the creation of the NII. In this way, this chapter demonstrates 
why many scholars’ failure to consider the role of religion and specifically, the conceptualisation 
of hākimiyya, in the history of the DI has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the group and 
the development of Indonesian militant Islamism.  
 
Hākimiyya in nineteenth and twentieth century Islamist thought 
 
Hākimiyya refers to the concept of realising and securing God’s sovereignty in the political system. 
As noted in the introduction Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi was the primary contributor to the 
development of this concept. He came to believe that the absence of God and religion at the centre 
of a political system results in ‘tyranny, despotism, intemperance, unlawful exploitation, and 
inequality’.255 At a minimum, achieving hākimiyya requires the creation of a state governed through 
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Islamic institutions and an Islamic legal system, with citizens abiding by shari’a. Beyond ensuring 
that the rule of God was assured – viewed as a good in its own right – hākimiyya would allow 
Muslims to freely live pious lives, ensuring their temporal security and eternal salvation. An Islamic 
state would, in short, ensure both the spiritual and the physical security of Muslims, guarding 
against both foreign domination and un-Islamic forces. 
 
Hākimiyya and the Modernists 
 
While hākimiyya was popularised and developed significantly by Maududi in the early twentieth 
century, it has a longer intellectual history. In his most famous work, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (The 
Ordinances of Government), the tenth century Iraqi jurist Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi advanced the 
notion that Muslims had an obligation to secure God’s rule on earth. He wrote that hākimiyya 
‘[means] to protect the right of God that we have been entrusted with against His enemies’.256  The 
thirteenth century scholar Ibn Tayimiyya similarly argued that state power and faith in God could 
not be separated, writing that it was ‘a duty to consider the [state] as a form of religion’.257 Building 
on the arguments advanced by Mawardi, he wrote that it was necessary not only to protect God’s 
will but that ‘when state and religion are completely engaged… perfect spiritual and temporal 
prosperity is ensured’.258   
 
Advancing these ideas, the modernist like al-Afghani, ‘Abduh, and Rida, contributed significantly 
to the development of how hākimiyya would be discussed and approached by Islamists in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The modernists’ ideas emerged in a period of significant 
international upheaval, which saw the decline of long-established Muslim empires and the rise of 
the Westphalian system of states. The relative weakness of traditional Muslim-majority societies in 
the international system, and the establishment of Western-backed, non-Islamic regimes in much 
of the Muslim world has persisted into the twentieth and twenty first centuries. As such, many 
contemporary Islamists still believe that the modernists’ depictions and diagnosis of – as well as 
solutions to – the problems afflicting their societies remain relevant today.  
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At its core, the mission of Islamic modernism was to revive Islamic societies so that they could 
resist further invasion and potentially free themselves from infidel colonial domination. The 
modernists advocated the renewal of Islamic societies through internal reforms of the religion, its 
practices and outlook. Afghani led this charge, arguing that sclerotic, orthodox methods of Islamic 
education had ‘tried to stifle science and stop its progress…thus halting the philosophical or 
intellectual movement’ and needed to be upended.259  
 
His disciple, ‘Abduh, advances these principles, advocating ijtihād (independent reasoning), 
particularly for jurists making legal decisions, so as to return to the Qur’an and hadith rather than 
relying on imitations and orthodox interpretations.260 Rida, a student of ‘Abduh’s, furthered this, 
arguing that the Qur’an and hadith should serve as the primary guides for understanding Islam, 
claiming that the four Sunni schools of legal thought did not provide anything more than dogma.261 
The men argued that centuries without religious reform had ultimately led to ‘laziness’ and national 
weakness, which had facilitated Muslim societies’ domination by European colonialists.262 As such, 
their movement attempted to free Islam from orthodoxies that stymied the ability of its clerical 
class and its adherents to thrive in the modern world.  
 
The modernists’ support for internal reform was coupled with a desire to reform Muslim societies 
externally, thus facilitating socio-political change. To that end, the men advocated pan-Islamism, 
arguing that Western imperialism could only be effectively resisted through Muslim unity. Rida in 
particular saw pan-Islamism as a means by which Muslims could ‘protect the moral boundaries of 
the community of Muslims and the political independence of the holy cities in the face of the 
power of empire’.263 Similarly, Afghani and ‘Abduh saw colonialism as a destructive force that 
‘heightened a sense of difference among Muslims of different client states’, and led to the growth 
of nationalist ideologies.264 ‘Abduh did not believe that a true sense of solidarity and kinship could 
be achieved on the basis of these ‘material’ beliefs, which would only result in groups trying to 
destroy others.265 He argued that these divisions could only be overcome if Muslims renounced 
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these false allegiances and formed ‘a new Islamic solidarity, creating a single umma and desiring 
only the protection and preservation of the sharī’a’.266   
 
This spirit of renewal, anti-colonialism, and Islamic solidarity underpinned the modernist 
conceptualisation of hākimiyya. In the eyes of the Modernists, an Islamic polity – be it a state or a 
revived, Pan-Islamic caliphate – was necessary ‘as a means of power and safety’ for Muslims that 
would ensure the protection of their faith.267 In their vision, this polity would incorporate elements 
of European scientific progress and enquiry, but use them to build a bulwark against secularism.  
 
Of the three leading Modernists, it was Rida who devoted the most attention to the question of 
what an Islamic state would actually look like. In his treatise, Al-khilāfah aw’al-imāmat ‘al-uzmā (the 
Caliphate or Supreme Imamate), Rida cited numerous hadiths and ijmā (a consensus of Islamic legal 
scholars on a point of law) to contend that Muslims had an obligation to pursue the creation of 
such a state.268 Rida argued that a true caliphate had only existed under the Rashidun caliphs, 
claiming that the subsequent corruption of the ulama had contributed to Islamic societies’  failure 
to flourish in later eras.269 As such, the paucity of candidates who would meet the requirements of 
a leader in the mould of the Rashidun would make the revival of a modern caliphate difficult.270   
 
Given these constraints, Hamid Enayat argues that Rida’s innovation was to advocate instead for 
an independent al-hukūmat al-Islāmiyyah (Islamic state) rather than a traditional emirate or wilayat 
(province run by a governor) which is usually associated with a caliphate in some form, in line with 
the new nation-states of his day.271 While this distinction was not clearly outlined, Rida saw the 
creation of an Islamic state as a middle path to enabling Muslims to live in societies governed by 
shari’a, which he believed would be sufficiently flexible to allow for ‘legal renovation’ and thus 
capable of ‘coping with the growing complexity of modern life’.272 In attempting to adapt an 
Islamic polity for the modern age, Rida, building on the works of his predecessors, provided a 
blueprint for Islamic nationalists around the world to copy or adapt to their own circumstances. 
In drafting this treatise, Rida argued that Muslims had a religious duty to establish a structure that 
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implemented and enforced shari’a and was governed by Islamic institutions and led by Muslims, 
since this was crucial for the community’s temporal and spiritual well-being. 
 
Maududi and Qutb 
 
Maududi contributed significantly to the development of the modern conceptualisation of 
hakimiyyah among Islamists. As noted in the introduction, he believed that Muslims now existed in 
a state of jāhiliyyah due to numerous transgressions in the practice of their faith, including their 
failure to promote and live under an Islamic state. Maududi had an expansive definition of what 
constituted un-Islamic practices, which be believed included ‘every course of action which runs 
counter to the Islamic culture, Islamic morals and conduct, or Islamic mentality’. Resultantly, his 
definition of jāhiliyyah solely meant any ‘ignorance towards God, His Prophet, and the revelation, 
or the pre-Islamic period of “lawlessness”’.273  
 
In particular, Maududi saw the promulgation of man-made laws, as a contravention of shari’a and 
thus a failure to obey God. Moreover, be believed that men declaring themselves rulers and 
claiming authority through the ballot box or some other form of legitimation were ultimately 
usurping God’s place as the only true maker of laws and sole object of worship. These practices 
were akin to polytheism and thus shirk.274 Ultimately, Maududi made the case that secular regimes 
– or Islamic regimes that failed to live up to Islamic ideals – were both fundamentally 
contraventions of God’s will and also particularly exploitative towards Muslims since they would 
naturally lead to corruption and barbarism.275   
 
Maududi thus believed that the only way Muslims could practice pure Islam and end this state of 
jāhiliyyah was through the establishment of an Islamic state. Maududi’s conceptualisation of 
hākimiyya placed God’s absolute sovereignty at its core and required man’s unquestioning 
obedience.276  Maududi saw God’s primary function, ‘after calling the universe into being’, as being 
the issuing of rules and regulations.277 Resultantly, man must submit to these divine laws as a sign 
of devotion to, and worship of, God. In practice this meant not only following shari’a but ensuring 
its promulgation through a caliph and caliphate. The Islamic state served as a conduit through 
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which God’s commands would flow to humanity. The caliph, as the trustee of God, would 
actualise God’s commands thus enabling Muslims to lead truly Islamic lives in the temporal 
realm.278 An Islamic state was thus a means of empowerment since Muslims would not be 
persecuted within their own societies but free to fully actualise their faith.279    
 
Maududi believed that hākimiyya could only truly be attained through jihad. Rather than confining 
his definition of the term to the defence of Islam or the protection of Muslims, he argued 
explicitly that Islam was a revolutionary force, meant to spread and ‘realise God’s ultimate 
sovereignty and subsequently man’s assigned place as God’s faithful servant’ across the world.280 
Resultantly, since living under God’s reign was the ultimate aim of any Muslim, it was incumbent 
upon them to help bring about an Islamic state. Maududi explicitly argued that jihad was the 
‘sixth, and besides, the Islamic creed, most important’ of the pillars of Islam as it was crucial to 
bringing about or expanding an Islamic state.281   
 
Sayyid Qutb read Maududi’s work extensively and, as explored in the introduction, held a similar 
view to Maududi regarding jāhiliyyah. Like Maududi, he believed that an Islamic state was essential 
for the successful practice of Islam, writing that ‘religion cannot be rightly practiced in isolation 
from society’. Muslims required a full ‘social legal and economic system’ because Islam was 
essentially a political religion.282 Qutb spelled out this political philosophy in Social Justice in Islam, 
arguing that ‘the theory of government in Islam is based on the testimony that there is no god but 
God’.283 As such, divinity belongs solely to God and those who profess their faith, ‘thereby confess 
that sovereignty (hakimiyyah) in human life belongs to God alone’.284  
 
Resultantly, Islam encompasses a faith and a state in one. As Sayed Khatab summarises, Qutb saw 
God as the ‘supreme legislator and ultimate source of governmental and legal authority’, with 
government ‘specifically designed to implement Islamic law’, and enforce God’s decrees.285 
Moreover, Qutb did not separate hakimiyyah from tauhid, arguing that a belief in God’s sovereignty 
‘over the universe, life and humanity is an integral part of tauhid’.286 As such, Qutb saw a belief in 
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hākimiyya as a fundamental component of belief in Islam, akin to the profession of faith.287 Man 
was thus compelled to worship and serve God through an adherence to his laws (shari’a) and the 
promulgation of this state.  In turn, an Islamic state grants Muslims complete and total religious 
freedom, allowing them to fulfil their obligations to their faith unmolested. 
 
More explicitly than Maududi, given this link with tauhid, Qutb entwined the idea of servitude or 
subjugation to God (‘ubudiyyah) closely with hakimiyyah. Because Muslims were required to submit 
to Allah as a profession of their faith, they were also compelled to submit to his sovereignty via 
obedience to Islamic laws and state structures.288 In doing so, Qutb makes it clear that the Muslim 
faith cannot be fully actualised without an Islamic state to serve, which underscores the necessity 
of creating or advancing one. In turn this renders jihad a fundamental principle as well, since ‘jihad 
is based on hākimiyyah’.289 Similar to Maududi, Qutb saw jihad as an obligation on all Muslims to 
bring about or protect an Islamic state as a manifestation of their belief in and devotion to God.  
 
The spread of Islamic Modernism in the Dutch East Indies  
 
In Indonesia, local Islamists saw clear parallels between the conditions described by the Modernists 
and their own colonial experience under Dutch rule. In a speech at al-Azhar University in 1958, 
the literary figure, politician, and cleric Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (known by his initials as 
Hamka), spoke of how the Modernists ‘made a contribution – and not a small one – to the 
development of the Indonesian people and the building of an Islamic spirit’, helping his 
countrymen to properly understand and practice their faith by ‘[fighting] stagnation and 
antiquation, and [combating] blind obedience’.290 Hamka argued that Indonesian independence 
was only achieved through stripping their faith of bid’a (heretical innovation) and emphasising a 
reliance on the Qur’an and hadith as the true source of understanding of Islam.  
 
The spread of Islamic modernism to Southeast Asia gained momentum in the early 1900s. 
According to M.C Ricklefs, between 8,000 to 15,000 residents of the Dutch East Indies journeyed 
to Mecca for the hajj (the pilgrimage made by Muslims to Mecca, and one of the five pillars of 
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Islam) each year between 1912 and 1930.291 In addition to the numerous publications produced by 
Modernists in the Middle East, the travellers were the ‘major vehicles for the spreading of 
Modernist ideas’.292 Both Ricklefs and Michael Laffan point out that the individuals who embarked 
on this arduous journey – and who consumed the literature produced by the ulama (religious 
scholars) – were generally wealthier, urban residents of the archipelago.293 As such, the spread of 
Modernism was generally confined to cities like Jakarta (then Batavia), Yogyakarta, and Surabaya.  
 
Many scholars and students from the islands also travelled to study in the intellectual centres of 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt in particular. They produced numerous publications such as al-Imam 
(primarily distributed in Singapore), al-Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta), and Pembela Islam (Bandung), 
in both Arabic and Malay, helping to spread the Modernists’ teachings to their co-religionists back 
in the Malay-Indonesian world.294 Al-Manar (The Beacon), the journal edited by ‘Abudh and Rida 
was also distributed widely in Southeast Asia, advancing ideas of Islamic community, the threat 
posed by Islamic orthodoxies and traditions, as well as anti-colonial themes.  
 
Alongside this burgeoning intellectual discourse came the formation of Islamic Modernist activist 
groups. In 1912, the Muhammadiyah movement was established in Yogyakarta by Ahman Dahlan. 
Influenced by ‘Abduh’s teachings, the movement created schools quickly spread to ‘almost all 
major cities and towns in Java’.295 The group promoted the Modernists’ teachings, emphasising a 
return to the foundational sources of Islam – the Qur’an and hadith –purifying Muslims’ 
understanding of their religion in Indonesia. However, in it is initial years, the group largely stayed 
out of politics, believing instead in the power of reforming the archipelago through community 
groups and education. The spread of Modernist ideas in the cities of the Dutch East Indies meant 
that Muhammadiyah came to represent the polity’s ‘urban middle and upper class Muslims’.296   
 
In contrast, SI, which had been established just a year earlier, embarked on a decidedly more 
political path. Initially created as a batik traders’ union (Sarekat Dagang Islam) to combat Chinese 
influence in the industry, the organisation quickly developed into an anti-colonial force under the 
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leadership of Umar Said Cokroaminoto.297 Cokroaminoto was a Dutch-trained civil servant who 
took over the leadership of the party and moved the organisation’s headquarters to Surabaya in 
1912. In the process, the organisation’s name was shortened to just Sarekat Islam, broadening its 
scope from a labour movement to an anti-colonial, political outfit.298 
 
Throughout this transition, Cokroaminoto maintained the organisation’s initial focus on the 
wellbeing of the local population, arguing that Islam provided the solutions to the practical 
problems of economic hardship and inequality.299  Cokroaminoto’s charismatic leadership, shrewd 
ability to reach across social cleavages, and careful balancing between socialism and Islamism 
helped the organisation to attract ‘followers among all classes, urban as well as rural. Muslim 
traders, workers in cities, kyai [traditional Islamic teachers] and ulama [religious scholars], even 
some priyayi [the Javanese aristocracy], but above all peasants, were drawn into this first – and last 
– political mass movement in colonial Indonesia’ .300 Under his watch, SI grew rapidly across Java 
and spread to the rest of the colonial polity. 
 
Though he was an impressive ideologue and leader, Cokroaminoto’s organisation was filled with 
tensions between socialist-leaning nationalists and Islamists, who were divided over the future of 
the organisation and the shape of the independence struggle. Laffan argues that the ‘tenor of the 
Sarekat Islam meetings began to change’ around 1918 with members expressing increasingly open 
hostility towards the Dutch and advocating a more virulent form of ethnic nationalism, which 
challenged the Chinese presence and their control of a disproportionate share of wealth in the 
Dutch East Indies.301  
 
This rise in hostile rhetoric was followed by acts of violence as workers staged anti-Chinese riots 
in Kudus in October 1918 and subsequently demonstrated against economic injustice in West Java 
and Central Sulawesi.302 The resulting violence gave the colonial authorities a pretext to jail 
Cokroaminoto in 1919, allowing Agus Salim to take the reins of the movement. Under Salim’s 
leadership, the organisation increasingly adopted an Islamic Modernist worldview, moving further 
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away from its socialist roots. By 1923, the party had expelled members who were also affiliated 
with PKI on the grounds that their loyalty to the pan-Islamic cause could not be split.303  
 
Buoyed by these intellectual developments, the SI under Salim began publishing a newsletter called 
Doenia Islam (World Islam) in December 1922, which echoed ‘Abduh‘s claim that the Rashidun 
caliphs were ‘natural democrats whose use of consultation (shura) anticipated by thirteen centuries 
the parliamentary process’.304 Even the name of the publication, Doenia Islam, was seemingly ‘an 
attempt to place [SI’s] activities in the context of the wider Islamic world’305 and again highlighted 
the turn towards pan-Islamic ideals. 
 
However, support for a transnational caliphate appeared short-lived. The abolition of the Ottoman 
Caliphate in March 1924 became a focal point for disputes within the organisation as to whether 
SI should pursue the restoration of the caliphate or embrace nationalism. While the organisation 
created a caliphate committee in the aftermath of the Ottoman collapse to study the issues and 
their impacts, the committee did not appear to produce anything of substance and enthusiasm 
soon waned.306  
 
By 1927, these pan-Islamic ideals appeared completely absent from the organisation’s ideology. 
Instead the SI had begun to call for ‘national freedom based on Islam’, arguing that ‘the 
achievement of national sovereignty now ranked as a duty of their Islam’.307 The organisation’s 
structural changes also appear to reflect its growing shift towards nationalism. At its national 
congress in Madiun in February 1923, members voted to change the group’s name to Partai Sarekat 
Islam (PSI, Islamic Union Party), which was later switched to Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII, 
Indonesian Islamic Union Party) in 1930, indicating a growing desire to identify the movement 
with the peoples within the territorially defined boundaries of the Dutch East Indies rather than a 
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Kartosuwiryo’s early understanding of hākimiyya 
 
As noted in the introduction, Kartosuwiryo’s early years were fairly mysterious and his entry and 
rise in the Sarekat Islam movement not particularly well document. Nevertheless, by1928, 
Kartosuwiryo’s position within the movement had been firmly established. He appears in a listing 
in Fadjar Asia, the movement’s publication, due to his contributions to the ‘Indonesian Students’ 
Mutual-Help Committee’.308 He soon began writing for the paper,was eventually made a regular 
columnist and, in 1929,  the editor.309 His first article, ‘Vergadering ISDP’ (ISDP Meeting), was 
published in Fadjar Asia on 2 April 1928.  
 
These articles, about 120 in total, provide a comprehensive means of establishing the foundations 
of Kartosuwiryo’s thoughts on the relationship between Islam and nationalism and the role of 
Islam in state building. Kartosuwiryo also wrote numerous articles on the themes of Islamic 
modernism, economic inequality, social justice, and the impact of colonial policies on Indonesians. 
The ideology he began to shape was thus rooted in anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism as much 
as it was in Islamic modernism and nationalism. 
 
Unlike nationalists like Sukarno, Kartosuwiryo did not see anti-Westernism and independence 
from colonial rule as an end in and of itself. Instead, independence from the Dutch was a necessary 
first step so that indigenous Muslims could begin the process of securing political sovereignty for 
God. In one of his first articles for Fadjar Asia entitled ‘Agama dan Politiek’ (Religion and Politics), 
Kartosuwiryo concocted an imaginary debate between two Muslims (one a civil servant in the 
colonial administration and the other a religious figure) over whether religion should be a private 
matter. The latter convinces the former that ‘religion is political’, because ‘religion embodies rules, 
rules for this world and the hereafter’ and that political Islam is necessary because the Dutch had 
‘a policy named Kersteningspolitiek, aimed at Christianizing the Indonesian population’.310   
 
This initial article is significant as it demonstrates that Kartosuwiryo felt a need to make the case 
to his fellow Muslims that Islam should not be separated from the political realm. Instead, his 
argument that Islam ‘embodies rules, rules for this world’, reflects an understanding, later echoed 
by Maududi, that faith requires respect for and adherence to God’s legal sovereignty. While 
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Kartosuwiryo does not explicitly reference hakimiyyah, the article suggests that he was attempting 
to build an argument in favour of the submission to God’s laws in the temporal realm. Given that 
in 1928, it was unlikely that he would have encountered Rida’s writings on hākimiyya (which would 
have only been available in Arabic) and that Maududi’s and Qutb’s work on the subject were only  
published significantly later, it seems Kartosuwiryo was independently thinking along similar lines.  
 
In addition to advocating for the need for a political Islam, Kartosuwiryo also appears to have 
been implying that this need was a defensive one. In raising the example of Kersteningspolitiek, 
Kartosuwiryo suggests to his readers that Muslims need to be protected from foreign incursions 
in the spiritual realm as much as they needed to be defended against more tangible forms of 
colonial encroachment. As such, Kartosuwiryo appears to be arguing that nationalism without a 
religious dimension would be insufficient in ensuring the security of Muslims in all realms. 
 
Kartosuwiryo’s subsequent writing in Fadjar Asia became more explicit in demanding that Islam 
occupy a central place in the Indonesian independence struggle. For example, in a piece published 
on 12 September 1928 he declared that the nation could not simply be ‘based on being anti this or 
that’, but required something more.311 Nationalism, he argued, was simply a tool for creating the 
conditions for an independent nation governed under shari’a and led by a ‘government based solely 
on our glorious Islam’.312 Without Islam as the basis for the new political unit, Indonesians would 
‘[live in] the world of darkness’.313  
 
The use of the term ‘world of darkness’ suggests that Kartosuwiryo saw a state without God’s law 
as the basis of its political structure akin to a state of despair. While he does not use terms like 
jāhiliyyah, the notion of darkness suggests he saw this world as lacking God’s light and guidance, 
and thus similar to the state of the world before God’s revelations. Resultantly, in making the case 
that an Islamic state was necessary to save Muslims from this darkness, Kartosuwiryo once again 
demonstrates that he was at least thinking in similar terms to contemporary and later proponents 
of the concept of hākimiyya. His writings and analysis were, admittedly, theologically 
unsophisticated compared to Rida, Maududi, and Qutb, but this may be due to his lack of 
comprehensive religious training and the constraints of writing short articles in Fadjar Asia.  
 
 




Kartosuwiryo reiterated this position following PSI’s youth congress on 27 and 28 October 1928. 
In an article entitled ‘Lahir dan bathin’ (Outer and inner), he wrote that Islam is ‘the religion of the 
Indonesian nation’ and ‘acts as a bond between the groups and peoples that have settled in our 
homeland, Indonesia’, illustrating once again his longstanding commitment to an independent 
Indonesia, with Islam playing a central position in society, law and governance.314  
 
This theme remained central to Kartosuwiryo’s writing in Fadjar Asia in 1929 and 1930. He 
continued to press and develop the argument that Islamic law could only be enforced if 
Indonesians had independence in a territorially defined unit. He stated that prioritising the 
sovereignty of an Islamic state was essential so that Indonesians ‘[could] follow Islamic shari’a in 
its most perfect and complete way, in all matters’.315 Furthermore, he argued that Islam would 
ensure true freedom for the people, ‘[liberating them] from all forms of slavery, humiliation and 
subjugation’.316 In this respect, Kartosuwiryo’s reference to the idea that an Islamic state with 
Islamic laws ‘ensured true freedom’, mirrored Maududi and Qutb’s later belief that freedom was 
fundamentally submission to God’s rule because this would free Muslims from the tyrannical rule 
of men.317   
 
The consistency with which Kartosuwiryo’s writings call for an Islamic state in the Dutch East 
Indies undermines claims by scholars such as van Dijk and Jackson that DI was not a self-
consciously Islamist political project. Across many years, Kartosuwiryo showed a clear and 
unwavering commitment to the need for an Islamic state in Indonesia to ensure spiritual and 
temporal liberty through the implementation and observance of shari’a under an Islamic 
government. He argued that this liberty would ultimately enable Muslims to lead lives truly in line 
with their faith and was thus an obligation for them to pursue.  
 
In this respect, while Kartosuwiryo did not explicitly use the term hākimiyya in his writings for 
Fadjar Asia, his writings nevertheless show that his beliefs closely aligned with the concept, 
indicating it remains the best lens by which to understand this component of his ideology. 
Additionally, his continued allusions to the concept indicate that, while it is unclear if he ever 
personally read the publications of Modernist thinkers based in the Middle East, he was likely to 
have been familiar with their points of view through numerous Malay-language pamphlets. His 
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writings on the need for sovereignty rooted in Islamic law and governance clearly reflect the ideas 
put forward by these Modernist thinkers. In his writings in Fadjar Asia between 1928 and 1930, 
Kartosuwiryo echoed the claims advanced by ‘Abduh and Rida, that only a strong state with Islam 
at its core could provide power, security, and prosperity for Muslims.  
 
While Kartosuwiryo could not have drawn on the ideas of Maududi on account of the latter’s work 
being published after he had stopped writing for Fadjar Asia and the lengthy delays of translating 
works into Indonesian, he reached similar conclusions about the need for an Islamic state in the 
late colonial period. Kartosuwiryo’s arguments calling for the creation of an Islamic state in 
Indonesia and the implementation of shari’a to ensure the future liberation of Muslims from the 
‘chaos of godlessness’ and the resulting economic and political hardship, aligned with Maududi’s 
belief that non-Islamic governance would inevitably result in the oppression of Muslims.318  
 
Like Maududi, Kartosuwiryo believed that establishing God’s sovereignty was crucial in order to 
avoid the ‘tyranny, despotism, intemperance, unlawful exploitation, and inequality’ that prevail 
when men rule over men.319 These repeated references to the tyranny of man’s rule once again 
suggest that Kartosuwiryo believed that man’s usurpation of God’s place as the maker of laws, 
ultimately resulted in barbarism and chaos. Similar to Maududi, Kartosuwiryo also reflected the 
concern that secular systems are particularly exploitative, associated with declines in moral 
standards and fundamentally corrupt. Kartosuwiryo thus appears to have been warning his readers 
that not only was sovereignty in the political realm for God alone to possess, but that secular laws 
would ensure their oppression at the hands of other men.  
 
Kartosuwiryo argued that the implementation of Islamic governance and law were essential, since 
without them Muslims would wander in a state of ‘darkness’ - which again suggested that securing 
hākimiyya was crucial for the preservation of the faith.320 Reiterating this argument, Kartosuwiryo 
stated that, Islamic nationalism meant the ‘[pursuit of] prosperity of the one God, one belief, one 
Prophet, one flag of Islam’ rather than just the ‘freedom and promotion of one people’.321 As such, 
Kartosuwiryo believed that nationalism and the state should serve a larger, ideological purpose, 
and not just its citizens’ individual interests.  
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Instead, he argued that the goal of the state was to ensure the promulgation of God’s sovereignty 
on Earth. Similarly, Maududi saw hākimiyya as more than just liberation for the individual and the 
nation from colonial oppression, writing that an Islamic state would ‘release the human soul from 
its fetters’ and deliver a ‘social organisation based on human equality… in which all men should 
become servants of the one real Lord’.322 As such, both men argued for liberation from the tyranny 
of the oppression wrought by man so that Muslims could be free and openly serve God. 
 
These parallels are not presented to suggest that Kartosuwiryo influenced Maududi (or later salafi 
writings on hakimiyya) but rather to argue that both men were part of a broader strain of political 
thought taking root in Muslim societies on the basis of the writings of the Egyptian Modernists. 
Kartosuwiryo’s writings also reflect a willingness to incorporate these foreign ideas in domestic 
debates. The idea of establishing an independent Indonesia, with Islam as the basis of the state, 
was both a political tool used to inspire and bind together the peoples of the Dutch East Indies 
and a sincerely-held belief shared by a variety of anti-colonial movements like Persis and 
Muhammadiyah.323 As such, Kartosuwiryo’s nascent ideas about the concept of hākimiyya in the 
1920s and 1930s place him at the heart of that political movement, and not an outcast or extremist 
(as the Indonesian state would later allege), or a messianic figure standing above the day-to-day 
political debates of his time (as successive generations of Islamic militants have claimed). 
 
Islamic nationalism and pan-Islamism in Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of hākimiyya  
  
While these early writings give a strong sense of Kartosuwiryo’s commitment to the ideas that 
would later be popularised by Maududi and Qutb as hākimiyya, he provided little detail about how 
he expected that an Islamic Indonesian state to be structured. By the late 1930s, the SI movement 
was in disarray, wracked by infighting and the fallout from a controversial decision to adopt a 
policy of non-cooperation with the colonial administration.324 Additionally, the party’s leadership 
was in turmoil following Cokroaminoto’s death in 1934 and Salim’s 1936 ousting, due to his 
support for continued cooperation with the colonial government. Amidst this fractious political 
climate, Kartosuwiryo began the work of theorising the day-to-day workings of an Islamic state. 
 
The first issue to resolve was whether this state would be nationalist enterprise or part of a wider 
transnational caliphate. In 1924, the SI had formed a caliphate committee but enthusiasm for this 
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project quickly diminished. Nevertheless, the idea of allegiance to a global umma never fully died 
and Kartosuwiryo’s own thoughts appeared to reflect the difficulties of reconciling national 
ambitions with obligations to a globe-spanning religious brotherhood. Ultimately, Kartosuwiryo’s 
actions appear to have prioritised a struggle rooted in territorial nationalism, but he never fully 
renounced a commitment to Islamic internationalism. 
 
Kartosuwiryo first notes Muslims’ transnational commitment to each other in July 1928, writing 
that, regardless of whether they were ‘white or black or yellow’, Muslims, could ‘understand [each 
other] with a glance or look’.325 He then argued in September that PSI ‘committed each and every 
bone in its body to pan-Islamism’.326 However, these commitments do not appear in any sustained 
way in his subsequent writings or in the movement’s actions. Kartosuwiryo’s writings remained 
focused on the plight of Muslims in the Dutch East Indies, neither spending much time on events 
abroad, nor situating Indonesia in the context of wider anti-colonial struggles in the Arab world 
and beyond. Despite its short-lived committee, the PSI does not appear to have made any 
sustained efforts to liaise with groups abroad. Kartosuwiryo continued to make clear that the 
‘[spirit] of nationalism certainly exists in Islam. National pride is part of faith in Islam’.327 
 
However, this did not stop Kartosuwiryo from occasionally invoking the concept of pan-Islamism, 
seemingly as a rallying cry for his readers, or making further attempts to reconcile the two forces. 
He asserted that Islamic nationalism was more complex than other forms of nationalism, allowing 
for those committed to its aims to hold allegiance to both the nation-state and a global Islamic 
community due to the fact that his version of nationalism was ‘grounded in Islam, unrestricted by 
territorial borders... skin colour, language, etc.’.328 Different Islamic societies were, ultimately, 
committed to the same objective: ensuring God’s sovereignty and glory on Earth.329 Whether 
Kartosuwiryo truly believed that this amorphous form of pan-Islamism could co-exist with his 
Islamic state in the longer term is not clear. Nevertheless, his occasional attempts to reconcile the 
two shows that he never committed fully to Islamic nationalism either. Instead, his writings suggest 
that he continued to inhabit a grey area, fuelled by a belief that there was a solution to this puzzle. 
 
Hijrah to hākimiyya 
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After a spell of ill health earlier in the decade that likely stymied his writing and participation in SI, 
Kartosuwiryo appears to have attempted to concretise his vision of an Islamic state in the mid-
1930s. 330 In September 1936, Kartosuwiryo drafted a pamphlet, Bosoer Sikap Hidjrah PSII 
(Pamphlet on the PSII’s Hijrah Stance) for PSII members. The document was meant to explain 
the party’s non-cooperation policy towards the Dutch. It was divided into two parts, with the first 
largely focused on a retelling of the Prophet Muhammad’s flight to Medina. Kartosuwiryo then 
linked this story to PSII’s own hijrah in the form of its non-cooperation with the Dutch and 
spiritual withdrawal from kufr (disbelief; denial of the articles of faith in Islam) politics in order, 
like the Prophet, to forge a community of likeminded believers in a secure base. From this, he 
envisioned that a ‘new era’ would arise and this would be the beginning of the Islamists’ triumph.331 
 
In the second part, Kartosuwiryo elucidated PSII’s objectives and intended programme of action, 
arguing that the path to an Islamic state would be predicated on three concepts; namely jihad, imān 
(faith) and tauhid.332 This required individuals to develop ‘character, strength, intelligence, skill’ so 
they can conduct jihad al-nafs (a jihad against oneself to master emotions, desires, and thoughts).333   
 
Despite an in-depth discussion of the meaning of each of these ideas, Kartosuwiryo does little to 
spell out how they would shape the content and form his Islamic state. Nevertheless, the document 
is crucial as it demonstrates that Kartosuwiryo viewed the attainment of an Islamic state as 
intrinsically linked to the performance of a non-violent, spiritual jihad to decolonise the minds of 
Muslims in Indonesia.334  
 
Through this process, Muslims would embark on a form of hidjrah in their minds, just as the 
Prophet did before them, to establish a pure Muslim community away from the unbelievers who 
dominated wider society.335 As such, the building of an Islamic state was predicated on Muslims 
first conducting hijrah through a spiritual jihad. Without this action of self-betterment, an Islamic 
state, in Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation, would never be fully realised since society would not 
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be ready to accept the tenets of shari’a or to truly live in accordance with the principles laid down 
by God, rendering the state vulnerable.  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of the attainment an Islamic state involved Muslim leaders creating 
governance structures and implementing and enforcing Islamic law. However, the Sikap Hidjrah 
pamphlet indicated that he also saw the need for a bottom-up movement through which 
individuals would spiritually prepare themselves to live in this state. As such, in the pamphlet he 
calls on the PSII to build and strengthen faith in the community through the promotion of 
‘teaching and education’ and the provision of information through ‘multilevel paths’.  336  
 
He also argued that the party would be responsible for practicing Islamic politics and creating an 
Islamic economy, facilitating an individual’s ability to successfully pursue their own struggle in the 
path of God.337 Although he did not clarify what exactly Islamic politics or Islamic economics 
would look like in practice, their inclusion in the pamphlet illustrates the totalising nature of 
religion in this state, in which no sphere could be separated from Islam.  
 
Just four years after the publication of the Sikap Hidjrah, Kartosuwiryo wrote a companion piece 
entitled Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah (List of Hijrah Efforts). In this pamphlet, Kartosuwiryo intended to 
lay out a programme of action to achieve an independent Islamic state in Indonesia. The document 
was largely a summary of what Kartosuwiryo had advocated over the past 12 years, such as the 
promotion of the understanding of Qur’anic scripture, deepening Indonesians’ connections with 
Muslims around the world, and of course, implementing Shari’a and Islamic governance so that 
Muslims could lead fully Islamic lives in ‘darul Islam’ (abode of Islam, an ideal Islamic state).338  The 
pamphlet went slightly further than the Sikap Hidjrah insofar that it placed a greater emphasis on 
dakwah (proselytisation) and charity, ostensibly as a means of promoting PSII’s cause. 
 
While these documents offered little in the way of new ideological developments relating to the 
need for an Islamic state or ensuring God’s sovereignty, their publication formalised 
Kartosuwiryo’s overriding message that the reason why Muslims in the Dutch East Indies required 
independence from their colonial masters was so that they could build a sovereign nation, in which 
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able to fully express their faith and live up to the tenants of Islam. He argued that, even under the 
governance of an independent but non-Islamic state, Muslims would still be subject to some forms 
of oppression, again highlighting the tyranny of man-made law and by contrast, the security and 
freedom that adherence to God’s laws provided. These increasingly hard-line views would thus 
make it difficult for Kartosuwiryo to compromise with nationalist forces as Dutch rule crumbled 
in the wake of the Japanese occupation in 1942. 
 
Kartosuwiryo’s Understanding of Hākimiyya, 1942-1949 
 
Kartosuwiryo only produced two substantive pieces of writing setting out his conception of 
hākimiyya between the onset of the Second World War and the end of the Indonesian Revolution 
in 1949. In July 1946, he gave a speech in Garut, West Java entitled ‘Haloean Politik Islam’ (Direction 
of Political Islam) to a gathering of Masyumi activists. The speech, subsequently printed as a 
pamphlet by Masyumi that same year, outlined Kartosuwiryo’s thinking on the need for an Islamic 
state in light of Sukarno’s declaration of independence and the return of colonial forces.  
 
Increasingly frustrated with the actions of Sukarno and his nationalist, Republican government’s 
failure to expel the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo released a Kanun Azasy (constitution) for the prospective 
NII on 27 August 1948. He declared the formation of his state on 7 August 1949, issuing a hukum 
pidana (penal code) shortly after. These two documents, together with Kartosuwiryo’s decision to 
found the NII, do not illustrate a substantive change in the understanding of hākimiyya he had 
before the war. However, their publication showed that he had come to see the futility of waiting 
for the slow, incremental progress of individual citizens or small communities building momentum 
towards the achievement of hākimiyya by waging their internal jihads as part of their hijrah.  
 
The Japanese occupation as an opportunity for state building 
 
By the end of the 1930s, Kartosuwiryo’s standing in PSII and the wider Indonesian nationalist 
movement was on shaky ground due to his continued refusal to abandon his hijrah policy. PSII 
leaders had decided to participate in the Gabungan Politk Indonesia (GAPI, Indonesian Political 
Federation), an alliance of nationalist parties and groups formed in 1938, which petitioned the 
Dutch for limited self-government.339 Kartosuwiryo, who had advocated non-cooperation for 
years, saw the decision to participate in the federation as a significant betrayal of the Islamist 
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nationalist cause. These fractures led to his eventual expulsion from the party in 1939. 
 
However, the Japanese occupation provided Kartosuwiryo with opportunities to revitalise his 
political career as they ‘seemed in fact more ready to make concession to Islamic, rather than to 
nationalist… demands’, at least initially.340 This seems to have been driven by the belief that they 
could win popular backing for their occupation by supporting the faith. The Japanese authorities 
revived the Majelisul Islamil a’la Indonesia (MIAI, Indonesian Muslim High Council), an umbrella 
organisation for Islamic groups established in 1937, before replacing it with Masyumi in 1943. 
Masyumi helped to unite the country’s large Islamic groups, including Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhmmadiyah. The support given to Islamist leaders by the Japanese forces enabled them to 
participate alongside religiously neutral nationalists in governance activities and debates over the 
future of the Indonesian state. 
 
Despite his hostility to cooperation with the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo was far more pragmatic in his 
approach to working with the Japanese. Writing in Soeara MIAI (Voice of MIAI), the bi-weekly 
magazine of MIAI, he pledged support for the Japanese war efforts.341 He does seem to have been 
cognisant of this contradiction, writing that working with the Japanese was still collaboration, 
‘whether one liked it or not’342. This willingness to compromise, however, illustrates how 
Kartosuwiryo was responsive to political realities and not dogmatic about the means by which an 
Islamic state in the Dutch East Indies would be established. Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese 
appeared willing to tolerate and even promote some level of Islamist-led state building projects 
for their own objectives in the war. After years of making little headway with his project to establish 
an Islamic state, it is likely that Kartosuwiryo welcomed the prospect (however slight) of advancing 
his cause. 
 
In addition to supporting an Islamic state under the wider Japanese-led Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity sphere,343 Kartosuwiryo established an institution within MIAI to manage the collection 
and distribution of zakat (obligatory alms) payments, a practical manifestation of the economic 
policies he had advocated when writing the Sikap Hidjrah pamphlet.344 Through these activities, it 
appears that Kartosuwiryo had found his way back into the Islamic nationalist movement. 
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The Haloen Politik Islam and the ascendency of nationalism 
 
Despite these positive developments for Islamic nationalists, their ascendency under Japanese rule 
was short-lived. As the Allies advanced across the Pacific, Japanese prime minister Koiso Kuniaki, 
seemingly in a bid to keep Indonesians on side, declared on 7 September 1944 that the country 
would soon be granted independence. Islamic nationalists responded, forming the Badan Untuk 
Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (BPUPK, Committee for the Investigation of 
Independence) on 1 March 1945 to begin the work of structuring a newly independent Indonesia. 
The committee’s make up was evidence of the shifting fortunes of the Islamic nationalists, with 
‘territorial nationalists…rather conservative in temper, authoritarian in disposition and by the 
standards of the day, aged’ men forming the majority of its 62 members.345 
 
Even so, by the end of its first session on 1 June 1945, the committee had readily accepted 
Sukarno’s Pancasila, five principles of kebangsaan (nationalism), perkemanusiaan (humanitarianism), 
permusyawaratan-perwakilan (deliberation among representatives), kesejahteraan (social welfare) and 
ketuhanan (belief in one God), as the ideological principle of the state.346 The adoption of these 
principles helped to set Indonesia on a path towards building a multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
state, rather than one that based its legal framework and governance structures on Islam. 
 
The Islamic nationalists were dealt a further blow when the sub-committee tasked with beginning 
the process of drafting an Indonesian constitution crafted a preamble, known as the Piagam 
Djakarta (Jakarta Charter), on 22 June 1945. According to the document, only adherents of Islam 
would be obliged to follow Islamic law, which signalled that Islam would be important to the 
foundations of the new state, but did not cement its primacy.347 
 
Ultimately, exempting non-Muslims confined the reach of shari’a to a specific group of 
Indonesians. This meant that the Indonesian umma would be unable to completely enforce its legal 
structure, requiring some compromises with secular legislation and the interests of minority 
groups. It thus brought into question whether the new state would be a truly Islamic polity that 
could provide Muslims with the structures they required to live in accordance with God’s will at 
all times and guarantee the practice of their faith. The adoption of the charter was hotly debated 
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during the BPUPK’s second and final session in July 1945. Despite concerns from Islamic 
nationalists that the charter did not go far enough in cementing the importance of Islam to the 
new state, its uneasy compromise remained.348 
 
Japan’s surrender to Allied forces on 15 August 1945 radically altered the Indonesian nationalists’ 
timeframe. Rather than an orderly and considered transition to independence under the auspices 
of the Japanese, Sukarno and other leaders rushed to declare independence on 17 August to 
consolidate their authority. The BPUPK was transformed into a legislative body and Sukarno 
encouraged the formation of political parties.349 By the time British troops arrived to reassert 
control in Java in September 1945, Sukarno had assembled a cabinet for the nascent republic.350 
 
The return of European forces to Indonesia was met with stiff resistance from both religiously 
neutral and Islamist nationalist groups, marking the beginning of a chaotic period known as the 
Indonesian Revolution. The period was characterised by rebellions and riots across the country, 
which targeted the returning European colonialists as well as local groups viewed as sympathetic 
to the Dutch such as the Eurasians and the ethnic Chinese community. Due to the weaknesses of 
the newly established Republican government, little of this fighting was centrally coordinated, with 
most conducted by local militia forces, gangs, and other disorganised and disparate groups, most 
of them poorly armed and barely trained. While accurate figures are hard to obtain, it is estimated 
that between 45,000 and 100,000 Indonesians died in the conflict between August 1945 and the 
eventual Dutch withdrawal in December 1949.351 
 
The return of colonial forces following a period of relative autonomy for Islamic and religiously 
neutral nationalist groups under Japanese rule was a radicalising experience for all Indonesians. 
The next chapter will give a more complete account of the revolution, the effect it had on 
reshaping Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of jihad, and his increased willingness use violence to 
attain his long-held aim of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.  
 
In addition to clashes with Dutch forces, this period was characterised by a breakdown in relations 
between the nascent Republican government and Kartosuwiryo’s group in West Java. While the 
BPUPKI draft constitution - which accepted Pancasila as the ideological basis of the state - had 
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been formally adopted following Sukarno’s declaration of independence, Kartosuwiryo continued 
to press the case that Indonesian Muslims would only truly be free under the auspices of an Islamic 
government guided by shari’a. 
 
It was against this background of growing violence and political setbacks for the Islamist 
movement that Kartosuwiryo gave his Garut speech in July 1946, arguing that participation in 
politics was a ‘sacred obligation’ for Muslims, who had a ‘duty to govern [their] own country and 
an obligation to [become] an independent nation’.352 The speech, which was subsequently 
published by the Dewan Penerangan Masyumi Daerah Priangan (Priangan Regional Masyumi 
Information Office), was known as ‘Haloean Politik Islam’. Organised into seven sections, the 
pamphlet stated that it was ‘a much-needed guide for Masyumi and its branches, especially in this 
time of revolution [and] rapid social change’.353  
 
The document provides a clear illustration of Kartosuwiryo’s priorities and plans for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Kartosuwiryo began by giving an overview of the 
country’s political situation before arguing that the struggle for independence would consist of 
two parts; first, the expulsion of the Dutch so that the country could be ‘free from foreign 
imperialism’ and second, the struggle for the ideology of the new state.354  
 
Remarkably, Kartosuwiryo argued that after independence, Indonesia would be a sovereign 
republic where the ‘voice of the people matters most’.355 He conceded that if the people chose to 
follow the ideological paths of socialism, communism or nationalism, whichever triumphs would 
‘determine the political direction of the state’.356 While Kartosuwiryo hoped that ‘by the grace of 
God’ Islam would prevail in this contest, he did not suggest that he would undermine or overthrow 
the Republic if the people chose another path.357 Moreover, he told Masyumi supporters to avoid 
‘fanaticism’ in their pursuit of an Islamic state, arguing that this would be like a ‘disease that 
threatens the unity of the nation’.358  
 
This suggests that, a year into the Indonesian Revolution, Kartosuwiryo prioritised unity among 
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Indonesians in order to win the anti-colonial struggle. This does not mean that he had given up 
on the establishment of an Islamic state. Indeed, at the end of the third section of his speech, he 
briefly contrasts the triumph of Islamic sovereignty if Muslims prevail in the political struggle with 
a situation in which Indonesians were ‘subjugated to the sovereignty of the people’ if nationalists 
or communists won out. This contrast between Islamic sovereignty and the sovereignty of the 
people reflects the dichotomy embedded in Modernist writings about hakimiyyah; God’s 
sovereignty ensures freedom whereas man’s results in subjugation. Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo 
kept this warning brief, focussing on the removal of the Dutch from Indonesia as a necessary first 
step towards achieving an Islamic state. He was, for the moment, willing to work those who might 
later be his ideological competitors in the subsequent struggle to define the character of the state.  
 
His plea to supporters to refrain from fanatical attacks on religiously neutral nationalists who 
disagreed with them and his stated desire to accept whatever system eventually prevailed in the 
independent state may have also been an attempt to signal to those outside his movement that he 
could be a trusted partner in the revolution. It could simply have been a move to head off internal 
dissent about Masyumi’s strategy of cooperation with non-Islamists groups or a sign of how 
confident he was that Islam would inevitably prevail as the state’s ideology after independence.  
 
Kartosuwiryo argued that Masyumi members must take part in two revolutions; a national 
revolution and a social revolution. In the first, they would have to use both diplomacy and war ‘in 
their fight for freedom’.359 Significantly, he argued that the second, social, revolution would have 
to take place through a personal jihad. Masyumi members, and presumably Muslims across 
Indonesia, would be obliged to better themselves spiritually in order to ‘transform [themselves] 
into “independent souls”’ and decolonise their minds of any foreign influence that remained after 
the colonialists themselves had departed.360 Only after having done so could they truly start the 
work of building an independent Indonesian republic based on Islam. In this respect, 
Kartosuwiryo appeared to be echoing the ideas of the Modernists, particularly Rida, who argued 
that a state without a truly pious population would be Islamic in name only.  
 
Subsequently, Kartosuwiryo reiterated arguments he had made earlier in his career, stating that 
only through the creation of an Islamic state could Muslims enjoy safety in this world ‘but also in 





in its broadest and most perfect sense’.361 The document highlights Kartosuwiryo’s consistent 
understanding that a world without respect for God’s laws, as enforced through a state, would 
result in Muslims forevermore being subject to the insecurity and whims of man-made laws, which 
would ultimately prevent their spiritual salvation.  
 
Once again, Kartosuwiryo demonstrates in his writings that while he did not use the term explicitly, 
he believed and advocated for principles consistent with hakimiyya, seeing respect for God’s rule 
as the only form of salvation. Moreover, by arguing that Muslims’ safety would be compromised 
in the afterlife, Kartosuwiryo suggests that living in an Islamic state is a necessary condition for 
living a truly Islamic life. In this respect, he implies that the promotion and creation of an Islamic 
state is a fundamental duty of Muslims, akin to worship and other obligations adherents are 
required to fulfil in order to profess their faith. 
 
However, this goodwill and desire for unity among Indonesian nationalist groups crumbled just a 
year later. In July 1947, Dutch forces intensified their efforts to recapture Indonesia through an 
offensive known as the First Dutch Police Action (also known as the First Dutch Aggression). 
Dutch forces initially landed in West Java, slowly isolating the area from political activity and 
military support from the Republican government based in Yogyakarta. Given that Kartosuwiryo’s 
stronghold was in West Java, the event contributed to the Islamists’ feelings of abandonment and 
resentment towards a seemingly ineffective national government. 
 
With no end to the conflict in sight, the Republican government and the Dutch came under 
significant diplomatic pressure from the newly-created United Nations (UN) and the government 
of the United State of America. On 17 January 1948, the two sides signed the Renville Agreement, 
under which the Republic was ‘left holding a large part of the traditionally food-deficient province 
of Central Java, the Banten residency… half of Madura, and the poorest part of Sumatra’ while 
the Dutch gained control over the majority of West and East Java, including the areas occupied 
by Kartosuwiryo’s followers.362 Republican troops subsequently abided by the deal by retreating 
back to Central Java, but Islamic forces remained unwilling to cooperate. 
 
The withdrawal of Republican troops left Islamic forces as the only resistance to the Dutch in 
these areas. On 1 March 1948, Kartosuwiryo, together with senior Masyumi officials, gathered in 
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Cirebon to begin the creation of a unified political and military force to regain control from the 
colonialists. They announced the dissolution of Masyumi and that Kartosuwiryo would now serve 
as the imam (leader) of the region’s Islamic community. They declared the creation of the Tentara 
Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army), which would be formed out the various militia 
groups in the area. This new political force would aim to ‘[take] control of the Republic’ and 
prepare to establish a new democratic Islamic state.363  
 
The intensification of the conflict strengthened Kartosuwiryo and his followers’ newfound resolve 
and commitment to the formation of a state with religion as its guiding principle. It also led to 
their increasing disillusionment and lack of faith in the Republicans government’s ability to deliver 
freedom to Indonesians. 
 
The establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia 
 
Kartosuwiryo’s newly consolidated force had some initial success, capturing territory in and 
around West Java between March and May 1948. After establishing a relatively secure base, its 
leadership could engage in basic state building. On 27 August 1948, Kartosuwiryo released the 
Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia (Constitution of the NII) for his prospective state. The 
document served as the culmination of his ideas of hākimiyya that he developed since his entry into 
political life in the late 1920s. It is a Modernist Islamic text, as it incorporates and attempts to 
reconcile Islamic ideals with secular state structures. 
 
The constitution’s preamble begins with a potted history of the formation of the independent 
Indonesian state and of West Java in particular. Kartosuwiryo wrote that in separating West Java 
from Republican control due to the Renville Agreement, the local Muslim population, led by his 
TII, could begin a ‘second revolution’ to actualise an Islamic state in Indonesia through jihad.364  
 
Kartosuwiryo spent much of the constitution laying out the political structures of this new Islamic 
state. The document is comprehensive, covering an extensive list of issues ranging from the 
powers and duties of the executive to the management of natural resources. As one might expect, 
the Qur’an and the hadith would constitute the basis for all laws and citizens would be obligated to 
 
363 Formichi, Islam and the making of a nation, p.116 
364 S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia’, 27 August 1948, no page number; Arsip Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (AABRI), Darul Islam, no. 9 
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enforce and follow them, but non-Muslims would still be guaranteed religious freedom.365 
 
At the apex of political power sat the imam, who was obligated to follow and enforce shari’a and 
govern in accordance with Islamic principles, but otherwise had nearly unconstrained power. 
Articles 11 to 17 laid out that the imam would preside over a dewan syuro (executive committee), and 
a dewan fatwa (advisory council) which was made up of seven muftis.366  
 
The imam would have the power to issue decrees, and as leader of the country’s armed forces he 
had the power to declare war. In times of crisis or a state of emergency, sole authority would rest 
in the imam and his appointed advisors, the dewan imamah. The imam would be elected by the majelis 
syuro (parliament), which also had the power to create and approve laws and so served as a nominal 
check on the imam’s power.367 
 
The constitution laid out the economic and social arrangements of the new state. Harking back to 
SI’s socialist roots, the document decreed that citizens ‘had the right to work, a livelihood which 
provides decency’, as well as a social safety net and appropriate education.368 The state would play 
a very interventionist role in the economy, controlling the production levels of important goods 
as well as regulating water and other natural resources. In this respect, the document reflects the 
goals of contemporary, non-Islamic constitutions, going beyond the concerns and structures of a 
traditional emirate or wiliyat. In this respect, the Modernist influence on Kartosuwiryo’s thinking 
can be seen as he attempts to grapple with issues that confronted states in the twentieth century, 
and to solve them using Islamic governance structures.  
 
Continuing in this vein, the NII constitution adopted much of the language of the constitution of 
the Indonesian Republic. For example, in Article 33, the NII constitution set the official language 
of the nation as ‘Bahasa Indonesia’ rather than Arabic. This likely reflected pragmatic 
considerations; while Arabic was the language of the Prophet and the texts of Revelation, Bahasa 
Indonesia was the most widely spoken language in the archipelago.369 It also made provisions for 
a national flag, identical to the Indonesian Republic’s, but with a crescent in the centre.  
 
 
365 Idem, p.1 
366 Idem, pp.1-3 
367 Idem 
368 Idem, p.5 
369 Ibid 
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The constitution ultimately demonstrated that authority and power did not rest with the citizens 
or even the government, but with God alone. As such, it made clear that the primary aim of the 
construction of an Islamic state was to facilitate the ability of Muslims to abide by God’s laws and 
Islamic principles by adhering to shari’a, which dictates all aspects of life from financial and 
economic arrangements to social matters such as education and charity. Enforcing shari’a would 
ultimately prevent Muslims from residing in a condition of jāhiliyyah and saving them from the 
unjust, tyrannical rule of foreign or kafir leaders. 
 
In issuing the NII constitution, Kartosuwiryo thus posed a direct challenge to the Republican state 
as well. Despite his earlier ‘Haloean Politik Islam’ speech, he now appeared unwilling to let other 
ideologies prevail in setting the course for an independent Indonesia. Furthermore, by centring 
Islam, his proto-state was based on a substantially different ideology from that of the religiously 
neutral nationalists’ Pancasila and their vision of a plural Indonesia. 
 
Despite the publication of the constitution and growing tensions with Republican forces after the 
Renville Agreement, Kartosuwiryo refrained from officially proclaiming the formation of the new 
state. However, the launch of Operation Kraai (Operation Crow) by the Dutch on 19 December 
1948, appears to have finally destroyed Kartosuwiryo’s faith in the Republicans as a viable force 
to lead Indonesia to freedom. While Kartosuwiryo’s TII continued to consolidate its hold on West 
Java, this second Dutch military offensive occupied the Republican capital, Yogyakarta, and 
captured Sukarno, Prime Minister Sutan Syahrir and other key leaders.370 In response, 
Kartosuwiryo declared the NII and the Dutch remained in a state of war, denouncing efforts to 
negotiate with the colonialists or engage in diplomatic efforts.371 
 
This position once again put Kartosuwiryo at odds with the Republicans, who were simultaneously 
engaging in talks with the Dutch upon the release of their key leaders and waging guerrilla warfare. 
Tensions between the two sides came to a head quickly in 1949, just as the conflict with the 
colonialists was reaching a denouement. In January, NII denounced the Republican leadership for 
abandoning the people of West Java, calling their soldiers an illegal militia and ‘an “obstacle” to 
the Islamic revolution’.372  
 
 
370 The men were released and the Republican government reinstated in January due to international pressure and 
anger at the Dutch authorities’ violation of the Renville Agreement.  
371 Al Chaidar, Pemikiran politik proklamator negara Islam Indonesia, pp. 556-7 
372 Formichi, Islam and the making of a nation, p.129 
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This increasingly confrontational rhetoric was followed up by Kartosuwiryo’s demand for 
uncontested control over West Java in February, when he decreed that Republican forces could 
‘either leave [West Java] or join the ranks of the Darul Islam’. There were increasing reports of 
clashes between troops on both sides.373 As Republican leaders returned to the negotiating table 
in March, Kartosuwiryo denounced their efforts as futile and lambasted Sukarno and his cabinet 
for selling the country out to the Dutch.374 
 
By August, the relationship between the NII and the Republicans was beyond repair. Kartosuwiryo 
saw the Republican state as fundamentally compromised by its participation in the protracted 
negotiating process and too weak to ever overthrow the Dutch. On 7 August 1949, he officially 
declared the formation the Negara Islam Indonesia ‘known in other words, as ad-Daulatul 
Islamiyyah, or Darul Islam’.375  
 
In issuing the proclamation, a slightly revised version of the constitution, and an accompanying 
penal code, Kartosuwiryo was attempting to create the institutions and enforcement mechanisms 
needed to bring his theoretical state into being. While the constitution focused on the theoretical 
structure of the state, the relationships between various branches of government, their powers and 
relationship to the citizenry, the penal code dealt with matters of more immediate relevance to 
most Indonesians, spelling out the law as it would apply in their daily lives.  
 
The proclamation and the penal code reflected the circumstances under which they were written. 
The proclamation explained how Indonesia has been in a state of war since the end of the Japanese 
occupation and declared that Perang Suci (holy war), would continue until the ‘disappearance of 
colonialism and slavery; the [expulsion] of all enemies of God, enemies of religion and enemies of 
the state of Indonesia’ and ‘the perfect and complete application of Islamic law throughout fully 
sovereign Islamic State of Indonesia’.376 As such, the text goes on to declare that Islamic martial 
law would apply until these aims were met. 
 
Similarly, the penal code placed a lot of emphasis on martial law, detailing in its first three sections 








of judgement, conduct in battle, how to treat prisoners captured, and bounty secured in victory.377 
However, much of the code still related to everyday issues of crime and punishment. For example, 
Kartosuwiryo dedicates two articles in part six of the constitution to dealing with adultery, spelling 
out the punishments including stoning, whipping and jail time for those found guilty.378 In 
providing guidance and regulation on quotidian topics, the code signalled the totalising vision of 
Islam in the personal and public lives of citizens and affirmed of the state’s Islamic identity. 
 
The code was structured largely in line with conventional Islamic criminal jurisprudence, with 
sections on hudud (capital offenses or crimes against God with punishments clearly stipulated in 
the Qur’an and Sunnah), qisas (crimes related to physical assault and murder, which are punished 
by retribution or diyya, monetary compensation) and ta’zir (acts that are prohibited in the Qur’an 
or hadith or infringe public standards and are thus given discretionary punishments).379 
Kartosuwiryo largely followed convention in stipulating various punishments for hudud offenses, 
such as death for apostates who fail to repent and the amputation of the right hand and left foot 
of those who steal but do not injure their victims.380 
 
However, he did occasionally exercise discretion, illustrating once again his willingness to sacrifice 
some degree of religious purity for the sake of greater political ends. While the penal code stipulates 
that the consumption of alcohol is punishable with 40 lashes in line with the conventions on hudud 
offenses, it exempts arrack, a distilled alcohol generally made from rice in Indonesia, when given 
‘to treat a disease on the advice of a doctor’.381 This suggests that he was willing to compromise 
on some issues, sacrificing some doctrinal purity for pragmatic benefits. 
 
Through the consolidation of territory and the release of the NII constitution and penal code, 
Kartosuwiryo had effectively created a small, but functioning state. The weakness of the 
Republican government and its geographical separation from West Java allowed him to put into 
practice the ideology that he had begun conceptualising in his early days as an SI activist and writer 
at Fadjar Asia. The adoption of the penal code was a particularly pivotal moment, since it provided 
a concrete manifestation of the implementation and enforcement of shari’a. This was a crucial 
component in Kartosuwiryo’s conception of hākimiyya, since it ensured that Muslims would not 
 
377 S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘Hukum Pidana’, 7 August 1949, DI no. 19, AABRI 
378 Ibid 
379 Etim E. Okon, “Hudud punishments in Islamic criminal law”, European Scientific Journal, 10, no 14 (2014), p.228 
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follow man-made laws but instead be able to lead lives worthy of God by fully adhering to the 




Over a twenty-year period, Kartosuwiryo advanced his understanding of why an Islamic state was 
necessary, building the case that only through the adoption and observance of Islamic law and 
governance could Indonesians truly be free and secure. This need to ensure the temporal and 
spiritual well-being and safety of his fellow Muslims underpinned his drive to establish an Islamic 
state and fight for its continued existence against encroachment from both colonial and religiously 
neutral Indonesian nationalist forces. While he did not explicitly use the term hakimiyyah, these 
beliefs are nonetheless consistent with its popular Modernist conceptualisation. His writings, 
speeches and actions clearly demonstrate that he articulated and promoted few, if any, other 
concepts to the same degree, cementing hākimiyya’s place as the cornerstone of the DI’s ideology. 
 
In chronicling the evolution of Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of hākimiyya, it is evident that 
political realities shaped his definition of the concept. He often held beliefs and positions similar 
those of his religiously neutral nationalist and non-violent Islamist counterparts, putting him 
squarely inside the mainstream of Modernist, Islamic political thinking of his time. His willingness 
to participate in congresses, constitutional deliberations, and propaganda efforts alongside 
Republican leaders and to cooperate with the Japanese occupation authorities show that his 
ideology was never completely set in stone nor was he above trading the consistency and purity of 
his beliefs for opportunities to create his Islamic state. 
 
Kartosuwiryo’s project was grounded in a thorough understanding of Modernist Islamic political 
thought. His willingness to work within Islamist groups from SI to Masyumi illustrated his 
commitment to fusing religion and state building. While he lacked formal Islamic schooling, 
Kartosuwiryo’s advocacy and writing demonstrates that he was clearly engaged with and had 
knowledge of the key debates taking place in Modernist circles in the Middle East and Indonesia. 
As such, Islam was crucial to his understanding of anti-colonialism, nationalism and formed the 






Chapter 2 | Jihad: The Obligation to Secure the Islamic State of Indonesia, 1928-1962 
 
Kartosuwiryo did not give much thought to the concept of jihad when he began his career as an 
activist and journalist in Surabaya. On the rare occasions when he did write about the subject in 
the 1920s and 1930s, his interpretations remained well within the mainstream of normative Islam. 
He preached a non-violent interpretation of jihad, calling on Muslims to lead pious lives and free 
themselves, at least within their own minds, from colonisation.  
 
This conceptualisation of jihad shifted dramatically as Dutch forces attempted to reassert control 
over the archipelago at the end of the Second World War. Kartosuwiryo began advocating armed 
resistance to the colonial regime and, subsequently, to the newly-independent Indonesian republic, 
seeing jihad as the only path to achieving an Islamic state. While he hewed to a narrow 
conceptualisation of jihad as a physical struggle throughout the DI’s 13-year insurgency, 
Kartosuwiryo never fully discarded the term’s non-violent interpretations. This flexibility 
ultimately provided DI leaders with the means to sustain their movement following their military 
defeat and Kartosuwiryo’s execution in 1962.  
 
This chapter examines Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of jihad and the evolution of his 
interpretation from his beginnings an Islamist activist in 1928 to his execution as the leader of a 
rebellion against the Indonesian state in 1962. It situates his understanding of the idea within the 
wider context of anti-colonial movements inspired by the classical doctrines of jihad. Ultimately, 
his interpretation of jihad as meaning a physical conflict laid the foundations for DI’s embrace of 
militancy as the main path to achieving an Islamic state in Indonesia.  
 
While Kartosuwiryo came to see jihad primarily through the lens of conflict against the enemies of 
Islam, he never fully abandoned its non-violent meanings. Resultantly, this chapter argues that the 
concept’s plural meanings allowed him the flexibility to strategically deploy different 
interpretations in response to changing military and political circumstances. This malleability was 
crucial to DI’s ability to survive and adapt, particularly in the wake of its military defeat and 
Kartosuwiryo’s death. Kartosuwiryo’s various interpretations of jihad should not be taken to mean 
that he had no concrete definition of the term. This chapter argues that, regardless of whether he 
was emphasising jihad’s violent or non-violent aspects, he always saw the concept as a tool to 
achieve hākimiyya. The goal of establishing God’s sovereignty on earth thus made jihad a collective 
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obligation for all Muslims and at times, a form of worship itself. Finally, he conceived of jihad as a 
defensive struggle to liberate Muslims from oppressive colonial rule and later infidel leadership. 
 
These arguments are presented over the course of four sections. This chapter begins with a brief 
examination of the classical interpretations of jihad and how anti-colonial Islamist movements in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries used them to justify rebellion. It then traces 
Kartosuwiryo’s initial understanding of jihad from his years in PSI in 1928 until the beginnings of 
the Indonesian Revolution in 1945. The third section analyses the impact that the revolution and 
the growing dominance of secular nationalists had on narrowing Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation 
of jihad to that of a violent, physical conflict. Finally, this chapter considers the malleability of his 
interpretation and what this meant for the group at the end of the insurgency. 
 
Classical jihad and anti-colonial resistance 
 
Muslim scholars of antiquity were instrumental in crafting a doctrine of jihad that maintained 
significant appeal among Muslim reformers and anti-colonial agitators in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. However, before beginning a discussion on jihad, it is necessary to situate the 
concept within a broader understanding of the legal conceptualisation of an Islamic state and its 
world order.  
 
The Islamic law of nations 
 
Majid Khadduri, the foremost scholar on this subject, begins from the premise that Islam is 
predicated on ‘the concept of authority’, since the community of Muslims ‘cannot survive without 
[it]’.382 This authority takes the form of a set of ‘divine commands, endowed by a Supreme 
Legislator, constituting its “fundamental law” or “constitution”’.383 In turn, ‘Allah is the supreme, 
though not the direct, ruler of the state’; that duty falls to a caliph, who administers and enforces 
divine law. 384  
 
With these premises in mind, Khadduri argues that the Islamic state is unique because it is first 
and foremost ‘an instrument for achieving… an ultimate religious objective, the proselytisation of 
 
382 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1955), p.5 
383 Ibid 
384 Idem, p.11 
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mankind’, by granting order and salvation to all who accept Islam.385 Resultantly, the Islamic state 
is a ‘necessarily imperial’ and ‘expansionist state striving to win other peoples by conversion’.386 Its 
religious legal framework is, at least in theory, universal, it is ‘intended to apply… to all people of 
every  time and place’.387  
 
As such, the laws that govern an Islamic state’s relations with other states are not ‘a system  separate 
from Islamic law’, but merely an extension thereof. 388 This Islamic law of nations, or siyar, is thus 
an integral part of the ‘Islamic corpus juris, binding upon all who believe in Islam’.389 Siyar , the plural 
of sira (path), can mean a narrative account or biography of  an individual but as used most readily 
by Islamic scholars denotes the ‘complete set of principles, rules and practices governing Islam’s 
relationships with other nations’.390 
 
Khadduri, alongside Saba Habachy and Mohammad Talaat al Ghunaimi, notes that classical 
Islamic law ‘recognises no other nations than its own’. Instead it divides the world into spheres of 
dar al-Islam and dar al-harb; the former refers to the house or abode of Islam, a polity where Muslims 
can practice their religion freelyunder the guidance of shari’a and Islamic structures of governance, 
while the latter are areas that remain ‘in a state of nature’.391 Given its duty to expand and 
proselytise, an Islamic state engages in constant war with the lands of dar al-harb, until Islam is 
triumphant in turning these areas into dar al-Islam. As such, dar al-Islam is a state of peace, where 
Islamic law is upheld and promulgated though an Islamic state.392 In this respect, it is unsurprising 
that classic and contemporary Islamic theologians and jurists have prioritised the study of the laws 
of war. Jihad is fundamentally the primary mechanism of achieving this end point as it is the ‘legal 
device designed to achieve Islam’s ideal public order’.393   
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It is important to bear in mind that initially, classical scholars believed that the laws of war would 
be temporary, ‘on the assumption that the Islamic state was capable of absorbing the whole of 
mankind’, and there would then no longer be a need for jihad.394 The failure of Islam to achieve 
universal conquest, however, necessitated the creation of a legal framework for interacting with 
non-Islamic states.  
 
Writing in the 700s, the jurist Abu Hanifa (founder of the Hanfi school of jurisprudence) appears 
to be the first to develop a comprehensive treatise governing Islam’s relations with the non-Islamic 
world as the Islamic empire expanded rapidly. Using the life and conduct of the Prophet 
Muhammad as a model, he began to define the conduct of the state in its relationships with other 
communities (siyar). For example, he argued that women who married outside the fold should be 
‘forced to return to Islam’ and be punished with beatings or imprisonment.395 He also decreed that 
preachers of other faiths could pass through Islamic territory but not reside within it.396 His 
missives reflected both the triumphalist spread of Islam throughout the Arabian peninsula as well 
as the anxieties prompted  by ongoing contact with non-believers. 
 
These ideas were built upon by Hanifa’s disciple, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, possibly 
the most important jurist to write on these issues. Writing in the mid-700s, his works, particularly 
Al-Siyar Al Kabīr, are the most comprehensive treatise of international law and fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence).397  Shaybani ultimately saw conflict with non-Islamic states as a ‘tool for peace’, 
and argued that an Islamic state was justified in undertaking war for either the protection of Islam 
or its promotion.398 His work is preoccupied with justifying the conditions for conflict and just 
war , prescribing the conduct of combatants, examining the duties and obligations of the Islamic 
community in times of conflict, and analysing the  processes for managing the end of conflict, like 
the treatment of prisoners and division of spoils.  
 
Nevertheless, an Islamic state could not  be expected to (and, indeed, did not) consistently win its 
wars, nor be involved in constant state of conflict. As Khaled Bashir argues, a significant portion 
of Shaybani’s work is concerned with ‘peace-making tools’ such as the laws governing the creation 
of pacts and treaties, the grounds for trading relationships, and the rights of minorities in Islamic 
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lands.399 As Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul notes, Shaybani believed that treaties were not only permissible 
under Islamic law, but were essential tools of an Islamic state’s foreign policy.400 Indeed, an Islamic 
state was obligated to respect the promises it made in these treaties, unless the actions of the other 
party violated their terms.401 Shaybani was also pragmatic, encouraging flexibility in negotiations 
and in the implementation of their conditions.402 Thus Shaybani’s writings not only provided a 
guide for how Islamic rulers should conduct themselves in times of war and at the conclusion of 
conflict, but advanced a nuanced conceptualisation of the Islamic law of nations not defined by a 
binary divide between an Islamic state and its enemies, but rather one in which compromise and 
accommodation is often necessary to preserve peace and the state itself.  
 
Jihad in the Qur’an 
 
With this context in mind, an in-depth examination of the concept of jihad is now possible. Jihad’s 
literal meaning is to strive, struggle or exert effort to achieve a laudable or praiseworthy goal. This 
is usually taken in the context of striving in the path of God. The term appears 41 times in 18 out 
of the 114 surah (chapters) of the Qur’an.403 It is used in five ways, which are listed here in 
descending order of frequency: striving as a result of one’s faith (21 times), offensive and defensive 
wars (12 times), a solemn oath (five times), resisting the pressure of non-Muslim parents to 
abandon Islam (two times), and physical strength (once).404  
 
The term appears for the first time in Al-Baqarah (The Cow), the second surah of the Qur’an, with 
the decree that ‘those who have believed and those who have emigrated and exerted themselves 
in the cause of Allah – these can indeed expect the mercy of God’. 405 The term appears again in 
the eighth and ninth suwar with Muslims assured that that ‘those who believed, emigrated, and 
struggled in the cause of God’ would be given relief and God’s blessing.406  
 
 
399 Idem, p.216 
400 Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul, The Formation of Islamic Jurisprudence: From the Time of the Prophet Muhammad to the 4th Century 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p.171 
401 Ibid 
402 Bashir, Islamic Internatinoal Law, p.226 
403 Emad M. Al-Saidat and Mohammad I Al-Khawalda, ‘Jihad: A Victim of Policy and Misinterpretation’, Asian 
Social Science, 8:7 (June 2012), p.205 
404 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 
p.56  
405 Qur’an, 2:218  
406 Qur’an, 2:218  
 124 
In these initial suwar, jihad’s meaning is construed as either a physical conflict undertaken for 
defensive purposes or the act of striving and enduring hardship for one’s faith in the context of 
the Prophet Muhammad and his followers fleeing persecution from non-Muslim tribes. Jihad is 
also presented as a necessary religious undertaking for the Prophet and his followers. Beyond 
articulating their commitment to their faith, Muslims can, and often should, physically demonstrate 
and manifest their commitment to God through jihad. Finally, these early chapters discuss the 
concept in the context of determining when it is just and appropriate to engage in a defensive 
struggle. For example, retaliation against an enemy is justified in Al-Hajj (The Hajj), the twenty-
second surah, when Muslims are ‘driven out of their homes without just cause’.407  
 
However, the distinctions between defensive and offensive struggles are not always clear cut. In 
Al-Anfal (The Spoils of War), the eighth surah, which was revealed to the Prophet following the 
Battle of Badr in 624, unbelievers were given a choice to desist and have ‘past sins…forgiven’ or 
face further attack.408 In this sense, the Qur’an justifies the fight against the Quraysh in Badr as a 
defensive struggle to respond to previous acts of persecution and prevent future ones.  
 
Nevertheless, the subsequent verse appears to contradict this justification, claiming that Muslims 
should carry on fighting until there is an end to unbelief in God [fitnah]. In this sense, the struggle 
takes on an offensive meaning, with Muslims obligated to fight unbelievers on the basis of their 
refusal to convert and accept Islam. As Ahmed Al-Dawoody points out, this is contingent on the 
meaning of the word ‘fitnah’. If Muslims are likely to be persecuted ‘until they recant, Muslims are 
required to fight… until they enjoy complete freedom to worship God without fear or the need 
to hide their beliefs’, rendering the conflict a defensive struggle once again.409 
 
The verses clearly show the difficulty in coming to a consensus over the meaning of jihad given 
that the term itself is malleable and that the Qur’an can be interpreted in numerous ways. 
Additionally, bearing in mind the concerns of the Cambridge School of intellectual history, it is 
difficult to ascertain the accurate meaning of a concept without fully knowing and situating the 
language within its historical context. In the instances in the Qur’an where jihad is used in relation 
to an offensive or defensive conflict, scholars may not be able to completely understand its use by 
the participants as a result of paucity of sources beyond the Qur’an itself. In the instance of the 
Battle of Badr, historians are unlikely to glean a full picture of the Muslims’ or the Quraysh’s aims, 
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the extent to which leaders on both sides felt a need to convert the other party to their beliefs, or 
the motivations for the conflict beyond religious grounds. Without this historical context, it is 
difficult to come to firm conclusions as to what conditions determine jihad as an offensive or 
defensive struggle and whether it is ever justifiable to undertake jihad against infidels solely on the 
grounds of their lack of faith. 
 
The classical doctrine of jihad 
 
Islamic scholars of antiquity  attempted to impose some order given the numerous uses of jihad in 
the Qur’an and the lack of clarity around its intended meaning or meanings. This scholarship was 
largely consolidated into a legal doctrine in the four Sunni schools of thought on fiqh – Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. It has focused on determining who was obligated to participate in 
jihad, who or what were legitimate targets, other prohibitions, the division of spoils, when it was 
permissible to retreat or request help from non-Muslims, and under what conditions to end the 
conflict. In clarifying jihad’s meaning and its practice, these scholars saw jihad as the primary 
‘instrument which would transform dar al-harb into dar-al Islam’.410  
 
The issues these scholars focused on reflected the conditions under which they were devised. 
During the late eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries Muslim rulers governed large swathes of territory 
stretching across the Middle East, North Africa, Southern Europe, and South Asia. Scholars like 
‘Abdallah b. al-Mubarak, Malik Anas, Abd al-Rahman al-Awza‘i, and Muhammad al-Shaybani, 
primarily analysed the question of jihad through the lens of empire and state power, rather than as 
authorised and exercised by a small community or group. As Khadduri points out, by 
conceptualising jihad as something to be performed by the community, it consequently turns jihad 
into a state instrument.411 Its declaration was the prerogative of a caliph or amīr, a figure with 
legitimate authority over the polity, who was best placed ‘to serve the common interests of the 
community’, with its ultimate aim being the ‘universalisation of [Islam] and the establishment of 
an imperial world state’.412  
 
Examining the various conditions under which jihad could take place, the specific obligations and 
conduct of participants, and the requirements for ending a conflict could easily fill several doctoral 
theses. Instead, this section will briefly elaborate on two issues raised in this literature that continue 
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to emerge in the writings of nineteenth and twentieth century Muslim anti-colonial ideologues, 
namely the obligation to participate and justifications for engaging it. 
 
As Rudolph Peters writes, this classical scholarship largely viewed jihad as fard kifayah (collective 
obligation), incumbent upon all Muslims with few exceptions.413 This is based on verse in the 
second surah, which reads: 
 
Fighting has been enjoined upon you, although it is a matter hateful to you. 
And yet, perhaps, you may hate something – and it is good for you.  
And perhaps, you may love something – and it is harmful to you.  
God knows, and you do not.414 
 
Resultantly, it is not for individuals to decide whether they want to participate or not; this duty is 
imposed on them by God and his temporal enforcer, the caliph.  
 
However, this does not mean that every Muslim has to participate in all circumstances. The jurists, 
particularly twelfth century scholar ‘Ala al-Din al-Kasani, argued that the Qur’an in the fourth surah 
acknowledged it would not be prudent for all the believers to go forward and fight, but instead 
that only some need to participate in combat. It is justifiable that some stay at home as the Qur’an 
states that they too are promised a reward in eternity, which would not be the case if jihad was 
incumbent on all. As such, only some fraction of the community must undertake jihad for the sake 
of the collective, thus fulfilling the non-combatants’ duties as well as their own.415  
 
Moreover, some classes of Muslims are exempted from participation. These included, among 
others, minors, the mentally unwell, women, the ill or disabled, and those who cannot afford to 
leave their families.416 Given that not all who are able to participate in jihad need to do so, these 
exemptions suggest jihad in these writings was primarily aimed at fulfilling a state purpose (like 
securing a border or expanding territory) rather than demonstrating individuals’ dedication to God.  
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These arguments regarding jihad as a collective obligation become even more pronounced with the 
encroachment of the Mongols onto Muslim lands in the thirteenth century. Writing in response 
to the Mongol invasion of Syria, the jurist and philosopher Ibn Taymiyya conceived of jihad as ‘a 
just and defensive war launched and waged by Muslims whenever their security was threatened in 
the dar al-Islam by infidels and heretics’.417 He argued that defensive or ‘involuntary’ jihad was 
necessary when an invading force enters Muslim lands, ‘commits well-known atrocities’ and 
‘refuses to abide by any clear and universally accepted Islamic law’, after being called upon to 
implement it.418  
 
Given the desperation of the situation, Ibn Taymiyya saw fewer avenues for individual Muslims 
to excuse themselves from participation. He began his chapter on jihad in his work Governance 
according to God’s Law in reforming both the ruler and his flock, by emphasising the potential for 
punishment for ‘both individuals and collectives’ that failed to fulfil their duty to defend Muslim 
lands against unbelievers. He argued that God ‘criticised those who fail to participate in [jihad] and 
called them hypocrites and sick in their hearts’.419 These threats of sanction are not accompanied 
by any acknowledgement of the exemptions listed in the Qur’an or made by other legal scholars. 
Ibn Taymiyya’s work indicates that in times of particularly significant or existential threat to an 
Islamic polity, the obligations on Muslims to participate grew stronger.  
 
Unlike his predecessors in the ninth and tenth centuries who wrote at the apex of Islamic military 
power, Ibn Taymiyya did not have the luxury of discussing wars of conquest or expansion. Most 
of the classical legal scholarship conceived of jihad as a means of ‘strengthening Islam, [protecting] 
believers and voiding the earth of unbelief’.420 However, classical scholars had largely skirted the 
issue of casus belli.  Scholars in the Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali schools claimed that aggression 
against non-Muslims was legitimate, particularly to end the persecution of Muslims. Similarly, 
Asma Afsaruddin notes that the early Medinan scholars Ata b. Abi Rabah and Abd Allah ibn Umar 
cite Qur’anic scripture to show that Muslims have a duty to fight unbelievers unless they are willing 
to subjugate themselves to Muslim rule. Additionally, jurists in the Seljuk period (1037-1196) 
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encouraged Muslims to attack ‘hostile polytheists with whom the first generation of Muslims did 
not have pacts’.421  
 
Although these scholars stipulated that there were limits on the targeting of unbelievers (e.g. 
women and children were exempt), they often shied away from grappling with the question of 
what specific actions – beyond direct attacks –  constituted a legitimate threat to Islam, or when 
wars of expansion were permitted. Rudolph Peters accounts for the broadness of their 
interpretation of casus belli by arguing that, while the Qur’an is ‘not clear’ as to whether Muslims 
must fight unbelievers ‘only as a defence against aggression or under all circumstances’, classical 
scholarship  largely dispensed with these ambiguities.422 Peters notes that in general, these jurists 
believed there was an ‘unconditional command to fight the unbelievers’, based not only on a 
selective reading of the scripture but also ‘the pre-Islamic concept that war between tribes was 
allowed, unless there existed an existing truce between them’.423   
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s work continues this trend, largely justifying jihad as a defensive struggle against a 
broadly defined enemy, stating ‘Fighting is only against those who fight us’.424 He saw it as 
something to be primarily directed by state authorities. While it was still a collective obligation, 
individuals were generally only obligated to act once those in power had determined that a 
transgression had occurred.425 Michael Cook notes that underpinning this stance is a ‘structural 
disposition to cooperate with the state, and it is cooperation rather than confrontation that is the 
keynote of his political thought’. 426 
 
While construing jihad as a defensive struggle, Ibn Taymiyya maintained a broad definition of who 
constituted an enemy of Islam, arguing ‘whoever goes against God and the Prophet is a muhàrib 
[someone who attacks Muslims]’.427 In addition to non-Muslim aggressors, Ibn Taymiyya called 
for the punishment of Muslims who opposed legitimate Islamic rule (bughāh, rebels or 
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transgressors) and believed that it was only through jihad that this defiance could be defeated. 428 
His work thus helped further legitimate attacks by Muslims against their co-religionists.  
 
Justifying Rebellion  
 
The works of these classical thinkers helped to shape the later interpretation of jihad in response 
to the advent of Western colonial rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Once again, jihad 
was framed as a legitimate means of defending against encroachment by infidel forces. Beginning 
in South Asia, the loss of territorial control to the British following the Battle of Plassey in 1757 
prompted theologians such as Shah Abdul Aziz, Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, and Shah Ismail to argue 
that the territories conquered by the British were dar al-harb (abode of war).429 Anti-colonial 
struggles were waged by groups like Tariqa-I Muhammadi, who called on supporters to make hijrah 
to the Northwest Frontier. From that territorial base, the group distributed propaganda ‘extolling 
the virtues of jihad against unbelievers’ and conducted attacks against the British forces until it was 
completely suppressed in 1883.430 
 
In Indonesia itself, revolts against the Dutch often attempted to root their struggles within an 
Islamic frame, with religious leaders playing a key role in the conflict.431 For example, in Aceh, the 
‘ulama [religious scholars] declared the fight against the Dutch to be a holy war, and participation 
in that fight incumbent upon all Muslims’.432 The invading forces were routinely described as 
‘kaphe Belanda’, ‘infidels’ and ‘enemies of God’.433  
 
Christine Dobbin provides another example through her work on the Padri movement, a 
puritanical Islamist worldview anchored by the group’s struggle against local elites and 
subsequently, the Dutch colonisers.434 The Padris were a group of religious pilgrims who returned 
from Mecca to Minangkabau, West Sumatra in late 1803 or 1804 and attempted to impose shari’a 
on their community and rid it of adat (customary law). The men appear to have been influenced 
by revivalist Islamist thought during their time in Mecca, particularly the teachings of Ibn Abd al-
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Wahhab, and desired a return to a pure interpretation and implementation of the Qur’an and 
sunnah, ‘discarding all innovations’.435  Upon returning from Mecca, the Padris’ launched a 
campaign against the local elite that resulted in attacks against a wide range of local customs and 
laws.436 The conflict only concluded in 1837 following significant interventions by Dutch forces, 
who feared that a religious movement influenced by foreign Islamic teachings would destabilise 
their client relationships with the local ruling elite.  
 
The Java War (sometimes referred to as the Diponegoro War) was a significant revolt against 
colonial rule framed as a religious struggle. According to Peter Carey, ‘[widespread] millenarian 
expectations caught the imagination of the peasantry’, who - facing numerous economic and social 
hardships - rallied behind the charismatic leadership of Diponegoro, who ‘posed as a Javanese 
messianic king’ to contest Dutch rule between 1825 and 1830.437 Diponegoro issued a perang sabil 
(a declaration of war in the way of God) against the Dutch and motivated his followers by asserting 
that their fight was to ‘raise up the high state of the Islamic religion in Java’.438  
 
However, the overwhelming military power of the European colonialists eventually reduced the 
appeal of calls for explicit, physical confrontation. Instead, jihad began to largely take the form of 
passive resistance and non-cooperation. For example, though Algerian resistance leaders like 
Ahmed Bey and Abdal Qadir invoked jihad when leading military resistance against the French in 
the 1830s, Qadir began to de-emphasise this physical aspect of the conflict when he was later 
exiled in Morocco. Instead,  he argued that Muslims had an obligation to refrain from collaborating 
with the colonialists and a duty to emigrate from dar al-kufr (land of the infidels) to dar al-Islam.439 
 
In this respect, jihad’s numerous meanings and manifestations allowed anti-colonial movements to 
still embrace the term without necessarily engaging in military conflicts that they were likely to 
lose. With few options available, acts of non-cooperation, emigration and improving oneself as a 
Muslim, took on new meaning as acts of resistance and ultimately a form of anti-colonial jihad.  
 
 
Kartosuwiryo’s initial conceptualisation of jihad, 1928-1945 
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Kartosuwiryo had little interest in creating or explicating a doctrine of jihad prior to the Indonesian 
Revolution. He rarely wrote about the concept, preferring instead to focus on building a case for 
the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Despite jihad’s relative unimportance to Kartosuwiryo 
during this period, he did express some views about its purpose and form. Firstly, Kartosuwiryo 
conceived of jihad as a non-violent struggle and an act of worship. It was through this quest for 
spiritual betterment that Muslims would embark on their hidjrah away from an un-Islamic society, 
making their first step towards the achievement of an Islamic state. Secondly, it was an act that all 
Muslims had a duty to engage in, indicating that Kartosuwiryo saw it as a collective obligation for 
the country’s Islamic community. Finally, jihad was an anti-colonial activity, undertaken to purify 
oneself from the Western influences and beliefs contrary to Islam.  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s regular column in Fadjar Asia offers little insight into his thoughts on jihad during 
his initial years with PSI. The concept was never mentioned in the numerous articles he wrote for 
the paper between 2 April 1928 and 24 May 1930. The paper, as mentioned in the first chapter, 
afforded Kartosuwiryo a daily means of promoting his ideas and reaching fellow PSI members 
and Islamist activists across the Dutch East Indies. Kartosuwiryo wrote on a huge range of issues, 
including the brutality of colonial policies, the plight of poor Muslims, his opposition to the 
establishment of a national bank and his mistrust of irrigation systems.440 While the topics covered 
were numerous and varied, the articles generally advanced Kartosuwiryo’s belief that Indonesia 
ought to be an independent state where Muslims were free to practice their faith under the 
protection of an Islamic governance structure and shari’a.  
 
Resultantly, the omission of any discussion on jihad is notable. It suggests that either Kartosuwiryo 
did not believe he had anything useful to contribute on the issue or that he did not think it was a 
significant or useful concept in the struggle against Dutch colonial rule between 1928 and 1930. 
Kartosuwiryo’s early writings indicate that, rather than being a fixed concept in his ideology, jihad, 
unlike hākimiyya, underwent a significant transformation in terms of its importance to and centrality 
in his belief structure. This transformation highlights the importance of recognising ideologies as 
flexible rather than static structures, particularly over long time periods. Moreover, it demonstrates 
the impact of events and conflict in shaping the trajectory of an ideological framework.  
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Prior to the Indonesian Revolution, Kartosuwiryo produced only two pieces of writing that spoke 
to his understanding of jihad; the Brosoer Sikap Hidjrah PSII published on 10 September 1936 and 
the Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah PSII published in March 1940. As noted in the first chapter, the Sikap 
Hidjrah pamphlet was written at the apex of Kartosuwiryo’s power within the PSII following the 
1935 ousting of Agus Salim, the party’s president and his former mentor. Agus Salim had tried to 
get Kartosuwiryo and other PSII leaders to moderate their attitudes for fear of antagonising the 
Dutch and prompting a crackdown.441  
 
The pamphlet marked the beginning of PSII’s full embrace of a policy of non-cooperation and 
non-engagement with the Dutch colonial administration. The Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah was published 
as a companion piece to the Sikap Hidjrah pamphlet. It laid out the party’s agenda for the 
transformation or hijrah (emigration) of Indonesian society, at least spiritually, away from a world 
governed by infidel colonialists to one guided by shari’a and the principles of an Islamic life. The 
concept was modelled on the Prophet’s own flight from Mecca to Medina to establish the first 
Islamic community. Both documents were signed by Kartosuwiryo and attribute authorship to 
him alone. The analysis of jihad in both pamphlets is comparatively brief, in contrast to arguments 
made in favour of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo’s 
thoughts on jihad are remarkably consistent in both documents. 
 
Jihad as a non-violent struggle in the path to hākimiyya 
 
In the Brosoer Sikap Hidjrah, Kartosuwiryo confined his discussion of jihad to the pamphlet’s second 
half. After establishing the party’s reasons for resisting participation in Dutch-controlled 
institutions and political life and telling the story of the Prophet’s flight to Medina, the second part 
establishes the party’s aims and programme. Kartosuwiryo began the section with a discussion of 
the meaning of jihad, noting that it has been often misunderstood or reduced (often by Westerners) 
to the spread of Islam by the sword.442 He then referenced 18 passages of Qur’anic scripture in a 
bid to establish jihad’s true meaning as ‘earnest effort… in the way of Allah, towards Truth and 
Reality, in line with the teachings of Islam’.443 This included exercising patience, thinking through 
one’s thoughts and actions carefully, and practising charity. It was through the practice of these 
deeds that God would be exalted and praised. 
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Kartosuwiryo’s emphasis on a non-violent interpretation of jihad appeared to be driven to some 
extent by a desire to challenge what he perceived as the negative Western definitions of the term. 
In his opening paragraph, he wrote that the association of jihad with war meant that Westerners 
assumed Islam was practiced by ‘mere brutes’.444 While his conceptualisation of jihad as a non-
violent and primarily personal act of contemplation and striving to do good acts may have served 
his party’s practical aim of advocating non-cooperation with the Dutch political system, his 
opening paragraphs suggest that he was also trying to counter these negative stereotypes and 
present his co-religionists as civilised and considered practitioners of their faith. 
 
Kartosuwiryo was keen to stress that jihad was a positive struggle through which individuals could 
continuously grow. Muslims were obliged to reject shirk (the practice of idolatry or polytheism) 
and commit themselves to learning about tauhīd. These efforts to master, ‘jihad al-naf’, which 
Kartosuwiryo defined as jihad against oneself, were to take place on an individual, spiritual plane 
rather than through physical struggle against non-believers. In Kartosuwiryo’s understanding, this 
was the ‘Greater jihad’ (jihad al-akbar) wherein Muslims ‘worked diligently’ to rid themselves of 
‘foul, low and despicable passions’ while fostering ‘strength, intelligence, [and] skill’.445  
 
Kartosuwiryo saw continuous struggle for improvement as more than just an obligation for the 
individual to demonstrate their faith in God, but an act of enduring worship (‘ibāda), akin to prayer. 
He made this argument by firstly arguing that participating in this earnest effort was ‘tangible’. 
Muslims could demonstrate their engagement in jihad through ‘acts in the form of good or 
charitable deeds’ or conquering their own passions and desires. But it ‘would be difficult to call 
[those efforts alone] worship’ if a Muslim’s ‘heart is empty of faith’. To be considered worship, 
true jihad must encompass both these elements – concrete attempts at betterment of the self and 
the community combined with strong belief in God. In Kartosuwiryo’s understanding, jihad 
encompassed more than a struggle to better one’s relationship with God and practice as a Muslim, 
but also served a larger purpose demonstrating devotion.  
 
In striving for God in this manner, Kartosuwiryo argued that this ‘greater jihad’ was ‘no different 
from the aims and objectives of the Hidjrah’ as the Prophet fled from Mecca to Medina, to avoid 





new era for Islam and the beginnings of the path to the creation of an Islamic state. Jihad as a 
struggle for spiritual betterment thus formed the basis of the party’s new political programme. 
Their quest to ‘perfect [their] Islamic practices’ rather than engage with an un-Islamic system 
imposed by the Dutch would be akin to the Prophet’s flight from a society governed by infidels.446 
While this move was not a physical departure, it would still signal a new beginning as Indonesian 
Muslims left ignorance and oppression behind and followed God’s command. Kartosuwiryo made 
the claim that a physical hijrah was unimportant and potentially meaningless if jihad (in the form of 
the purification and improvement of oneself as a Muslim) was not conducted simultaneously. 
Given this logic, PSII’s priority would be to focus on this self-betterment rather than seeking to 
establish a physical base elsewhere.  
 
Although it is likely that Kartosuwiryo saw the betterment of Muslims as a noble duty and 
genuinely conceptualised jihad in this manner, his exhortations for the party’s members to turn 
inward also reflected his movement’s limitations. Dutch authorities note that the death of 
Cokroaminoto and the ousting of Agus Salim from PSII had caused the movement to 
haemorrhage members, with the number of party branches falling from 140 in 1934 to 90 in 
1935.447 It is plausible that this inward-looking interpretation of jihad reflected the fact that PSII 
had few, if any, options to truly confront the Dutch or move towards their stated aims of an 
independent Indonesia and the creation of an Islamic state. Kartosuwiryo’s vigorous calls to 
engage in self-betterment for the sake of God and party may have thus been one of the only ways 
he could hold together a party in decline, and provide some semblance of pseudo-political action 
for his followers to engage in. 
 
Although Kartosuwiryo did not completely repudiate the use of violence in the Brosoer Sikap 
Hidjrah, he argued that violence was the ‘small jihad’ (more commonly referred to as the lesser jihad) 
and a ‘negative and destructive’ force, which could be only undertaken for self-defence’.448 He did 
not specify the conditions under which a physical conflict could be undertaken, either because the 
matter was not worth exploring or because he was trying to avoid engaging PSII members in a 
debate over whether violence was permissible. Nevertheless, by referring to it as a ‘small’ and 
‘negative’ struggle, and one that should not take ‘precedence’ before the ‘Greater jihad against 
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It is difficult to fully understand why Kartosuwiryo made this choice to diminish jihad’s associations 
with physical conflict, given the clear link the term has with warfare in the Qur’an and classical 
Islamic jurisprudence. It is plausible that, in addition to genuinely believing that personal 
betterment for the sake of God was the more important struggle, Kartosuwiryo had pragmatic 
reasons for emphasising non-violence. By arguing that physical conflict was the ‘small jihad’ in the 
Sikap Hidjrah pamphlet, he could have also been attempting to push back against calls from PSII 
members who supported a more hard-line or confrontational approach with the Dutch 
government, which PSII was unlikely to win.  
 
Regardless, the shorter Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah pamphlet continued to reinforce Kartosuwiryo’s 
preference for defining jihad as a non-violent endeavour. The document stated that PSII was 
committed to its hijrah policy of spiritually relocating from ‘Mecca-Indonesia’ to ‘Medina 
Indonesia’, through jihad, which was once again taken to mean a purification of the beliefs and 
actions of Indonesian Muslims rather than a physical conflict or spatial migration.  449 
 
Jihad as a collective obligation  
 
In addition to conceptualising jihad as a non-violent act, Kartosuwiryo saw participation in this 
process of striving in the path of God as an obligation for all Muslims in Indonesia. In the Sikap 
Hidjrah pamphlet, Kartosuwiryo wrote that mastering the greater jihad against oneself was not only 
a duty for individual Muslims but for ‘one’s own household, the people in the village and in the 
country’.450 In listing out these various groups and increasing the scale, Kartosuwiryo showed that 
he expected Muslims to participate as a collective, with each group’s efforts cumulatively growing 
and impacting the greater whole.  
 
Similarly, in the Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah, Kartosuwiryo argued that the move from ‘Mecca-Indonesia’ 
to ‘Medina-Indonesia’ would be a collective struggle because the full realisation of Islamic life 
requires the participation of an entire community.451 In order to achieve tauhīd (unity) PSII 
members had to commit themselves to unity and full submission to God (jihad ubudiyah), to 
spreading education, to provide charity and to striving for improvements in one’s society (jihad 
ijtimaiyah).452 Kartosuwiryo saw it as necessary for PSII members to, at very least, engage in dakwah 
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(proselytisation) through education and charitable acts as part of their jihad. This would ensure that 
all who lived within their society were given some assistance by the party in mastering their struggle 
in the path of God and facilitating the purification of the entire community.  
 
However, this formulation of jihad as a community-wide undertaking remained under-developed 
by Kartosuwiryo in these documents. In neither pamphlet did he discuss the consequences for a 
society if some members fail to participate, nor whether there were any exemptions for certain 
groups within a polity, as was the norm in classical doctrines on jihad. This may be because 
Kartosuwiryo believed that, since this was a largely internal struggle to purify one’s faith, all 
members of the community could participate to some extent. But the text’s lack of explicit 
discussion makes it difficult to come to any definitive conclusions on these specificities.  
 
Jihad as an anti-colonial struggle 
  
Although Kartosuwiryo preached non-violence, he still saw jihad as a means of liberating Muslims, 
at least mentally, from a society governed by foreign infidels. Like the Prophet Muhammad and 
his followers who fled from Mecca to ensure they could practice their faith unimpeded, PSII would 
also have to participate in a hijrah; using lives of piety and subservience to God to escape their 
society in order to reunify religion and politics until an Islamic state could be attained.  
 
This effort, formalised by Kartosuwiryo as a Program Djihad, must thus be understood as a non-
violent political struggle against the colonialists. In the Sikap Hidjrah pamphlet, Kartosuwiryo 
blamed the Dutch (and the West in general) for separating religion from politics. With this link 
broken, Muslims were unable to lead full and complete religious lives, which require political and 
legal systems reflecting their beliefs and reinforcing their practices.453  
 
In calling on Muslims to commit to jihad and purify their faith in their hearts, Kartosuwiryo was 
encouraging an extraordinarily radical act of decolonisation. This plea to return to a true form 
Islam would require his followers to completely change their way of thinking and to reject a 
mindset defined by colonial hierarchies of racial and Christian superiority, secular education, and 
non-Islamic norms, values, and practices. The renunciation of these modes of thinking would, if 
done completely, result in PSII members – and potentially other Indonesian Muslims – living, at 
least intellectually and spiritually, in a decolonised world structured according to Islamic precepts. 
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This mental shift would mark the beginning of an Islamic community in thought and thus set the 
party on the path to eventually achieving an Islamic state.  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s repeated attempts throughout the Sikap Hidjrah pamphlet to define jihad as more 
than just warfare in defence of Islam indicates that he did not see outright conflict as productive 
or likely to achieve his desired outcome of an Islamic state in this period. By broadening the 
definition to include daily acts of worship and encouraging individuals to lead their lives in line 
with their Islamic faith, jihad in Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation was a means by which his 
supporters could still resist colonialism.  
 
As demonstrated in the earlier section, Kartosuwiryo was not alone in conceiving of jihad as an 
anti-colonial activity, with numerous movements in the Muslim world using the idea as a means 
to rally and justify resistance. Based on his writings in Fadjar Asia and the pamphlets he wrote for 
PSII, Kartosuwiryo does not appear to have engaged much with the writings of ideologues or 
leaders of contemporaneous Islamist anti-colonial movements. Resultantly, it is difficult to know 
with certainty the degree to which he was aware of these struggles or how much kinship he felt 
with them and their ideas.  
 
Despite – or, potentially, because – of this lack of engagement, Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation 
of jihad stands out as a unique contribution for its commitment to a non-violent interpretation. By 
contrast, South Asian resistance leaders and ideologues such as Mawlānā Fadl-i-Haqq Khairābādī, 
who issued a fatwa against the British colonialists in 1857, as well as Maududi, called on Muslims 
to engage in a physical and violent form of jihad to ‘annihilate all tyrannical and evil systems in the 
world’ as part of a ‘programme of destruction and reconstruction, revolution and reform’.454 
Kartosuwiryo did not choose to use another term to describe resistance to colonial rule. Instead, 
in both the Sikap Hidjrah and Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah pamphlets, he uses jihad in terms of describing 
PSII’s programme of non-cooperation with the Dutch, suggesting that he saw value in it, perhaps 
as an emotive, rallying cry or as a means of lending religious legitimacy to his cause. Regardless, 
the term’s numerous meanings make it perfectly suited for his application of it as a form of 
defensive resistance to colonial subjugation.  
 
This stance may be largely the result of PSII’s circumstances and the state of the wider Islamist 
movement in Indonesia. With the Dutch maintaining a monopoly on force and the marginalisation 
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of Islamism within the Indonesian nationalist movement, it is unlikely that Kartosuwiryo or other 
groups would have been able to successfully carry out an armed revolt against the colonialists.  
 
It is also probable that Kartosuwiryo was restricted from publicly advocating for violent jihad 
because he or PSII members feared a backlash from the colonial administration. These fears 
appeared evident in Agus Salim’s fight with Kartosuwiryo and other PSII members over the 
creation of the non-violent hijrah policy in 1935. As Formichi notes, Salim was concerned ‘that the 
government would further limit the party’s activities if it did not assume a more moderate 
attitude’.455 Given that internal debates within the party were heated even when discussing a policy 
of passive non-cooperation that did not explicitly call for violence, and animated by fears that the 
Dutch could take punitive action, it is unsurprising that Kartosuwiryo eschewed a violent 
conceptualisation of his anti-colonial jihad.  
 
World War II 
 
Kartosuwiryo published little in the years following his ostracism from PSII in 1939 and the 
outbreak of World War II. However, the war provided him with new opportunities to reassert his 
position in the Islamic nationalist movement. His willingness to work with the occupying Japanese 
administration meant he was able to participate in Masyumi activities, including writing for their 
publication Soeara MIAI from March to December 1943. Kartosuwiryo saw the Japanese as a 
largely positive force due to their expulsion of the Dutch and their promotion of ‘common welfare 
and prosperity’ in Asia.456 In his writings for Masyumi, he repeatedly praised the Japanese 
government and returned to the theme of the potential for economic prosperity under their rule.457  
 
However, Kartosuwiryo did not appear to explore jihad as a topic in his writings in this period. His 
writings in Soeara MIAI largely centred on issues of personal behaviour such as fard al-ayn (legal 
obligations that must be performed by Muslims, like prayer and fasting). The avoidance of a topic 
like jihad may have been the result of self-censorship and a desire to avoid confrontation with his 
new imperial masters, or he could have seen the issue as unnecessary given that he welcomed 
Japanese rule.  
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Kartosuwiryo may have genuinely believed that the Japanese forces would eventually grant 
independence to an Islamic state of Indonesia given their support, particularly in the initial phase 
of the occupation, for Islamist groups and their state-building efforts. Nevertheless, these 
speculations are difficult to substantiate given the paucity of sources or external accounts of 
Kartosuwiryo’s thinking during this period.  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s initial understanding of jihad was considerably under-developed in comparison to 
his conceptualisation of hākimiyya. His limited writings on the topic between 1928 and 1945 
illustrate that when he did think about the concept, it was usually in terms of jihad as a struggle for 
a more pious community or closer personal relationship with God. In bettering themselves as 
Muslims, Kartosuwiryo believed Indonesians would thus be one step closer to achieving an Islamic 
state. It was necessary that all Muslims in the archipelago take part in this endeavour. While this 
conceptualisation prioritised a non-violent struggle, it was nevertheless still a form of anti-colonial 
resistance aimed at ridding Indonesian Muslims of values and beliefs inculcated by the Dutch. 
 
Radicalisation through conflict, 1945-1949 
 
While still preaching his non-violent interpretation of jihad, the Second World War did offer 
Kartosuwiryo his first opportunity of combat training. As Allied forces made progress in their 
Southeast Asian campaign, Japanese officials in Indonesia began facilitating the formation of 
Islamic militia groups and provided training and equipment in a bid to create auxiliary troops. 
These groups, including Pembela Tanah Air (Peta, Defenders of the Fatherland), Hizbullah, and 
Sabillah, were created between 1943 and 1944 and gave large numbers of young men religious 
tutelage as well as the requisite skills to resist the returning colonialists following the war’s end. In 
Bandung, Kartosuwiryo ‘took advantage of this opportunity… and in 1945 reactivated the Suffah 
Institute to arm and train youths who had joined Hizbullah’.458 It was through these guerrilla units 
that Kartosuwiryo would find a core of dedicated fighters to support and join his cause.459  
 
This opportunity to train and engage in physical resistance against colonial rule began the shift in 
Kartosuwiryo’s thinking on jihad. This transformation was rapid. After initially embracing a limited 
form of physical violence at the end of World War II, he came to see jihad almost exclusively as 
defensive, physical conflict by July 1947 with the advent of the First Dutch Police Action. In 1948, 
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in the wake of the Renville Agreement signed by the government of the Netherlands and the 
Sukarno-led administration, Kartosuwiryo declared the formation of the Tentara Islam Indonesia 
(TII, Indonesian Islamic Army) and released a constitution for an eventual Islamic state in 
Indonesia. He declared the foundation of the NII on 7 August 1949, setting his movement on a 
collision course with the Indonesian Republic.  
 
This section will thus examine the narrowing of Kartosuwiryo’s interpretation of jihad, illustrating 
the impact of external events in spurring his embrace of violence as a legitimate tactic of resistance. 
While the form of jihad had changed, Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of the term remained 
squarely defensive and an obligation incumbent on all Muslims. Rather than being a gradual and 
incremental process that would somehow lead to the creation of an Islamic state, Kartosuwiryo’s 
understanding of jihad took on a new urgency. It was only through a physical struggle that Muslims 
in Indonesia would be able to attain hākimiyya. Over a four-year period, his conceptualisation of 
jihad moved quickly from a non-violent struggle, largely conducted on an individual level, to one 
that entailed physical conflict against foreign, un-Islamic forces and even other Muslims who did 
not support his vision of an Islamic state.  
 
Haloean Politik Islam and the Perang Sabil 
 
As the colonial powers attempted to re-establish their hold over Southeast Asia following the 
Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, Kartosuwiryo continued to develop his ideas on jihad. 
Between the end of the war and the retreat of the Dutch in December 1949, Kartosuwiryo drafted 
two key documents that showed the evolution of his thinking on the subject; the ‘Haloean Politik 
Islam’ in July 1946 and a perang sabil in 1947. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Kartosuwiryo gave a speech in Garut, West Java entitled ‘Haloean Politik 
Islam’ in July 1946. In addition to his thoughts on hākimiyya, the speech outlined Kartosuwiryo’s 
thinking on jihad in light of Sukarno’s declaration of independence and the return of colonial 
forces. Despite the threat posed by the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo hewed closely to the positions he 
had held prior to World War II, emphasising non-violent resistance and the collective participation 
of all Muslims in this personal, spiritual quest. 
 
Kartosuwiryo began his speech by elaborating the differences in political culture between the West 
and Islam, emphasising that the nature of Islam was all-encompassing and prevented a separation 
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of religion and state in the lives of Muslims. Indonesians required both ‘de facto’ independence from 
Dutch rule and ‘de jure’ independence, which could only come with the implementation of an 
Islamic political system and shari’a thus ensuring God’s will on earth.460 In order to achieve both 
forms of independence, Kartosuwiryo argued that Indonesians needed to engage in both a national 
and a social revolution, which Kartosuwiryo referred to as ‘jihad al-asghar’ (lesser jihad) and ‘jihad 
al-akbar’ (greater jihad) respectively. A national revolution, entailing physical resistance against the 
Dutch, was ultimately less important than the social revolution, which required all Muslims to 
engage in a ‘change in attitude and spirit’.461 
 
This formulation reflected much of Kartosuwiryo’s thinking from the pre-war period. Not only 
did he see these forms of jihad as a tool to achieve independence and hākimiyya, he continued to 
emphasise the value of non-violence and personal betterment as the most important means by 
which this Islamic state would be achieved. While Kartosuwiryo conceded that in the face of Dutch 
encroachment, jihad al-asghar should, temporarily, take priority, this did not exempt Muslims from 
participating in the other, greater jihad. These struggles should thus be pursued in tandem in order 
to truly achieve freedom.  
 
The speech also reflected Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of this struggle as an obligation for all 
Muslims in Indonesia. Once again, he argued that ‘whether they want to or not, every Muslims 
must feel obligated to participate in the national revolutions’. 462 This formulation echoes verse 216 
in the second surah which reads that ‘Fighting has been enjoined upon you, although it is a matter 
hateful to you’ and indicates that Muslims may not have a choice as to whether they want to 
participate in jihad or not, as only God can decide. 463 This is reinforced later in the speech when 
he reiterates that all Muslims have a ‘duty’ and ‘sacred obligation’ to govern themselves and 
participate in politics.464 By joining these revolutionary jihads, Muslims were both participating in 
a collective enterprise to achieve their freedom and demonstrating their commitment to their faith. 
Without the participation of all, particularly in a social revolution to purify the hearts and minds 
of the faithful, Indonesians would never be truly independent. 
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The ‘Haloean Politik Islam’ speech indicates that Kartosuwiryo believed that a largely similar course 
of action to what he advocated in the pre-war period could be used to counter colonial rule in the 
post-war period. While he acknowledged that a greater emphasis must now be placed on the 
physical, national rebellion, he did not give up on advocating non-violent, personal struggle. His 
speech clearly demonstrated that he still regarded this as the greater jihad and the key to the 
attainment of an Islamic state after the end of Dutch rule.  
 
However, Kartosuwiryo appears to abandon these fairly restrained positions following the First 
Dutch Aggression in July 1947 as the colonial forces intensified their efforts to recapture the 
archipelago. Kartosuwiryo, who was now the vice-president of Masyumi in West Java, issued a 
perang sabil shortly after the police action began. The phrase, which translates as ‘war in the way of 
God’, is ‘a hybrid term derived from the Malay word for war and the Arabic saying jihad fī sabīlillah’ 
and has frequently been used to rally colonised Muslims against foreign forces.465  
 
This perang sabils marked a return to the ideology and tactics of movements that struggled against 
the Dutch in the early years of colonial occupation. The Javanese prince Diponegoro used the 
term sabil to rally his troops during the Java War (1825-1830) against encroaching Dutch forces. 
Diponegoro believed that jihad was a ‘war against non-believers who [had] attacked, displaced and 
robbed Muslims’.466 During the Achenese war (1873-1912), the doctrine of Perang Sabil was 
codified in a text known as Hikayat Perang Sabil (the Epic of the Holy War), to ‘motivate Achenese 
fighters in the war against the Dutch’.467 However, once Dutch rule was consolidated, Islamic 
groups generally turned away from physical confrontation, choosing instead to pursue a path of 
non-violent jihad, similar to the ideas espoused in Kartosuwiryo’s Bosoer Sikap Hidjrah in 1936.  
 
It is likely that Kartosuwiryo would have been aware of the numerous fatwas (legal opinions) 
authorising jihad and perang sabils issued following the return of Dutch forces, which urged 
Indonesians to defend their homeland from encroachment. For example, the government in Aceh 
issued a perang sabil in 1945 calling on Indonesians to resist the colonialists who ‘will enact efforts 
to destroy our pure Islamic religion’468. Similarly, the NU branches of East Java issued a fatwa on 
21 October 1945, which argued that jihad ‘[became] mandatory for every Muslim (fardlu‘ain)’ to 
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‘oppose the Dutch and their accomplices who wish to re-colonise Indonesia’.469 This fatwa, known 
as the Resolusi Jihad (Jihad Resolution) appeared to galvanise Indonesian Muslims, particularly the 
members of Hizbullah and Sabilillah, who engaged the British forces spearheading the Western 
powers’ bid to retake the Dutch East Indies in a three week-long battle.  
 
Given this febrile atmosphere, it is surprising that Kartosuwiryo held off declaring his own perang 
sabil for as long as he did. Nevertheless, its language and tone largely followed the blueprint of 
earlier fatwas issued by other Islamist groups and carries within it some of the concepts espoused 
by foreign ideologues. In the brief document, Kartosuwiryo argued explicitly that Indonesian 
Muslims must engage in ‘a war for the defence of the sovereignty of the country and the purity of 
religion, [and] a war to fight any attempt to colonise any nation’.470 Furthermore, they must ‘rise 
up and fulfil their obligation to establish dar al-Islam and implement hukum Islam [Islamic law]’, 
once again emphasising the collective obligation to participate in this conflict.471  
 
The document makes no mention of a greater jihad to purify one’s beliefs and practice of Islam, 
which signals that Kartosuwiryo had clearly abandoned any pretence that an internal struggle could 
result in the attainment of a de facto or de jure Islamic state. He made it clear that the physical 
expulsion of the Dutch was his primary aim, pledging to work with any group, regardless of their 
religious orientation, that opposed colonial rule and supported the creation of an independent 
Indonesia. Kartosuwiryo acknowledged that in the aftermath of this conflict, these other groups, 
namely secular nationalists, might prevail as the governing force. However, he stated that he was 
prepared to accept this result as long as Muslims were free to practice their faith. Nevertheless, he 
did not elaborate further on what would constitute a breach of this condition.  
 
This explicit focus on the need to win a physical conflict against the Dutch, even at the expense 
of the creation of an Islamic state, signalled a huge transformation in Kartosuwiryo’s 
understanding of jihad. Kartosuwiryo had gone from downplaying jihad’s association with war and 
emphasising a definition of peaceful struggle to gradually acknowledging and advocating the term’s 
more violent and militaristic connotations. It is clear that Kartosuwiryo’s ideology was not static, 
but rather was shaped by the circumstances he found himself in.  
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It is also important to recognise that Kartosuwiryo’s perang sabil received widespread support from 
the Indonesian Republican administration, highlighting the relatively mainstream position of both 
his status within the Indonesian independence movement and his conceptualisation of jihad. For 
example, the head of the defence ministry’s office for military justice, Major Kasman 
Singodimedjo, said that Kartosuwiryo’s declaration was ‘straight away right’ for Indonesian 
Muslims, thanked him, and referred to him as a ‘brave and courageous’ son of Indonesia.472 Despite 
Kartosuwiryo’s status as the forefather of Indonesian Islamist militancy, messages of support like 
this show that he did not consistently occupy the position as a rebel fighter nor was his ideology 
always unacceptable to government officials.  
 
Betrayal and the Renville Agreement 
 
While conflict with the returning Dutch forces had a radicalising effect on Kartosuwiryo, domestic 
forces played a role in narrowing his conceptualisation of jihad. When he issued his Perang Sabil in 
August 1947, Kartosuwiryo did not actively oppose the secular nationalists led by Sukarno and his 
self-declared Indonesian government. Indeed, he had advocated cooperation and even indicated 
his willingness to accept their rule following the expulsion of the colonialists. However, a 
breakdown in relations between the nationalists and the Islamists over the signing of the Renville 
Agreement in January 1948 served as a further radicalising event for Kartosuwiryo and solidified 
his embrace of a violent interpretation of jihad.  
  
The Renville Agreement, which was signed by the Republican and Dutch authorities after 
significant US pressure on 17 January 1948, alienated the Islamists physically and psychologically. 
Under the terms of the deal, West Java – where Kartosuwiryo and most of his Masyumi followers 
were based and engaged in combat against Dutch forces – was largely surrendered to the 
colonialists alongside major cities in East Java. With the Republican government essentially 
confined to Central Java and its troops slowly withdrawing, Islamic nationalists saw the agreement 
as a betrayal of the Indonesian revolution.  
 
However, the absence of Republican troops and the inability of the Dutch to completely secure 
the area allowed Masyumi’s West Java branch – with Kartosuwiryo at the helm – to operate with 
relative impunity. He seized his chance. By February, representatives of various Islamic groups 
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including Masyumi, NU, Muhammadiyah and Persis, had gathered in Pangwedusan, Cisayong, to 
discuss coordinating an Islamic resistance to the Dutch.  
 
The following month, Kartosuwiryo decreed that West Java’s political and military apparatus 
would be unified, leading to the disbanding of Masyumi and the establishment of an Islamic army, 
the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army). With Kartosuwiryo installed as the 
imam of the region, the movement began making plans to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. 
These developments, complete with Kartosuwiryo’s transformation into a religious and military 
leader, illustrate how far he had come in terms of his embrace of the so-called ‘lesser jihad’ as a 
legitimate means of bringing about an Islamic state.  
 
Over the course of six months, the TII had established a territorial stronghold in West Java. With 
a secure base, Kartosuwiryo was able to release the Kanun Azasy for the prospective NII on 27 
August 1948. The document, which was examined in greater detail in the previous chapter, was 
meant to serve as a blueprint for the future independent Islamic Indonesia and covered all matters 
relating to the state’s structure, legal framework, and relationship with its citizens.  
 
While Kartosuwiryo did not extensively expound on jihad in the constitution, he did acknowledge 
in its muqaddimah (preamble) that the Islamic state was in a state of war against the Dutch, having 
been subjugated for many years. Although this situation was not ideal, it had a ‘sacred purpose’ to 
create an Islamic state in Indonesia. As such, citizens of the NII were obliged to perform their 
‘sacred duty’ of establishing an Islamic state and participating in an ‘Islamic Revolution’ to liberate 
the country from Dutch rule.473  
 
Although brief, this preamble showed how Kartosuwiryo had come to see a physical, violent 
revolution as the only means of overthrowing the Dutch and attaining an Islamic state. In this 
respect, jihad was the key instrument for the attainment of hākimiyya in Indonesia, highlighting its 
newfound centrality in the doctrine of Kartosuwiryo’s movement. Furthermore, by beginning the 
document with a description of Indonesia’s colonial history and occupation by the Japanese in 
World War II, Kartosuwiryo frames the need for rebellion as a defensive and anti-colonial struggle 
for the liberation of Indonesia’s Muslims. Finally, in repeatedly referencing the ‘sacred’ nature of 
 




the act that he wished all Muslims in the country to engage in, Kartosuwiryo again framed jihad as 
both an extremely important way of demonstrating one’s faith and a collective obligation.  
 
The document appears to have been primarily drafted by Kartosuwiryo, although this cannot be 
ascertained with certainty. One indication of the limited number of participants involved in its 
creation was a report produced by the Ministry of the Interior about Kartosuwiryo’s movement 
between 1946 and 1948. According to this report, seemingly few, if any, other renowned Islamist 
leaders were present with Kartosuwiryo in West Java. It states that Islamist and Republican leaders 
outside West Java received copies of the Kanun Azasy, indicating that they were not consulted in 
its development, or not until it was in its final form.474 The Ministry of Interior’s series of reports 
on the activities of Kartosuwiryo’s group within West Java during this period makes no mention 
of other prominent activists or ideologues in his camp.  
 
Moreover, Kartosuwiryo does not appear to have had significant correspondence with other 
Islamists around the country, beyond sending them his literature. Similarly, neither Indonesian-
language biographies by Pinardi, Amak Sjariffudin, and Al-Chaidar nor Western scholars like 
Chiara Formichi, Holk Dengal, or Cornelius van Dijk mention the contribution of other 
ideologues to the creation of the Kanun Azasy. While not conclusive, the absence of other 
contributors in the secondary literature and scant evidence of their presence in primary sources, 
suggests that Kartosuwiryo’s contribution to the creation of document was at very least significant.  
 
While it is possible that scholars with significantly more religious training were in Kartosuwiryo’s  
base in West Java to assist him, by the 1940s, after decades of participation within SI circles, writing 
and editing for Fadjar Asia, and steeped in Islamist advocacy, it is likely that he was himself capable 
of crafting a short constitutional document. As noted in the previous chapter, the document 
focuses heavily on the practicalities of organising the state, rather than providing strong religious 
justification. It ultimately served as a reflection of the political system Kartosuwiryo hoped to 
install – a state structured around a single amīr with extensive political and military power – rather 
than as a scholarly text. Even if other scholars did play some role, the lack of acknowledgement 
or any indication that the document was a product of a group of ideologues, suggests that 
Kartosuwiryo was keen to demonstrate that he above all shaped the DI’s ideology.   
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The establishment of the NII and opposition to the Indonesian Republic 
 
The events of the final year of the Indonesian Revolution solidified Kartosuwiryo’s belief that a 
violent jihad was fundamental to the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. On 19 
December, Dutch forces invaded Republican-held territory in Central Java, seizing the capital, 
Yogyakarta, and taking leading figures such as Sukarno hostage.475 According to a report produced 
by the Ministry of the Information on 20 September 1950, the creation of the NII was ‘predicated’ 
on the assumption that, for all intents and purposes ‘the Republic of Indonesia had dissolved’.476 
The Republic’s defeat also provided Kartosuwiryo with an opening to position himself and his 
movement as the rightful leader of the fight for an independent Indonesia.  
 
The very next day, Kartosuwiryo declared in a statement issued in the name of the NII, that the 
ummah were ordered to begin a ‘holy war, a total war’ against the Dutch ‘until the invaders were 
completely wiped-out’, claiming that this was the only way to bring about independence and an 
Islamic state in Indonesia.477 He issued another statement on 21 December 1948, announcing with 
sadness that the ‘Republic of Indonesia fell as a state’ and there was ‘no other way’ for the 
Indonesian ummah to attain independence other than through jihad fī sabīlillah’ illah (jihad in the way 
of God).478 In a final statement on 23 December 1948, he reiterated these points and argued that 
throughout the entirety of the Indonesian Revolution, there had been ‘only two groups at war: the 
Islamic State of Indonesia and the state of the Netherlands’. 479 
 
These statements serve as the clearest indication of the transformation of Kartosuwiryo’s 
understanding of jihad and the importance of conflict in driving these shifts in interpretation. Far 
from being an afterthought, the concept of a physical jihad had become central to his belief 
structure, serving as the key tool to establish an Islamic state. By 1948 he was interpreting it in line 
with classical Islamic doctrine, emphasising its meaning as a physical struggle to defend a Muslim 
society from non-Muslim aggressors, and a duty incumbent on all his co-religionists. 
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Moreover, his statements build a case that only the NII could lead the jihad to realistically achieve 
independence for Indonesia. They effectively asserted that there were only two real actors in the 
fight to control Indonesia since the capture of nationalist leaders nullified their ability to lead the 
revolution. This is reinforced by his argument in the final statement issued on 23 December that 
only two groups had participated in the conflict for its entire duration, suggesting that even before 
they were captured, the Republican leadership’s tactics of peaceful negotiation, in some instances, 
invalidated their claim to be true fighters for the cause of Indonesian freedom. In this respect, 
Kartosuwiryo exploited the power vacuum left by the detention of the Republican government to 
claim his position as the rightful leader of the independence movement.  
 
These statements also demonstrate once again Kartosuwiryo’s belief that cooperation with the 
colonialists in any manner was unacceptable. This idea, which first emerged in the 1930s as he led 
PSII on its jihad of non-cooperation, was brought to its logical conclusion in these statements, 
where attempting to negotiate or engage with the Dutch invalidated the legitimacy of a group’s 
struggle. Jihad to Kartosuwiryo consistently meant engaging in a process of rejection of non-
Islamic values and practices. It was an act of purifying one’s thoughts and deeds, thus reaffirming 
and demonstrating commitment to faith and devotion to God.  
 
Republican leaders’ actions in the months after their release from Dutch captivity in January 1949 
condemned them further in Kartosuwiryo’s eyes. Realising they were not going to win Indonesia’s 
freedom through irregular warfare alone, the Republicans returned to the negotiating table with 
the Dutch. Coupled with the signing of the Renville Agreement months earlier, this tipped 
Kartosuwiryo over the edge, leading him to begin a period of ‘triangular warfare’ attacking both 
the Dutch and Republican forces.480 
 
Despite the escalating conflict with DI, the Republicans continued to make progress with the 
Dutch, eventually coming to an agreement for the transfer of sovereignty during talks in May 1949. 
This diplomatic success was seen once again by Kartosuwiryo as a betrayal of the revolution and 
the Indonesian people. By agreeing that the Republic would be subsumed within a larger United 
States of Indonesia, Kartosuwiryo and his followers believed that the country would never truly 
be independent as this federal structure allowed for the Dutch to continue exploitation through a 
divide and rule strategy.481 
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Given this hostility towards both the Republicans and the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo finally decreed on 
7 August 1949 the official formation the Negara Islam Indonesia ‘known in other words, as ad-
Daulatul Islamiyyah, or Darul Islam’.482 He explained that Indonesia had been in a state of war 
since the end of the Japanese occupation and declared that Perang Suci (holy war), would continue 
until the ‘disappearance of colonialism and slavery; the [expulsion] of all enemies of God, enemies 
of religion and enemies of the state of Indonesia’ and the perfect and complete application of 
Islamic law throughout fully sovereign Islamic State of Indonesia.483 As such, the statement went 
on to declare that Islamic martial law would apply until these aims were met. 
 
The proclamation illustrates how Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of jihad, in comparison to 
hākimiyya, evolved largely in response to political circumstances and conflict, rather than through 
thorough intellectual debates. This is not to argue that his ideas about jihad were devoid of 
engagement with the debates about the term in political Islam, but rather that these shifts in 
position were prompted by the changing circumstances of the Indonesian revolution. 
 
Structuring jihad: The hukum pidana 
 
Alongside the proclamation of the NII, Kartosuwiryo released an updated version of the 
constitution as well as a hukum pidana. The document covered a wide range of legal issues, but 
focused heavily on martial law, reflecting the circumstances under which it was written. The 
document signalled the seriousness of his endeavour, demonstrating that the NII had the capacity 
to engage in state building through the construction of a legal code and a belief that it had the right 
and power to enforce these rules.  
 
While largely focused on day-to-day crimes and punishments, the penal code helped to concretise 
parts of Kartosuwiryo’s interpretation of jihad that had thus far been underdeveloped. On the issue 
of who was obligated to participate in jihad in the NII, the hukum pidana stipulated in Article 1of 
its second chapter that adherence to martial law was ‘one of the five pillars of jihad’ and that all 
able-bodied adult men were obliged to participate in the war against the NII’s enemies.484 
Referencing the Qur’an, only those who are blind, weak, or have ‘an infectious dissease’ would be 
exempted from the fight. Failing to adhere to martial law through spreading un-Islamic 
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propaganda, propaganda that ‘undermines the security, order and welfare of the country’, those 
who worked with the enemy as spies or in other capacity, would be arrested.485  
 
Although not an unusual definition of who was obligated to participate in combat, the notion that 
citizens must obey martial law as a ‘pillar of jihad’ illustrated how Kartosuwiryo was using the 
concept to ensure compliance with his state’s policies. 486 Adhering to martial law was thus framed 
as a greater religious struggle and a sign of piety and demonstration of faith, likely limiting 
opportunities for dissent and rebellion within his own ranks.  
 
For the first time, the code also explicitly defined the enemies of Islam beyond the Dutch 
colonialists. It decreed that jihad was permissible against hypocrites who professed belief but 
undermined Islam by working with its enemies (munafiq), sinners who did not adhere to God’s law 
(fasik), those who rebelled against legitimate Islamic authority (bughāh), and anyone who was a ‘tool 
of the colonial power’. 487 In justifying these categories, the code references the verses in the surah 
At-Tahrīm (The Banning), which state that Muslims should ‘strive against the disbelievers and the 
hypocrites and be harsh upon them’, and the surah As-Saff (The Ranks) that warns against 
‘extending [hypocrites] affection while they have disbelieved’. As such, if these individuals were 
caught and tried, their punishment would be death.  
 
This inclusion of numerous categories of Muslims illustrated a marked shift in Kartosuwiryo’s 
thinking and conceptualisation of jihad. Given Kartosuwiryo’s inability to understand Arabic and 
the paucity of translations of Ibn Taymiyya’s work into Indonesian during this period, it is unlikely 
that he read Ibn Taymiyya’s first fatwa approving jihad against Muslims who failed to adhere to 
Islamic rule and collaborated with the infidel forces. Even so, the penal code echoes Ibn 
Taymiyya’s understanding of which Muslims could be legitimate targets of attacks. This illustrates 
the potential within Qur’anic scripture on jihad to engender similar interpretations and 
justifications of who constitutes an enemy of the faith across radically different time periods and 
contexts. Like Ibn Taymiyya before him, Kartosuwiryo adeptly moulded these verses to suit his 
circumstances and legitimise his state’s legal system.  
 
From being a struggle against non-believers and foreign oppressors, Kartosuwiryo’s conception 






transgressed against the Islamic community or state in some way. The code thus justified attacks 
against the Republican state, many of whose leaders and supporters were themselves Muslims and 
obligated NII members to potentially kill their co-religionists. This was a clear expansion of the 
scope of the NII’s enemies, requiring NII members to fight both a war against an external force 
as well as a domestic threat, blurring the line between a defensive and offensive jihad. 
 
Although Kartosuwiryo did not explicitly use the term takfīr in the penal code, the document 
alludes to the concept in justifying the killing of other Muslims on the grounds that their 
transgressions constitute a major breach against an Islamic community. The code permits the NII 
authorities to kill their fellow Muslims who conspire with the state’s enemies and thus committing 
rebellion against a legitimate Islamic authority and thus God. As such, it does not consider their 
shared faith to be a mitigating factor, rendering them no different from non-believers who act 
against the NII. However, these nascent takfīri ideas remained marginal since Kartosuwiryo did 
not clarify in the document whether he considers those who have transgressed against the state 
still Muslim and the process by which one could be stripped of their faith and thus made eligible 
for slaughter.  
 
The adoption of the penal code represented a hardening of attitudes among DI leaders and 
members, reflecting Kartosuwiryo’s narrowing definition of jihad and uncompromising vision of 
the Indonesian revolution and the state that should arise from it. Kartosuwiryo began his career 
as an Islamist activist paying little attention to the concept of jihad and conceiving of it largely as a 
non-violent, personal struggle, but by the mid-1930s he moved on to viewing it as a collective 
obligation to non-violently oppose colonial rule. The Indonesian Revolution radicalised his 
thinking and prompted a reformulation of his conceptualisation of jihad. While retaining its sense 
of collective duty and anti-colonial interpretation, Kartosuwiryo viewed jihad as a violent, physical 
conflict and the only means by which an Islamic state would be achieved. This resulted in an 
expansion of the legitimate targets for a jihad, namely other Muslims who opposed Kartosuwiryo’s 
state or supported the development of a secular republic.  
 
From intransigence to pragmatism, 1949 to 1962  
 
Kartosuwiryo wrote little between 1949 and 1962, presumably focusing his energies on his guerrilla 
campaign and maintaining his state in West Java. The actions of the DI indicate that there was 
little, if any, change to his conceptualisation of jihad until the final few months of his life. Once 
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again, events drove changes in his conceptualisation of jihad. With the prospect of defeat at the 
hands of the Republican government after a 13-year conflict, Kartosuwiryo redefined the concept 
once again as a form of non-cooperation and intellectual resistance. This change allowed his 
movement to sustain itself after his execution on 5 September 1962.  
 
Resistance to Republican rule 
 
The chance that Kartosuwiryo and his movement would be able to negotiate with the Republicans, 
let alone the Dutch, to find a compromise to end the conflict was increasingly slim as 1949 drew 
to a close. The Dutch and the Indonesians signed The Hague Agreement on 2 November 1949 
paving the way for the transfer of sovereignty and the recognition of an independent Indonesia 
on 27 December 1949. The treaty brought an end to the bloody revolution and at long last brought 
independence to Indonesia.  
 
Having previously objected to the idea of an independent Indonesia structured as a federal state, 
it was unlikely that these developments would have appeased Kartosuwiryo and the DI. At all 
stages of his career as an Islamist activist, Kartosuwiryo believed that any form of collaboration 
with the colonialists was tantamount to heresy, and continued to define jihad as non-cooperation 
and resistance. The Republican government, preoccupied over the past few years with its struggle 
against the Dutch, was at a loss as to how to deal with the DI as the movement continued to 
spread throughout West Java and openly engage Republican forces attempting to impose control 
after the Dutch retreat.  
 
Initially, the government appeared to favour some sort of appeasement, or at least was willing to 
broker a truce in order to defeat the Dutch. Between December 1948 and the end of 1949, Vice 
President Mohammad Hatta apparently sent two letters to Kartosuwiryo, asking if DI and the 
Republican government ‘could elaborate a common strategy of defence against the Dutch; if 
Kartosuwiryo was interested in receiving a Republican medal for combat; and if he would 
reconsider his position on the Republic once an independent state of Indonesia was established’.488 
Kartosuwiryo did not deliver a response.  
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These peace overtures continued but simultaneously, ‘the army was (successfully) conducting 
small-scale anti-Darul Islam operations’ between March and May 1950.489 This dual strategy of 
both sending senior government officials, including Mohammad Natsir, the prime minister and an 
Islamist sympathetic to Kartosuwiryo’s desire for an Islamic state to forge compromises such as 
the granting of an amnesty or rewards for Kartosuwiryo himself and simultaneously targeting the 
group’s forces in West Java continued until 1955.  
 
While Kartosuwiryo abstained from negotiations with the Republicans, he did attempt to forge 
relationships and alliances with other like-minded Islamists. Kartosuwiryo met and formed an 
uneasy alliance with Acehnese leader Daud Beureueh, South Sulawesi commander Kahar 
Muzakkar, and Kiyai Hadjar of South Kalimantan. Muzakkar committed himself to DI in 1952, 
while Beureueh declared that ‘Aceh was “separating” from the Indonesian republic and instead 
joining with the Negara Islam Indonesia’.490 The reasons for the revolts in Aceh and South Sulawesi 
are complex, as were the motivations and ideologies of their leadership, although their initial 
participation in the conflict was couched in religious terms.491 The men often resisted 
Kartosuwiryo’s leadership and agitated for greater autonomy, with Beureueh declaring in 1955 that 
Aceh was a ‘federal state’ within the NII.492 
 
The groups’ disparate motivations, as well as their relative autonomy regarding their conduct 
throughout the conflict, makes it difficult to analyse the bloc as a cohesive entity, much less provide 
a substantive characterisation of its ideologies in totality. Furthermore, there is very little evidence 
that their writing and participation in the DI significantly impacted the thinking of subsequent 
generations of DI leaders, with Kartosuwiryo’s writings and teachings making up the bulk of the 
group’s thinking on its core concepts. The DI in West Java and the ideas of its leader, 
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Islamist failures at the ballot box 
 
Indonesian political society was also changing rapidly during this period, further isolating the DI 
movement. Numerous Islamists organisations (Masyumi and a reconstituted PSII among them) 
looked to the 1955 elections as the key opportunity to attain power and transform the country into 
an Islamic state. Masyumi and PSII’s participation in mainstream, democratic politics illustrated 
how far Kartosuwiryo had gone in alienating himself from the organisation and its ideological 
stance.  
 
However, the failure of Islamist parties to form a government following elections in September 
likely reinforced Kartosuwiryo’s belief that he was right not to have engaged with the political 
process to achieve an Islamic state. With 20.9% of the vote, Masyumi was the second largest party 
in the legislative assembly. However, with the nationalist Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), PKI 
and NU with 22.3%, 18.4% and 16.4% respectively, no stable governing majority could be formed, 
which thwarted the prospect of bringing about an Islamic state via the electoral system.493  
 
This belief was likely to have been strengthened with the decline of constitutional democracy. With 
the revolts in West Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Aceh continuing, the collapse of 
numerous cabinets and the failure to establish a permanent constitution, Sukarno used these 
opportunities to centralise power. On 9 April 1957, he announced a policy of ‘Guided Democracy’, 
aimed at continuing the struggle of the Indonesian revolution. This resulted in the imposition of 
martial law on 14 March 1957, the banning of most political parties, including Masyumi, the 
nationalisation of key industries, and the demise of the federal structure of the country.494 During 
this period, Islamic political activity was sharply curtailed. Where this activity was permitted, it was 
dominated by the traditionalist NU, who were ‘careful to engage only in social, economic, 
education and religious roles’. 495 The prospect of establishing an Islamic state through electoral 
political means appeared all but dead as the decade came to an end.  
 
Kartosuwiryo did not issue many written or oral statements between the handover of sovereignty 
and his capture by Republican forces on 4 June 1962, making it difficult to fully assess any 
ideological shifts and developments during this period. Nevertheless his unwillingness to negotiate 
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with the Republic or compete in elections, and his continued attacks on government forces 
suggested that his conception of jihad remained focused on the need to continue to expand and 
protect the nascent Islamic state he had built in West Java and a belief that engagement with the 
government and non-violent Islamists through the political process was treasonous and futile.  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s penal code and refusal to engage with the political process thus continued to 
illustrate his understanding of jihad as an anti-colonial, defensive process even in the post-colonial 
era. His refusal to participate in ‘man-made’ political structures or endorse the participation of his 
former allies showed the steadfastness of his belief that, while Indonesia was now an independent 
state, true freedom only came from the establishment of an Islamic state.  
 
The experience of Guided Democracy demonstrated that, even if constitutional provisions 
protecting Muslims’ freedom to conduct themselves as they saw fit were made, these would be 
insufficient, because man-made laws could ultimately be changed by the machinations of later 
administrations. As such, Kartosuwiryo’s position that it remained a duty to engage in jihad to 
remove ‘any oppression or obstruction of [Muslims] exercising their faith, [which impaired] the 
foundation of some of the pillars of Islam’, formed part of a continuum of Islamic scholars 
opposing British rule in India to resistance movements in Algeria, Egypt, and the Caucasus. 496 
 
The hope and pragmatism of Hudaybiyyah  
 
By the early 1960s, Kartosuwiryo’s movement had been pushed out of most of their territorial 
strongholds in West Java as the army adopted an ‘active-offensive’ strategy. The military even co-
opted the civilian population, using them as human shields and preventing DI from receiving 
supplies.497 Increasingly isolated, Kartosuwiryo was captured on 4 June 1962 and executed on 5 
September that same year. 
 
Kartosuwiryo recognised the looming potential for defeat. Once again, he was responsive to his 
circumstances and adapted his interpretation of jihad to the prevailing political and military 
conditions. In 1959, he issued a communiqué to DI members, telling them that ‘in the event of 
such a disaster’, they should ‘continue the fight as long as Pancasila is still there’ and as they 
remained ‘in a state of jihad’.498 These fighting words were however tempered by pragmatism. 
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Although he encouraged followers to continue to challenge the Republic, he simultaneously 
compared the possible defeat of DI to the Hudaybiyyah treaty that created a ten-year ceasefire 
between the Prophet Muhammad and Quraysh tribe of Mecca in March 628.  
 
The Hudaybiyyah treaty was a deal negotiated between the Prophet and the Quraysh, which 
allowed Muslims access to Mecca to perform the hajj. The Muslims had ‘humiliated Mecca and 
quashed opposition in Medina’ leading the Prophet to believe ‘it was time to abandon the jihad 
and begin a peace offensive’.499 He led unarmed volunteers to Mecca, held in 628 by the defeated 
Quraysh, and made camp near the city at Hudaybiyyah. Faced with overwhelming numbers of 
pilgrims and a desire to avoid bloodshed in the city as the guardians of the sacred Kabah shrine, 
the Quraysh relented, striking a compromise with the Muslims. 
 
The Hudaybiyyah treaty is seen as the ‘classic example’ and ‘model for subsequent treaties’ in fiqh.500 
According to Khadduri, the treaty set the template for future pacts signed by Muslim governments 
and authorities. This is somewhat ironic as the Hudaybiyyah treaty made ‘no attempt’ to give details 
as to the wider application of its provisions.501 Islamic judicial scholars saw treaties as specific 
documents, with their content having no bearing on whether they could be considered 
permanently binding or time limited.502 Instead, their duration was determined by who Muslims 
were negotiating with. Based on the text of the Hudaybiyyah treaty, Hanafi and Shafi’i schools 
argued that ‘a peace treaty with the enemy should not exceed a period of ten years’.503  
 
The Hudaybiyyah treaty is also significant in Islamic jurisprudence as it illustrated that the power 
to strike such accords lay in the hands of the Prophet, his successors and their designated field 
commanders.504 Seeking peace was permissible as long as it ‘serves Muslim interests, is a valid 
instrument, the provisions of which must be binding upon all Muslims’.505 While Muslim 
authorities had to strictly follow the terms of the agreement after it was agreed, they retained the 
right to abrogate treaties if the other party violated the terms of the accord first.506 In the case of 
 
Marijan Kartosuwirjo, published: 28 July 2016, https://ahkamsulthaniyah.com/2016/07/28/amanat-dan-wasiat-imam-
asy-syahid-sekarmaji-marijan-kartosuwirjo/, accessed: 6 January 2020 
499 Armstrong, Islam, p.19 
500 Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p.203 
501 Idem, p.219 
502 Ibid 
503 Ibid 
504 Idem, p.203 
505 Ibid 
506 Idem, p.204 
 157 
the Hudaybiyyah treaty, the Quraysh eventually broke the pact when their ally Banu Bakr attacked 
an ally of the Prophet and his followers.507  
 
It is unclear how deep Kartosuwiryo’s knowledge on Islamic jurisprudence and treaty-making 
went, but invoking Hudaybiyyah treaty demonstrated that he had at least some awareness of its 
function as significant legal tool. The Hudaybiyyah precedent ultimately provided an opening for 
a reinterpretation of the understanding of jihad among DI members, many of whom remained at 
large due to a general amnesty issued by the Sukarno government at the end of the conflict.508  
 
The analogy with the Prophet’s compromise was a good fit for the DI’s circumstances and made 
the prospect of surrender more palatable, since DI members could conceptualise it as a temporary 
truce rather than true defeat. Additionally, if any who were aware of the ten year limit on truces 
with the enemy, may have been mollified that they could soon resume their struggle for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. As such, the meaning of jihad transformed from 
immediate and mandatory participation in war against infidel forces under the terms of the NII 
penal code to a conceptualisation in which resistance need not necessarily mean physical conflict. 
This was, in some ways, a return to Kartosuwiryo’s interpretation of the term in his early years as 
a PSI activist. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the signing of the treaty was contested by some of the Prophets 
followers could have also helped Kartosuwiryo pre-emptively curtail criticism from some DI 
members who wanted to continue the struggle. Sahih al-Bukhari’s hadith collection, which details 
the Prophet’s treaty negotiations, indicates that the Prophet’s followers were initially resistant to 
the Hudaybiyyah treaty, seeing it as a source of shame. Zakyi Ibrahim writes that the treaty’s 
provisions, which required compromises by the Muslims were ‘considered to be grossly unfair’.509 
These included forcing Muslims who were in the midst of their pilgrimage to Mecca to return to 
Medina immediately and the dismissal of all Meccans who had defected to the Muslims without 
first obtaining permission from their tribal elders.510 Despite these protestations, the Hudaybiyyah 
treaty served as a useful propaganda tool for the Muslims. In showing restraint and a desire to 
maintain peace, the Prophet’s actions apparently convinced many Bedouin to convert to Islam and 
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gave the Muslims the pretext to seize Mecca in 630 when the Quraysh flouted the treaty by 
attacking Muhammad’s followers.511 If faced with resistance, Kartosuwiryo could have invoked 
how the Prophet’s followers eventually came to see the benefits of this compromise and patience 
in eventually achieving their aims.  
 
In referencing the Hudaybiyyah treaty, Kartosuwiryo was able to mould the DI’s conceptualisation 
of jihad in line with the political realities for his successors. The Hudaybiyyah treaty showed that a 
temporary truce with an enemy can be a more strategic option than using force, as stated in the 
Qur’an, as ‘a conspicuous victory’. This once again highlights Kartosuwiryo’s pragmatism and his 
willingness to compromise in the service of his longer-term goal of keeping his movement alive in 
order to eventually establish an Islamic state.512 In this respect, the flexibility of the meaning of 
jihad ensured that it consistently remained a tool in the service of hākimiyya. Crucially, it illustrated 
to Kartosuwiryo’s supporters that the present compromise did not preclude the use of force in the 
future and the group could bide its time before launching a successful attack.  
 
In comparing his movement’s situation to that of the Prophet’s in 628, Kartosuwiryo also provided 
hope to his successors. The Prophet’s decision to negotiate with the Quraysh was not conducted 
from a position of strength, as both sides found themselves in a stalemate.513 However, in 1962 
DI was a weakened force, barely holding on to territory in West Java and most of its leadership 
had been captured. The comparative with the Prophet’s situation was thus very flattering, and 
provided members with an alternative narrative; they were not defeated but instead actively 
choosing to end their violent struggle, in line with the actions of the Prophet himself. The Prophet 
and his followers were unarmed when they attempted to enter the Quraysh stronghold in Mecca 
and cleverly negotiated a temporary peace. As such, Kartosuwiryo’s followers could interpret the 
analogy to see their own situation as not one of defeat but rather a pragmatic choice legitimised 
by Qur’anic scripture. Indeed the could even countenance some cooperation with those whom 
they had previously deemed infidels.  
 
The culmination of the Kartosuwiryo’s invocation of the Hudaybiyyah treaty came in the form of 
the Ikrar Bersama (Joint Proclamation) signed by 32 senior Darul Islam members on 1 August 
1962.514 In exchange for amnesty, the men renounced their ties to the movement, stating they had 
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been ‘misguided and wrong’ and pledged allegiance to the Republican government. According to 
an ICG report, one signatory later stated that this level of cooperation with the government meant 
that ‘the Islamic State of Indonesia was buried by the worldly facilities that the enemy provided’.515  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s ability to adapt his own conception of jihad in the weeks leading up to his death 
showed that the ideology of DI was never completely fixed. The term is polysemous and has ‘an 
emotional connotation that goes beyond [its] meaning’, thus allowing Kartosuwiryo and his 
followers some leeway in adapting its meaning to different circumstances.516 In doing so, the group 
could, to some degree, maintain coherence and legitimacy amongst its followers by illustrating to 
them that their core beliefs remained intact and as seen above, accommodate some level of dissent.  
 
In adapting his earlier conception of jihad as an active and violent struggle, Kartosuwiryo was also 
able to exercise some control, albeit in fairly constrained circumstances. Despite their military 
defeat, the DI was left with sufficient agency to redefine a core component of its ideology rather 
than abandoning it entirely or allowing for the full co-optation of the organisation by another 
group, including the state itself.  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s invocation of the Hudaybiyyah treaty to some degree preserved his group’s 
interpretation of jihad as a violent struggle against infidel forces as viable, and left it ready to be 
invoked in the future. This again gave his followers a sense of hope that their dream of an Islamic 
state was not over. The conclusion of Kartosuwiryo’s own will appeared to embody both meanings 
with an exhortation to supporters to ‘resist Sukarno’ if they wanted ‘to have a prosperous 
Indonesia and the blessings of Allah’.517 Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo remained vague about the 
form of this resistance, providing room for flexibility in its interpretation.  
 
By the time of his execution, DI’s interpretation of jihad had been stripped of its urgency to 
participate in active combat against the Indonesian Republic. The primacy of physical conflict was 
instead replaced by a commitment to other forms of resistance, which could even take the form 
of cooperating with, or at least temporarily acquiescing to some demands of the enemy. As such, 
the obligation to participate in physical jihad was removed until the movement’s senior figures 
declared that the time was right to resume the conflict.  
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Ultimately, Kartosuwiryo’s attempts to reshape a core component of DI’s ideology in the weeks 
leading up to his death sowed the seeds for the fracturing of the movement. Some members, 
including senior leaders such as Djaja Sujadi and Kadar Solihat, supported his reframing of jihad 
from jihad fī sabīlillah’ illah to jihad fillah (a spiritual, non-violent struggle) but refused to sign the 
Ikrar Bersama, claiming it to be a betrayal of the organisation’s goal of eventually overthrowing 
Republican state.  
 
While the men did not agree with working with the government, they seemingly did not break 
away to form a separate organisation at this point and participated in leadership gatherings 
throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.518 They continued to voice opposition to the DI’s 
involvement with the military and challenged believers in jihad fī sabīlillah’ illah for claims to the 
leadership of the DI movement. As such, Kartosuwiryo’s decision to reframe the group’s 
understanding of jihad opened space for continued contestation of the term’s meaning, and again 
its polysemous character allowed for both sides of this divide to claim legitimacy and accuracy in 
their interpretation.  
 
The inability of either side to impose its interpretation of jihad’s meaning onto the wider group is 
likely to have accounted for some of the group’s inaction in the 1960s. Without a clear 
interpretation of one of the DI core ideological tenets, the leadership had a limited ability to inspire 




Kartosuwiryo’s conception of jihad went through substantial evolution over the course of his life. 
The concept was almost an afterthought when he first began his political activism calling for the 
establishment of an Islamic state, often referring to it as a ‘lesser’ form of jihad and promoting a 
non-violent definition of personal betterment.  
 
The catalyst for the increasing salience of jihad within the DI ideology was the opportunity afforded 
to Islamic groups by the Japanese during the Second World War and the violence of the Indonesian 
Revolution. By training and arming Islamic fighters against Western forces, Kartosuwiryo was 
given some leverage in his quest to establish his Islamic state. The weakness of the Republican 
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government in the face of Dutch aggression and its willingness to compromise on issues such as 
the structure of political power in an independent Indonesia thus helped to confirm 
Kartosuwiryo’s belief that jihad was the only way forward. These circumstances helped to bring 
about a more militant conception of jihad, requiring the participation of all Muslims. 
 
As such, Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of jihad was largely reliant on the circumstances he found 
himself in. By the end of the conflict, and with DI on the ropes, Kartosuwiryo returned to a non-
violent understanding of the term, allowing his forces to make the necessary compromises to 
survive. Kartosuwiryo appeared to grasp intuitively that jihad’s malleable definition allowed it to 
grow and wane in significance according to the needs and circumstances of the group. As such, it 

























Chapter 3 | Takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’: Defining the Enemy  
 
DI leaders knew that the defence of Islam would require more than armed conflict against the 
Indonesian Republic. They understood that the protection of their faith rested as much on 
guarding against perversion from within the community of followers, as it did on shielding Islam 
from external physical and spiritual threats. To that end, the concepts of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-
barā’ were crucial in shaping the movement’s understanding of the boundaries of Islam and 
justifying separation from – and attacks against – the wider community of Muslims in Indonesia.  
 
This chapter analyses how DI leaders conceptualised takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, arguing that their 
definitions of these ideas evolved in response to changing domestic political circumstances and 
increasing connections with the works of foreign Islamist ideologues and organisations. It posits 
that Kartosuwiryo only began embracing aspects of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ after he proclaimed 
the foundation of the NII. As such, his conceptualisation and application of these terms was 
primarily shaped by and linked to the wartime situation DI members found themselves in. The 
ideas were useful tools to differentiate between rightful adherents of Islam and those who 
supported their Dutch or Republican enemies, thus furthering the group’s understanding of the 
jihad they were engaged in. The belated incorporation of these concepts into the DI’s ideological 
frame signals that, although they were significant, they performed a supporting role to the core 
concepts of hakimiyya and jihad. While Kartosuwiryo’s exploration of these concepts remained 
relatively superficial and underdeveloped, it nevertheless served to strengthen a Manichean 
worldview, ensuring loyalty from his followers and helping to justify the group’s isolation from 
and, indeed, attacks against mainstream Muslim society. 
 
While Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ was shaped by conflict and 
their role in the DI’s early ideology largely confined to that circumstance, Abdullah Sungkar had a 
significantly more expansive conceptualisation and application of these two ideas. Sungkar 
embraced and promoted a much more sophisticated interpretation of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, 
based largely on the teachings of the Islamic scholar Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In broadening the group’s understanding of who counted as an 
apostate or performed shirk (denying the oneness of God by engaging in polytheism or denying 
His existence or authority), Sungkar established the justification for attacks on a broader range of 
targets, including Muslim civilians. Nevertheless, his inclusion of these concepts into the DI’s 
ideology in the 1970s and 1980s had the same overarching purpose as Kartosuwiryo’s; to 
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underscore the movement’s dualist belief system; to act as tool of in-group control; and to 
legitimate censure of and violence toward other Muslims.  
 
These arguments will be presented over the course of three sections. This chapter will begin with 
an examination of the origins of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ as concepts within Islam. It will then 
assess how these ideas were selectively adopted and interpreted by Kartosuwiryo during the 
Indonesian Revolution and his subsequent insurgency against the Republican state. Finally, the re-
conceptualisation of these ideas by Sungkar will be examined, highlighting his use of concepts 
initially spread by the Saudi state and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
The foundations of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ 
 
Takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā are both concepts concerned with the protection of the Islamic faith. 
Like jihad, these ideas form the more practical aspects of the DI’s ideology insofar as they can be 
performed and observed in the daily lives of the group’s members. While hākimiyya was always a 
core part of the DI’s belief structure, it remained largely unrealised and served as a goal for 
members to strive to.  
 
Takfīr: Defining belief  
 
Takfīr is the act of one Muslim declaring another to be an apostate. It is a serious allegation since 
if the accused is found guilty, they are stripped of ‘all legal and civil rights (i.e. inheritance, child 
custody, and marriage to a Muslim) and [it] justifies the shedding of his or her blood’.519 The 
practice also carries risks for the accuser, who would themselves be committing apostasy if they 
falsely or incorrectly denounced a true believer.520 The interpretations of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā 
relied on by Islamist militants and ideologues find their ‘antecedents in the Salafi traditions, 
principally emanating from the works of scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya or ‘Abd al-Wahhab’.521 
 
Despite the certainty with which numerous clerics, militants, judges, and governments have 
excommunicated fellow Muslims, the practice of takfīr remains hotly contested. The Qur’an 
repeatedly denounces as hypocrites those who profess faith but do not truly believe, and claims 
 
519 Hussam S. Timani, Takfīr in Islamic Thought (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), p.x 
520 Mohamed Badar, Masaki Nagata and Tiphanie Tueni, ‘The Radical Application of the Islamist Concept of Takfīr’, 
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that they will ‘be in the lowest depths of Hell’.522 It also calls on Muslims to strive against the 
unbelievers’, as they have committed a great sin.523 Nevertheless, the Qur’an provides little 
consistency in the application of punishment, much less a clear definition of apostasy itself.524  
Some verses in the Qur’an  ‘visualise repeated apostasies and reversions to the faith, without 
mention of any punishment for any of these defections on earth’525 while others indicate that only 
God has the right to judge this sin.526 Similarly, the hadith provide contradictory teachings, in some 
cases arguing that insulting a believer with the charge of apostasy is itself a sin against God.527  
 
Given this lack of clarity, Islamic theologians have extensively debated the grounds for declaring 
another Muslim an unbeliever, the various (if any) punishments to be meted out, and the legitimacy 
of this process. Hussam S. Timani attempts to summarise some of this discussion, proposing that 
there are at least ten different types of kufr, while Shiraz Maher suggests that there are at least ‘70 
different acts which can constitute kufr in general’.528 These are categorised into two groups; the 
major kufr (al-kufr al-akbar), who expresses a ‘straightforward disbelief in God and His message’ 
and must be punished through excommunication, and the minor kufr (al-kufr al-asghar), whose 
‘punishment is left to God on judgement day’.529 While these lists of offenses appear extensive, 
Patricia Crone argues that beyond an agreement that denying the core tenets of Islam constituted 
apostasy, numerous Muslim sects and scholars throughout Islam’s early history ‘disagreed over 
precisely what [these tenets] were or whether ‘disagreement over points of law could make a person 
an infidel too’.530 
 
In addition to disputing what constituted unbelief, Muslim jurists have historically faced difficulties 
in determining how to properly prove apostasy. Beyond explicit expression through confession or 
proclamation, determining what is in the hearts and minds of a believer appears to be a near 
impossible task. As such, from its earliest uses, takfīr appears to be largely a political tool to 
determine and police the boundaries of Islamic communities. The Kharijites, a sect initially 
affiliated with the Prophet’s nephew and son-in-law Ali, were the first group to attempt to 
methodically practice takfīr, classifying their opponents as infidels on the basis of violating God’s 
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rules.531 This interpretation of takfīr was not only politically expedient but marked the first time 
that an Islamic movement had ‘established the principle that legitimacy was not necessarily derived 
through either the Caliph or the Caliphate’ but could instead be determined independently of 
political leaders or the state, by individuals convinced of their ‘personal righteousness’.532  
 
Ibn Taymiyya built on these precepts, providing much of the intellectual foundation for attacks 
against other Muslims, particularly Muslim rulers. In response to the Mongol invasion of the 
Mamluk empire, Ibn Taymiyya issued a fatwa (legal opinion) justifying rebellion against the 
invaders, despite the fact that they themselves identified as Muslims. As noted in the previous 
chapter, Ibn Taymiyya had largely eschewed calling for rebellion against ineffective or corrupt 
Muslim leaders.  
 
However, in the case of his first fatwa summoning Muslims to resist the Mongols (popularly known 
as the Mardin fatwa), Ibn Taymiyya argued that the invading forces were not properly Muslim. He 
claimed that, despite their conversion to Islam, the Mongols still ruled based on their own legal 
code and did not implement shari’a.533 In failing to implement shari’a, which Ibn Taymiyya believed 
was ‘a fundamental part of being a Muslim’, the Mongols had ceased to be Muslims and thus were 
infidels whose rule could be legitimately contested.534 Ibn Taymiyya’s contribution to this discourse 
was thus to develop takfīr by introducing two ideas, namely: that any serious failure of religious 
obligation was an offence, and that Muslims who failed in their religious obligations were much 
worse than polytheists or members of other monotheist groups, and were thus worthy of the 
harshest punishments. 
 
Sayyid Qutb capitalised on Ibn Taymiyya’s conceptualisation of takfīr in the 1950s to contest the 
rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president from 1954 to 1970. Qutb argued that, in 
failing to secure hākimiyya by implementing shari’a and Islamic political structures, Muslim leaders 
had led their countries astray, falling back into a state of jāhīliyyah. Writing in his seminal work, 
Milestones, he argued: 
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[A]ny society is a jāhīli society if it does not dedicate itself to submission to Allah 
alone in its beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and in its legal norms. 
According to this definition, all the societies existing in the world today are jāhīli… 
 
Lastly, all the existing so-called “Muslim societies” are also jāhīli societies. We classify 
them among jāhīli societies not because they believe in other gods besides Allah or 
because they worship anyone other than Him, but because their way of life is not 
based on submission to Allah alone. Although they believe in the Oneness of Allah, 
still they have relegated the legislative attribute of Allah to others and submit to this 
authority, and from this authority they derive their systems… Allah Most High says 
concerning such rulers: “Those who do not judge according to what Allah has 
revealed are unbelievers”.535 
 
Like Ibn Taymiyya before him, Qutb believed that ‘obedience to the Shari’ah of Allah is a necessary 
condition for harmony… no individual or group of individuals can be truly Muslim until they 
wholly submit to Allah’.536 Like the Mongols of Ibn Taymiyya’s day, Qutb believed that 
contemporary ‘Muslim’ leaders had voided their status as Muslims by failing to implement shari’a. 
In casting them outside the fold of the faith, Qutb legitimated attacks – physical or otherwise – 
against them.  
 
Qutb’s understanding of what constitutes disbelief – seemingly anything that was not Islamic – 
and thus forms grounds for excommunication was incredibly broad. This may account for his 
interpretation’s appeal among groups discontented with or persecuted by their ruling class, and 
seeking to legitimate revenge. Charles Tripp, Gilles Kepel, Leonard Binder and Ibrahim M. Abu-
Rabi begin this line of reasoning. They compellingly argue that Qutb’s embrace of takfīr as a 
justification for violence against the state grew not only out of Ibn Taymiyya’s work, but was 
heavily shaped by his radicalising experience of imprisonment and torture at the hands of the 
Egyptian state.537 
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The idea of prison as a radicalising space has been examined at length by Andrew Silke, Clark 
Jones, and Michelle Butler, among others.538 Silke, who has written most extensively on the topic, 
argues that for numerous ideologues – Islamists or otherwise – who oppose the state, prison 
represents ‘another battleground in the struggle against the state’, where these individuals face 
intense conditions and ‘the relentless proximity’ of state power.539 Resultantly, prison becomes a 
space where the authorities attempt to break the resolve of inmates, who in turn fight to preserve 
their belief structure, often committing themselves even more fervently to their cause. 
 
These patterns appear largely applicable to the development of Qutb’s understanding of takfīr 
during his time in prison. As Kepel points out, the inmates lived in constant terror.540 Guards 
routinely massacred prisoners, subjected them to backbreaking labour, and failed to provide basic 
sanitation.541 Seemingly in response to these horrors, Qutb rationalised that ‘the guards and 
torturers in the concentration camp had forgotten God…but revered Nasser in his stead’.542 Rather 
than merely being ignorant of God and existing in a state of jāhiliyyah, the torture and mistreatment 
encouraged Qutb to see the actions of his captors as a sign of obedience to Nasser, rather than to 
God.      
 
Similarly, Barbara Zollner explicitly states that ‘the very context’ of Qutb and his followers in the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s radicalised understanding of takfir was ‘Gamal Abdel Nasser’s prisons’.543 
She goes on to argue that ‘there is ‘no doubt that torture convinced him that the state–system, and 
particularly Nasser, was evil’ and these experiences ‘correlate… to organisational adjustments and 
ideological discussions’.544 She builds a much deeper analysis of Qutb’s ideological trajectory during 
this period, pointing out that he initially supported Nasser during the Egyptian revolution in 
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1952.545 Nevertheless, the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood in the years immediately 
following Nasser’s takeover and the isolation and torture he and his fellow members faced in 
prison, hardened his belief that the government of Egypt, particularly Nasser, was the ‘prime 
enemy’ as they ‘represented the epitome of un-Islamic conduct’.  
 
This is not to argue that Qutb’s thought had no traces of takfīri content prior to his imprisonment. 
Qutb apparently completed 33 suras of his seminal work In the Shade of the Quran years before his 
imprisonment, and had already authored numerous books and articles on behalf of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In these texts, he often relies on a strict and totalising dichotomy between Muslims 
and non-Muslims, arguing that ‘one is either a Muslim and accepts all this [this referring to the 
primacy of shari’a in all aspects of life] or is not a Muslim, there is no middle term’.546   
 
Nevertheless, as William Shepard, Barbara Zollner, and John Calvert argue, Qutb sharpened and 
consolidates his view on takfīr during his in prison. Calvert, for example, notes that in his earlier 
work ‘Qutb did not deny the existence of Islam in either state or society’, indicating that Egypt 
and its leaders, were not completely in a state of jāhiliyyah and thus not apostates.547 By contrast, 
his writings in Milestones, completed while in jail, Qutb argued that this state of ignorance could 
not be defeated by preaching alone. Instead, believers must  
 
abolish the dominion of man, to take away sovereignty from the usurper and return it to 
Allah, and to bring about the enforcement of the Divine shari‘a and the abolition of man-
made laws. Those who have usurped the authority of Allah and are oppressing Allah’s 
creatures are not going to give up their power merely through preaching.548 
   
In doing so, Qutb demonstrated a clear belief that Nasser and his ilk were irredeemable. Having 
usurped God’s power, they not only preventing the implementation of God’s laws and ensuring 
his sovereignty on earth but were wilfully ignorant of this truth.  
 
Writing primarily while jailed in the hospital of Liman al-Turra prison, Qutb was ‘at the heart of 
the discourse among prisoners’, who ‘eagerly adopted the concept of takfīr’. 549 In this respect, 
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Qutb’s development takfīr  and its widespread appeal among inmates also lay in its ability to 
account for the prisoners’ perceived persecution by their ostensibly Muslim jailers. Their captors 
‘were ignorant of the principles of justice laid down by Koranic ethics and had placed themselves 
outside of Islam’, and thus opened themselves up to charges of heresy and persecution by ‘true’ 
Muslims.550 In his captivity, Qutb thus successfully ‘mainstreamed’ takfīr in ‘radical circles to 
combat and confront the state’.551  
 
While his interpretation of takfīr was extreme, Qutb stopped short of openly and directly calling 
for violence against the Egyptian state in his publications. Later Egyptian ideologues would not be 
so restrained. By the late 1970s, the Egyptian militant movement al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyah (GI) 
was using this interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya’s work alongside Qutb’s writings to justify attacks 
against the government, particularly the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. According to 
Gilles Kepel, GI’s roots lay in the Islamist student activist groups that developed in Egyptian 
universities after the Muslim Brotherhood’s renunciation of violence.552 In a pamphlet entitled Al 
Farida al-Ghaiba (The Hidden Imperative or The Mission Obligation), GI ‘chief theorist’ 
Abdessalam Faraj took Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb’s ideas to their logical extreme by calling for ‘jihad 
against any ruler failing to implement the precepts of Islam, even if he calls himself a Muslim’.553 
In openly advocating for jihad against nominally Muslim leaders who failed to implement Islamic 
governance and law, Faraj had simply made plain the logical outcome of Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya’s 
writings.  
 
J.J.G Jansen’s close analysis of Al Farida al-Ghaiba reinforces this point. According to Jansen, the 
pamphlet takes Qutb’s arguments to their logical extreme, arguing that ‘[the] ruler of such a non-
Islamic state…cannot be called a Moslem, even if his subjects may be Moslems’.  554 Anwar Sadat, 
in particular commits a grievous sin as he was ‘born as a Moslem [thus] became guilty of 
apostacy’.555 Given these transgressions, Muslims have a duty to engage in jihad, not only to punish 
those who have transgressed but because they have thwarted the formation of an Islamic state, 
which would enable them to fulfil their religious obligations in their entirety.556 
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What is notable about these arguments is that they focus on justifying attacks against the state as 
embodied by its leadership, often taken to be represented by a single individual who has failed in 
his duty as Muslim to implement shari’a and Islamic governance. What is unclear in these texts is 
the implications for those working within or living within this jāhīli state. It seems plausible given 
Qutb’s broad definition of un-Islamic behaviour that Muslim judges, lawyers, civil servants, police 
officers, or soldiers, who participate in state structures, enforce laws or protect its institutions, 
could also be deemed infidels for their part in imposing man-made law. Alternatively, their 
collaboration or co-optation could be read as a less severe transgression, meaning they could be 
punished on the grounds of working with an enemy of Islam, but ultimately not excommunicated. 
Even less certain is the designation of Muslims who passively accept the rule of infidel leadership 
because they are unable or unwilling to protest. Would this inaction be held against them such that 
it forms the basis of a charge of disbelief? Or is it simply a minor transgression, or perhaps not a 
violation at all?  
 
Takfīr can be a useful tool for demarcating who is no longer a Muslim and thus establishing the 
threshold for being a part of the Islamic community. However, the above conceptions of the term 
ultimately apply it to leaders rather than to civilians, and are less clear on those who occupy a 
plethora of spaces within a regime.  
 
Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’: Defining commitment 
 
Given takfīr’s limitations in establishing the status of Muslims who exist within or even support a 
non-Islamic state or ruler, al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ provides another means by which the boundaries of 
the community of the faithful can be policed. At its simplest, the term is taken to mean loyalty and 
disavowal, or alternatively devotion and denunciation. According to Joas Wagemakers, who has 
written one of the few texts on the concept as it is utilised by militant Islamists, it ‘is not clear 
whether walā and barā were initially connected or if they came to be seen as two different sides of 
the same coin later on’. 557  
 
Regardless of how the fused term came into being, the concept provides no room for Muslims to 
exist in a grey area; they must fully commit to their faith and their fellow Muslims while 
simultaneously disavowing everything and everyone outside of these. According to Muhammad 
Said al-Qahtani, a Saudi Arabian religious scholar and author of Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ According to the 
 
557 Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi, p.148 
 171 
Aqeedah of the Salaf, the seeds of the term lie in the fact that the ‘love [of God] is the source of 
loyalty and hatred [of God] is the source of opposition’.558  
 
First published in 1984, al-Qahtani’s work ranks among the most popular works on the subject of 
al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, and is read and cited widely by salafis and non-salafis alike.559 Al-Qahtani argues 
that al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ ‘constitute essential elements in [the declaration of faith in God, the central 
tenant of Islam]’.560 Resultantly, displaying ‘devotion to and love of God and His Prophet, and 
hate towards heresy, transgression, and immorality’ are integral to being a Muslim as they are 
professions of one’s faith.561  
 
Moreover, al-Qahtani argues that since ‘Islam is actively concerned with the sincerity of devotion 
to Allah’, believers must guard against actions or thoughts that threaten their faith because these 
would  ultimately threatens the entire community of the faithful.562 He goes on to describe 20 
different types of ‘alliances’ that endanger the Muslim community, including ‘contentment’ (i.e. a 
willingness to tolerate a variety of beliefs and faiths other than Islam), ‘agreeing with [non-Muslims] 
on some points of disbelief’, and ‘taking disbelievers as friends’.563   
 
Stephane Lacroix summarises these ideas on al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ well. Fundamentally, Muslims are 
obligated by their faith to ‘encourage their coreligionists to follow the principles of Islam and must 
admonish them when they stray from the right path’.564 Due to the communal nature of Islam, 
individual transgressions are not only harmful to the person who has erred but the wider 
community as it impinges on their faith. As such, the principle fosters an ‘in-group’ mentality and 
a sense of solidarity amongst adherents of Islam, while creating a clear boundary with those outside 
the fold.  
 
Given this quality, the concept has been utilised and developed by leaders of political entities 
throughout Islamic history to ensure compliance and support for their regimes, or to rally support 
against enemies both outside and within their territories. In this respect, Ibn Taymiyya once again 
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played a leading role in shaping this idea, publishing numerous texts on how to determine 
acceptable Islamic practice and beliefs. In his work Al-furqān banya awliyā’ al-Rahmān wa-awliyā (The 
Decisive Criterion Between the Friends of Allah and the Friends of Satan), Ibn Taymiyya relies on 
Quranic scripture to establish his first premise that ‘the firmest bond of faith [is] “loving for the 
sake of God and hating for the sake of God”’.565  
 
According to Wagemakers, Ibn Taymiyya also ‘devoted an entire book [Enjoining Right and 
Forbidding Wrong] to calling on Muslims to refrain from religious innovations, particularly in the 
celebration of religious festivals and adhere to the “straight path” (al-sirāt al-mustaqīm) or risk 
sullying the purity of their religion’.566 Furthermore, he argued that Muslims should refrain from 
‘participating in the outward customs of non-Muslims’.567 To Ibn Taymiyya, it was crucial that 
Muslims kept their practices different from those of people from other faiths. This boundary was 
crucial for preventing Muslims from, unintentionally or otherwise, sliding into practices that would 
compromise their faith and blur the boundaries between Muslims and heathens. As such, Ibn 
Taymiyya understood al-walā’ wa-l-barā as a tool to help Muslims maintain the purity of their beliefs.  
 
However, Ibn Taymiyya’s conceptualisation remained largely personal, with little enforcement of 
the concept by the state. In contrast, Lacroix demonstrates that the clerical authorities of the 
nascent Saudi state played a significant role in developing the idea politically in the nineteenth 
century. While Abd al-Wahhab introduced the idea of ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’, 
it was a relatively minor principle in his ideological framework.568  
 
Instead, Lacroix argues that it was al-Wahhab’s grandson Sulayman bin Abdallah Al al-Shaykh, 
who first starkly outlined the concept when he demanded that his community challenge Egyptian 
incursions into their territory. He claimed that true a Muslim had to demonstrate an ‘unconditional 
loyalty to his coreligionists and a complete break with the infidels’, in this case meaning the 
Egyptians.569 As such, the concept was utilised to ensure social stability and a commitment to a 
rigidly defined form of Islam, as well as the disavowal of potential competitors or threats.  
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While the concept was used primarily by the Saudi state to consolidate its hold on its populace and 
quell dissent within its ranks, Islamists opposed to the rule of so-called infidel regimes also co-
opted it for their own purposes. The Jordanian Islamist activist and ideologue, Abu Muhammad 
al-Maqdisi (who would go on to mentor al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi), 
developed his understanding of the concept while studying in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. As Wagemakers points out, al-Maqdisi’s use of the term generally ‘does not represent 
a clear break with its history’, despite his opposition to the Saudi state.570  
 
However, he was responsible for two significant developments to Islamic militants’ understanding 
of the term. Firstly, he clarified that displaying ‘right’ or ‘correct’ Islamic behaviour, and thus loyalty 
to other Muslims, went beyond the actions of an individual. Entire countries, and particularly their 
ruling class, could also be subject to the same standard. For example, al-Maqdisi argued that it was 
‘forbidden for Muslim states to help ‘infidel’ countries or call on them for aid’, as it was ultimately 
a sign of demonstrating friendship or loyalty with infidels.571 Secondly, he used al-walā wa-l-barā as 
a ‘tool to frame the legislation of “man-made laws” as kufr and the laws of their legislators as taghut 
[idols or false deities]’.572 In this respect, al-Maqdisi posits that, as only God can be worshiped, 
efforts by governments – and those that uphold them, like  ‘legislators…the army, and the secret 
service’ –  to create or enforce non-Islamic legislation constituted  a form of shirk.573 As such, these 
individuals must be condemned by true Muslims and cast out of the fold.  
 
In this respect, al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ together with takfīr are collectively useful concepts for 
determining the boundaries of Islam and the behaviour expected of those within the faith. 
Together, they provide groups or states with the ability to build a shared identity and belief system 
and to police dissent by utilising peer pressure and coercion to ensure conformity with their belief 
systems. Moreover, they provide a mechanism for determining what sort of ideas or behaviours 
put someone or something outside the boundaries of the faith, thus justifying violent action against 
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Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ 
 
Before exploring Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of takfīr and al-walā wa-l-barā’, this section will 
first examine the existing scholarship covering these ideas in the DI’s early history. It will argue 
that the existing scholarship’s limited engagement with these topics should not be taken to indicate 
that these ideas were of little importance to Kartosuwiryo and his insurgency. Instead it shows that 
researchers have belittled or overlooked secondary – but still significant – components of the DI’s 
ideology that served to bolster the group’s understanding and pursuit of its core beliefs of hākimiyya 
and jihad. 
 
Limited scholarship on the role of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā in DI ideology 
 
Little effort has been made to understand Kartosuwiryo’s beliefs regarding takfīr and al-walā wa-l-
barā, either in his early career as an Islamist activist or during his tenure as a commander of an 
insurgency. As noted earlier, early research on the organisation included little effort to consider, 
much less to centre, the role of Islam in motivating DI leaders and their followers. 
 
Of the few works that do – notably Chiara Formichi’s comprehensive study of Kartosuwiryo’s 
political activism, Solahudin’s history of the JI, and Quinton Temby’s paper, ‘Imagining an Islamic 
State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah’ – the authors pay scant attention to 
the component parts of his ideology and their relationship to each other, beyond examining, to 
greater or lesser degree, his conceptualisation of jihad. Formichi’s aim was largely to examine 
Kartosuwiryo’s life as a mainstream Islamist nationalist, and so charting the ideas that underpinned 
his insurgent movement and their legacy was beyond the scope of her research. While Solahudin 
acknowledges that takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā played a role in Kartosuwiryo’s thought, he 
conducted limited research into Kartosuwiryo’s writings on the concepts. Even in the more 
comprehensive Indonesian-language version of the text, his treatment of both is fairly superficial.  
 
Temby’s paper traces the development of the DI network over the second half of the twentieth 
century, but examines its trajectory through the prism of its desire for and conceptualisation of an 
Islamic state. His PhD thesis touches more on the concept of takfir but only insofar as it attempts 
to discredit Solahudin’s claim that ‘aspects of Salafi jihadism were developed independently in 
Darul Islam as early as the 1950s’, prior to the spread of al-Qaeda’s global Islamist doctrine.574 
 
574 Temby, ‘Jihadists Assemble’, p.113 
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However, this thesis contends that Temby’s work misunderstands takfir as a concept and 
misinterprets Solahudin’s claim of a link between its manifestation in Kartosuwiryo’s thought and 
in later salafi-jihadist ideology.  
 
Temby misunderstands takfir, claiming that it is simply ‘a pejorative term’ used to denounce both 
Muslim governments and the Islamist militants that challenge them.575 This stance ignores the vast 
body of scholarship, written by Muslim thinkers – Islamists, salafis, or otherwise – who have 
advanced a sophisticated understanding of the concept as a necessary tool in demarcating the 
boundaries of the faith and a process by which Islam itself is protected. Temby bases his claim on 
two paragraphs from Thomas Hegghammer’s chapter ‘Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries’, which 
contends that in ‘classical Islamic jurisprudence, takfir is an extremely serious measure that can 
only be pronounced by qualified religious authorities under very specific circumstances’.576 As 
such, the broader Muslim public views it as a ‘clearly pejorative term that connotes rebellion and 
extremism’.577 Hegghammer’s work – and by extension Temby’s – seems to deny the work done 
by Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb in contesting the assertion that only legitimate authorities, rather than 
individuals, have the right to excommunicate an individual. Moreover, Hegghammer’s 
interpretation starts from a flawed foundation, since the Qur’an itself explicitly allows ordinary 
Muslims to engage in takfīr, while also cautioning against its reckless use.  
 
While Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb’s views may be on the margins of mainstream Islamic political 
thought, their work has clearly developed takfir into a concept that is widely relied upon by 
ideologues and militant organisations. Hegghammer and Temby may disagree with the content of 
this thought but its ideational development by these thinkers and its widespread use by militant 
groups indicates that it is more than just a ‘pejorative term’. Moreover, numerous researchers, 
including Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy, Shiraz Maher, and Joas Wagemakers have made the case that 
takfir has been a significant part of militant Islamist or salafi-jihadist thought, evolving into a quasi-
doctrine. Maher, after tracing the concept’s development from antiquity, recognises that various 
groups ‘have constructed a number of different rules for declaring takfīr against someone’ but 
despite these differences, the ‘concept has become an intrinsic and essential feature of the 
contemporary Salafi-Jihadi movement’.578 
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Temby is correct to argue that researchers must be careful not to assume that DI leaders who used 
the term in the initial years of their insurgency were employing it in exactly the same way that salafi-
jihadists or other militant organisations would do later. However, Solahudin does not appear to be 
making that point either. He simply states that Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of the term takfir 
‘echoed’ in the ideas of later salafi-jihadists.579 This seems far less contentious as a statement than 
the strawman argument put forward in Temby’s work.  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of takfīr 
 
Kartosuwiryo does not appear to mention the concept of takfir explicitly in the articles he wrote 
during his time at Fadjar Asia between 1928 and 1929. Instead, he largely focused on anti-colonial 
themes, blamed the Dutch for economic hardship and the denial of political rights, and 
simultaneously called for an Islamic state. While he challenged Indonesian nationalists, who 
advocated the creation of a secular (or at least religiously neutral) state, he refrained from declaring 
them apostates. Instead, Kartosuwiryo encouraged them to re-examine their beliefs and accept his 
view that Islam was not a private matter but instead ‘must have something to do with politics’, 
and, indeed, would serve as their ‘best weapon’ to ensure their freedom.580 Moreover, 
Kartosuwiryo’s columns often presented these arguments as discussions between two imaginary 
individuals, indicating that he was seeking to persuade Muslims to come round to his point of 
view, thus expanding his body of supporters, rather than narrowing the group through an 
exclusionary process like takfīr.  
 
Similarly, in his ‘Haloean Politik Islam’ pamphlet published in 1946, Kartosuwiryo called on his 
followers in Masyumi to complement their idealism with ‘realism’, in order to achieve their goal 
of a free Islamic Indonesian Republic.581 He warned them to refrain from engaging in ‘fanaticism’ 
or dividing the nationalist movement by demanding ideological conformity and commitment to 
the creation of an Islamic state.582 As noted in Chapter 1, Kartosuwiryo went so far as to claim 
that he would accept the decision of the Indonesian population if they chose to adopt an alternative 
ideology like socialism or nationalism as the basis for an independent Indonesia.583 Even after the 
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end of the Second World War and the early months of the Indonesian Revolution, Kartosuwiryo’s 
writings still implied that Muslims could be a part of the umma even if they did not support an 
Islamic state.  
 
However, conflict once again acted as a radicalising force for Kartosuwiryo, leading him to adopt 
and implement a much more stringent view of takfīr. The concept quickly moved from being non-
existent in his conceptualisation of the DI’s ideological framework, to an essential component that 
supported the group’s core tenets of hākimiyya and jihad. Takfīr provided Kartosuwiryo with the 
means of delegitimising the Republican government in the wake of the Renville Agreement of 
January 1948, and a justification for resisting their authority after the Dutch retreat in December 
1949. Finally, it served as a tool for Kartosuwiryo to ensure ideological conformity and loyalty 
from his own supporters.   
 
As Solahudin notes, one of the clearest manifestations of takfir in the DI’s belief structure appears 
in the group’s penal code.  In Article 2.2, Kartosuwiryo decrees that ‘anyone who does not comply 
with the regulations of the government of the Islamic State of Indonesia is a bughāh’.584 Similarly,  
Article 2.3 states that anyone who fails to ‘observe the laws of Islam is a fasik [impious for violating 
Islamic law]’ while Article 2.4 says those who are ‘tools of the occupiers’ are enemies of the state.585 
In the following set of articles, the code made clear that those who were found guilty of committing 
the above offenses would be ‘subject to severe punishment’ namely banishment or death.586 
Muslims would be given opportunities to repent and ordered to better their religious practice, but 
if they refused they would be deemed an ‘enemy of Islam’.587 Kartosuwiryo justified these 
punishments by citing Qur’anic scripture, notably surah 9:73, which states that Muslims have a duty 
to ‘fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them. Their refuge is Hell 
and wretched is the destination’.588   
 
Although Kartosuwiryo refrains from using the terms ‘riddah’ and ‘irtidād’ to describe acts of 
apostasy, or the word kufr to describe these transgressions as acts of disbelief, his language still 
indicates that he viewed his coreligionists who did not support the Islamic state as enemies, rebels 
and, at the very least, impious Muslims. While he did not explicitly call for stripping them of their 
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faith, he nevertheless proclaimed that anyone found guilty of these crimes would be put to death, 
facing the same punishment as those who renounced their faith explicitly or invalidated their claim 
to being a Muslim on account of their actions. The reference to surah 9:73 also indicates that, while 
the code may not have used the traditional language of apostasy, Kartosuwiryo still saw these 
transgressions as similar as the surah itself references the sin of disbelief and states that the 
appropriate punishment for such an offence is death.  
 
While Temby was right to point out that in a strict sense the penal code confines the application 
of takfir to a period of war – the articles are grouped under the heading ‘Islamic Law During 
Wartime’ – it seems implausible that Kartosuwiryo would ever give up this provision in a time of 
peace given the totalising and undemocratic nature of his Islamic state as set out in his constitution.   
Given that the DI continued to view itself as being in a state of conflict with the Indonesian 
Republic for the remainder of the twentieth century, it would be incorrect to characterise the 
group’s use of the concept as ‘limited’.589   
 
Solahudin notes that these principles were put into practice between 1949 and 1958 when DI 
forces staged 47 attacks on the Cipari boarding school run by Yusuf Taudjiri, one of 
Kartosuwiryo’s former religious teachers.590 Taudjiri consistently rejected Kartosuwiryo’s 
leadership and the creation of the NII, thus opening himself up to charges of apostasy for resisting 
the authority of an allegedly legitimate Islamic state. Kartosuwiryo continued to launch these 
attacks despite his former relationship with Taudjiri and his wife’s apparent close friendship with 
Taudjiri’s daughter. The incidents indicate that Kartosuwiryo was unwilling to tolerate dissent of 
any sort, and that he prioritised adherence to his code and beliefs above his personal relationships. 
Moreover, his willingness to attack a school, in addition to state targets, showed that he had a 
broad conceptualisation of what actions constituted unbelief, and that he aimed to tackle 
transgressions at all levels of society, not just those made by government leaders.  
 
The penal code primarily also served to act as a check on Muslims living within Kartosuwiryo’s 
territory. While it theoretically applied to Muslims across the archipelago, its application and 
enforcement would ultimately be confined to the areas actually controlled by the DI. The code 
thus served to demonise those – like Republican nationalists – who resisted the creation of the 
Islamic state in Indonesia, but it also, crucially, aimed to police the behaviour of the average 
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Muslims of West Java, ensuring their compliance with Kartosuwiryo’s rule. In this respect, the 
code represents a deviation in terms of Kartosuwiryo’s understanding and application of the idea 
of takfir from that of a classical jurist like Ibn Taymiyya, who largely focused on the need to 
excommunicate insufficiently pious leaders. Kartosuwiryo’s penal code expands the term’s 
application by making the threat of takfīr possible in the lives of everyday people.  
 
About 18-months after his declaration of the formation of the NII, Kartosuwiryo released a 
political manifesto, entitled ‘Heru Tjokro Bersabda: “Indonesia Kini dan Kelak”’ (Heru Tjokro Speaks: 
Indonesia Now and in the Future; Heru Tjokro was one of Kartosuwiryo’s nicknames). In it he 
argued that the nationalists had been trying to ‘kill and destroy the spirit of Islam’  since the 
beginning of the Indonesian Revolution.591 The 48-page document repeatedly refers to Sukarno 
and other nationalist leaders as ‘murtad’ (apostates) for failing to implement shari’a.592 It claims that 
this had resulted in the politics of the Indonesian Republic being ‘destructive and negative’ and in 
the government ‘spreading misery’.593 NII members thus had a duty to fight this un-Islamic force 
for the good of the people of Indonesia, in order to see the implementation of God’s law and the 
creation of an Islamic structure of governance to ensure temporal and spiritual well-being.  
 
The document makes an explicit case for stripping Sukarno and the nationalist leadership of their 
identity as Muslims. In failing to implement shari’a once the Dutch had been vanquished, the 
nationalists had invalidated their claim to be true practitioners of their faith. In this respect, 
Kartosuwiryo echoes the argument made by Ibn Taymiyya centuries before; that implementing 
Islamic law is crucial to one’s identity as a Muslim ruler. This argument once again reinforces the 
idea that takfīr had become an important tool for Kartosuwiryo to legitimate his jihad against a 
regime that, despite being led by self-proclaimed Muslims, was causing suffering to his 
countrymen. Embedded in this argument is the expectation that while any non-Islamic regime 
would inevitably fail to better the lives of its subjects (either by failing to implement shari’a or 
through outright oppression), Muslims leaders at least ought to know better. A self-proclaimed 
Muslim leader who fails to create a true Islamic polity has thus committed an even greater 
transgression than his ignorant, non-Muslim counterparts.  
 
 
591 S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘Manifest Politik Negara Islam Indonesia - Heru Tjokro Bersabda: “Indonesia Kini dan Kelak”’, 
17 February 1951, p.6 
592 Idem, p.26 
593 Idem, p.37 
 180 
Kartosuwiryo’s integration of takfīr into his ideological frame may have occurred late in his political 
development, but it nevertheless became an important tool in justifying the DI’s continued 
insurgency against the Indonesian Republic after its liberation from the Dutch. Additionally, the 
concept provided him with a tool for ensuring compliance from his followers and a means of 
harshly punishing dissenters, thus ensuring control in a difficult period of conflict. 
 
Furthermore, it shows that Kartosuwiryo’s DI had embraced takfīr long before its use by salafi-
jihadist groups, or even ideologues like Qutb, who popularised the concept in radical Islamist 
circles. This is not to suggest that the DI’s later understanding of the term after Kartosuwiryo 
underwent no subsequent evolution or was not influenced by foreign sources. Instead, takfīr’s long 
history in Islamic discourse and use as a tool by both dissidents and governing elites made it an 
appealing concept for appropriation by groups like the DI.  
 
Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ 
 
Like takfīr, the concept of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ played a limited role in Kartosuwiryo’s early writings. 
While he was the editor of Fadjar Asia, Kartosuwiryo did not seem particularly concerned with 
maintaining ideological purity among Muslims. Indeed, in an article published on 31 October 1928, 
he argued that for Islamist nationalists to prohibit ‘relations with other parties, who are not in line 
with [PSI’s] principles’, even when these groups ‘sincerely extend their support and assistance’, 
would ‘only give rise to a narrow worldview and hatred of others’.594  
 
Furthermore, he argued that this ‘arrogance’ would ‘lead to hatred’ and prevent the formation of 
the broad coalition necessary to liberate Indonesia from the Dutch.595 As noted earlier, his ‘Haloean 
Politik Islam’ speech touched on the same themes, once again prioritising widespread agreement 
and cooperation between Islamists and religiously neutral nationalists. In seeing the Dutch as the 
greatest threat to Indonesian freedom, Kartosuwiryo adopted a very pragmatic approach, 
encouraging broad cooperation across all sectors of society.  
 
However, this support for working with other Indonesian nationalist groups was paired with a 
strict policy of non-cooperation with the Dutch. As examined in the previous chapter, 
Kartosuwiryo used his Sikap Hidjrah and Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah pamphlets to encourage his 
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supporters to embark on a spiritual hijrah and fight a personal jihad to decolonise their minds and 
remove themselves from a world governed by colonial structures, values, and modes of thought. 
In this respect, Kartosuwiryo was attempting to build a committed group of ‘true’ Muslims, 
committed to the foundation of an Islamic state through the bettering of their spiritual practices 
and dedication to God. While not particularly well developed, his idea of building a community of 
likeminded Muslims through this spiritual flight hinted at the beginnings of creating an ‘in-group’ 
dedicated to the cause of Allah, while simultaneously – albeit passively –  denouncing the non-
Muslim colonial state and its structures.  
 
On a more practical level, the publication of the Sikap Hidjrah pamphlet in 1936 marked the 
triumph of his political strategy of non-cooperation within the PSII movement. Having forced out 
Agus Salim – who favoured working within the Volksraad (People’s Council; a legislature with 
limited advisory powers) –  the previous year, Kartosuwiryo’s takeover meant that the PSII was 
now committed to shunning the Dutch-run political process. In pushing Salim out of the 
organisation and instituting his hijrah policy, Kartosuwiryo was clearly laying out the obligations of 
party members.  
 
Nevertheless, these events do not indicate that Kartosuwiryo had a particularly well-developed 
conceptualisation of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ in his initial years as an Islamist politician. Kartosuwiryo 
understood that the first priority of Indonesian nationalists, regardless of their ideological 
orientation, was the removal of the Dutch from the archipelago. As such, he was willing to work 
with any and all who opposed Dutch rule, whatever their doctrinal differences. His split with Agus 
Salim was over the latter’s belief that cooperation would lead to political gains, rather than a dispute 
over Islam.  
 
Once again, the experience of conflict in the Indonesian Revolution would alter Kartosowiryo’s 
outlook. Embittered by the concessions made by the Republican nationalists in the Renville 
Agreement and their embrace of Pancasila rather than Islam as the foundation of the independent 
state, Kartosuwiryo began to define the boundaries of membership in the Muslim community in 
increasingly narrow terms, while demanding higher levels of commitment from its members.  
 
At its most basic level, Article 1 of the NII constitution released on 27 August 1948 proclaimed 
that citizens had to pledge bayat to Kartosuwiryo as their imam. Their commitment would be to 
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the Islamic state, its leader, and through him to God alone.596 This precluded support for the 
Republican nationalists who were also still engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Dutch, and 
committed Kartosuwiryo’s followers to what he would later call ‘triangular warfare’ against both 
the Dutch and the majority of their fellow Indonesians.597 Beyond voicing their support for 
Kartosuwiryo’s cause,  Muslims were also required to participate actively in the fight to establish 
and preserve the NII as laid out in the hukum pidana. In addition to calling for the execution of 
hypocrites and those who actively worked on behalf of the enemy, Article 7 of the code stipulated 
that those who were obligated to fight but failed to do so (or who fled from the battlefield) would 
be punished by banishment or death.598 Their failure to live up to their obligation to fight for God’s 
polity meant that their claim to be a Muslim was voided.    
 
While these laws applied to a wartime scenario, they clearly spelled out the obligations of 
membership within the community of the faithful. The struggle against the enemies of the NII 
(and thus, of God, for they resisted his divine rule) required the complete commitment of its 
citizenry. This entailed denouncing or even killing those who made overt transgressions against 
the state, as well as demanding that DI members lay down their lives for the state. In this respect, 
Kartosuwiryo’s constitution and penal code used al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ much like al-Shaykh in 1818, 
when he demanded that the Wahhabi community ‘fight to the death against the Egyptians’ who 
were seen as ‘not true Muslims’ and had invaded the Arabian Peninsula.599 Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ thus 
served as a useful tool for the authorities to martial support for their cause on account of serving 
God, while simultaneously threatening expulsion from the group for failing to act.  
 
Kartosuwiryo invoked the concept more explicitly in his 1951 political manifesto. In it he wrote 
that DI supporters must abide by the principle of ‘distinguishing and separating – in accordance 
with the Quran’.600 This would allow them to separate ‘good from false truth peddled by a wicked 
Imam’, ‘kufr and taghut from the honest’ and above all ‘Islam from apostasy’.601 Written in the midst 
of the insurgency, these directives for true Muslims to separate their faith from impurities served 
to reinforce their commitment to the NII and reinforce distrust of the Republican state. 
Kartosuwiryo’s words also highlight the totalising, Manichaean worldview fostered by al-walā’ wa-
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l-barā’. Kartosuwiryo and his followers existed in a world where there was a constant struggle 
between good and evil, with no grey areas. Muslims could only commit fully to their faith and 
support their co-religionists. Failing to do so would result in being cast outside the fold and 
punished for their lack of belief.  
 
Beyond serving as a tool of in-group control and out-group demonisation, Kartosuwiryo’s 
interpretation of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ required more than just passive support for Islam. Followers 
were required to demonstrate the highest commitment to their faith by supporting their fellow 
Muslims – in this case by fighting alongside them – and being willing to lay down their life for 
God. This was thus a positivist interpretation that required continuous action on the part of 
adherents. Additionally, Kartosuwiryo had transformed his conception of disavowal from passive 
non-cooperation in the face of colonial subjugation to active contestation with the enemies of 
Islam on a physical battlefield. In this respect, Kartosuwiryo showed that his interpretation differed 
from Ibn Taymiyya’s highly personalised construction of the concept, using it to ensure positive 
compliance and loyalty to his agenda in a militarised situation.  
 
Sungkar’s conceptualisation of takrfir and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’  
 
Steeped in Modernist Islamist and salafi teachings, Abdullah Sungkar’s induction into the DI in 
1976 would have profound implications for the ideological trajectory of the group. Although he 
was only formally inducted into DI in December 1976, he was - like his close friend and colleague 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir - already well known in Islamist circles as a prominent advocate for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and fierce critic of the Republican government. 
 
Sungkar’s ideas about takfir and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ were well established prior to his membership of 
the DI on account of his work with the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII; Indonesian 
Islamic Propagation Council), which spread Wahhabi and salafi teachings in Indonesia. This section 
will briefly illustrate his background in the DDII Modernist network, established by his mentor, 
Mohammad Natsir, before exploring his views on takfīr and al-walā wa-l-barā’.  
 
The DDII and Mohammad Natsir  
 
The DDII was founded 1967 by Mohammad Natsir, Indonesia’s fifth prime minister and a former 
head of Masyumi. According to Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘[from] its inception, it became the Indonesian 
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representative of the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami’, the Muslim World League (MWL), an initiative 
established by the government of Saudi Arabia to promote its own Wahhabist interpretation of 
Islam.602 The DDII, as a result of its Saudi connections, ‘provided the Islamists with a well-funded 
and efficient infrastructure for their Islamic propagation efforts’.603   
 
The organisation operated with a cell-like structure in which ‘campus mosques continued to play 
a central role as nodal points for a new type of network inspired by…Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood’ with smaller study circles acting as usroh, ‘family-like mini-communities of dedicated 
propagandists’.604 The DDII, in addition to Wahhabist teachings, helped to popularise salafist ideas 
from the Arab world, particularly Egypt, by publishing Indonesian translations of works by Hasan 
al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Hawwa, Mustafa al-Siba and the Pakistani ideologue, Abul A’la 
Maududi.605 It criticised the practice of Sufism and the incorporation of local traditions like 
Javanese mysticism into the forms of Islam advocated by Traditionalist organisations like NU, 
claiming these practices were bid’a. The organisation also ‘distributed scholarships enabling 
Indonesian students to attend universities in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’.606  
 
As noted in the introduction, Sungkar joined the DDII soon after its creation. He was quick to 
adopt the ideas and methods of the Muslim Brotherhood, establishing a pesantren called the Al 
Mukmin in Gading Kidul on 10 March 1972.607 The school eventually relocated to Ngruki, a hamlet 
in Solo, and was renamed the Ngruki Islamic boarding school (Pondok Ngruki). By now, it was 
clear that Sungkar had embraced the Salafist worldview. His preaching during this period reflected 
the influence of the Wahhabi and salafist scholarship promoted by the DDII. He advocated for the 
implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia and was hostile to polytheism, Javanese cultural 
practices, minority Muslim sects, Westerners, Jews, and Christians.608   
 
Along with Ba’asyir, he also devised a curriculum designed to give students a ‘pure understanding 
of the Islamic faith’ so that they would be able to live each day in accordance with Islamic law.609 
The pesantren was made up of three programmes, the Kulliyat al-Mu’allimin (KMI), the Kulliyat al-
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Mu’allimat (KMA) and the Madrasah Aliyah Al-Mukmin (MAAM), which followed the national 
curriculum to varying degrees. KMI and KMA focused primarily on religious teachings but 
included a few mathematics and science classes as well.610 In contrast, 70% of the curriculum at 
MAAM focused on secular topics, following a model the Department of Religious Affairs created 
and promoted. While Sungkar prohibited the flying of the Indonesian flag and singing of the 
national anthem at his school, his curriculum design showed at least some willingness to abide by 
some of the regulations handed down by government officials prior to his association with DI.611 
 
According to Nasir Abas, the former head of JI Mantiqi III, Sungkar had the utmost admiration 
for Natsir, seeing him as a mentor.612 A prominent member of the Islamist community, Natsir 
frequently worked within the confines of Indonesia’s political structures. While a cabinet official, 
Natsir was committed to ‘maintaining a unified and independent Indonesian state’  and worked 
closely with Sukarno to reign in the Darul Islam rebellions, despite his sympathies for their cause.613 
Natsir held roles in government as the Minister of Information between 1946 and 1949 and 
eventually prime minister between 1951 and 1952.614   
 
Nevertheless, Natsir’s alignment with the Sukarno government did not last. The president’s 
increasingly autocratic tendencies coupled with his own doubts about the use of Pancasila in an 
overwhelmingly Muslim nation pushed him first into leading Masyumi out of government and into 
parliamentary opposition in 1955. Natsir’s continued criticism of Pancasila and Sukarno’s concept 
of ‘Guided Democracy’ in 1957 resulted in sustained harassment in the state-controlled press.615 
According to Fogg, pro-Sukarno gangs protested outside Natsir’s home and ‘stones shattered his 
front window several times in the course of a month’.616 His family received numerous threatening 
phone calls to him and one of his nephews was arrested on ‘trumped up charges’.617    
 
By 1957 Natsir had had enough of the intimidation, fleeing his home in Jakarta for Medan, ‘where 
sympathy for Masjumi was very high and where personal attacks by Communist-leaning groups 
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were less likely’.618 Alongside other Islamist politicians like Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, Natsir allied himself Ahmad Husein, a Central Sumatran military commander, who 
had begun denouncing the government in Jakarta for allegedly appropriating Sumatra’s natural 
resources and for ‘general political disfunction’.619  
 
On 10 February 1958, these disaffected military men, anti-communist groups and Islamist 
politicians gathered together to issue an ultimatum to the Jakarta government, calling for a new 
cabinet and a return to the spirit of the Indonesian revolution. As the government failed to respond 
to their demands, Ahmad Husein declared the formation of the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia (PRRI, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia).620  The declaration 
prompted retaliatory military action from Jakarta on 20 February. The ensuing violence prompting 
Natsir and the PRRI leadership to flee to rural towns or the jungles of West Sumatra, where they 
would attempt to mount their resistance.  
 
Despite his sympathies for Kartosuwiryo and his cause, Natsir does not appear to make any 
attempt to engage him and the DI as part of a wider struggle against Sukarno. There does not 
appear to be any correspondence in archival sources between the two men nor communication 
between DI representatives and Natsir’s Masyumi faction. Additionally, Kahin notes that there 
was ‘little effort to enrol Kartosuwiryo’s Darul Islam in their ranks and West Java does not appear 
among the component states’ of the PRRI nor Natsir’s successor revolutionary state, the RPI 
(Republik Persatuan Indonesia, or United Republic of Indonesia), declared on 8 February 1960.621  
 
There is also scant evidence that the DI attempted to engage Natsir. According to Holk Dengel, 
the DI did attempt to establish contact in the late 1950s, but nothing came of its efforts.622   
Kartosuwiryo’s limited writings and DI communiques issued during the 1950s and 1960s do not 
reference Natsir, the West Sumatran rebellion, or the RPI. This is not to suggest that Kartosuwiryo 
was unaware of these developments, but is an indication that achieving intra-group cooperation 
to resist the government in Jakarta across many disparate provinces of the archipelago was 
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Natsir’s rebellion was ultimately brief. By 1959, government forces had taken Central Sumatra. 
Natsir and his family were forced out of the jungle the following year, but only surrendered 
themselves to the authorities on 20 September 1961.623  
 
However, Natsir’s treatment at the hands of the state differed dramatically from his domestic and 
foreign contemporaries, Kartosuwiryo and Qutb, and from Sungkar’s persecution in the ensuing 
decades. Kahin writes that between 1961 and 1963, Natsir spent his time largely under house arrest 
or in detention with his wife. He was allowed to write numerous essays and articles, store books, 
receive visitors, and never faced serious interrogations. He was even released briefly in 1964 to 
attend his daughter’s wedding. 624   
 
The overthrow of Sukarno in 1965 effectively ended Natsir’s detention, and he was granted 
complete freedom in July 1967. 625 While his time in prison spanned the better part of the 1960s, 
Natsir did not emerge with a set of more radical beliefs nor a desire to resume his rebellion. With 
Sukarno ousted and the threat of communism vanquished through the mass killings of 1965-1966, 
Natsir attempted to return to parliamentary politics, establishing the Committee for the 
Rehabilitation of Masyumi in 1966.  
 
Natsir’s experiences stand in stark contrast to his domestic contemporaries, such as Kartosuwiryo 
and Sungkar, and foreign counterparts, like Sayyid Qutb. Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar and Qutb all 
faced significant harassment and persecution by their governments, in large part owing to the 
public expression of their theological and political beliefs and criticism of the state. All three were 
imprisoned and Kartosuwiryo and Qutb were eventually executed. This experience of persecution, 
harassment and imprisonment was ultimately radicalising for all of these men, who came to believe 
that politicians and state officials were not just hostile to Muslims and the actualisation of an 
Islamic state, but also were heretics and infidels. 
 
While Natsir faced similar harassment and persecution by the Indonesian government, his 
experiences, as described above, were not as harsh as that faced by Kartosuwiryo, Qutb or Sungkar. 
This relatively lenient treatment in prison, coupled with the eventual overthrow of the regime that 
put him there, seemingly blunted the potential for a more radical turn in his ideology and an 
embrace of takfīri principles. 
 
623 Kahin, Islam, Nationalism, and Democracy, p.151 
624 Idem, p.151-2 
625 Idem, p.155 
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It also seems plausible that Natsir was temperamentally different to these three men. He appeared 
less willing to viciously condemn his political opponents or see them as heretics when they 
embraced non-Islamic forms of governance. For example, when it became clear that Sukarno 
would not tolerate multiparty competition nor the return of Masyumi, Natsir opted not to 
challenge New Order through civil disobedience, nor to preach publicly (and even privately) that 
Sukarno and his regime were not true Muslims, nor call for or return to armed rebellion.  
 
While Natsir could have easily calculated that public opposition to the New Order would be 
difficult, or even futile, his decision to establish the DDII in 1967 illustrated his willingness to 
work within the confines of an unreceptive, and at times overtly hostile, regime, and potentially 
exploit its gaps. In establishing the DDII, Natsir believed that ‘preaching [was] a way to engage in 
politics’, and returned to demonstrating a commitment to non-violent advocacy and some forms 
of democratic political norms, namely the engagement in civil society and activism.626  
 
Sungkar’s embrace of takfīr 
 
Unlike his mentor, Sungkar was never part of the Indonesian political establishment. As noted in 
the introduction, Sungkar was raised in Modernist Hadrami circles and was unsparing in his 
criticism of the Suharto administration and of Indonesian society more generally. These criticisms 
largely revolved around Sungkar’s rejection of democracy and nationalism. He saw these concepts 
as fundamentally antithetical to Islam and eventually, grounds for takfīr, as they undermined the 
notion that God’s rule and laws were supreme. 
 
His efforts to spread these opinions brought him into regular confrontations with the Sukarno 
government, as the security services routinely surveilled his propagation efforts. As noted in the 
introduction, the authorities shut down Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s radio station, Radis, in 1975 after 
the men repeatedly made provocative statements about the government’s treatment of Muslims 
and questioned political leaders’ commitment to their faith.627 Despite this, there is little evidence 
to suggest that Sungkar actively advocated for Sukarno and his government to be  
excommunicated, nor that he called for violent action to bring about an Islamic state in Indonesia 
prior to 1976.  
 
626 Idem, p.168 
627 ICG, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia’, p.6 
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While his opinions were fiery and uncompromising, his sustained involvement in youth 
organisations, media networks, educational institutions, and other political bodies, often with 
Ba’asyir by his side, indicates that the men believed – at least until 1976 – that the creation of an 
Islamic state could be achieved through political participation and building support for their cause 
through education and outreach. Natsir’s willingness to appoint Sungkar as the head of the Solo 
branch of DDII in 1970 suggests that the men likely shared a common belief in using the power 
of dakwah to shape the Indonesian political process, rather than challenging the state through mass 
demonstrations or more violent forms of political protest.  
 
Nevertheless, the Indonesian government’s constant interference to stymie his own proselytisation 
efforts and broader grievances that Muslim political parties were unable to have a fair chance at 
political participation, played a significant role in Sungkar’s decision to leave the DDII in 1976 and 
join the DI. These moves by the regime likely convinced Sungkar that there were few opportunities 
to change the system through his work with Islamist political organisations.  
 
Sungkar’s arguments in his defence plea at his 1982 trial testified to this line of thought. It featured 
a laundry list of anti-democratic measures targeting Muslim parties and political interests. For 
example, he detailed at length his anger at the government’s 1970 decision to prevent former 
Masyumi leaders from taking up positions in its successor, the newly formed Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia (Parmusi, Indonesian Muslim Party) and its January 1973 decision to merge all Muslim 
parties into the Partai Persatuan Indonesia (PPP, United Development Party). This move came 
alongside an agglomeration of nationalist, non-Islamic parties into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
(PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party) to serve as the official opposition to the ruling Golkar party. 
To Sungkar, these incidents, along with the government’s alleged use of ‘special operations… [and] 
exceptional figures such as Ali Moertopo and Sujono Humardani’, were evidence of the state 
‘hijacking’ Muslim political parties, causing them to lose elections.628 
 
Additionally, Sungkar claimed that the government was failing to honour the rights of Muslims to 
practice their faith as they saw fit, as guaranteed by the constitution. In particular he cited the 
introduction of a 1974 law allowing interfaith marriage. He described the law as ‘disgraceful’ and 
designed as yet another attack on the Muslim community. 
 
628 Abdullah bin Ahman Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and Irfan Suryahardy, Perjalanan hukum di Indonesia: Sebuah 
Gugatan (Yogyakarta: Ar-Risalah: Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid (BKPM, 1982), p.91 
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Crucially, Sungkar appeared to have seen increasingly little political space to successfully oppose 
and resist the Suharto government or advocate for the implementation of shari’a. The closure of 
his radio station, Radis, in 1975 prevented them from proselyting to a mass audience. While 
campus usroh networks continued to flourish, it is likely that Sungkar understood the limits of his 
reach and activism so long as the state was committed to thwarting real political competition. It is 
difficult to say with certainty, given the paucity of sources, that Sungkar, unlike Natsir, lost hope 
in a non-violent struggle. But Islamist groups had made little progress towards achieving an Islamic 
state in Indonesia 27 years after the end of Dutch of colonial rule. It is likely that this lack of 
progress spurred them to try a different path.  
 
Sidney Jones and Quinton Temby have made similarly convincing arguments regarding how 
repressive state action resulted in the radicalisation of Sungkar. Jones is most forthright about the 
link, writing: 
 
It is questionable whether a man like Abdullah Sungkar, JI’s founder, would have 
made common cause with the DI if the New Order government had allowed a party 
like Masyumi, the largest Muslim party before its banning by Sukarno in 1960, or any 
party headed by Mohammad Natsir to function freely.629  
 
Temby adds to this, arguing that Sungkar’s protests in court show his frustration with the political 
process and with Suharto’s heavy-handed tactics.630Citing Mohmammad Hafez’s work Why 
Muslims Rebel, Temby concludes that ‘Islamist movements become militant when confronted with 
a combination of political and institutional exclusion and repression’.631 
 
This thesis largely agrees with their assessment. Building on this, this thesis adds that Sungkar’s 
transformation was not unique among Indonesian Islamist activists. He appears to have followed 
a similar path to Kartosuwiryo, whose embrace of takfīr, which supported a violent interpretation 
of jihad,  also occurred as he began to hit the limits of peaceful resistance and lobbying ultimately 
repressive regimes, whether the Dutch colonial administration or an increasingly authoritarian 
Sukarno-led government after independence.  
 
 
629 Jones, ‘New Order Repression and the Birth of the Jemaah Islamiyah’, p.40 
630 Temby, ‘Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah’, p.30 
631 Ibid 
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However, this thesis slightly differs from Jones and Temby’s readings, arguing that the repressive 
political circumstances created by these regimes only go some of the way to explaining why 
Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar embraced an expansive definition of takfīr as well as a narrow, violent 
definition of jihad. The uncompromising and totalising nature of their ideology is also to blame. 
Their belief structure, namely the need to ensure the implementation of shari’a and an Islamic 
political structure at any cost, resulted in an ideology that sees state control as a zero-sum game. 
Given this uncompromising world view, Sungkar finally broke with the DDII in 1976 to join the 
DI, becoming the head of its branch in Solo. He installed Ba’asyir as his deputy. His radicalisation 
and embrace of jihad will be examined in greater detail in the subsequent chapter.   
 
Sungkar’s conceptualisation of takfīr 
 
As noted above, Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of takfir was primarily constructed in (and defined 
by) a state of war. Those who opposed his rule and the legitimacy of the NII were seen to be 
defying God’s authority and were thus kuffar. This broad definition allowed for the widespread 
application of takfīr during the NII’s insurgency. It served as means of ensuring loyalty and mainly 
focused on controlling the political behaviour of Kartosuwiryo’s fighters and those living within 
his territory by presenting dissent as a form of unbelief, punishable by death.  
 
By contrast, Sungkar’s contribution to the development of takfīr in the DI’s ideological frame was 
to refine its application, singling out specific groups and practices for condemnation. This 
conceptualisation reflected the fact that the DI was no longer attempting to ensure the loyalty of 
an army or the compliance of a large civilian population, but also that Sungkar saw takfir as a means 
of purifying an individual’s practice of Islam, rather than just ensuring their loyalty to the wider 
cause. In this sense, Sungkar was attempting to impose and standardise the beliefs of his followers 
to an even greater degree than Kartosuwiryo, who demanded loyalty to God (and practical support 
for his regime), but showed little interest in micromanaging the quotidian thoughts of his followers.  
 
In Sungkar’s sermons, recorded sometime before his flight to Malaysia in 1985 to avoid a return 
to prison, he lays out his interpretation and understanding of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’. As 
explored more fully in the analytical famework, these recordings served as a means by which 
Sungkar could reach his supporters and those beyond the DI network and spread his ideas. The 
recordings mirror the practices of Egyptian ideologues in the 1960s and 1970s, who also attempted 
to bypass state oversight in the face of the consolidation of religious authority and knowledge by 
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the Egyptian state from the 1950s onwards’.632 While Sungkar never stated if he had listened to 
sermons by Egyptians or if he or DI members had access to their recordings in Indonesia, given 
his familiarity with the practices and tactics of Egyptian Islamist movements, it is likely that he was 
aware of the spread of cassette sermons there.  
 
With regards to the takfīr, he examines four major themes: (1) the illegitimacy of contemporary 
Indonesian leaders, (2) the status of Muslims who support leaders who do not uphold Islamic law, 
(3) forms of un-Islamic behaviour, and (4) the practices of Muslim minority sects.  
 
In repeatedly returning to these four themes, Sungkar clearly defines for DI members what is kufr, 
its manifestations, and (in some cases) how to respond. While he never advocates open rebellion 
or violence against the state or minority religious sects – perhaps due to the precarious nature of 
his legal situation or fears, as noted earlier, of government surveillance – he does reference 
numerous passages in the Quran that call for hypocrites and disbelievers to be harshly punished 
or that say that they will suffer in the afterlife. While Sungkar stops short of directly inciting attacks, 
he still manages to signal to his followers that these are serious crimes against the faith, and a basis 
for ex-communication.  
 
Sungkar, like Kartosuwiryo before him, defines Muslim leaders who fail to implement shari’a and 
Islamic governance structures as ‘murtad’.633 These leaders have, he argued, failed in their duty as 
Muslims to guide their people and ensure their physical and spiritual well-being. In one sermon, 
Sungkar asks his listeners the rhetorical question of whether ‘[Suharto and his cabinet] understand 
shari’a?’ or if they are ‘ignorant about shari’a’.634 He responds that the distinction does not matter 
since ‘[in] either case, he is not implementing it’.635 Sungkar continues to build this line of argument, 
saying that ‘all legal decisions belong to God alone’ and that ‘worshiping God means obeying 
God’s law’.636 As such, the ostensibly Muslim president and legislators have defied God by creating 
and implementing laws based on other sources of legitimacy. Sungkar thus makes it clear for DI 
members that implementing Islamic law is the key determinant of being a legitimate Muslim leader.  
 
 
632 Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape, p.55 
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Sungkar continued to reinforce the notion that the only way for a leader to be legitimate, be 
accepted by Muslims, and be a practicing Muslim himself is through implementing shari’a. In 
subsequent sermons, he claimed that ‘your leaders are actually Allah, the prophets and the 
believers… those who do not submit to Allah’s law are not believers’, thus again ex-
communicating the Muslims that made up the government of Indonesia.637 The cumulative effect 
of these denunciations was likely to have convinced DI members of the legitimacy of their struggle 
against the state and the righteousness of their jihad against an enemy who threatened them 
temporally and spiritually.  
 
Sungkar was also relatively direct in telling his congregants how to respond to such leadership. He 
stated that Muslims can only grant their full support to a government ‘when all power belongs to 
Allah’. As such, they could not give their backing to the Indonesian Republic because, ‘Muslims 
are not supposed to support kuffar’.638 Non-cooperation would not be enough. Sungkar 
encouraged his followers to be ‘hostile’ to the government for its failure to implement Islamic law 
and claimed the government would collapse, ‘unless they have the full support of Muslims’.639 
While he did not specify what hostility or the withdrawal of support from the government would 
look like in practice, he called on his supporters to resist and to deny the legitimacy of the Republic.  
 
By claiming that the government’s leadership had committed a sin so severe that it negated their 
faith, Sungkar – like Qutb and Kartosuwiryo before him – justified rebelling against an ostensibly 
Muslim regime. This also served to undercut arguments, often made in classical Islamic 
jurisprudence, that prioritised stability or support for leaders, even if corrupt or inept, on the basis 
of their shared belief in Islam. In this respect, Sungkar’s interpretation of takfīr served to bolster 
arguments for the necessity of jihad against the government, highlighting the concept’s supportive 
role in the structure of the group’s ideology.  
 
In the same sermon, Sungkar also condemned Muslims who supported the government, referring 
to them as ‘fools’ and ‘hypocrites’ for ‘choosing infidel leaders’.640 His use of the word ‘choosing’ 
is particular significant since Indonesia had not held genuinely free and fair elections since 1955, 
so actively casting a ballot in favour of the government was not an option seriously available to 
 
637 Abdullah Sungkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 16’, undated, Internet Archive, 
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Indonesian Muslims. Given this situation, it is likely that Sungkar saw Muslims’ failure to actively 
protest against the government as a form of passive or tacit support for its rule. This stance created 
a binary division where Muslims either joined the DI in opposing the government and fighting for 
shari’a or were condemned themselves as apostates.   
 
Sungkar would reiterate these arguments in at least three other sermons recorded in this period. 
For instance, he claimed that it was ‘impossible’ for God to ‘command us to obey an unfaithful 
government’, once again highlighting there was no reason to respect or tolerate Suharto’s rule.641 
Additionally, he claimed that hypocritical citizens who wrongly believed that ‘following an infidel 
will bring glory while following fellow Muslims will not and bring the insult in life instead’.642  
 
He cautioned that Muslims’ support, in whatever form it took, for such non-Islamic regimes would 
lead them ‘to go to hell for they are misled by their leaders’.643 Moreover, he told his listeners that 
even if they personally adhered to the basic tenets of their faith, this would not absolve them from 
this sin. He argued that ‘[p]eople who have prayed, have fasted, have given alms, have made hajj, 
have done all kinds of things, but if they choose an infidel as their leader, trust him to become 
their protector, that is when they have become hypocrites’.644 As such, he, like Kartosuwiryo, 
elevated opposition to an infidel regime as a key requirement to be considered a true Muslim. This, 
once again showed an attempt by a DI leader to ensure conformity of thought amongst followers 
and to demand an active show of support for the DI’s resistance to the state. 
 
Where Sungkar went further than Kartosuwiryo was in using takfīr as a tool of ensuring doctrinal 
purity. These ideas have roots in work of ʿ Abd al-Wahhab, whose key work, Kitab at-Tauhid focused 
largely on trying to cleanse the practice of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, thus ensuring taūhid. al-
Wahhab’s work lists numerous acts that constitute unbelief, including ‘supplicating pious living or 
dead people, seeking their intercession, making vows to them, offering sacrifices and praying at 
their tombs, and attributing to the dead… the power to harm or give benefit’.645 Furthermore, he 
included the ‘belief in, practice, teaching and learning of magic, astrology, and divination, the use 
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of amulets and talisman’, and numerous other actions that sought the intercession of someone or 
something interceded or supplanted a direct relationship with God.646  
 
Through his time at the DDII, Sungkar would have been well acquainted with this work. His 
sermons speak to the concerns listed by ‘al-Wahhab, encouraging supporters to renounce such 
practices, and using takfīr to remove excommunicate those refused. As such, takfīr served to purify 
and protect the faith. Sungkar advocated that Muslims should not worship at sacred tombs, 
lamenting that they were ‘now open everywhere’.647 He also lamented that Muslims were 
increasingly participating in un-Islamic traditions such as getting married ‘dressed in Western 
style’.648 To Sungkar, the performance of these ‘habits’, both old and new, was ‘all bid’a…wrong, 
and belong[ed] in hell’.649 Those who engaged in this ‘bid’a have made their own law, and those 
who make their own law means they have committed kufr’.650  
 
In this respect, Sungkar was much more prescriptive and dogmatic than previous DI leaders, 
clearly defining the boundaries of acceptable personal behaviour for Muslims. Not content with 
condemning such practices, Sungkar also argued that those who engaged in them had committed 
such grave errors that they had invalidated their faith. The focus on such quotidian matters such 
as wedding attire illustrated how Sungkar’s interpretation and application of takfīr was totalising. 
Since Muslims could be judged, and indeed excommunicated, for any aspect of their thoughts or 
deed – no matter how small or personal – this understanding of takfīr gave Sungkar and the DI 
greater scope to judge and condemn potential enemies. 
 
Finally, Sungkar’s sermons also indicate that he believed that minority Muslim sects were heretical 
and worthy of censure. In one sermon, he spent nearly 45 minutes discussing the apparent dangers 
of the Shia ideology, arguing that its true purpose was to undermine Sunni Islam. He warned 
listeners that the Shia were sending ‘missionaries to work in Indonesia to spread their ideology’.651  
Its teachings were work of ‘rafidah’ (splitters, a pejorative term to refer to the Shia) who had ‘grudge 
grow[ing] for centuries’.652  Once again, in singling out the Shia for their supposedly heretical 
practices, Sungkar narrowed the boundaries of the faith to only include Sunni Muslims who 
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adhered to his strict conceptualisation. In claiming the Shia were deviant, Sungkar stoked distrust 
and set the theoretical and religious foundations for violence directed against the community.  
 
From these sermons, Sungkar’s conceptualisation of takfīr largely conformed to Kartosuwiryo’s 
interpretation as it saw a Muslim leader’s failure to implement shari’a as a kufr act. Sungkar also 
clarified that Muslims had to completely reject this apostate system or risk being excommunicated 
themselves for expressing even tacit support for an un-Islamic regime. However, Sungkar went 
further than Kartosuwiryo, defining some non-political acts as constituting disbelief and heresy. 
Drawing on the work of the Wahhabis, Sungkar conceptualised takfīr as a tool for purifying and 
defending Islam, which necessitated policing the non-political thoughts and behaviours of his 
supporters in addition to their political actions. This interpretation of takfīr thus served to support 
DI’s understanding and pursuit of jihad as the primary mechanism for achieving an Islamic state 
and the need to base that state on surrendering all authority to God.  
 
Sungkar’s interpretation of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ 
 
Based on his sermons, Sungkar’s understanding of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ draw heavily on interpretations 
advanced by Ibn Taymiyya and Abd al-Wahhab. While they bear similarities to Muhammad Said 
al-Qahtani’s conceptualisation, it is unlikely that Sungkar was aware of Qahtani’s work in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, as the latter’s book was only published in 1984. Sungkar’s followers and students 
made no mention of Qahtani as a source of inspiration or an essential text for DI or later JI recruits 
when questioned during interviews, nor do other scholars of the JI’s early years mention Qahtani’s 
work as an influential book.  
 
This is not to argue that Sungkar was never influenced by Qahtani or was entirely unfamiliar with 
his work. It is likely that given the popularity and spread of Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ According to the Aqeedah 
of the Salaf, that Sungkar would have encountered it during his sojourn in Saudi Arabia in 1985 or 
following his exile to Malaysia in the late 1980s or 1990s. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that it was an 
influence on Sungkar’s initial conceptualisation of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’.  
 
Like Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar primarily used al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ as a tool of in-group control, that 
reinforced his followers’ Manichean understanding of the world. The concept also served as a 
powerful mobilising force, encouraging DI members (and Muslims in general) to better their 
practice of their faith and support each other in this pursuit. Sungkar introduced the concept to 
 197 
the group’s ideological framework, broadening its application to cover a wider range of personal 
beliefs and actions during a time when members were not actively engaged in armed conflict 
against the state. In doing so, he increasingly made Islam the only legitimate basis of a Muslim’s 
relationship with others inside and outside the faith, drawing heavily on Ibn Taymiyya and Wahab’s 
interpretations on the concept. 
 
 
Muslims were thus encouraged to form closer bonds amongst themselves, while simultaneously 
distancing themselves from situations or people that were un-Islamic. This loyalty to Muslims and 
disavowal of the non-Muslim world would reduce the spheres in which Muslims could exist in a 
state of ambiguity with non-Muslims or with un-Islamic ideas and practices, strengthening DI 
members’ Manichean view of the world. This once again helped to ensure a cohesive and loyal 
movement but also fostered a polarised climate, in which DI supporters could not possibly accept 
or exist in a non-Islamic polity. As such, the themes that run through Sungkar’s sermons with 
regards to al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ can be divided into two groups; firstly, the requirement to actively 
resist the un-Islamic Indonesian Republic, and secondly, the requirement to support fellow 
Muslims by practicing Islam correctly.  
 
Sungkar repeatedly stresses that ‘there must be a straight line drawn between Muslims and those 
that claim to be Muslim but do not enforce shari’a’.653 If Muslims fail to ‘respect that straight line’, 
they ‘will be among those who are misled’.654 He makes a similar proclamation in another sermon, 
stating that ‘[t]here are two types of government in this world. One is the government with faith 
in Islam and the other is the government of infidels’.655 Like Kartosuwiryo, he makes this division 
explicit for his listeners. In failing to understand and respect this division, Muslims would be 
engaging in a form of shirk, led astray by murtad rulers, and thus condemned to hell.  
 
Given this situation, Sungkar encourages Muslims to ‘take care of [themselves], protect 
[themselves] from the punishment of God. The punishment of Allah will not only affect the 
wrongdoers. If the wrongdoers are not prevented, they can do wrong everywhere, and we will be 
punished by Allah for not preventing the wrongdoers.’656 He told Muslims to take action to ensure 
that they do not engage in un-Islamic practices by supporting an infidel government. This is not 
 
653 Abdullah Sungkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 1’ 
654 Ibid 
655 Abdullah Sungkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 16’ 
656 Ibid 
 198 
just for their own sake in the afterlife, but also for the benefit of the wider Muslim community. 
Sungkar thus effectively added social pressure to an individual’s religious duty to actively 
participate in the resistance against the state.  
 
In the same sermon, he reminded his listeners that ‘[y]our actions affect others’, emphasising the 
collective obligation that Muslims have to one another.657 He furthered his argument in another 
sermon, stating that Muslims must also be ‘very careful in choosing their friends’ as making ‘friends 
with the wrong people will result in danger, especially when we choose a leader’. His words 
highlight the importance of social networks in shaping the views of Muslims and the need to be 
around likeminded individuals who have similar ideas about the type of government they want.  
 
In this respect, he used al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ to narrow the DI members’ worldview, preventing them 
from co-existing with those with different political ideas for fear of engaging, perhaps unwittingly, 
in a sinful act that may result in ex-communication. Underpinning this idea is the notion that by 
simply doing nothing, Muslims will somehow come to think and behave like an infidel, once again 
emphasising the requirement for positive action to resist the government.  
 
In addition to these ideas about engaging in active measures to protect the oneself and the umma 
from un-Islamic influences, Sungkar also called on his supporters to practice Islam ‘correctly’ by 
drawing further away from those that do not. In one sermon, Sungkar cautioned listeners about 
against engaging in interfaith ‘reconciliation’ efforts, arguing that performing the religious rites of 
another faith ‘is not the way of life taught by the Qur’an’ and it was ‘stupid logic’ to believe that 
all religions were equal.658 In condemning these efforts to bring different groups together, Sungkar 
emphasised the need for his community of believers to separate themselves from non-Muslims, 
even in the most benign scenarios. This would, once again, close down avenues for DI members 
to co-exist peacefully, or even tolerate the presence of, non-Muslim groups in their society.  
 
It also indicates that Sungkar thought that Muslims’ belief was incredibly fragile, and potentially 
sullied by even the most non-threatening of actions. This theme is repeated in at least five other 
sermons in which he reminds Muslims to be wary of the environments in which they find 
themselves, because even if ‘[s]omeone is well educated about Islam at home and at school… he 
will start to work, socialise, etc. and it is then possible that his environment will not allow him to 
 
657 Ibid 
658 Abdullah Sungkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 8’, undated, Internet Archive, 
https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_8.mp3, accessed: 25 January 2020 
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do what was taught to him by his household and at his school’.659 These warnings were meant to 
keep his listeners in a heightened state of tension and alertness at the possibility that, in passively 
existing in a non-Islamic state, they might fall prey to dangerous and sinful thoughts and deeds. 
 
He developed this line of thought in another sermon, arguing that:  
 
[Muslims] must be absolutely sure that the food comes from halal sources That is how 
believers do things. They always afraid their religious practice will not acceptable to God. 
They always check and recheck repeatedly, in contrast to hypocrites who always continue 
to do evil but always felt safe.660 
 
Once again, he encouraged Muslims to be aware of the risk of straying from God’s true path when 
engaging in any aspect of life. In telling his listeners that true believers ‘check and recheck’ 
constantly, he promoted unceasing self-policing and vigilance in order to ensure that their practice 
of Islam is pure. 
 
However, in order to maintain an acceptable environment for the flourishing of Islamic life in the 
absence of an Islamic state, he also called on believers to act collectively. Muslims are told to ‘invite 
[their] families… to come back on the right track, pray and stay away from sinful things. By inviting 
them back, [his listeners] have protected [their] faith and [they] will not have been influenced to 
violate shari’a’.661 As such, Sungkar encouraged the building of community among Muslims, 
strengthening their commitment to their faith while simultaneously withdrawing from non-Islamic 
practices and society. In this respect, his promotion of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ served as a tool to assist 
in the building of a solid base for the achievement of hākimiyya.  
 
Sungkar’s use of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ ensured that supporters were constantly affirming their faith by 
rejecting and distancing themselves from un-Islamic concepts, practices and even people. They 
were encouraged to do so not just for the sake of their own spiritual well-being but also for the 
wider Muslim community. As such, the concept was an effective tool for shoring up support for 
his movement and ensuring that a pure form of Islam was adhered to and policed by the members 
 
659 Abdullah Sungkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 4’ 
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themselves. In this respect, Sungkar effectively used al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ to develop a community of 




Although Kartosuwiryo adopted the concepts of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ belatedly, he 
nevertheless demonstrated they were effective tools for ensuring control and loyalty among both 
those fighting for the NII and among those it claimed as citizens. While his conceptualisation of 
these ideas was not as fully developed as his ideas on hakimiyya or jihad, they still played an 
important role in justifying the group’s continued insurgency by ex-communicating the Muslim 
Republican leadership of Indonesia, and thus reinforcing the core ideas of the DI’s belief structure. 
Kartosuwiryo used both concepts to ensure that support for his movement was never merely 
passive, but instead that supporters were required to demonstrate the highest commitment to their 
faith by being willing to lay down their life for Islam. 
 
Abdullah Sungkar later refined Kartosuwiryo’s ideas. His key contribution was adapting the use of 
these concepts to a period when the DI no longer controlled territory nor was engaged in an 
outright insurgency, by applying them to the daily lives of its members, thus ensuring purity of 
belief and ideological conformity among his followers. He focused on ensuring that DI members 
were clear on the boundaries of their faith and on justifying the continued rejection of the 
Indonesian state’s legitimacy. In doing so, he laid the groundwork for attacks against both the state 
and also civilians who, in his view, had committed grave sins by tacitly supporting the regime or 













Chapter 4 | Expanding jihad: Reconceptualising warfare after Kartosuwiryo, 1962-1979 
 
The death of Kartosuwiryo had profound implications for the conceptualisation of jihad among 
militant Islamists in Indonesia in the 1960s and 1970s. This chapter will focus on the group’s 
struggles to define jihad in the wake of his death and how the ascent of Abdullah Sungkar helped 
to cement the DI’s understanding of the concept as a violent physical struggle against a broad 
array of enemies.   
 
Like Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar embraced the necessity of jihad to establish an Islamic state, mainly 
because of increasing political repression by the authorities. However, his acceptance of the DI’s 
vision of jihad was not merely passive. His background in Modernist activism and his experience 
persecution by the government and subsequent exile in Malaysia led him to define the enemies of 
Islam more broadly, expanding the range of targets for the group.  
 
This chapter argues that there were significant continuities in how these Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar 
understood jihad. Like Kartosuwiryo before him, Sungkar eventually came to interpret the concept 
as a defensive and physical struggle to defeat the enemies of Islam in Indonesia. He also saw 
participation in this conflict as an obligation for all Muslims. Similarly, Sungkar conceptualised 
jihad as the sole means by which an Islamic state would be established in Indonesia. Sungkar did 
not merely repackaged Kartosuwiryo’s ideas for a new era. His understanding of takfīr and al-walā’ 
wa-l-barā’, as explored in the previous chapter, helped him to create and promote an understanding 
of jihad that rested on a broader definition of what actions constituted kufr and thus who could be 
considered a kafir. As such, Sungkar expanded the range of legitimate targets compared to the 
range in Kartosuwiryo’s time as the imam of DI.  
 
Once again following a similar ideological trajectory to Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar gradually excluded 
non-violent interpretations of jihad his understanding of the idea. Both men experienced significant 
disappointment in advancing their goal of Islamising Indonesian society while operating as activists 
in the mainstream political process. They adopted increasingly uncompromising stances following 
experiences of heavy-handed repression by the authorities. As a result, domestic, rather than 
foreign, developments predominantly drove Sungkar’s transformed thinking on jihad, at least in 
their initial years of membership in the DI movement.  
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This chapter makes these arguments over the course of three sections. This chapter begins by 
examining why numerous DI factions chose to interpret jihad as a non-violent struggle in the wake 
of Kartosuwiryo’s death in 1962. It subsequently analyses how some DI leaders had already begun 
to push back against this pragmatic understanding of jihad and were increasingly willing to target 
minority religious groups and security forces prior to Sungkar’s leadership. Finally, it will examine 
the transformative impact of Sungkar’s membership on the DI’s interpretation of the concept 
between 1976 and 1979 as Sungkar loses faith in non-violent methods to achieve an Islamic state. 
 
Stasis: DI’s pragmatic interpretation of jihad after Kartosuwiryo, 1962-1968 
 
In the nearly 15 years following Kartosuwiryo’s death, the DI remained largely leaderless due to 
state co-optation, repression and constant internal divisions over how to interpret jihad. The 
movement eventually split into two factions. A smaller group, led by Djaja Sudjadi, a senior DI 
figure and former NII minister of finance, advocated Kartosuwiryo’s early conceptualisation of 
jihad as a spiritual struggle and supported non-violent non-cooperation with the Indonesian state. 
The other group, which included far more of Kartosuwiryo’s top lieutenants, prioritised resuming 
a physical conflict and had fewer qualms with working with the state in order to take advantage of 
its material benefits to revitalise its ranks. Despite their differences, neither side appeared to make 
any effort to adjust or revise either of Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisations of the term.  
 
The flexibility of Hudaybiyyah 
 
Kartosuwiryo’s execution on 5 September 1962 left DI in disarray both logistically and 
ideologically. He did not have a designated successor and 32 of his top lieutenants had signed the 
Ikrar Bersama, a declaration which pledged allegiance to the Indonesian government in exchanged 
for amnesty, compromising their ability to subsequently lead the organisation. Kartosuwiryo had 
attempted to formalise the group’s military command structure in the event of his death. On 7 
August 1959, he issued a decree stating that ‘if for one reason or another, [the Komandemen Perang 
Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesia Military Commander)] is unable to carry out his duties… a 
replacement may be taken among the K.Ts’, a reference to the komandemen tertinggi (high 
commanders) or ‘those of a position is considered equal’, seemingly opening the position up to 
commanders of regional forces outside the group’s stronghold in West Java. This meant that there 
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were numerous individuals with potentially legitimate claims to the group’s leadership.662 Their 
indecision in the wake of Kartosuiwiryo’s death resulted in a leadership vacuum for over a decade. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Kartosuiwiryo’s final communiqué to DI members told them that ‘in 
the event of such a disaster’, they should ‘continue the fight as long as Pancasila is still there’ and 
that they remained ‘in a state of jihad’.663 Kartosuwiryo had significantly narrowed his and the 
movement’s understanding of jihad, from a non-violent interpretation that centred on improving 
oneself spiritually a form of anti-colonial protest to one that saw violent, physical conflict as the 
only route to ensuring hākimiyya.  
 
Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo’s interpretation of the concept was also pragmatic and responsive to 
political circumstances. As Republican forces closed in on the group’s stronghold in West Java in 
1959, he once again tried to reframe the concept of jihad, broadening its interpretation to 
encompass its non-violent meanings. While he reminded his followers not to give up the fight 
against the government, he also tacitly acknowledged the realities of their situation, and that 
military defeat was almost inevitable. 
 
In the same document, Kartosuwiryo made references to the Hudaybiyyah treaty that created a 
ten-year ceasefire between the Prophet Muhammad and Quraysh tribe of Mecca in March 628. 
The Qur’anic example was used to convince DI members to lay down their arms without shame 
and bide their time before resuming conflict at a more favourable moment.  The story provided 
hope to Kartosuwiryo’s followers by reframing their defeat as a voluntary, temporary cessation of 
hostilities to preserve their organisation for the eventual resumption of jihad. As such, 
Kartosuwiryo maintained that jihad remained a critical tool for the attainment of hākimiyya, but its 
manifestation as a physical conflict could be deprioritised in favour of other forms such as a 




Even in 1975 – 13 years after Kartosuwiryo’s death – some DI members continued to advocate 
for the use of non-violent jihad to attain hākimiyya, while downplaying the need to manifest this 
 
662 S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘Ma’lumat Komandemen Tertinggi Nomor: 11’, Komandemen Tertinggi Angkatan Perang Negara 
Islam Indonesia, 7 August 1959, in Al-Chaidar, Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S. M. Kartosoewirjo 
(Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), pp.625-626 
663 Kartosuwiryo, ‘Wasiat Imam Negara Islam Indonesia’  
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struggle as a physical conflict. Led by Djaja Sudjadi, this faction urged others within the group to 
approach the resumption of military conflict against the government with caution and continued 
to invoke Kartosuwiryo’s words to make their case. 
 
Sudjadi had fought alongside Kartosuwiryo until his surrender and served as the NII’s minister of 
finance. His former position and membership of a group of senior DI figures tasked with running 
the non-military functions of the NII, signalled his high standing within the organisation. 
However, unlike Kartosuwiryo, Sudjadi does not appear to have had credentials as a notable 
scholar or learned religious figure. 
 
In a document entitled Tjatatan Djihad (Notes on Jihad), Sudjadi, wrote that non-violent jihad should 
be prioritised.664 He had come to advocate a more moderate path of attaining an Islamic state, 
arguing that Kartosuwiryo’s surrender had triggered a period of ‘jihad fillah’, a spiritual jihad without 
the use of arms, similar to the Prophet Muhammad’s signing of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya.665 This 
would give DI ‘room and opportunity…to make preparations to continue to struggle’, reiterating 
Kartosuwiryo’s position that the relinquishing of arms would be a temporary state until victory 
could later be assured.666  
 
In this regard, Sudjadi’s move to interpret jihad as non-violent, spiritual struggle, harked back to 
Kartosuwiryo’s interpretation of jihad in the 1930s as part of PSI, when he saw spiritual purification 
and non-cooperation as a form of jihad against the colonial Dutch authorities. However, Sudjadi 
does not appear to have developed this concept any further beyond referring to it as a spiritual 
quest and a means of buying time for the group to reorganise. 
 
Like Kartosuwiryo’s 1962 decree, this his vague reinterpretation of jihad gave DI members the 
ability maintain an ideological opposition to the Indonesian state but removed the requirement to 
pursue a physical jihad that they were, in Sudjadi’s eyes, still not yet capable of winning. This 
emphasis on a spiritual rather than physical struggle was thus an act of self-preservation for the 
DI. The slippery and multifaceted nature of jihad thus permitted committed DI militants to lay 
 
664 Interview with AR, a former DI member, Jakarta, 9 October 2019. I was unable to verify AR’s position within 
the organisation and the extent of his participation in its activities, although he claimed to have known Djaja Sujadi. 
Nevertheless, his description of Sujadi’s role broadly aligns with accounts in other texts, see:  
Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia, pp.49-50 and pp.52-53 
665 Djaja Sudjadi, ‘Tjatatan Djihad’, Unpublished Manuscript (c.1975), p.81 in Quinton Temby, ‘Jihadist Assemble: 
The rise of militant Islam in Southeast Asia’, PhD Thesis, Australian National University (2017) p.72 
666 Ibid 
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down their arms once again, secure in the belief that they were not wholly renouncing the struggle 
for an Islamic state.  
 
This attempt at reinterpretation by Sudjadi illustrates that, regardless of whether it was taken to 
mean a spiritual or physical conflict, jihad was still a critical component of the DI’s ideological 
framework in 1975. Rather than renouncing their commitment to the idea altogether, Sudjadi’s 
reframing shows that he still saw jihad as both a critical tool for achieving an Islamic state in the 
future and a concept that had purchase with his membership. Moreover, his reframing of the 
concept left open the possibility of the resumption of violence when circumstances favoured the 
group’s victory. 
 
Nevertheless, the commitment to this interpretation of jihad was short-lived. An interview with a 
former DI member indicates that Sudjadi did not appear to have a strong enough following within 
DI to impose his understanding of the term on the organisation as a whole.667 The testimony of 
this member, whose accounts may be biased or based on faulty memories, may not be enough for 
us to be able to say with certainty how widely-shared Sudjadi’s interpretation was among DI 
members at the time. However, Sudjadi’s dislike of many of his former DI comrades, as chronicled 
by Solahudin, and his eventual decision to leave the organisation, gives weight to the idea that his 
non-violent interpretation of jihad held little purchase.668  
 
The enemy of my enemy 
 
Most DI commanders who had served as members of the NII’s military high command or were 
‘komandemen wilajah’ (regional commanders), unlike Sujadi, advocated a return to violent 
confrontation with the Indonesian state. Led by Aceng Kurnia, senior DI members such as Adah 
Djaelani Tirtapraja, Ateng Djaelani, Ules Sudjai, Djaja Sujadi Wijaya, Danu Muhamad Hassan, 
Zaenal Abidin, Toha Mahfud, and Dodo Mohamad Darda began meeting in the late 1960s to 
revive the moment, intending to embrace a more militaristic interpretation of jihad akin to 
Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of the term as he proclaimed the foundation of the NII in 1949. 
 
However, many of these men had also signed the Ikrar Bersama in 1962, pledging loyalty to the 
Republic and acknowledging that the DI movement had been ‘wrong and misguided, and had 
 
667 Interview with AR, a former DI member, Jakarta, 9 October 2019.  
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sinned against the people of West Java’.669 In exchange, they received amnesty from prosecution. 
Despite this apparent acquiescence, these men would later go on to participate in violent anti-state 
activities in the late 1970s and 1980s. This suggests that their decision to sign the 1962 declaration 
was a pragmatic choice to compromise given the defeat of their rebellion, and did not indicate a 
true change of heart.  
 
These DI members demonstrated huge pragmatism in signing the Ikrar Bersama. They were willing 
to sign their names to a document renouncing their commitment to an Islamic state and to swear 
allegiance to an enemy in order to keep themselves and their movement alive in service of one day 
reviving mission to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. A more ideologically inflexible and 
uncompromising doctrine would have likely resulted in their choosing to die for their beliefs, or 
at least serving incredibly long prison terms. Instead, their actions indicated that martyrdom was 
not a core component of their conceptualisation of jihad at the time, nor did they appear to believe 
that death or incapacitation would serve their goal of creating an Islamic state in Indonesia. 
 
This pragmatism became a hallmark of their relationship with the Indonesian state during this 
period. Indonesian politics had undergone radical change in the last few years of the DI insurgency. 
By 1957, President Sukarno had introduced ‘Guided Democracy’: he dismantled the federal state 
and replaced the elected parliament with a fully appointed body. He suspended elections and 
dissolved political parties. 670 By 1963, Sukarno had appointed himself president for life and 
‘increasingly favoured the PKI’,671 aligning himself more publicly with the communists. He allowed 
them to take control of major news organisations, such as the Antara news agency, and installed 
sympathetic leftists in the political parties that remained.672 With the communists in ascendance, 
rumours of a coup began circulating throughout the country in 1965.  
 
On 30 September 1965, a group of military officers based in the Halim air force base in Jakarta 
attempted to kill seven generals. The men succeeded in murdering all but one, precipitating a 
response from a faction of senior military officials led by Major-General Suharto.673 Suharto 
denounced the group, labelling the action a coup and using the opportunity to take control of the 
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country. The details surrounding the plot’s origins, the extent of PKI involvement, the role of anti-
Communist Western powers, and Suharto’s own ambitions remain hotly contested.674 But 
regardless of the plot’s origins, the events of 30th September set in motion the demonisation of 
the communists and their eventual massacre. The military, often aided by vigilante groups, targeted 
anyone affiliated with or accused of having affiliations with the Communist Party. The estimated 
death toll ranges from 400,000 to 500,000 people between October 1965 and March 1966.675 
 
In this period of upheaval, some military officials saw in DI a potential ally. Despite years of 
animosity, these officers appear to have believed that they could harness the group’s anti-Sukarno 
and anti-communist sentiments. At very least, the officers’ actions suggest that they were confident 
that a sufficient financial incentive would overcome any potential ideological obstacles and secure 
the DI’s cooperation.  
 
For DI members, the overtures to work with the military against the PKI presented an opportunity 
to regain weapons and funds, and to observe the workings of (and potentially infiltrate and exact 
revenge on) some of those responsible for their perceived persecution. The trade-off was a 
willingness to work alongside and – even take orders from – the army that caused their defeat just 
a few years earlier.  
 
In participating in this activity, DI members once again showed great flexibility in their 
conceptualisation of jihad, choosing to work with the military and slowly regroup, rather than 
taking the weaponry and quickly resuming their conflict with the state. It also meant that members 
could continue to practice a form of physical jihad, aimed, if not at the state itself, at an enemy of 
Islam: godless communists.  
 
It is also likely that the DI understood that resuming direct hostilities with the state would result 
in the group’s annihilation, and again demonstrated that they were unwilling to sacrifice themselves 
for their cause at this juncture. The remnants of the organisation appear to have prioritised survival 
and the long-term actualisation of their aims of an Islamic state. It also indicates that their 
understanding of jihad remained pragmatic – the group ultimately appears to have still viewed it as 
a tool to achieve hākimiyya rather than a worthy pursuit in and of itself.  
 
674 For a detailed discussion on the debates surrounding the outbreak of the coup attempt see John Roosa, Pretext for 
Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2006)  
675 Robert Cribb, ‘Genocide in Indonesia: 1965-66’, Journal of Genocide Research, 3:2 (2001), p.233  
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According to Geoffrey Robinson, the notion that DI militia groups would have had significant 
autonomy to pursue their own local interests and agendas is ‘mistaken, and with rare exceptions, 
these militia groups and death squads operated under army direction and control’.676 Kill lists were 
‘often prepared by the army and then passed along to vigilantes’677 and militia groups were 
‘mobilised, armed trained and supported by the army’.678 Quinton Temby’s work also makes this 
argument, writing that a close advisor to General Suharto, Ali Moertopo, encouraged a close 
relationship with the group, making Danu Hasan, a senior DI member, his main point of contact 
and using him and his men to ‘pursue pro-Sukarno officials who had gone into hiding’.679 DI 
members were also likely to have acted out of self-preservation, cooperating to avoid arrest or 
punishment. Individuals who resisted and attempted to carry on the fight against the state, such as 
Ahmad Sobari (a DI district head in Priangan Timur in West Java) and Opa Mastopa (a regiment 
commander in Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya) were swiftly arrested by the authorities when their actions 
were discovered. 680 
 
Those who cooperated were indeed rewarded. An ICG report notes that the military also ‘offered 
weapons in exchange for help in attacking suspected communists (PKI) in West Java, Aceh, and 
North Sumatra’.681 Additionally, the men received far more than weapons and training from the 
state as compensation for their help in defeating the PKI. During his trial on charges of subverting 
the Indonesian state, Haji Ismail Pranoto (alias Hispran) admitted that he knew Danu and Ateng 
Djaelani were on the government’s payroll when they organised and participated in the pogroms. 
According to Hispran ‘[one] gets a salary and a car, one distributes kerosene for the whole of West 
Java’,682 showing he knew that Danu was being paid like a civil servant and that Ateng had attained 
his position as the Bandung municipality chairperson of the Association of Oil and Gas Companies 
(Gapermigas) in 1968 with support from the Siliwangi military command’.683 Some DI figures even 
believed that the reason for their favourable treatment by the military so soon after their defeat 
was a sign that the military genuinely supported their cause for an Islamic state. This perception 
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was aided by the fact that Ali Moertopo had fought alongside some DI members as part of the 
Hizbullah militia during the Japanese occupation period. 684  
 
It is difficult to gain insight into how these individuals negotiated these apparent contradictions: 
they worked so closely under the military, and even profited from the newly installed Suharto 
government. Many of the DI members who participated in the violence against purported PKI 
members have since died and few, if any, chronicled this period. Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo’s 
final, pragmatic conceptualisation of jihad may have provided them with a means of rationalising 
their collaboration.  
 
It would be easy to write off these men as insufficiently committed to the DI cause or to suggest 
that their understanding of the ideology (or the ideology itself) was not robust, but most of them 
did return to forms of conflict against the state in the late 1970s. As such, it is likely that they did 
believe that stockpiling weaponry and funds for the future would put them in a better position to 
eventually launch their jihad against the state, as their former leader had suggested.  
 
The DI’s lack of a clear military or spiritual leader hindered the group’s ability to wholly alter or 
put forward a competing ideological interpretation to Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of jihad. The 
group remained effectively leaderless between 1962 and 1968, with the ICG noting that 
Kartosuwiryo’s deputies ‘bickered’ and the ‘rank-and-file… were left rudderless’.685 With the men 
focused on maintaining some semblance of a cohesive organisation, it was understandable that 
they paid little attention to theological debates and had little time to craft treaties extolling the 
virtues of jihad in all its various forms.  
 
Spoiling for a fight: An end to a pragmatic interpretation of jihad, 1968-1976   
 
As the group entered the 1970s, Kartosuwiryo’s malleable definition allowed for numerous DI 
members to justify their co-optation by state security services. However, the Suharto regime’s 
increasing intolerance of Muslim political organisations and perceived embrace of religious 
minorities, particularly Christians, would push numerous DI leaders to push for an increasingly 
confrontational approach with the government. Similar to Abdullah Sungkar’s increasing 
disillusionment with peaceful political activism as a means of achieving an Islamic state, younger 
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DI members were beginning to contest the approach of their predecessors, ultimately embracing 
violent jihad against the state as ideologically consistent with the group’s primary aim of achieving 
God’s sovereignty on earth.  
 
Getting their money’s worth  
 
While the group achieved little in terms of its ideological development in the years following 
Kartosuwiryo’s death, DI members that cooperated with the government did manage to reap some 
rewards. By 1968, Aceng Kurnia, one of Kartosuwiryo’s most trusted deputies, established the 
Penggerakan Rumah Tangga Islam (PRTI, Islamic Household Movement) with the aim of bringing 
the DI leadership back together. An ICG interview with one PRTI participant revealed that, after 
some deliberation, Aceng Kurnia decided to ask the Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (BAKIN, 
State Intelligence Agency of Indonesia) ‘to support a get-together with DI leaders’.686 BAKIN 
consented, giving the group the requisite funding to host the reunion.  
 
On the face of it, the intelligence agency’s decision to cooperate with the militants appears odd. 
However, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Moertopo had been engaged in a long-running scheme to entice 
DI members into President Suharto’s Golkar party ahead of the 1971 election. Moertopo has been 
referred to by Ken Conboy as Suharto’s ‘trouble shooter’. When the DI reunion took place, 
BAKIN officials reportedly gave speeches to the assembled militants extolling the virtues of 
joining Golkar.687 According to Conboy, Ali Moertopo had been courting elements within the 
group since 1965, wooing them as he did Ateng Djaelani, with business contracts, and other forms 
of financial gain.688 This strategy appeared largely successful, at least in the short-term. Moertopo’s 
deputies claimed that ‘[of] the twenty-six core leaders in the movement… a third were 
cooperative’.689 
 
This reprieve from persecution, coupled with an influx of funds and weapons, helped DI re-
establish its structure, even though the government was fully aware of its activities. In 1973, DI 
leaders from West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh gathered at a house on Mahoni Street in Tanjung 
Priok for a meeting.690 According to Gaos Taufik, the DI’s Medan commander, who was deposed 
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as a witness at the trial of Timsar Zubil, a DI member who participated in several attacks on 
civilians, on 10 January 1978, the ‘West Java DI/TII leader Adah Jailani proposed that Teuku 
Daud Beureuh take up the DI/TII’s leadership again’.691 Daud Beureueh agreed to take on the 
position temporarily and became the group’s acting imam, largely due to his seniority in the militant 
Islamist movement.  
 
Daud had been a leading figure in the resistance against the Dutch in Aceh. By 1953, he and his 
followers in Aceh issued a statement announcing that the province was separating from the 
Indonesian Republic and joining the NII. Although part of NII, Daud operated autonomously, 
announcing in 1955 that the province was a ‘federal state’ rather than an integral part of the NII.692  
 
He was installed as the titular head of the organisation in 1973. But he ‘did not authorise’ the 
formation of regional combat or battalion commands for the resumption of a jihad against the 
Indonesian state due to a lack of preparedness and resources.693 The decision not to engage in 
military conflict once again highlights the strategic acumen of the group’s leadership. The lack of 
urgency to confront the state militarily suggests that, in the 11 years following Kartosuwiryo’s 
death, the physical performance of jihad was, like the preservation of his Islamic state, an aspiration. 
 
A change of heart  
 
However, Daud was either overruled or relented shortly after the initial meeting. The group began 
to reorganise itself into a military command structure, indicating that it had not given up on the 
concept of a physical jihad entirely. Instead, jihad remained essential to the realisation of hākimiyya, 
but it needed to be performed slowly and with guarantees of success. The group returned to the 
structure largely based on the one established by Kartosuwiryo in 1949. It once again divided the 
country up into seven zones of war, overseen by an ‘All Indonesia War Command’ led by a 
supreme commander, who oversaw regional heads.694  
 
These preparations and the use of militaristic language indicate that the group had not given up its 
belief that jihad was the sole means of realising an Islamic state. The fact that the DI’s new 
leadership focused on slow but steady combat preparations rather than using their connections 
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with the armed forces to lobby the government politically – or even revive dakwah efforts – 
suggested that a militaristic interpretation of jihad was now central to the group’s identity. 
 
This rapid switch from cooperation with the state to a desire to violently oppose it is largely 
unaccounted for in the literature on the DI and JI. Few, if any written sources exist from this 
period, and few participants remain alive and willing to participate in interviews. Part of the 
explanation may lie in the fact that like Sungkar and other Islamists, DI leaders were increasingly 
appalled by the apparently un-Islamic laws being promulgated by the Suharto government. 
Solahudin speculates that the ‘rapid industrialisation’ of Aceh as well as the ‘influx of Western 
companies’ following the discovery of oil in the region affected Daud deeply, causing him to act 
to stop the spread of sin.695 Several DI members arrested by the police on 8 January 1977 would 
later tell the authorities that, by 1975, Daud had advocated the creation a ‘Barisan fi Sabilillah’, a 
fighting front, seemingly disregarding his earlier caution.696  
 
Regardless, of whether their so-called ‘temporary’ imam really advocated this, the actions of DI 
members indicate that they supported resuming their violent struggle against the Indonesian state. 
In order to make up for their lack of resources, DI members sought assistance from foreign 
governments. During Timsar Zubil’s trial (who a Sinar Harapan news report identified as a ‘leading 
Jihad Commander’) Dainuri Saleh, the ‘fourth assistant in the North Sumatra DI/TII Regional 
Combat Command’ claimed that DI had sent a letter to the Libyan ambassador in Kuala 
Lumpur.697 The letter, signed by Daud Beureuh, ‘requested the aid of 12 billion as well as weapons 
and other military equipment from the president of Libya’.698 Following a visit to Aceh to consult 
with Daud, Dainuri Saleh and Rifai Ahmad were told the group required the aid to ‘equip the [TII] 
and to revive the DI’ and that it ‘was sorely needed to fight against the RI [Indonesian Republic] 
government’. Another witness, identified only as RA, the son of the leader of Central Java DI 
branch, said the group subsequently requested ‘300,000 light weapons and the most modern heavy 
weapons’ from the Libyans. 699 These pleas to the Libyan government went unanswered. 
 
The group also tried to acquire money and weapons through criminal activity during this period. 
In the same trial, another witness, identified as Anwar Jerri (‘fourth assistant in the North Sumatra 
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DI/TII Regional Combat Command’), planned to steal 6 million Rupiah from a company called 
PT Milano.700 However, the plan failed because the would-be thieves were unable to secure a 
vehicle. Nevertheless, the men were successful in gathering small arms, such as ‘a Colt .38… along 
with six grenades’, an FN .32 pistol, and smaller sums of money.701 These efforts led to plans to 
‘sabotage the arrival of President Suharto in Medan in 1975 when he came to inaugurate a plywood 
plant, as well as to bomb a bridge and set fire to the Medan fair’ but were stopped due to 
unspecified reasons.702  
 
Even though many of these plans had come to nought, they show that many of the group’s top 
commanders and members were ready to resume a violent and physical jihad against the Indonesian 
government. Based on their methods and target selection, this jihad appeared to have been 
conceptualised in the same manner as Kartosuwiryo’s challenge to the Dutch colonial 
administration and subsequently the Republican government. Timsar Zubil argued in his trial that 
‘there was a consensus’ among DI leaders of the need ‘to implement shari’a in Indonesia’ and ‘as a 
Muslim, it was his duty to challenge the current laws and regulations of the Indonesian Republic’.703 
 
It is clear that in both periods, DI leaders rationalised their rebellion on the grounds that the 
authorities had failed in their duty to uphold Islamic laws and practice Islamic governance for the 
benefit of the predominantly Muslim population. Through the reformation of a national command 
structure as well as formally writing to and requesting aid from other states, DI leaders in the 1970s 
conceived of themselves as equals to the government of an Indonesia. This not only conferred 
legitimacy to the group in the eyes of its members, elevating its position from a small band of 
rebels to an organisation with equal status and claim to control of Indonesia. 
 
Expanding Jihad: Sungkar and Ba’asyir join DI, 1976-1979 
 
Sungkar’s interpretation of jihad showed many continuities with Kartosuwiryo and previous DI 
leaders. His key contribution to its development in the group’s ideological framework, however, 
was to successfully link the concept together with takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, thus expanding the 
range of legitimate targets for the group. These ideas had already begun to circulate among DI 
members prior to the arrival of Sungkar, indicating the prevalence of salafi material being promoted 
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in Indonesia at the time, but they had not been fully codified or developed by existing members, 
many of whom were jailed as he entered the organisation.  
 
Thus, rather than introducing ideas that were completely novel, Sungkar found an organisation 
with a receptive audience for their teachings and interpretation of jihad. During his initial years, he 
was able to more cogently present and link these three concepts together due to his background 
as preachers and teachers.  
 
Embracing non-traditional conflict 
 
Despite aspirations to fight the Indonesian state as an equal force, the reality was that DI was still 
far too weak to effectively carry out a military campaign. Between 1976 and 1979, despite the 
formation of a formal military command structure, the organisation only conducted sporadic, 
small-scale bombings, occasionally killed individuals purportedly working for the state, and 
targeted religious minorities. They made little progress toward their long-term goal of bringing 
about a theocratic regime in Indonesia. DI was not even able to sustain a low-level insurgency that 
would engage the Indonesian military in a guerrilla campaign. This was both due to its lack of 
access to weaponry and funding (particularly after their requests to the Libyan government went 
unanswered) and continued infiltration and surveillance by the government itself.  
 
As such, the movement’s attempts to reconceptualise jihad in the aftermath of its revival was once 
again shaped by the limitations of its circumstances. In contrast to the arguments put forward by 
Sidney Jones, Solahudin and Quinton Temby, it is posited here that the evolution of DI’s 
understanding of jihad had begun before the involvement of Sungkar. Jones and Temby are 
particularly strident in attributing all ideological development during this period to Sungkar. Jones 
wrote that ‘by itself, DI could not have produced JI. It was a parochial, ideologically 
unsophisticated guerrilla movement’ that would require the assistance of a ‘highly educated, 
Modernist Muslim urban elite’ to fully transform.704 This is not to downplay the significant role 
Sungkar subsequently played in changing the DI’s understanding of jihad, but rather to 
acknowledge that he entered the organisation at a time of ideological upheaval, driven largely by 
the circumstances the existing membership found itself in, and thus found a receptive audience 
for his beliefs. Ultimately, Sungkar was able to provide a framework for these new ideas, thus 
crafting an expanded understanding of jihad within the movement.  
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DI’s embrace of asymmetric conflict and the targeting of both religious minorities and Muslims 
deemed to have transgressed had begun prior to the entry of Sungkar. DI leaders had spent the 
period between 1962 and early 1976 largely regrouping and reorganising its members into a military 
command structure once again, and they made few innovations in terms of their interpretation of 
jihad from Kartosuwiryo’s at the height of the insurgency. This appeared to change in 1976 when 
the group began to branch out from attacks against government officials, security forces and other 
state institutions.  
 
In October 1976, DI militants attacked the Baptist-run Emanuel Hospital in Bukittinggi by 
planting a bomb in a toilet.705 The attack does not appear to have caused significant damage or 
causalities. In his trial in January 1978, Timsar Zubil admitted that he had ordered DI members 
to: 
set fire to churches in Pekanbaru and West Sumatra, throw grenades into churches, 
theatres, a bar and a school in Medan, set fire to the Java Christian Church in the Sei 
Rotan village.706 
 
These attacks were all conducted in the months following the bombing of the Baptist hospital. 
This rise in activity also marked a change in the DI’s targeting patterns and heralded a significant 
shift away from Kartosuwiryo’s interpretation of jihad, even prior to the arrival of Sungkar. In 
bombing cinemas, places of worship, and even targeting traditionalist mosques, DI members 
acting under Timsar’s orders demonstrated a willingness to view civilians, regardless of their 
religious background, as legitimate targets. This represents a departure from the group’s former 
respect for and adherence to traditional conduct in warfare, as spelled out in its 1949 penal code, 
which generally prohibited attacks on non-combatants, particularly women and children. While 
DI members did attack civilians during its insurgency, the inclusion of laws of conduct during war 
in its penal code suggested that Kartosuwiryo was at least theoretically committed to refraining 
from indiscriminate attacks. 
 
While Timsar does not appear to have explicitly referenced any salafi scholarship during his trial, 
the group’s targeting patterns in the mid-1970s indicated that they were beginning to adopt some 
ideas from radical salafi scholarship into its conceptualisation of jihad, namely the concepts of al-
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walā’ wa-l-barā’ and takfīr. In targeting places of apparent vice, such as bars, or Christian-run 
hospitals and churches, the group appears to have been drawing a hard line between that which 
was pure and good and anything even potentially un-Islamic.  
 
This delineation seemingly reflected the nascent incorporation of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ into the group’s 
interpretation of jihad. By destroying these places of sin and danger, DI members under Timsar’s 
command were ultimately demonstrating their commitment to God by removing un-Islamic 
practices from their society and protecting Muslims from potentially being tempted by one of 
these establishments, or inadvertently participating in un-Islamic activity.  
 
Quinton Temby, citing Timsar’s deposition file during his 1978 hearing, states that Timsar ordered 
these attacks in 1976 as ‘shock therapy’ for Indonesian society and the Suharto regime.707 In 
justifying the attacks as such, Timsar and his DI cadres saw the accommodation of Christians and 
the spread of drinking establishments and cinemas as signals that his society had become immoral 
and hedonistic. The attacks were thus an attempt to save Muslims from these sins, demonstrating 
a willingness to protect their co-religionists and denounce un-Islamic practices. Timsar’s 
justification for his attacks has strong parallels to Sayed Qutb’s lamentations that societies ruled 
by un-Islamic governments exist in a state of jahiliyya with corrupt leaders who are either unable 
or worse, unwilling to tackle these perceived social ills.  
 
Timsar and other DI cadres from this period did not leave a comprehensive written record and 
few are still alive and able to give interviews, making it is difficult to ascertain with certainty the 
extent to which Qutb’s scholarship and notions of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ motivated these 
attacks. Nevertheless, far as their targeting patterns serve as a guide, these DI members appeared 
to have been slowly embracing the idea that there was no room in an Islamic state for the inclusion 
of non-Muslims. As such, their conception of jihad increasingly focused on purging Indonesian 
society of these un-Islamic elements (whether minority religious groups or un-Islamic behaviours) 
as much as on overthrowing the Republican state. While Kartosuwiryo had advocated the 
expulsion of the Dutch and condemned the their promotion of the Christian faith, his constitution 
and penal code had suggested that non-Muslims would still be able to live in his Indonesia if they 
accepted NII rule and paid jizya (a special tax on non-Muslims).  
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In this new conception, however, Muslims were increasingly obligated to undertake a violent jihad 
to protect their faith from sin and transgressions, rather than merely purifying their own personal 
faith or taking non-violent actions to improve their community. They now had a duty act not only 
to express their disavowal by confronting and eradicating the sinful but to demonstrate their 
commitment and loyalty to their in-group, thus keeping them safe.  
 
No transgression was deemed too small to go unpunished. For example, Timsar Zubil chose to 
attack the Riang cinema because ‘he was aggrieved that it had shown an Egyptian film he thought 
denigrated Islamic teachings’.708 In doing so, he demonstrated that an individual’s obligation to 
jihad was totalising. Since failing to respond to even seemingly minor infractions or insults to the 
faith would indicate a Muslim’s failure to show loyalty to his God and his co-religionists, policing 
the boundaries of the faith and protecting it from danger became constant necessities. 
 
The attacks on NU-affiliated or government-built mosques indicated another significant evolution 
in DI’s conceptualisation of jihad. The explicit targeting of other Muslims signalled that takfīr was 
becoming increasingly crucial to group’s understanding of jihad. While Kartosuwiryo had 
eventually come to embrace the idea of takfīr, his application of the concept was more 
circumscribed than his successors’, generally limiting its application to condemning enemies while 
engaged in an armed struggle against them. In explicitly targeting Muslims outside of a warzone, 
Timsar’s faction was redrawing the boundaries of the group’s definition of who constituted a true 
Muslim and what practices were Islamic, thus creating an in-group of true believers and an out-
group of heretics. For instance, participation in a government-backed competition, regardless of 
its religious content, would now indicate that those involved were practicing a corrupted form of 
Islam, sullied by the involvement of an un-Islamic state. 
 
Nevertheless, these ideas of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ and takfīr were never fully articulated or concretised 
into a doctrine alongside jihad by figures in this revitalised version of DI. However, the group’s 
changing tactics and targeting patterns suggest that DI leaders had firmly moved away from 
guerrilla warfare against the conventional military forces of the Republic, prioritising instead the 
targeting of religious minorities and Muslim civilians deemed to have transgressed. This shift was 
probably the result of a combination of these new ideas and an adaptation to the realities of their 
situation. Lacking a guerrilla army, money, arms, or a territorial stronghold, the group was now 
forced to take its jihad into more urban settings. Sungkar’s contribution to the group would be to 
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use his background as a teacher and a religious scholar to clarify and articulate these concepts as 
they applied to jihad in a far more structured and considered manner.  
 
While revitalised, the surge of activity in 1976 came at great cost to the leadership of DI. The 
attacks quickly resulted in a series of raids by the government. Timsar Zubil was the first to be 
arrested on 16 January 1977.709 Most of the senior leadership, including Hispran, Gaos Taufik, 
Dodo Muhammad Darda, Danu Muhammad Hasan, and Ateng Djaelani, were rounded up by 
June that same year. Those that were not caught up in the police dragnet quickly fled. By 1978, the 
group’s imam, Daud Beureueh, was placed under house arrest, leaving the organisation in disarray.  
 
The arrests not only created space for new leaders to emerge but presented an opportunity for the 
reshaping of the group’s ideology. Many of those arrested had worked closely with Kartosuwiryo 
in the NII and were keen to carry on his legacy, rarely deviating from his teachings. Their removal 
from the organisation thus presented an opportunity for newcomers with different ideas to stamp 
their own mark on the group.  
 
In this period of upheaval and uncertainty, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir were 
formally inducted in December 1976. Their decision to embrace the organisation, particularly 
during this period of violent revival, marked a clear end to their commitment to a non-violent 
struggle to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. According to AK, this decision was clear when 
Muhammad Natsir told Sungkar he could no longer be a member of DDII as long as he was a 
member of DI.710 Sungkar promptly renounced his DDII membership, breaking with Natsir’s 
commitment to non-violence and political engagement.  
 
Linking jihad, al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ and takfīr  
 
As noted above, Sungkar was not introducing entirely new concepts to DI members, but had 
instead found a receptive audience for the salafi-inspired doctrine that they had honed at Pondok 
Ngruki. Sungkar did not explicitly call for violence against the Indonesian state while teaching 
general lessons in the pesantren or in public sermons. In his public sermons, Sungkar tended to 
focus on the concepts of takfīr, al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, and hākimiyya, deriding nationalism as a corrupt 
ideology, explaining its incompatibility with the Muslim faith, and discussing various forms of shirk 
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and other un-Islamic practices. Sungkar’s reluctance to speak on jihad outside of these small groups 
was likely due to concerns about security, particularly since he had already been censured for 
speaking about less incendiary topics at the al-Irsyad radio station. 
 
His teachings regarding the necessity and justification of jihad were reserved for a few trusted 
students as they were being indoctrinated into the DI movement. These discussions usually took 
place at extra-curricular pengajian (Islamic study sessions) in small groups with existing DI 
members, often in the homes of the teachers.711 As Kirsten Schulze and Julie Chernov Hwang 
note, these sessions were ‘tightly controlled’ and ‘aimed at establishing a completely reliable and 
committed membership bound by loyalty not just to the amīr but also to their fellow ikhwan 
[brothers]’.712 As such, discussions of jihad were reserved for when participants had been through 
numerous sessions, often over the course of several months.  
 
Interviews with DI and JI members who attended these sessions in Indonesia prior to Sungkar 
and Ba’asyir’s flight to Malaysia, suggest that, in private, Sungkar’s thoughts on jihad had been 
shaped by his personal experience and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood.713 Though few 
could remember the specifics of these lessons, or were willing to disclose further information, they 
claimed that Sungkar discussed extracts from Jundullah (Army of God) by the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Said Hawwa, Maududi’s Jihad in Islam, and Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones and In the 
Shade of the Qur’an in these sessions. These texts are unlikely to have been the only ones referenced, 
but participants did not offer up additional sources on jihad during these interviews.  
 
There are further complications with determining a comprehensive list of texts that influenced 
Sungkar’s thinking on jihad in his initial years as a DI member. Members like Ahmad Sajuli 
bashfully admitted that they did not actually read everything assigned, illustrating the possibility 
that texts that were key to Sungkar may have simply been forgotten by those he taught.714 As noted 
earlier, Sungkar rarely gave public speeches on the topic, nor did he write much of his ideology 
down, so first-hand accounts of his thoughts on jihad are scarce.  
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Nevertheless, the three texts mentioned above provide some insight into his thinking on jihad. As 
Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo have noted with regards to the JI’s interpretation of jihad, the use 
of these texts shows a greater reliance on twentieth century Islamist scholarship rather than 
classical fiqh compared to previous DI leaders.715 This thesis broadly agrees with this assessment, 
but as noted above DI members had already begun to embrace salafi ideas spread by more 
contemporary ideologues prior to the arrival of Sungkar into the organisation. This indicates that 
the division was not as stark as Fealy and Bubalo suggest. 
 
Firstly, there are again notable overlaps between Sungkar and Kartosuwiryo’s beliefs. Sungkar 
embraced jihad’s definition both as a physical and spiritual struggle, though he placed emphasis on 
the former. His use of Said Hawwa’s work in his teaching supports this. Hawwa calls on Muslims 
to draw ‘a sharp distinction between the forces of truth and falsehood, light and darkness, good 
and evil’ and, like Qutb, argued that Muslim states were backsliding towards ignorance.  716 Hawwa 
had several remedies for this situation and thus advocated a wide-ranging conceptualisation of 
jihad, seeing its practice encompassing non-violent struggle for personal betterment (jihad al-nafs), 
persuasion and reasoning (jihad bil lisan), and a political jihad, which entailed the participation in 
civic action in order to shape public opinion.717  
 
However, he did not exclude the possibility of a physical jihad against enemies of Islam. Indeed, 
Hawwa argued that violence was sometimes necessary to overthrow an infidel regime or to protect 
Muslims from an invading force.718 Sungkar’s extensive dakwah efforts can be seen in this mould 
as a non-violent jihad to educate and persuade his fellow Muslims to come around to their ways of 
thinking. Similarly, in preaching extensively and publicly challenging the government over its 
unwillingness to implement Islamic law and governance, he was engaging in the non-violent 
promotion of their faith through civil discourse, akin to Kartosuwiryo’s writings in Fadjar Asia and 
work with PSII and Masyumi.  
 
The way in which Sungkar advanced the DI’s understanding of jihad was his articulation of a 
relationship between jihad, al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ and takfīr. All three concepts are fundamentally 
concerned with the protection of the Islamic faith. Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ creates an in-group and an 
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out-group, forcing participants to demonstrate their loyalty to their God and their co-religionists, 
while condemning that which lies outside it. Takfīr establishes the boundaries of what is Islamic 
and what is not, and thus serves as a means to protect the community of believers from traitors 
within its midst. Finally, jihad is the ultimate tool in defending a community of Muslims from both 
internal and external threats.  
  
Sungkar’s use of Qutb and Maududi in his teachings gives some indication as to the source material 
for this conceptualisation. Both men argue that a physical and spiritual struggle is necessary to 
bring about God’s rule on earth. Societies that fail to respect God as the sole authority will 
perpetuate great suffering and injustices against their citizens, and thus must be challenged.719 
Maududi began from the premise that ‘Islam is a revolutionary ideology and programme which 
seeks to alter the social order for the whole world’ for the good of all people.720 As such, the 
purpose of ‘jihad is to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish instead an Islamic 
system of state rule’, thus securing hākimiyya.721 Similarly, Qutb argued that jihad is both ‘striving 
through fight and striving through preaching’ and a tool to ‘[sweep] away tyranny and [bring] real 
freedom to man’.722 Without jihad and the participation of Muslims, the community was doomed 
to continue to live in a state of jāhiliyyah. 
 
The two ideologues saw jihad as a totalising force and were unconcerned by debates about its 
offensive or defensive nature. Qutb argued that it could not be a ‘defensive movement in the 
narrow and limited sense’ for Islam’s true nature was not only to preserve and protect Muslims 
but to liberate them from all tyranny.723 This conceptualisation thus opened the door to staging 
attacks on a wider variety of targets, no longer constrained by a definite objective of expelling an 
invading force from a territory, or simply toppling an un-Islamic ruler from power. Maududi made 
similar arguments, stating that Muslims must defend and protect certain principles but also launch 
‘an assault on the principles of the opponent’ in order to ‘abolish the government which sustains 
these principles’.724 In Maududi’s conceptualisation of the term, there can be no security for 
Muslims until the achievement of hākimiyya. As such, all un-Islamic belief, even when held by those 
unconnected to the current rulers, should be challenged on the grounds that it perpetuates an un-
Godly and threatening system to Muslims. This duty was thus incumbent upon all Muslims, with 
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seemingly no limit to what could be considered an un-Islamic principle or act.725 While Maududi 
and Qutb’s primary target was an un-Islamic state, their totalising and uncompromising 
interpretation of jihad introduced the theoretical possibility of struggling against any aspect of 
society to challenge un-Godliness and by proxy the infidel state as well.  
 
Given this theoretical framework, Sungkar contributed significantly to DI’s understanding of jihad 
by expanding the boundaries of what was un-Islamic, and thus a legitimate target for the group’s 
operations. For example, his 1982 defence plea offers one of the clearest arguments for the 
excommunication of Indonesian government officials and their associates. Sungkar began by 
arguing that ‘an ideal Islamic state is one that is based on pure Islamic law’, and that any state 
which premises its legitimacy on something man-made is attempting to subvert God’s will by 
claiming to be above (or at very least equal to) God.726 The government’s promotion of Pancasila 
as a state ideology was thus a form of idolatry, since the state was forcing Indonesian Muslims to 
worship and respect something other than God.727 As such, those that promote Pancasila are 
themselves idolators and can be excommunicated from the faith. 
 
Similarly, Sungkar argued later in his plea that the state demanding that civil servants show loyalty 
to Golkar alone, compelling educational institutions to raise the national flag, and sing the national 
anthem each day, forced Muslims to express devotion to something other than God.728 In each 
instance, Sungkar built a case that the Suharto administration was promoting a form of idolatry, 
and so its officials could not be seen as Muslims and would be ‘punished in hell for eternity’ for 
their actions.729 In describing the government as such, Sungkar seemingly drew heavily from the 
works of Qutb. Qutb made a similar argument that Sungkar could have easily paraphrased, writing 
that ‘[all] sovereignty belongs to God alone’ and ‘there is no law other than God’s law; all authority 
belongs to God’.730 As such, governments that failed to implement shari’a were clearly apostates 
and legitimate targets for rebellion.  
 
In making the case that Indonesian officials, and Muslim civilians that complied with their rule, 
were apostates, Sungkar, like Qutb before him, appeared to be laying the groundwork to sanction 
violence against the state and society. Qutb wrote that in order to establish the kingdom of God 
 
725 Ibid 
726 Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and Suryahardy, Perjalanan hukum di Indonesia, p.91 
727 Idem, p.92 
728 Idem, p.93 
729 Idem, p.101 
730 Qutb, Milestones, p.14 
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on earth, Muslims must ‘[take] power from the hands of its human usurpers’ 731 and ‘deliver blows 
at the political forces that make men slaves of something that is not Allah’.732 While Sungkar did 
not articulate the logical conclusion of the declaration of the state as an apostate regime, he 
nevertheless commends Qutb’s work, referencing its ideas repeatedly at his trial and in earlier 
sermons, suggesting that he largely agreed with its arguments.  
 
In addition to delineating the state as an un-Islamic force, Sungkar also took issue with religious 
minorities and syncretic practices, which he believed undermined Islam. In his sermons, Sungkar 
routinely condemned various Javanese rituals or Western practices adopted by Muslims across 
Indonesia. In a sermon recorded sometime in the mid-1980s, he lamented that ‘Sacred tombs are 
now open everywhere!’ and that ‘grand marriages, with people dressed in Western style’ were 
taking place frequently.733 He cautioned his listeners to beware of ‘bid’a that has struck everywhere’ 
and claimed that those participating in these rituals would ‘clearly be tortured by Allah’.734 While 
Sungkar did not call for attacks targeting these individuals in these sermons, his diatribes 
condemning those who practice them as polytheists, served to legitimise persecution from those 
within his group. 
 
Sungkar also invoked the concept of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ in his sermons, explaining to his listeners 
that certain actions distinguished true Muslims from non-Muslims. Sungkar gave the example of 
Muslim teachers who ‘were told to teach the PMP [civic education about Pancasila]’ and in doing 
so taught the children that ‘All religions are good. All religions are true’. 735 According to Sungkar, 
their hypocritical actions and failure to condemn those who believed in pluralism meant that ‘God 
[would] not speak to them on the Day of Resurrection’ and ‘they [would] have a painful 
punishment’.736 This was a topic Sungkar returned to repeatedly. In another sermon, he claimed 
that Muslims in Syria had failed their faith and community, becoming ‘hypocrites who made 
infidels into leaders’, instead of showing loyalty to their co-religionists.737 
 
 Framed in this manner, Sungkar established a test for his followers; to support Suharto and the 
Indonesian state would ultimately demonstrate disloyalty to other Muslims. Implicitly, his 
 
731 Idem, p.18 
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733 Abdullah Sunkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 2’ 
734 Ibid 
735 Abdullah Sunkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 5’, undated, Internet Archive, 
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737 Abdullah Sunkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 12’ 
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followers ought to resist or condemn Suharto to also prove their commitment to their co-
religionists. In this respect, Sungkar does not see any grey zone in which Muslims could faithfully 
practice their religion on an individual level but tolerate allegedly un-Islamic leadership. The stark 
division of the world into two camps (those loyal to Islam and those against it) once again served 
to facilitate conflict by clarifying to his supporters who was on their side and who was deemed an 
enemy and a potential target for an attack.  
 
Throughout this period, Sungkar never explicitly called for jihad in public. Nevertheless, his 
contribution to the development of the concept in DI’s ideological framework was significant, 
since they facilitated an understanding within the organisation of who was a true Muslim and 
simultaneously, who or what was outside the fold. The introduction and linking of these ideas with 
jihad thus provided a clear justification for the targeting of government personnel, state employees, 
security forces, and physical sites owned or operated by the state. Additionally, his interpretation 
of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ also allowed for the targeting of civilians who may tacitly support 
the government or religious minority groups whose very presence allegedly undermined the 
formation of an Islamic state. His beliefs would ultimately go onto expand the range of targets 
available to DI as it entered the 1980s. 
 
Given that the basis of his teachings on takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ were localised applications of 
the works salafi scholars, rather than truly novel innovations, they would have been easy for DI 
members understand and grasp. Even before Sungkar’s arrival in the group, it is likely that DI 
members would have begun to encounter these concepts, perhaps in a less structured manner. As 
noted in the previous chapter, DDII had begun translating and disseminating these salafi works 
throughout the 1970s, and ‘Darul Islam activists also met with several Brotherhood figures who 
came to Indonesia’.738  
 
Still, it is difficult to ascertain how widespread the knowledge of salafi texts was in the organisation 
prior to Sungkar’s membership. In interviews, some DI activists were often unable to recall the 
specific texts they referred to in their outreach sessions and recruitment efforts. Instead, these men 
said they sometimes spoke of Kartosuwiryo’s exploits, apparent heroism and writings about the 
need for an Islamic state to inspire their listeners.739 A consequence of Sungkar’s involvement with 
DI was that he was able to promote his salafi interpretations of these concepts and could do so in 
 
738 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism, p.93 
739 Interview with AR, a former DI member, 25 July 2018 
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a structured manner. His preaching in Pondok Ngruki and his promotion of a usroh network system 
within DI meant they could systematically issue these works as training material.  
 
As such, the DI understanding of jihad took on an increasingly salafist bent. Not only was jihad a 
tool for establishing an Islamic state, it was now also a means of policing the boundaries of the 
faith and a way of demonstrating one’s commitment to a pure interpretation of Islam. Sungkar 
helped to legitimise attacks against the government but also the targeting of religious minorities 
such as Christians or even other Muslims who incorporated syncretic practises into their faith. 
Followers were encouraged through the concept of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ to demonstrate their 
commitment to their co-religionists by condemning those outside of these increasingly narrow 




DI’s conceptualisation of jihad between Kartosuwiryo’s death and the induction of Abdullah 
Sungakr went through a gradual evolution. While the organisation never renounced its aim of 
establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia through violent jihad, its military defeat at the hands of 
the government meant that for most of the 1960s the organisation entered a period of stasis, too 
weak to continue their struggle. By invoking the Prophet Muhammad’s own experience of biding 
his time before taking action with the Treaty of Hudabiyya, the organisation created the ideological 
space to temporarily deprioritise a key part of its worldview while still remaining a relatively 
cohesive body.  
 
New funding and cooperation with the government allowed the movement to regroup and begin 
to see violent jihad as central to its identity once more. The authoritarian tendencies of the New 
Order government throughout the 1970s only helped to solidify DI leaders’ belief that jihad was 
the only solution. This repression had also served to radicalise Abdullah Sungkar, who had shown 
little interest in his early days as a salafi preacher in advocating violence against the state. 
Nevertheless, his persecution and anger at the apparent marginalisation of Muslim organisations 
in Indonesian society served as a catalyst for him eventually embracing a violent interpretation of 
jihad and joining DI in 1976.  
 
While Sungkar was critical in formalising the group’s understanding of the relationship between 
takfīr, al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ and jihad, DI members had already begun to embrace these concept. It is 
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likely, given the popularity and recent translation of salafist and Wahhabist scholarship, in no small 
part promoted by the DDII, that DI members were also reading the writings of Qutb, Maududi, 
and Wahhab. Nevertheless, the organisation remained deeply factionalised and its leaders unable 
or unwilling to concretise a comprehensive interpretation of jihad in this period 
 
Resultantly, Sungkar’s key contribution to the group’s ideological evolution during this period was 
to elucidate a clearer conceptualisation of jihad as a form of physical and violent resistance to the 
enemies of Islam. While this interpretation showed many continuities with Kartosuwiryo’s in the 
1940s and 1950s, his ability to link it to the concepts of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ helped provided 
the DI with a cohesive ideological framework to guide its aims and actions into the next decade. 
More importantly, the incorporation of the ideas of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ expanded the range 
of legitimate targets for the group’s attacks, particularly at a moment where they were unable to 























Chapter 5 | Global Jihad with Caveats: The True Impact of Afghanistan, 1979-1989 
 
The Afghan jihad is routinely touted by academics, journalists and numerous analysts at think tanks 
as a foundational moment for Indonesian Islamists, allegedly creating a new violent interpretation 
of jihad and resultantly spurring the creation of an internationally-oriented militant organisation, 
the Jemaah Islamiyah. While undoubtedly a pivotal moment for the DI and its successor 
organisation, the Afghan conflict’s role in advancing the group’s conceptualisation of jihad is 
greatly overstated.  
 
Sungkar’s decision to send men to participate in the Afghan jihad in 1985 was primarily motivated 
by domestic considerations rather than a desire to assist their fellow Muslims in their fight against 
the Soviet Union. Having fled to Malaysia with Ba’asyir to avoid another stint in prison in April 
1985, Sungkar came to believe that the DI’s efforts to revive the movement and re-engage the 
Indonesian state in armed conflict had come to naught over the past decade. The war between the 
Soviet Union and Afghan mujahideen thus provided an opportunity to give DI members combat 
experience and potentially build connections with groups for support in the future. These aims 
illustrated that Sungkar prioritised overthrowing the Indonesian government above a commitment 
to a transnational, militant Islamist movement and showed that his conceptualisation of jihad 
remained largely unchanged as the conflict wore on.  
 
This chapter firstly argues that Sungkar’s understanding of jihad was largely set before his decision 
to send his followers to participate in the conflict in Afghanistan. His interpretation hewed closely 
to Kartosuwiryo’s understanding, embraced by the group from the 1940s until the latter’s death in 
1962. While a physical jihad was an obligation incumbent on all DI members, it was ultimately a 
means to an end. In this conceptualisation, jihad was the primary mechanism for achieving an 
Islamic state within the boundaries of Indonesia.  
 
Resultantly, this chapter will propose that, rather than contributing to the group’s ideological 
development, participation in the conflict was significant for more practical reasons. DI members 
gained valuable skills and training that they would have been unable to glean in Indonesia or in 
exile in Malaysia. While these men forged connections with other mujahideen, they were not sent to 
further the creation of a transnational militant group. Finally, this chapter will argue that the role 
played by Abdullah Azzam, the chief ideologue of Afghan conflict, in shaping the DI’s 
interpretation of jihad has been both overstated and underexplored. His writings and teachings 
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largely supported thoughts already promulgated by Sungkar and Kartosuwiryo. Given that he did 
not introduce concepts that were significantly new or alien to the Indonesians fighters, and that 
their motivation for participating in the conflict was primarily to gain skills to wage a jihad back in 
Indonesia, it is unlikely that his ideology played a significant role in facilitating the eventual split 
between the DI and JI in 1993.  
 
This chapter makes these points over the course of three sections. It begins by examining how 
Sungkar consolidated his interpretation of jihad among DI cadres in the early 1980s as the Suharto 
government intensified its crackdown on the organisation. In this context, it examines Sungkar’s 
reasons for sending men to participate in the conflict in Afghanistan. The second section examines 
the ideology of Abdullah Azzam and his apparent role in furthering the DI’s understanding of 
jihad. The final section compares Azzam’s teachings on the subject with Sungkar’s and indeed 
Kartosuwiryo’s, illustrating the limited divergence between the trio.  
 
Revolutionary fervour: Jihad at home  
 
By 1979, the DI had adopted an increasingly confrontational approach towards the Suharto 
government. As discussed in the previous chapter, much of this anti-state fervour was driven by a 
revived membership and the widespread introduction of salafi teachings. It was also a response to 
a period of aggressive ‘Pancasila-isation’ of public life in Indonesia by the New Order regime, which 
ultimately convinced Sungkar and his followers that Islamists working within the system were 
unlikely to achieve their aims.  
 
Sungkar and his followers thus believed that only violent jihad could successfully bring about an 
Islamic state in Indonesia. This was because the government’s actions demonstrated that not only 
were they too tolerant of the rights of minorities and non-Islamic practices, they were actively 
hostile to Muslims themselves. The growing strands of takfīr thought in the group’s ideological 
framework thus helped to reinforce the notion that the Suharto regime’s actions showed it was 
un-Islamic, and thus obligated true Muslims to rise up and defeat it through jihad.  
 
The imposition of state ideology  
 
Relations between the Suharto government and Islamists of all stripes had been rocky throughout 
the 1970s as the government sought further control over the practice of Islam. Its decisions to 
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thwart the formation of a successor organisation to Masyumi in 1968 by preventing senior figures 
such as Natsir from taking up posts, to force the agglomeration of all Muslim political parties into 
the PPP in 1973, and to create the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Islamic Scholars 
Council) in 1975 as a means of monitoring and appointing religious scholars, showed a clear desire 
to control religious life in Indonesia and prevent Islam from becoming a political force that could 
challenge the New Order. 
 
By 1978, Suharto had begun a push for greater ideological control in Indonesia, through a formal 
programme called Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guidelines for the Instilling and 
Implementation of Pancasila). These guidelines sought to curtail dissent, particularly among Muslim 
groups. It declared that 
 
Islam teaches us to be obedient to Allah, his Messenger and the ulil-amri. Ulil-amri means 
the legitimate government… Because of this, the obedience of the Islamic community in 
Indonesia towards the legitimate government of Indonesia is regarded as a religious 
obligation.740 
 
In May 1982, Suharto decreed that ‘all Indonesian organisations should have only a single 
ideological foundation… Pancasila’.741 This posed a problem for numerous Islamic groups of all 
stripes. Organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah had to make public proclamations of 
acceptance, thus undermining their belief that only God could be the basis of one’s ideology.  
 
Moreover, this campaign confirmed DI members’ suspicions that the state was actively hostile to 
Islam and that there was no legitimate way of being an Islamic activist in mainstream Indonesian 
society. For example, Sungkar condemned NU leaders in a sermon released sometime in the mid-
1980s, claiming that ‘they were recruited by the government to convert Muslims into apostates’ as 
a result of the new guidelines.742 In another, he derided Muhammadiyah’s decision to accept the 
guidelines, saying that they ‘must be subsidised by the government and thus obey all the 
regulations. It’s like a pet dog that is tied by its neck’.743 The imposition of the guidelines thus 
confirmed for DI members that it was impossible to be involved in formal politics without 
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cooperating with the government and resultantly selling out your principles and your fellow 




Adding to the group’s desire to confront the government was the success of the Iranian revolution 
at the start of 1979. Although protests had been taking place against the Shah since 1977, his flight 
into exile on 16 January 1979 gave hope to DI members that they could achieve their aim of 
establishing their own Islamic state in Indonesia. In interviews, DI members often recalled reading 
the pamphlets and magazines published by the newly established government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. However, none appeared to be able to recall the title of any specific publication 
or the details of the content published.744 
 
Nevertheless, some DI members believed that the regime could be toppled with through the 
‘power of popular revolution’ rather than through jihad alone.745 The events in Iran showed that 
targeted acts of aggression could serve as the tipping point for a largely non-violent mass uprising 
against a takfīri regime. Indeed, these factions within DI planned to force Suharto into exile, like 
the Shah of Iran, or assassinate him in order to kick-start the revolution at home. Afterwards, DI 
members and their allies would assume positions of power within the new regime and purge the 
remnants of the New Order. The revolution would thus culminate in the proclamation of an 
Islamic state and the implementation of shari’a. 746 
 
In this febrile moment, DI members began pursuing their jihad with a new urgency. Rather than 
preparing for total war, DI members met in August 1982 in Jakarta to plot the assassination of 
Suharto, in line with their idea to inspire popular revolution and to punish the president for 
undermining Islam through his promotion of Pancasila. The group created numerous plans and 
engaged in several attempts to kill the president, failing at each juncture to successfully carry out 
their plots or inspire a mass uprising. For instance, they planned to attack the president as he drove 
 
744 Solahudin mentions that the DI members were particularly taken with a magazine published by the Iranian 
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through Jalan Cut Mutia, a central street in Jakarta or to detonate a bomb at the newly restored 
Borobudur Temple when Suharto presided over its reopening on 23 February 1983.747  
 
Despite their failures, these attempted attacks indicate that a new understanding of jihad was truly 
entrenched in the DI movement in the early 1980s. The targeting of Suharto as an idolater due to 
his imposition of Pancasila shows how takfīr had become closely embedded in the group’s 
interpretation of jihad. Rather than merely justifying their attacks on the grounds that Suharto, as 
a Muslim, had failed to implement and uphold Islamic governance and shari’a, the DI now went a 
step further, proclaiming that he was a traitor to his faith and thus a threat to Muslims in Indonesia.  
 
Moreover, the choice to plan an attack against Suharto at Borobudur, a Buddhist temple, signals 
an increasing intolerance of minority faiths within the country. Borobudur, which was constructed 
in the ninth century, predated the arrival of Islam to the country. As such, Suharto’s celebration 
of its reconstruction was anathema to Islamists as it represented the Qutbist notion that the 
Muslim leadership of the state had slid back into an age of jāhiliyyah.  
 
Hijrah and jihad 
 
In addition to these failed plots, Sungkar and Ba’asyir had spent much of the 1970s and first half 
of the 1980s in and out of police custody in Indonesia. The pair had their first run in with the 
authorities in 1975, when their radio station was shut down on account of their anti-government 
proclamations. Sungkar was actually arrested and detained for the first time in 1977 for apparently 
encouraging his followers to refrain from participating in the elections that year.  
 
The two men were arrested again on 10 November 1978 for allegedly supporting Hispran, a 
Komando Jihad figure, charged with subversion of the Indonesian state. Their trial, held in 1982, 
saw Sungkar use the public platform offered to give a blistering critique of the state, referencing 
numerous salafi scholars such as Qutb, Maududi, Hawwa, among others to justify his belief that 
the Suharto government was illegitimate. His defence plea, along with Ba’asyir’s, was compiled in 
a book by Irfan Suryahardy entitled Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia: Sebuah Gugatan (A Legal Journey 
in Indonesia: A Lawsuit). The book became a key text distributed to DI recruits in the aftermath 
of Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s flight to Malaysia.748  
 
747 ‘Five Arrested in Borobudur Temple Bombing’, Associated Press, 24 January 1985, 
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Both men were initially sentenced to nine years in prison, but had this reduced to three years and 
ten months after an appeal later that same year.749 They existed in a legal limbo as the prosecution 
attempted to repeal the reduced sentence. By March 1985, a court in Jakarta overturned the revised 
sentence. This would have resulted in a return to prison but the men fled, first to Jakarta and then 
to Malaysia in April 1985, apparently on the advice of Mohammad Natsir, Sungkar’s old mentor 
and DDII leader.750 According to Nasir Abas, the former head of JI Mantiqi III, Natsir helping the 
men find their feet in Malaysia, placing them in the care of a trusted friend and introducing them 
to his contacts in the Islamist lecture circuit.751 
 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s self-imposed exile in Malaysia would form another phase in the evolution 
of DI’s understanding of jihad. Their experience of the Indonesian legal system and flight from the 
country underscored their pre-existing beliefs that the government was corrupt and intent on 
persecuting Muslims. A violent revolution was thus necessary to ‘ensure justice for Muslims’ and 
establish an Islamic state in its place.752 In this respect, Sungkar remained committed to the core 
definition of jihad espoused by Kartosuwiryo.  
 
Ultimately, he believed, Muslims in Indonesia required an Islamic state in order to lead lives fully 
in accordance with God’s will. Sungkar worked hard to provide analysis to demonstrate the 
Suharto government’s lack of legitimacy, as noted in his sermons in the previous chapter. He made 
the case repeatedly in his sermons during the mid-1980s. For example, in one he claimed that as 
‘all power belongs to God, and we as Muslims cannot support the disbelievers, the Indonesian 
government will never have the full support of Muslims’.753 He added that the Ministry of Religion 
was staffed with ‘people who are ignorant and not knowledgeable’ and were a ‘group of fools’, 
unable to truly advise and make laws for Muslims.754  
 
Sungkar’s sermons argued that, not only was the government illegitimate because it was unwilling 
to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, but government officials could not really be considered 
Muslims in the first place. Sungkar often referred to them as ‘munafiqun’, deriding them for going 
on hajj or performing prayer but really seeking ‘wealth and power in this world’ or indulging in 
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vice.755 To Sungkar, these people were not truly Muslim, but were only pretending in public 
settings. In using the term, he was referencing Qur’anic scripture, which describes munafiqun as 
often more dangerous to Muslims than their non-Muslim enemies, and thus worthy of the highest 
punishments, such as death. Sungkar’s desire to expose and excommunicate his enemies set them 
apart from Kartosuwiryo and more traditionally-minded members of DI. 
 
Pragmatism and opportunity  
 
Sungkar’s exile in Malaysia and the failure of failure of DI cells to successfully conduct large attacks 
in Indonesia convinced the him that the group needed to drastically change its approach. Sungkar 
seemingly returned to the idea that jihad should take the form of a quasi-military conflict against 
the state in order to be effective, and began to make plans to prepare their supporters for this kind 
of warfare. It is unclear why they thought this was the best form of conflict to train for. None of 
the Afghan alumni interviewed were able to provide a clear answer, mainly speculating that 
Sungkar was disillusioned after the failures of the past few years in Indonesia.  
 
Whether intentional or not, this decision once again aligned Sungkar’s conceptualisation of jihad 
with Kartosuwiryo, who had seen the conflict between the NII and the Indonesian Republic as – 
at least conceptually – a clash of equal forces. This would mean that, in line with normative Islamic 
thought, the authorisation of such a conflict would be dictated by a rightful authority, with 
combatants adhering to the laws of war laid out in the Qur’an and Hadīth. Sungkar’s view that the 
government of Indonesia was un-Islamic and thus needed to be overthrown once again aligned 
them with mainstream writing on a defensive conceptualisation jihad. The behaviour of the 
government and its apparent oppression of its Muslim citizens meant that only jihad could ‘stem 
the corrosive tide of defiance while safeguarding Islamic principles.’756 Thus DI members could 
not afford to sit back and wait while their fellow Muslims suffered, and the only way to ensure and 
protect their freedom would be to then install an Islamic state.  
 
According to both Nasir Abas and Ahmad Sujali, a senior DI member who was among the first 
few groups to travel to Afghanistan, the decision to participate in the Afghan conflict was driven 
largely by pragmatism and opportunity rather than any desire to help the Afghans defeat the 
Soviets.757 These accounts are supported by Solahudin’s work, which states that DI cadres 
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travelling to Afghanistan were told that ‘they were not being sent to Afghanistan to wage war on 
the Soviet Union but for military training’.758 These skills would be used to wage jihad in Indonesia 
in the future.759 
 
In this regard, Sungkar’s understanding of jihad remained squarely focused on the territory of 
Indonesia at this juncture. He was largely uninterested in pan-Islamic solidarity, and did not 
conceive of jihad as obligating them to fight on behalf of oppressed Muslims beyond the 
boundaries of their nation-state. It is also unclear how realistic Sungkar thought the group’s 
chances of success were. Perhaps still buoyed by the success of the Iranian revolution and the 
global admiration for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, he believed they could accomplish 
something similar in Indonesia.  
 
The decision to send recruits to Afghanistan emerged as a result of circumstance. Sungkar together 
with Ba’asyir travelled widely seeking financial and military support for their cause after their arrival 
in Malaysia. With a letter of introduction from Natsir, the men met with the Saudi Ambassador to 
Malaysia, who then enabled them to travel on to Saudi Arabia to seek financial assistance from 
wealthy donors, just as the Afghan mujahedeen had. The men stopped in Pakistan en route to 
Saudi Arabia, allowing the men to make further contacts. While there, they met Abdul Rasul 
Sayyaf, the powerful Afghan commander and politician who ran an organisation facilitating the 
travel of foreign fighters to Afghanistan.760 Sayyaf offered them the possibility of participating in 
a military training programme. Sungkar’s followers would be given financial assistance to cover 
their travel and accommodation, and even a small stipend.761  
 
Given the global attention focused on the Afghan conflict and the number of wealthy donors it 
attracted, it was unlikely that Sungkar would have been able to establish a similar programme closer 
to home. Moreover, his focus on the practical elements of the experience such as securing the 
requisite funds for airfare and accommodation, their training regimes and the limits on their 
members’ time spent in the training camps, highlights his locally bound conceptualisation of jihad 
during this period.  
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While Ba’asyir has subsequently claimed in more recent interviews that the DI chose to send 
fighters to Afghanistan to ‘assist their [the Afghans’] struggle’,762 this appears to have been of 
secondary importance compared to acquiring the requisite skills to overthrow the Indonesian state. 
Recruits pledged allegiance to Sungkar and were told that they were going to learn skills to 
eventually return and fight the thagut regime in Indonesia.763 The fact that few Indonesians actually 
got frontline combat experience underscored that training was the primary motivation for their 
participation in the Afghan conflict.  
 
An individual’s journey  
 
When he landed in Karachi, Pakistan in 1986, Ahmad Sajuli had already fulfilled one of his lifelong 
ambitions: to ride on an aeroplane. He had taken a circuitous route to arrive in the busy port city. 
A DI member and a follower of Sungkar and Ba’aysir, Sajuli had left Sumatra earlier that year, 
travelling by boat to Malacca, Malaysia, before joining his mentors in their self-imposed exile in 
Kuala Pilah, a rural town about an hour south of Kuala Lumpur.  
 
After a few weeks of additional religious education, Sajuli pledged bayat to Sungkar, promising to 
acquire and learn combat skills to further the cause of jihad against the Indonesian government 
upon his return. Sajuli then travelled back to the Malaysian capital for a few weeks before heading 
to Harby Pohantum Mujahidin Afghanistan al-Ittihad al-Islam, a military training camp, near the 
Pakistani town of Pabbi, near the Afghan border.764  
 
Sajuli’s journey to join the growing number of foreign militants fighting alongside the Afghan 
mujahedeen was typical of the Indonesians from Sungkar and Ba’aysir’s network that travelled to 
the country between 1985 and 1991. Most had never previously left Indonesia, much less travelled 
on an aeroplane. Indeed, until Afghanistan this new generation of aspiring Indonesian Islamist 
militants had never participated in any form of military training or even seen a conflict zone.  
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The experience was undoubtedly life-changing. In addition to the glamour of foreign travel and 
the excitement of encountering new people, food, and customs, the war offered thrilling adventure 
and fostered a deep camaraderie with their fellow fighters, both Indonesian and foreign. The men’s 
experience also gave them a sense of purpose and status upon their return to Southeast Asia. They 
were no longer simply members of a closed and ineffectual anti-government movement, but 
lauded as scrappy veterans who had played their part in winning a righteous conflict to defend 
innocent Muslims against a tyrannical and oppressive empire.  
 
Building an army 
 
Nevertheless, these grand ideas were balanced against the reality that the Indonesian recruits were 
there to learn skills to help their jihad back home. Ahmad Sajuli lamented the lack of frontline 
action, saying that ‘most days were tiring – like boot camp’.765 Few fighters were allowed to return 
to Afghanistan after they had completed their training, further indicating that their ultimate 
purpose was to serve DI’s agenda back in Indonesia.  
 
The Afghan conflict gave Sungkar exactly what he desired. The men he sent later returned to 
Southeast Asia with the requisite skills to strike back against the Indonesian state. They had learned 
to handle small arms such as AK47s and M16 rifles, light weapons like anti-tank rifles and grenade 
launchers, and how to build improvised explosive devices. They developed other practical skills 
including map reading, basic reconnaissance, field communication, and combat engineering.766  
 
The war also gave these men, as well as Sungkar, the opportunity to build connections with the 
wider militant Islamist community. These new links with groups such as the Egyptian militant 
Islamist movement, GI, as well as the Afghan mujahedeen commander and leader of the Ittehad-
al-Islami Baraye Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan), Abdul Rasul 
Sayyaf, provided them with additional training opportunities and a limited source of funds and 
weapons to further their struggle back in Southeast Asia.  
 
According to Nasir Abas, while these connections linked the DI to a vast global network of 
militant Islamists, Sungkar and the majority of his men, were not particularly interested in or 
showed signs of wanting to create or join an international movement. Instead, they continued to 
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conceive of jihad as the primary tool overthrow of the Indonesian state, largely unchanged from 
their conceptualisation in the decades prior.767 
 
Shaping jihad: Assessing the impact of the Afghan conflict and Abdullah Azzam’s ideas 
 
In terms of providing opportunities for military training and access to resources, the Afghan 
conflict was hugely significant for individual men who fought and vastly improved the operational 
capabilities and finances of Sungkar’s faction. Veterans of the conflict are often very willing to talk 
to researchers and journalists about their experience, keen to reminisce about a time when they 
felt they were important and contributing to a sacred and successful cause. This emphasis from 
the participants themselves, coupled with the profound impact of defeat of the USSR, the 
formation of al-Qaeda, and the advent of a globalised jihad movement, have all contributed to the 
view held by many researchers and journalists that participation in the conflict and exposure to 
the beliefs of its chief ideologue, Abdullah Azzam, altered the beliefs of Sungkar and his men and 
was thus the primary motivation for their decision to split with the rest of the DI movement.  
 
This rationale for the growing divide between Sungkar and the rest of DI has been perpetuated in 
academic scholarship on the JI’s origins by Greg Barton, Bilveer Singh, and Scott Atran. Singh, 
for example, argues that ‘the United States condoned the mobilization of jihadists all over the world, 
including Southeast Asia [to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan]. The AJAI [al-Jemaah al-
Islamiyah] is believed to have been created in this context’.768 Singh does not clarify whether he 
believes the JI was formed in Afghanistan itself or if the participants returned home to 
subsequently establish the organisation, nor does he explain how the founders’ ideology differed 
from the DI members who did not participate. Similarly, Barton writes, without reference to any 
specific evidence, that ‘the concept behind [their] struggle …had long been much greater than a 
merely local, Southeast Asian one’, claiming that Sungkar had always aspired for a transnational 
Islamic state, grounded in a form of globalised jihadist ideology.769  
 
These arguments do not seem to have much factual basis. As noted above, DI members who 
trained in Pakistan report, report in their own words that they were sent to Afghanistan by Sungkar 
with explicit directions to acquire the skills needed to fight a jihad back in Indonesia. This argument, 
that DI leaders saw the Afghan struggle as an opportunity to advance their domestic struggle, has 
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also been made by several others, including Sidney Jones, Solahudin, Kirsten Schulze, and Julie 
Chernov Hwang. While the way that DI members who participated in the conflict understood 
jihad may have globalised over the course of their time abroad, it would be incorrect to argue that 
they entered the conflict with this interpretation of jihad in mind.  
 
Even if some DI members and their leaders desired an Islamic state across the region, or even a 
global caliphate, the primary aim upon their return to Southeast Asia was to first establish an 
Islamic state in Indonesia. Ultimately, their experience in Afghanistan appeared to deepen existing 
beliefs rather than creating a new ideological framework for this segment of the Indonesian 
militant Islamist community.  
 
The narrative of Afghanistan as an ideological catalyst 
 
Abdullah Azzam occupies a central position in most writings on the foundations of the JI, with 
many journalists and scholars crediting him with significantly influencing the group’s ideological 
framework. However, this thesis argues that his role has been both overstated and simultaneously 
under explored. Although Azzam contributed significantly to the development of a global jihadist 
ideology and the creation of a movement in Afghanistan, his influence on Indonesian participants 
of the conflict, and most importantly Sungkar, was less pronounced than much of the literature 
suggests. His writings and teachings largely supported thoughts already promulgated by Sungkar 
(and, indeed, by Kartosuwiryo before him). Given that he did not introduce concepts that were 
significantly new or alien to the Indonesians and that their motivation for participating in the 
conflict was primarily to gain skills to wage a jihad back in Indonesia, it is unlikely that his ideology 
played a significant role in facilitating the split between the DI and JI. 
  
Few academic texts or journalistic accounts have thoroughly considered the ideological roots of 
the JI, much less the role that ideology played in its split from the DI. Most of these works tend 
to give a potted history of the group’s origins, briefly citing the group’s ‘roots in the DI movement’ 
and referencing the fact that ‘virtually all of JI’s senior leadership had spent time in Afghanistan’, 
purportedly embracing a new ideology developed by the leaders of the mujahedeen.770 A typical 
example of the vagueness with which academics have treated the role of ideology in JI’s formation 
is found in Rohan Gunaratna’s paper ‘The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiya’.771 In spite of its 
 
770 Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia,  pp.13-15 
771 Gunaratna, ‘The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah’, pp.68-81 
 239 
title, Gunaratna pays little attention to the faction’s beliefs and values prior to and during its split 
with DI. Instead, he covers this terrain briefly, writing simply that ‘JI’s roots can be traced back to 
the Indonesian rebellion in 1950s led by Darul Islam’ and that Afghanistan ‘opened the gateway 
for JI members to become ever more politicized and radicalized’ but does not provide any 
information regarding the tenants of DI’s beliefs that were carried on or disregarded by JI or what 
principles were added or enhanced by the Afghan experience.772 When it came to Sungkar’s 
decision to go his own way, supported by Ba’asyir, Gunaratna only states that the two sides split 
‘[after] a dispute with the Indonesian-based DI leader named Ajengan Masduki’.773 The contours 
of this disagreement are never explained.  
 
Others are even less thorough. The journalist Mike Millard, writing about the rise of militant 
Islamism in Southeast Asia in his book Jihad in Paradise, scarcely mentions Afghanistan and the 
Indonesians that went to fight in the conflict, and leaves out Sungkar and Masduki entirely. 
Similarly, the academic Giora Eliraz’s Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, radicalism, and the Middle East 
Dimension makes little mention of split between the groups, claiming that it was the ‘formative 
collective experience of global jihad’, under the tutelage of Abdullah Azzam that resulted in the JI’s 
formation.774 Finally, Zachary Abuza appears to characterise the group as wholly a product of al-
Qaeda. He argued that JI members wanted ‘their jihad to be part of a global jihad’ and that al-Qaeda 
capitalised on this sentiment to ‘establish a local affiliate in 1993-1994’, seemingly ignoring the 
long history of Islamist militancy in Indonesia.775  
 
Even works that give a more thorough treatment of JI’s ideological origins, such as those by David 
Martin Jones and Michael L.R Smith, assert that Azzam had an influential role in changing the 
ideology of Indonesian militants who fought in Afghanistan but do little to explore the nature of 
those ideas or the role they played in shaping the dispute between JI and DI leaders 776 Instead, 
vague assertions such as ‘the ideas of Abdullah Azzam also affected theo-political thinking in 
Southeast Asia’ and ‘Azzam was especially influential’, are common.777  
 
 
772 Idem, pp.69-70 
773 Idem, p.70 
774 Giora Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension (Brighton and Eastbourne: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2013), p.37  
775 Zachary Abuza, ‘Learning by Doing: Al-Qaeda’s Allies in Southeast Asia’, Current History, 103:672 (2004), pp.171-
172  
776 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R.Smith, ‘Ideology, Networks and Political Region: Structure and Agency in 
Jemaah Islamiyah’s Small World’, Politics Religion and Ideology, 13:4, p477  
777 Idem, p.474 
 240 
In other cases, such as works by Syaifudin Zuhri, Raden Cecep Lukman Yasin, and Ken Conboy, 
Afghanistan is viewed as the primary catalyst for the ‘[transformation of] the ideological orientation 
of Indonesian jihadists’.778 These scholars have emphasised that the men were given significant 
‘religious and ideological indoctrination’ and ‘embraced a more militant view of jihad brought 
about by [Sungkar’s] association with Afghanistan’.779 As little information is provided about the 
actual ideology preached by Sungkar, much less by other DI leaders, works like these suggest either 
that there was little ideological content in their struggle against the Indonesian state or it was of 
little consequence prior to Afghanistan.  
 
Academics providing analysis on other aspects of JI have also tended to credit the Afghan 
experience, and Azzam personally, with inspiring the creation of the group or at least providing its 
ideological foundations. Noor Huda Ismail, Vedi Hadiz and Andi Rahman Alamasyah, have 
claimed at various turns that Sungkar sent recruits to ‘join [the] coalition with other jihadists from 
Muslim countries in the battlefield against atheist-Russian armies’, to ‘support the fight against the 
Soviet Union’ or to ‘help the Afghan mujahideen’.780  
 
Sidney Jones and her team at the ICG, who produced a series of in-depth reports on the JI and its 
inner workings between 2002 and 2013, also refer to the role that Azzam’s works played in the 
ideological indoctrination of JI recruits as well as those who attended the group’s pesantren and 
study groups. They write that in the 1980s, Azzam’s lectures were often circulated as photocopied 
pamphlets.781 By 2000, a complete collection of Azzam’s works was published by the Pustaka al-
Alaq publishing company, run by Ikhsan Miars, a JI member who had fought in Afghanistan 
between 1987 and 1990.782 The works were collectively titled Tarbiyah Jihadiyah (Jihad Education) 
and were ‘translated by Abdurrahman, possibly another name for Ikhsan himself’.783 According to 
the ICG ‘[these] books remain the staple of al-Alaq. They are used as teaching materials in JI 
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schools, discussion groups and training programs and are sold around the country in bookstores 
and through JI distributors’.784  
 
While the ICG reports were careful not to overstate the impact of Azzam’s ideology on JI, they 
nevertheless show that he played an important role in the group’s ideological cannon. However, 
despite the prominent position of his works and the relative depth with which most ICG reports 
delve into other aspects of the JI network, these reports still do not fully examine the actual content 
of Azzam’s teachings or provide a detailed assessment of how they were used, incorporated or 
understood by JI members in creating their belief structure. For instance, only one report out of 
the over 30 papers on the JI produced by the ICG devoted a paragraph to summarizing Azzam’s 
ideas on jihad.785  
 
As such, numerous scholars appear to believe that the Afghan conflict served as a catalyst that 
changed the ideology of (or introduced new ideas to) the Indonesian militants who fought there 
and thus set the stage for a schism within the DI. Despite imbuing these new concepts with huge 
significance, few, if any, appear to analyse, or even catalogue what these beliefs actually were. As 
such, this section will begin with an examination of Azzam’s writings, in particular, his 
understanding of jihad, in order to provide a foundation for an assessment of whether these ideas 
were indeed new to the Indonesians who participated in the conflict and if they were actually 
adopted by these participants, thus altering their ideology.  
 
Introducing Abdullah Azzam  
 
Born in Palestine in 1941, Abdullah Azzam was a militant, an academic and a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.786 Azzam studied Islamic law at Damascus University, enrolling in 1962.787 
He subsequently worked as a teacher back in Palestine but this was disrupted by the outbreak of 
the Six Day War on 5 June 1967.788 The war was hugely significant for Azzam, since it forced him 
to flee to Jordan as a refugee. It was also the moment, as Thomas Hegghammer and Sebastian 
Schnelle argue, that he began to earnestly contemplate the prospect of armed struggle. He took up 
arms against the Israeli state between 1969 and 1970, joining with Islamist Fedayeen members.  
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However, following a crackdown by Jordanian officials known as Black September in 1970, Azzam 
withdrew from armed struggle and returned to academia, enrolling in a doctoral programme at Al 
Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. Upon his graduation in 1973, he taught shari’a at the University 
of Jordan for seven years before briefly moving to the Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia, where he allegedly taught and befriended Osama bin Laden.789 Azzam’s unique background 
as both a resistance fighter and scholar gave him the requisite standing to become a leader among 
the mujahedeen who travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s. His time at Saudi Arabia’s premier 
university also put him in good standing with the Kingdom’s authorities, giving him access to a 
reliable source of funds for his operations.  
 
Having obtained a position at the International Islamic University of Islamabad, Azzam moved to 
Pakistan in 1981 and began to organise the response of numerous Arab humanitarian efforts on 
behalf of the Afghan people. He created the Council of Islamic Coordination, publishing 
recruitment literature to mobilise foreign support for the Afghan jihad and would routinely return 
to the Arab world to preach about the conflict and the plight of the Afghan people, thus raising 
awareness for his cause.790  
 
Azzam’s salary at the university was paid for by the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (Muslim World 
League, MWL), a global non-governmental organisation funded by the Saudi government. The 
organisation would go on to provide Indonesian Islamists with their first connections to Azzam 
via Mohammad Natsir, Indonesia’s fifth prime minister and a former leader of Masyumi and the 
Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII). As noted 
in Chapter 4, Natsir, who was a close friend of Abdullah Sungkar, served as the MWL’s deputy 
chairman in the 1980s. Natsir’s status and connections helped to facilitate meetings between 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir and senior Saudi clerics and government officials as well as with militant 
leaders on the ground in Pakistan and Afghanistan.791 
 
By 1984, Azzam had established a logistics office for foreign fighters, the Afghan Services Bureau, 
to facilitate their travel to Pakistan, their training and education, and their eventual deployment to 
the battlefield to confront Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In that same year, Azzam issued one of 
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his seminal works, The Defence of Muslim Lands: The first obligation after Iman, a fatwa in response to 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, concretising his worldview and interpretation of jihad. The 
work went on to become a seminal text for global Islamist militant movements. Indonesians who 
fought in the conflict often recall the teachers in the classrooms at Camp Saddah reciting sections 
of his work or providing photocopies of his writings to students.792 Others claim to have listened 
to Azzam preach in the camp himself.793  
 
The ideology of Abdullah Azzam  
 
Azzam’s ideology began from the premise that jihad was an essential obligation and form of 
worship for Muslims. Quoting Ibn Taymiyya, Azzam began by arguing that ‘the first obligation 
after Iman [faith] is the repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and the worldly 
affairs’.794 In doing so, Azzam raised the level of importance of the concept of jihad, arguing that 
after belief in Islam itself, jihad was the single, most fundamental duty of Muslims.  
 
Azzam echoed these arguments in subsequent texts. In Join the Caravan, he wrote that ‘jihad is the 
highest peak of Islam’ and ‘the most excellent form of worship, and by means of it the Muslim 
can reach the highest of ranks’.795 In describing jihad as a form of daily worship, Azzam made the 
case that it should also be a routine feature of Muslim life, rather than a sporadic or rare event. 
Azzam was not the first scholar to argue that jihad should be seen as an unexceptional form of 
worship, incumbent on Muslims to perform regularly. Azzam drew on the work of medieval 
scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Nuhaas, as well as twentieth century ideologues like Sayyid 
Qutb. Azzam also quoted Qutb, who argued that: 
  
If jihad were a passing phenomenon of Islam, the Messenger of Allah would not have 
said the following words to every Muslim until the Day of Judgement, ‘Whoever dies 
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While Azzam’s arguments for the notion that jihad ought to be considered the pinnacle of worship 
were not necessarily new, their consolidation and repetition in his texts and sermons indicated the 
primary role that they played in the ideology he was imparting to the generation of Islamic militants 
who learned and served under him in South Asia.  
 
Where Azzam actually broke new ground was by explicitly linking faith with constant action, 
particularly though engaging in jihad. In arguing that Muslims must see jihad as a routine act, like 
daily prayer, he was encouraging an expression of faith that was reliant on active rather than passive 
expressions of belief.797 In an undated publication entitled The Tauhīd of Action, Azzam wrote that 
‘Tauhīd al-uluhiyya [oneness of divinity] is only affirmed through stances taken in life’.798 This 
indicated that, while he believed that professions of faith were necessary, they were insufficient in 
demonstrating true belief because they were purely theoretical declarations and thus easy to 
perform. As such, action was the only way of truly demonstrating the sincerity of one’s 
commitment to Islam.  
 
This argument thus reinforced the notion that jihad was indeed the pinnacle of a Muslim’s 
expression of faith since it was a physical act of worship and an entire ‘way of life for the pious 
predecessors’,799 rather than a mere articulation of belief. As such, jihad became a key route through 
which Muslims could realise tauhīd. Reflecting on his time on the battlefield, Azzam argued that 
God was testing his faith by asking him to risk his life for God. He warned followers not to fear 
anything other than God, for that fear would be an expression of belief in a power other than 
God. 800 Those who shirk from this physical demonstration of their faith through jihad or lost their 
nerve in battle could thus be considered insufficiently pious or unable to fulfil their religious 
obligations. As Shiraz Maher argues, ‘Azzam developed an understanding of tawhid al-uluhiyya that 
is closely tethered with the idea of fighting for the sake of Allah’.801 It was only through a 
demonstration of sacrifice could faith really be demonstrated. 
 
Azzam’s second unique contribution to the development of the concept of jihad related closely to 
his argument that it was a means of fulfilling one’s obligations as a Muslim. Azzam explicitly argued 
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in The Defence of Muslim Lands that seeking help from mushrikun (polytheists) was unacceptable, even 
if Muslims were losing or weak, since such a request ‘forfeits the ultimate aim of jihad’.802  
 
However, he did make some exceptions. Referencing the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, 
he noted that if three conditions were met, namely that ‘the rule of Islam must have the upper 
hand’, ‘Muslims must be stronger than the combined group of mushrikun’, ‘the kuffar [unbelievers] 
must have a good opinion of the Muslims and the Muslims must feel safe from their treachery’, 
and finally ‘the Muslims must be in need of the kuffar they are asking help from’. 803 The precise 
nature of these exceptions indicated that Azzam thought that Muslims could legitimately seek help 
from non-believers in only very limited circumstances. In limiting the avenues for seeking external 
help, Azzam reinforced the idea that jihad is the ultimate profession of faith as Muslims should be 
willing to sacrifice themselves for their God.  
 
Azzam also strengthened the idea of jihad was a means of establishing a solid base for the 
flourishing of Islam. Writing in Join the Caravan, Azzam argued that the: 
 
establishment of the Muslim community on an area of land is a necessity, as vital as 
water and air. This homeland will not come about without an organised Islamic 
movement, which perseveres as consciously and realistically upon jihad, and which 
regards fighting as a decisive factor and as a protective wrapping.804  
 
Without jihad, Azzam did not believe that it was possible to successfully defend Muslims, much 
less establish an Islamic state. Not only was jihad crucial for hākimiyya, it was obligatory and the 
only realistic path to achieving a long-term security for Muslims. Nevertheless, Azzam’s writings 
on what this eventual Islamic state would look like remained relatively sparse. Little of his work 
attempted to lay out or describe the contours of the Islamic state that would be established after 
infidel enemies or corrupt Muslim government were defeated.  
 
While Azzam provided little material on the construction and day-to-day administration of an 
Islamic state, his final contribution to the discourse of militant ideology was potentially his most 
significant. In his writings throughout the late 1980s, Azzam built a comprehensive doctrine for 
the globalisation of jihad. Building on the idea that jihad was both a fundamental religious obligation 
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for all Muslims (particularly wherever Islamic lands were threatened) and one of the highest forms 
of worship, Azzam popularised the notion that jihad had to be universal. He wrote: 
 
Jihad must not be abandoned until Allah alone is worshipped. Jihad continues until 
Allah’s Word is raised high. Jihad until all the oppressed peoples are free. Jihad to 
protect our dignity and restore our occupied lands. Jihad is the way of everlasting 
glory.805 
 
In this respect, Azzam appeared to advocate for a near-perpetual struggle to liberate Muslim lands 
from perceived oppressors. It was, in his view, a totalising conflict. It is unclear how long Azzam 
believed these conflicts would take, but he believed that all Muslims, regardless of their country of 
origin, had an obligation to participate, whether in combat roles or at least financially or spiritually. 
Few exemptions were given; only those who had to support their own families or were prevented 
from doing so by their home governments were excused from fighting.806  
 
Azzam’s promotion of jihad as an obligation without borders accorded well with long-standing 
Salafi opposition to nationalism, particularly that espoused by contemporary Arab leaders. In this 
respect, Azzam’s ideology draws on a long tradition of work advocating pan-Islamism, beginning 
with the Modernists such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammed Abduh, and Rashid Rida, as well 
as salafists like Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-Ala al-Maududi, and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj. Azzam’s 
own experiences in Palestine in exile in Jordan after the multiple defeats of Arab governments by 
the new state of Israel between 1948 and 1973 also significantly contributed to this outlook.  
 
Azzam lamented that by pursuing nationalist agendas, Muslims have failed to obey God’s 
commands and were thus doomed to fail.807 By failing to centre God in their struggle to liberate 
Palestine for instance, nationalist leaders had not only betrayed the Muslim cause but allowed it to 
be ‘appropriated’ by godless forces like communism and liberal nationalism, which were impotent 
in the face of Israeli might.808 Similarly, he regarded pan-Arabism as a ‘kind of fantasy or delusion’ 
since without Islam at its core or a ‘collective Muslim effort’, it would be impossible to become a 
successful society.809 His calls for Muslims to ‘let [their] vision pass beyond geographic borders 
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that have been drawn up for [them] by the Kuffar’ not only reflected this history of pan-Islamic 
thought but used it as a basis for combat mobilisation. Azzam’s innovation was to fuse an identity 
that was already, by its very nature, not geographically bounded with an obligation to participate 
in the defence of Islam globally. As Gilles Kepel argues, Azzam ‘unflaggingly reminded his readers 
that Palestine and Afghanistan were part of the same struggle’.810 As such, he was able to reinforce 
a transnational identity, membership of the global ummah (community), among his supporters. 
 
Azzam’s demand for the involvement and support of the global ummah was truly without 
precedent. It reflected not only the necessity of jihad in his conception of Muslim identity and the 
performance of one’s faith and duty to God, but also the circumstances of an increasingly 
globalised world. His requirement that all able-bodied Muslims journey to a conflict zone was 
made possible by the availability of air travel, improved communications networks, mass media, 
and international financial systems. Indeed, his own Afghan Services Bureau was reliant on the 
same global structures to broadcast his cause, organise the funding and travel of militants, and 
supply them with a stipend, housing and arms throughout the conflict. The international force he 
constructed in Afghanistan was as much a product of his ideology as it was dependent on the 
conditions of the period.  
 
Selective interpretations: Comparing Azzam and the Indonesians 
 
The conflict in Afghanistan and the ideology of Abdullah Azzam were undoubtedly significant for 
militant Islamists around the world. Participation in the conflict helped to socialise and radicalise 
numerous young men into an international community that shared a collective consciousness 
based on a violent salafi ideology. This was especially true for the Indonesians among the first two 
batches of recruits sent to Afghanistan by Abdullah Sungkar. The men were taught by instructors 
from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arab world, often giving them their first interactions with 
non-Indonesians.811  
 
Their combat skills also improved exponentially. According to Nasir Abas, Indonesians first did 
basic training covering six areas (infantry, artillery, engineering, cavalry, communications and 
logistics) following a system established by the British for training local forces under the raj. 
However, they then specialised in either infantry or engineering (bomb-making) classes for the rest 
 
810 Kepel, Jihad, p.151 
811 Conboy, The Second Front, p.45 
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of their time in the camp.812 In this respect, the Afghan experience played an outsized role for the 
Indonesian militant Islamist movement, and particularly for those sent by Sungkar. Unlike most 
DI members, these men became vastly more capable of engaging in some form of guerrilla warfare 
against the Indonesian state upon their return.  
 
Ideologically, Afghanistan served to reinforce many of DI’s pre-existing beliefs among the 
Indonesians that participated. At its most basic level, Abdullah Azzam’s conceptualisation of the 
Islamist struggle against a hostile, ungodly empire, supported DI’s division of the world into a 
Manichaean binary of dar al-harb and dar al-Islam. Similarly, Kartosuwiryo had explicitly written in 
the DI’s Hukum Pidana that an ummat Negara Islam (community of the Islamic State) stood against 
the ummat penjajah (community of the coloniser) and ummat kafirin (community of the infidel), 
reflecting a belief that there was no possibility for Muslims to exist safely in a world outside of an 
Islamic state.813  
 
Defensive jihad  
 
This binary division of the world thus set the stage for the development of a doctrine that required 
true Muslims to defend and protect their lands from the encroachment of evil forces. Azzam’s 
doctrine of jihad as a sacred duty and obligation for all Muslims again reinforced some elements of 
DI’s ideology. While comparatively less sophisticated than Azzam’s theology, Kartosuwiryo’s 
penal code required (with very few exceptions) that all able-bodied Muslim men participate in a 
jihad against colonial and subsequently Republican forces to establish the NII. Kartosuwiryo drew 
on a similar classical, predominantly defensive interpretation of jihad that saw the struggle against 
non-Islamic forces governing Muslim lands as a duty of all Muslims (fard al-ain).  
 
While Kartosuwiryo had initially embraced a wider conceptualisation of jihad that included a non-
violent struggle for self-improvement and becoming closer to God, by the time of his insurgency 
he had come to define jihad as an exclusively physical struggle against un-Islamic forces. As 
examined in Chapter 4, this definition was subsequently revised just before his death to allow for 
a pause in the movement’s pursuit of war against the Republican state due to their lack of resources 
following their defeat. Nevertheless, the definition remained narrow and left the group committed, 
at least in theory, to a physical jihad over the longer term. In this respect, Azzam’s understanding 
 
812 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019 
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of the concept reinforced this shift within the DI movement. In the conclusion of Join the Caravan, 
Azzam made clear that the meaning of jihad in Qur’an was not plural and should only be used to 
refer to a physical struggle against the enemies of Islam. He wrote: 
 
The saying, ‘We have returned from the lesser jihad (battle) to the greater jihad (jihad 
of the soul),’ which people quote on the basis that it is a hadīth, is in fact a false, 
fabricated hadīth that has no basis. It is only a saying of Ibrahim ibn Abi ‘Abalah, one 
of the Successors, and it contradicts textual evidence and reality. 814 
 
While significantly more developed than Kartosuwiryo’s own writings on the topic (or those of 
his successors in the DI movement) Azzam’s stripping down of jihad’s meaning to only a physical 
struggle against un-Islamic forces accorded well with DI’s own commitment to conflict against the 
Dutch and subsequently the Indonesian Republic. These too found echoes in Azzam’s work, 
Defence of Muslim Lands, in which he wrote that a defensive jihad was an obligation for all Muslims 
(fard al-ain) as they had a duty to repel infidel forces from Islamic lands including (though not 
limited to) Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Chad, and Eritrea and to liberate 
societies from Muslim rulers who had failed to implement shari’a and uphold hākimiyya.  
 
Jihad as a means of realising hākimiyya  
 
This need to see God’s sovereignty guaranteed on earth in order for Muslims to fully actualise 
their religion resonated deeply with DI recruits, who were already steeped in this messaging due 
to the legacy of Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar’s own doctrine. Kartosuwiryo wrote extensively 
throughout his career about the necessity of hākimiyya, arguing that an Islamic state was the only 
way Muslims could be guaranteed freedom from slavery in their lands.815 Like Azzam’s struggle 
for a free Palestine and Afghanistan, he saw the removal of the Dutch as more than just an anti-
colonial liberation struggle, but rather an opportunity to create an abode of Islam for Indonesian 
Muslims. Again, coming out of these traditions in the DI network, recruits in Afghanistan were 
likely to have been broadly supportive of Azzam’s messaging, seeing parallels with their own 
struggles at home.  
 
 
814 Azzam, Join the Caravan 
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However, this shared belief in the necessity of establishing an Islamic state, free from the 
interference of non- or un-Islamic forces, throws into sharp relief some of the key differences in 
the ideological approaches of Azzam and Sungkar. To begin with, Sungkar sent his cadres to 
Afghanistan with the explicit aim of the men using the opportunity to gain the requisite skills to 
fight and successfully overthrow the Indonesian state upon their return. Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, 
Ahmed Sajuli and Adung, among other JI participants of the conflict have noted that regardless 
of when they travelled to the conflict, Sungkar emphasised that they were being ‘sent for military 
training’ in order to conduct jihad upon their return to Indonesia.816 DI cadres sent to Afghanistan 
were, more often than not, far from the front-line and unlikely to engage in direct combat with 
Soviet forces. According to Solahudin: 
 
Indonesian students were not permitted to take part on the front line and typically 
fought with artillery in the rear. Sayyaf [the commander of the al-Ittihad al-Islamy 
troops] argued that Indonesians need to be spared so they could fight when they 
returned to Indonesia.817 
 
While this decision did not entirely ensure there were no Indonesian causalities throughout the 
conflict, there were seemingly only two deaths among the ten batches of DI fighters who travelled 
to Pakistan and Afghanistan between 1985 and 1991.818 Additionally, rather than pledging 
allegiance to Azzam, other leaders of the Afghan mujahedeen, or even the DI imam in Indonesia, 
the men instead swore an oath to Sungkar, pledging to ‘listen and obey the orders of God and His 
Messenger in easy and difficult times’.819 The men were thus bound to Sungkar’s agenda and almost 
all returned to Indonesia or Malaysia within three years. The incident highlights not only the power 
of Sungkar’s hold over the men, but the autonomy of his operation in Malaysia. While he 
predominantly sent existing DI members to Afghanistan, he drafted in others, like Nasir Abas and 
Ali Imron, who had no pre-existing ties to the group. 
 
Sungkar’s decision to send men to participate in the Afghan conflict was motivated by a desire to 
provide his followers with an opportunity to train and prepare for a jihad back in Indonesia. This 
rationale put him at odds with Azzam’s belief that the conflict was about liberating Muslim lands 
from non-Muslim imperialism. Azzam had also hoped that following their success in Afghanistan, 
 
816 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019 
817 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia, p.136 
818 Ibid 
819 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta 3 October 2019 
 251 
the mujahideen would continue as a force to liberate other areas such as Palestine. As such, 
Sungkar appeared far less committed to being a part of the so-called caravan, instead prioritising 
his own local struggle.  
 
Furthermore, although Azzam had stressed that the first phase of the jihad in Afghanistan was 
directed against Muslim rulers who had betrayed their faith and their fellow Muslims, he was less 
supportive of conflict in other societies ruled by so-called deviant or pro-Western Muslim leaders. 
Fawaz Gerges posits that this may be because Azzam’s ‘main source of finance came from Saudi 
Arabia’ and thus he ‘could not just bite the hand that fed him… he had neither an independent 
financial patron nor grievances against the house of Saud’.820 As such, Afghanistan was the 
pragmatic choice to begin to build a transnational force of Islamist militants. It offered the 
potential to create a territorial base and opportunities to ‘to train on every type of weapon’.821 
These skills could then be used to help liberate Palestine, which Azzam saw as his next struggle.  
 
Sungkar’s focus throughout the 1980s on preparing for a battle against the Indonesian government 
and seeming disinterest in being a part of a long-running global Islamic struggle to liberate Muslim 
lands from non-Muslim occupiers thus sat uneasily alongside Azzam’s agenda. Despite Sungkar’s 
numerous sermons critiquing nationalism, he nevertheless seemed content to pursue the 
establishment of an Islamic society within the territorial boundaries of the existing Indonesian 
Republic during this period. While Sungkar routinely criticised the United States for its support of 
un-Islamic governments, and lambasted Christians and Jews in statements published in the 1990s, 
his 1980s sermons suggest a distinct disinterest in global events.  
 
Over the course of the 16 sermons available (which total about nine hours of audiotape) Sungkar 
rarely references specific international political events. Instead, his statements were vague, as if he 
intended their content to be timeless. It may have been the case that he did not think it necessary 
or interesting to delve into the details of American support for Israel. But regardless of his intent, 
the content of his sermons suggests that, despite his exile in Malaysia, his focus remained squarely 
on the Indonesian state and he displayed a lack of attention or interest in the international realm.  
 
Among his followers, while several expressed their concerns for the plight of the Afghan people 
and the Palestinians during their time in Afghanistan, few appeared to have made long-lasting 
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bonds with the local fighters or with militants from other networks. This appeared to be the result 
of poor language skills, with few speaking Arabic, or indeed any language other than Bahasa 
Indonesia. This limited their interactions with other foreigners and prevented them from learning 
in mixed classrooms, as did as the segregation of Indonesian fighters into their own barracks and 
the general prohibition against DI members fighting on the front line. Few, if any, of the men 
interviewed appeared to lament coming back to Southeast Asia or appeared interested in joining 
another foreign liberation movement. This quasi-segregation meant that the Indonesians were 
ultimately unintentionally insulated from a core element of Azzam’s ideology; the creation of pan-
Islamic solidarity and the pursuit of a collective military agenda to liberate Muslim lands.  
 
The continued focus on Indonesia as the primary location to enact hākimiyya therefor suggests that 
Sungkar’s ideology was largely unchanged by developments in Afghanistan. It thus seems highly 
unlikely that the conflict motivated their split from the DI movement back in Indonesia, 
particularly as their objectives and focus of the scope of their intended conflict remained the same.  
 
Takfīr and jihad  
 
A final difference between Azzam’s ideology and Sungkar’s was their approach to the concept of 
takfīr (excommunication). Azzam’s approach tended to be far more forgiving, since he saw 
preserving unity in the global umma as necessary to his larger aim of liberating Muslim lands from 
kuffar forces. As such, he supported using takfīr sparingly to reduce the creation of divisions and 
strife within the Muslim community. For example, in The Defence of Muslim Lands, Azzam offered 
several pragmatic responses to the question of whether it was acceptable to fight alongside 
Muslims with low or poor levels of Islamic education, who may smoke or ‘wear talismans’. First, 
Azzam argued that compassion and understanding were paramount since Muslims all over the 
world ‘have similar problems’ and it is acceptable, or indeed necessary, to overlook these 
shortcomings when ‘confronting the greater harm’ He wrote that ‘jihad in a nation with sin and 
errors’ was preferable to Russian victory.822  
 
He went on to argue that a desire for purity in all Muslims would allow their enemies to take 
advantage and gain the upper hand, lamenting that ‘[if] only Muslims had fought in Palestine, in 
spite of the corruption, that was present in the early stages’. He made it plain that he was largely 
uninterested in pursuing strict standards for Muslim behaviour in these circumstances, writing that: 
 
822 Azzam, Defence of Muslim Lands 
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[It was] obligatory to fight alongside any Muslim people as long as they are Muslims. 
It does not matter how bad or corrupted they are as long as they are fighting the 
Kuffar, People of the Book or Atheists.823 
 
Conversely, Sungkar favoured a much more stringent and puritanical approach. In his sermons, 
he routinely railed against Muslims who actively or tacitly supported the Suharto regime, describing 
them as living in a state of jāhiliyyah, easily influenced by ‘lies, made up beliefs like Pancasila’ and 
prone to ‘selective’ interpretations or innovative readings of Qur’anic scripture. His sermons 
frequently mentioned his hatred of common Javanese cultural practices such as selapanan and tedhak 
sithen, ritual gatherings and prayers held to bless children when they are slightly over a month old.824  
 
Alongside these other condemnations, his belief that Muslims who supported Indonesian 
nationalism were effectively practicing ‘serious idolatry’, illustrates how little tolerance Sungkar had 
for deviations from his rigid conceptualisation of the practicing of Islam. That he was willing to 
excommunicate people for engaging in historic cultural practices and pagan traditions, even if they 
still identified as Muslims, runs counter to the argument made by Azzam to overlook these 
indiscretions as long as these people were helping to overthrow a common enemy.825  
 
This uncompromising attitude suggests again that the influence of Azzam’s teachings in 
Afghanistan were more limited than many scholars have posited. Sungkar was sufficiently 
confident in his teachings and interpretations that he was able to selectively adopt elements of 
Azzam’s work and promote it in his pesantren network while discarding large portions of it that did 
not accord with his agenda.  
 
Moreover, the DI’s experience in Afghanistan illustrates the clear hold that the two men had over 
their cadres, who seemingly returned diligently, largely retaining Sungkar’s teachings. In interviews, 
none of the DI cadres who travelled to Afghanistan suggested that they learned anything contrary 
to their leaders’ ideology while abroad, though this may be because they did not want to present 
discord within their ranks to a researcher or simply could not recall or were less interested in the 
philosophical disputes between Azzam and Sungkar. Regardless, the episode showed that the 
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development of DI and subsequently JI’s ideology remained squarely in the hands of its leadership, 




At the start of the 1980s, the DI had returned to an understanding of jihad that narrowly defined 
the concept as a violent, physical struggle, akin to the definition preached by Kartosuwiryo from 
the 1940s until his death in 1962. This was largely because the group’s members had come to see 
the futility of peaceful advocacy as the Sukarno government attempted to impose a national 
ideology that alienated Islamists of all forms. The Iranian revolution provided further inspiration 
that small acts of violence could spark a wider societal uprising against a corrupt regime.  
 
Despite the failures of these plots to materialise and Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s continued legal 
troubles, the organisation’s understanding of the concept had concretised into an obligation for 
all true Muslims to pursue. Jihad was not only a means of professing one’s faith, but the primary 
mechanism for overthrowing a tyrannical, un-Islamic regime and bring about an Islamic state for 
the good of all Muslims. 
 
Given these developments, the argument that participation in the Afghan conflict from 1985, or 
the teachings of Abdullah Azzam in particular, created or gave DI members a new understanding 
of jihad, rings hollow. In many respects, Azzam’s understanding of jihad, often reducing it to a 
struggle against un-Islamic forces, aligned with and reinforced the beliefs of the DI members who 
participated in the conflict. Elements of his ideology that did not accord with Sungkar’s, or even 
Kartosuwiryo’s, were quickly disregarded or downplayed, given the control and respect that 
Sungkar had over his followers and the fact that they often only spent brief stints in Afghanistan 
before returning to Indonesia or Malaysia. Afghanistan played a significant role in enabling DI 
members to enact their own jihad against the Indonesian state through the skills they acquired and 
the connections, and ultimately resources, that they were able to procure from foreign groups. 






Chapter 6 | Reimagining Hākimiyya: Preserving or Creating the Islamic State of 
Indonesia? 1985-1993 
 
Given that neither Abdullah Azzam’s ideology nor the participation of DI members in the Afghan 
conflict were the primary reasons for Sungkar’s decision to leave DI, this final chapter will explore 
alternative explanations for the split and the creation of the Jemaah Islamiyah. By the mid-1980s, 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir, isolated in Malaysia, away from the key command structure of the DI, found 
themselves increasingly at odds with their counterparts in Indonesia over how best to create an 
Islamic state.  
 
Although Sungkar agreed with the rest of the DI that hākimiyya was an essential goal, he no longer 
thought the NII, with its military command structure and pseudo-state functionaries, was the right 
vehicle by which to achieve it. The DI had largely kept the organisational structure of 
Kartosuwiryo’s wartime state, maintain a series of regional and sub-regional commanders. Sungkar 
did not think that this diffuse entity was capable of overthrowing the Indonesian government, 
much less spreading its ideology effectively. Most significantly, he did not see it as an Islamic state 
in any meaningful sense, since it lacked any territory and the ability to impose Islamic governance 
and shari’a.  
 
Resultantly, this chapter will argue that Sungkar’s decision to break away and form the JI was due 
to a fundamentally different understanding of the importance and utility of the NII in achieving 
hākimiyya. Sungkar understood hākimiyya to be, as described by Maududi, temporal empowerment, 
where God’s laws and sovereignty were enacted so that Muslims could lead pious and fulfilled 
lives in accordance with their faith. In order to achieve this, the state’s leaders, its caliph and majelis 
shūrā, should have complete territorial control in order to impose and enact shari’a. The DI’s failure 
to hold territory for a small base, let alone an entire state, showed that it had not come close to 
achieving its goal of an Islamic state and could not be thought of as such.  
 
Secondly, this chapter will argue that divisions within the DI were already becoming apparent prior 
to the return of its members from Afghanistan. These disagreements were exacerbated by the fact 
that, by the 1980s, Sungkar’s idea of how to attain hākimiyya was largely influenced by concepts 
espoused by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab. Finally, this chapter will propose that Sungkar believed that the best path towards the 
attainment of hākimiyya was through the building a smaller, more agile organisation. Based on the 
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writings of the Brotherhood and Wahhab, Sungkar came to embrace the creation of a community 
of like-minded Muslims who would lead a life of piety, creating a proto-Islamic state like the one 
formed by the Prophet and his followers in Medina. Sungkar came to think that hākimiyya could 
only be realised by taking a bottom-up rather than top-down approach. This community would 
not only practice Islamic values, but also actively oppose the existing state through engaging in a 
physical jihad.  
 
This chapter will make these arguments over two sections. It will begin by examining the 
personality clashes and the ideological differences between Sungkar and the DI leaders who 
remained in Indonesia. Secondly, through an examination of the group’s foundational documents, 
this thesis will analyse the impact of the Egyptian salafis on Sungkar’s desire to create an Islamic 
state initially through the establishment of small communities as a form of hijrah and the 
incorporation of jihad.  
 
Personal or ideological? Assessing the reasons for the JI break away 
 
Scholars examining the origins of the JI often pay little attention to the group’s foundational 
moment. Many, like Rohan Gunaratna, indicate simply that ‘after a dispute with the Indonesian-
based DI leader named Ajengan Masduki, Sungkar formed JI in 1993’, providing little detail about 
the nature of the disagreement or examining if there was more to it than a clash of personalities.826 
Others argue that the group emerged out of the participation in the Afghan conflict. Greg Barton 
exemplifies this school of thought writing that in 1992, Sungkar ‘travelled to talk with the 
mujahidin in Pakistan, asking Southeast Asian fighters whether they stood with him and Ba’asyir 
or with the old DI set’.827 Barton does not give any context for why Sungkar was asking the men 
to pick between the two groups.  
 
Nevertheless, their writings are indicative of these narratives about the JI’s origins, which see the 
group as either a manifestation of Sungkar’s personal ambitions or a creature of the Afghan jihad. 
In either event, scholars have routinely failed to engage with the group’s ideological origins, 
specifically at the point of the rupture between the two sides. This section thus attempts to shed 
light on this period in greater depth, examing both the personality clashes between Sungkar and 
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Masduki and how these clashes were ultimately rooted in different understandings of how best to 




According to Nasir Abas, the decision to break with DI was made by Sungkar, with little 
involvement from Ba’asyir, who Abas characterised as ‘not a leader, not strong like Abdullah 
Sungkar’.828 The fallout was the result of long-simmering personal tensions with Ajengan Masduki, 
who was appointed the DI’s leader over Sungkar in November 1987, as well as frustrations with 
over the DI’s commitment to the preservation of the NII.829 Interviews with other DI members 
for this thesis and accounts in Solahudin’s work support the view that a combination of personality 
clashes and understandings of hākimiyya resulted in the split.830  
 
However, the limits of these accounts must also be taken into consideration. Between Masduki’s 
appointment on 4 November 1987 by the DI’s majelis shūrā and Sungkar’s announcement declaring 
the formation of the JI on 1 January 1993, there do not appear to be extant records of written 
communication between the pair, recordings of phone calls, or any first-hand accounts of their 
meetings by other members. This was presumably due to concerns that letters, calls or other forms 
of communication might be intercepted by the Indonesian authorities. Additionally, many of 
Sungkar’s close associates were training in Afghanistan during this period or simply not privy to 
these discussions among the most senior members of the DI.  
 
Although these second, or sometimes third-hand accounts are imperfect, the similarities in their 
narratives are striking and suggest that there is some truth to them. Furthermore, those interviewed 
generally refrained from passing judgment on either Sungkar or Masduki in their assessment of 
the breakdown in the relationship, even though they were generally closer to Sungkar. This 
suggests that they were making at least some attempt made to present the situation as neutrally as 
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None of those interviewed could specify the exact point when relations soured between the two 
men. According to Nasir Abas, who met Masduki for the first time while the latter was on a visit 
to Afghanistan in ‘late 1987 or early 1988’, things appeared fairly amicable. 831 Ali Imron and 
Ahmad Sujali both claimed on separate occasions to have heard ‘gossip’ while in Afghanistan about 
a rivalry between Sungkar and Masduki but could not recall when this began.832 AK, a close friend 
of Sungkar’s, claimed that Sungkar was ‘irritated’ with Masduki by 1989 but did not believe that 
the animosity had begun before then.833 Lower ranking members claimed they did not know about 
the personal tensions until Zulkarnian (alias Aris Sumarsono), a commanding officer who had 
been part of the first group of DI members to go to Afghanistan, asked them to pick between the 
two organisations in January 1993. 834  
 
Masduki had been a part of the DI movement ‘from its early days’, according to Solahudin, and 
had been a district commander in Tasikmalaya, West Java, one of the group’s traditional 
strongholds.835 He was known by his honorific title, Ajengan, meaning ‘a person with deep religious 
knowledge’, because many older DI members believed he was a religious scholar. 836  
 
According to Ali Imron, one of the points of contention between the two men after Masduki took 
power was the allegation that Masduki practiced ‘mysticism’ and ‘went to caves to hear whispers’. 
837 Similarly, Nasir Abas claimed that he ‘did not know if it was true’ but had also heard ‘stories of 
Masduki doing guna-guna’ (voodoo or witchcraft).838 Neither men claimed to know when these 
rumours started, who was behind them, or if the stories were true.  
 
Nevertheless, given the increasingly takfīri stance of many DI members, particularly those who 
had been under Sungkar’s tutelage, these allegations were problematic for the organisation’s new 
imam. Regardless of their veracity, the impression that Masduki was engaging in allegedly un-
Islamic practices rendered him vulnerable to charges of being an apostate or at very least 
insufficiently committed and knowledgeable of ‘true’ Islamic values. It was widely known that 
 
831 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019 
832 Interview with Ahmad Suljali, Jakarta, 16 July 2019 and Ali Imron, Jakarta, 2 October 2019  
833 Interview with AK, Jakarta, 4 October 2019 
834 Interview with AS, Jakarta, 18 July 2018 
835 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia, p.147 
836 Abdullah Sungkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 4’ 
837 Interview with Ali Imron, Jakarta, 2 October 2019  
838 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019 
 259 
Sungkar was opposed to these practices and had repeatedly criticised those who practiced them in 
his sermons. 839  
 
Solahudin claims that Sungkar confronted and ‘repeatedly warned Masduki to abandon Sufi 
teachings, but Masduki refused’, though it is not clear where this information came from or if there 
is any proof that Masduki was actually engaging in these practices. It is equally plausible that the 
allegations were a smear campaign conducted by Sungkar or his allies in the organisation to 
discredit Masduki and thus elevate themselves. A similar tactic was used by the Indonesian 
government to discredit Kartosuwiryo upon his death with allegations that he was a mystic and 
insufficiently committed to Islamism.840 
 
Masduki appears to have retaliated by spreading rumours that Sungkar needed to be side-lined for 
being was unprofessional, untrustworthy and corrupt. According to Nasir Abas, Sungkar served 
as the NII’s minister of foreign affairs during this period. In this role, he had discretion over which 
individuals were sent to Afghanistan and control over the funds provided by Abdullah Azzam’s 
services bureau. As Nasir Abas explained, Sungkar was accused of misappropriating funds, 
‘sending three men on the budget meant for one’ and allegedly pocketed the difference.841 Ali 
Imron defended Sungkar, claiming that - although he heard the rumours of Sungkar ‘stealing 
money’- he ‘could not be completely sure’ if it was true. 842 Ali Imron claimed it was more likely 
that Sungkar was just trying to ‘use the money efficiently’ though he added that ‘people in my 
batch complained they got their allowance in rupees not US dollars like the earlier batches’, and 
seemed to take this as evidence that Sungkar was corrupt.843  
 
Whether or not these allegations were true, the damage to Sungkar’s reputation was done. He 
ranted to his followers, according to Nasir Abas, about his exclusion from the top ranks, 
exclaiming ‘I found the donors! I found the training centres! I have the relationships! How can he 
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The ideological  
 
This personal antipathy was compounded by significant ideological differences over the question 
of the NII and the best path to achieving hākimiyya. Nasir Abas claimed that he was told about this 
point of contention between the two men by Zulkarnian when he was informed about Sungkar’s 
decision to break away. In his telling, in ‘1991 or early 1992, Sungkar in his capacity as foreign 
minister, was ordered by Masduki to open up several embassies ‘in countries like Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Palestine and more Arab nations’ and send representatives on behalf of the 
NII. 845 AK, a close friend of Sungkar’s, said that Sungkar was deeply displeased with the idea, 
apparently saying at some point in 1992: 
 
We cannot claim we are a state! How can we have a state, where is the area that we 
control? We do not control anything! So, we cannot say we are a country. It is 
wrong.846 
 
AK did not make clear whether these remarks were said to him personally if they were intended 
for a wider audience. However, the account appears similar to one provided by Nasir Abas, who 
said that ‘the structure of the organisation of that time had ministers for this, ministers for that, 
ministers for everything. They gave positions like the structure of the government of Indonesia. 
Abdullah Sungkar said back then “we cannot use this anymore. It does not make sense”’.847 
Additionally, Solahudin found that in an anonymously recorded interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
in 2004, Ba’asyir suggested that this was a key source of tension between the two sides as Masduki 
believed the NII continued to exist but the ‘enemy, namely the Republic of Indonesia, had seized 
its territory’.848  
 
The above suggests that there were substantive divisions, and not just personal vendettas, between 
the two men. This is not to argue that their dislike of each other played no role or could not have 
been the more important factor in driving the split. However, it does point to the fact that 
ideological differences over the utility of the NII in the achievement of hākimiyya played some role 
in causing the JI’s split.  
 
 
845 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019 
846 Interview with AK, Jakarta, 4 October 2019 
847 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019 
848 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism, p.151 
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Fundamentally, it appears that Sungkar did not see the existing NII as fit for purpose in the late 
1980s. Although organised as an Islamic state with an imam at its apex, a majelis shūrā, numerous 
ministers with portfolios, and a military hierarchy divided into regional divisions, the NII had no 
territory to speak of, no people to govern and no ability to impose its laws. Solahudin has 
characterised these objections as Sungkar holding a ‘salafi view that an Islamic state had to control 
territory and uphold Islamic law in that territory’.849 However, this does not appear to be a uniquely 
salafi principle, with classical Muslim jurists seeing dar al-Islam as a ‘legal construct that has a 
territorial dimension’.850 As such, Islamic law and the practice of the Islamic faith can only be 
guaranteed, ‘where it is protected by a Muslim ruler’. 851 Without this ruler’s control over an area, 
attempts to implement shari’a are futile.  
 
Despite the NII’s state-like organisational structure, it was clearly unable to implement or enforce 
shari’a, thus failing at one of the core components of hākimiyya. Additionally, while it attempted to 
mimic the institutions of a fully sovereign Islamic state, in reality its ministers had no power to 
implement Islamic policies that affected citizens in any meaningful sense. Finally, its military was 
clearly unable to protect its ‘citizens’ from a non-Muslim aggressor, seeing as the Indonesian 
Republic had full control over its claimed territory. On all three counts, the NII was not a useful 
vehicle for the attainment of hākimiyya.  
 
It is not clear why Masduki and older DI members believed that this structure was useful or worth 
clinging to beyond the symbolic power that came from it having briefly held territory towards the 
end of colonial rule and the early years of the Republic. Whether its leaders planned to somehow 
use its this governance and military structure to regroup and takeover Indonesia are also unknown 
due to a lack of written, oral and non-archival sources. Even if these justifications were accessible, 
it is highly unlikely that any such plan would have worked given that sporadic and low-level attacks 
by the group’s members had routinely resulted in mass arrests in the 1970s and 1980s, crippling 
the organisation.  
 
In light of these failures, Sungkar’s decision to part ways with the group makes sense on a personal, 
pragmatic, and ideological level. The organisation had managed to regroup – insofar as it had a 
leadership structure and new members – since its military defeat in 1962, but still lacked territory 
 
849 Ibid, p.149 
850 Manoucher Parvin and Maurie Sommer, ‘Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and Its 
Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 11:1 (1980), p.4 
851 Idem, p.5 
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or the resources to take it from the Indonesian state. Its efforts to attain hākimiyya were stymied 
further by the fact that many members were either in prison or, like Sungkar and Ba’asyir in exile 
abroad. Finally, it was not clear what keeping up the pretence of the NII meant for the realisation 
of God’s sovereignty on earth, other than to remind DI members that even with their self-declared 
state, they could not implement shari’a or ensure that Muslims lived in accordance with the ways 
of the Prophet. Sungkar seems to have thought that the group’s leadership – which had tarred his 
reputation and which he believed was engaging in idolatry –was insufficiently committed to truly 
pursuing hākimiyya. 
 
Hākimiyya through community and jihad 
 
Sungkar appears to have made the decision to leave DI at the end of 1992, bringing along with 
him most of his followers in Malaysia and winning the backing of the majority of those in the 
training camps in Afghanistan.852 He announced the formation of his new organisation on 1 
January 1993, taking its name and structure from the name from Egyptian salafi militant group, al-
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GI, Islamic Community), which cooperated with JI members in military 
training camps in Afghanistan in 1990.853  
 
The group’s aims were codified in the group’s manifesto, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jamā ‘ah Al-
Islāmiyah (PUPJI, the General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al-Jamā ‘ah Al-Islāmiyah), in which the 
group pledges to re-establish the caliphate through ‘imān, hijrah and jihad fī sabīllah’.854 Published in 
1996, the manifesto concretised Abdullah Sungkar’s ideas about hākimiyya in the early years of the 
group’s formation. Elena Pavlova’s excellent piece discussing the significance of the document 
describes it as a ‘reference manual for senior JI cadres’ and functions ‘simultaneously an 
organizational charter, an operational handbook, and a religious-strategic programme’.855 She adds 
that the document was most likely ‘drafted by a committee of religious scholars, rather than a 
single individual’ due to the ‘text’s irregular cadence, the differences in writing style among the 
various sections, and the insertion of extraneous material at the end of the pamphlet’.856  
 
 
852 Solahudin, The Roots of Terorism in Indonesia, p.151 
853 Idem, pp.8 and 141 
854 Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jamā ‘ah Al-Islāmiyah (PUPJI), 30 May 1996, p.13, Internet Archive, 
https://archive.org/stream/Pupji-GeneralGuidelinesForTheStruggleOfJamaahIslamiyah/Pupji-
englishRevision4#page/n5/mode/2up, accessed: 15 March 2020 
855 Elena Pavlova, ‘From a Counter-Society to a Counter State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI’, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30:9 (2007), p.780 
856 Idem, pp.780-781 
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Although the document calls for the re-establishment of the caliphate as its end goal, its primary 
focus is the building of a jama’ah (community) as the first step in this process.857 Formed by 
righteous leaders, this community would be strengthened so that it could serve as a qāʿidah salābah 
(solid base) for the promotion of the group’s aims.858 This community would be fortified by tarbīyah 
(religious education), dakwah (proselytisation), hijrah, jihad, and tajnid (military mobilisation). The 
document lists between six and eleven steps in each section relating to this initial stage of ‘preparing 
to establish the state’.  
 
However, it refers to only eight steps in the section regarding the ‘maintenance of the state’, which 
encompasses sections on the formation of this new Islamic state, its ‘substantiation’, foreign 
relations, and eventual establishment of the caliphate. The lack of emphasis on these later stages 
makes it clear that while the long-term goal may be the re-establishment of the caliphate, the JI in 
its initial years was clearly focused on the steps it would need to take to establish an Islamic state 
in Indonesia. It is clear from the document that Sungkar’s ideas of how to achieve hākimiyya rest 
squarely on the creation of a community of likeminded individuals, who would be able to live 
pious lives within this mini society, and the pursuit of violent jihad against the infidel regime 




The agenda specified in PUPJI for the achievement of an Islamic state in Indonesia reflected the 
arguments put forward in three books that were particularly influential for Abdullah Sungkar in 
the late 1980s. According to Solahudin, Sungkar relied heavily on At Thoriq ila Jama’atil Muslimin 
(The Path to an Islamic Community) by Hussain bin Muhammad bin Ali Jabri, Al Manhaj Al 
Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah (The Method of Struggle According to the History of the Prophet’s 
Struggle) by Munir Muhammad Al Ghadhban, and Mitsaq Amal Al Islami (Guide to Islamic Deeds) 
by Najih Ibrahim, Ashim Abdul Majid and Ishamudin Darbalah. 859  
 
At Thoriq ila Jama’atil Muslimin and Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah argued for the 
achievement of hākimiyya through a ‘long and difficult path’, a series of stages designed to build 
and strengthen a community so it is able to then take on and overthrow the enemies of Islam and 
 
857 PUPJI, p.15 
858 Ibid 
859 Munir Muhammad Al Ghadhban Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah (Jordan: Maktabah al-Manar, 
1997), pp.6-8 
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establish and Islamic state and eventually a caliphate.860 These texts along with PUPJI indicate that 
Sungkar’s conceptualised attaining hākimiyya through fiqh sirah; the concept of using the life of the 
Prophet as a model to follow for the building of an Islamic community by making slow and steady 
gains until a movement was strong enough to defeat its enemies.861  
 
At Thoriq ila Jama’atil Muslimin takes as its starting point that the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate 
opened the door to ‘destruction’ for Muslims and thus created a need to recapture the past glory 
of Muslim societies.862 Most importantly, it argues that only through the creation of an Islamic state 
can ‘the rights of Muslims to live in peace and prosperity be realised’.  863 The first step to recreating 
the caliphate must be the creation of a community of believers and the growth of this community 
through dakwah, which ‘can be done secretly or openly, or a combination of both, at the next stage 
of [the community’s] formation’.864 This community could begin at the household level, before 
expanding outwards over time, eventually encompassing the globe.  
 
Similarly, Munir Muhammad Al Ghadhban argues in his text that victory and the establishment of 
an Islamic state requires a five-stage process. Like Hussain, Munir argues that in the initial stages 
of building a community, members may need to ‘preach secretly and keep [their] organisational 
structure a secret’ in order to thwart their enemies.865 Subsequently, they may preach openly, but 
should still keep their organisational structure hidden. Taking his cues from the Prophet 
Muhammad’s own struggle, Munir believed that the third stage of the fight to build an Islamic 
state required a period of hijrah, which could be performed through physical separation but would 
more likely take the form of mentally and spiritually distancing oneself from the rest of society.866 
 
These two texts provide Sungkar with a path to the achievement of hākimiyya, prioritising the 
development of a community of likeminded followers, something that he was already building in 
exile in Malaysia. This plan stood in stark contrast to the workings of the DI back in Indonesia, 
which had a top down structure and seemingly put little emphasis on creating a small community 
within which they could begin to implement of their beliefs or values. In this respect, Sungkar’s 
conceptualisation of hākimiyya was no longer achieved through a top-down approach where shari’a 
 
860 Hussain bin Muhammad bin Ali Jabri, At Thoriq ila Jama’atil Muslimin (Jakarta: Robbani Press, 2004), p.64 
861 Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia, pp.151-152 
862 Idem, p.2 
863 Idem, p.41 
864 Idem, p.121 
865 Munir Muhammad Al Ghadhban Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah, p.35 
866 Ibid, p.62 
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and Islamic governance was imposed from above and spread through the population. Instead, this 
new approach prioritised a grassroots movement, inculcating Islamic values among those closest 
in physical proximity to him, before branching out secretly.  
 
The prioritisation of a local community not only highlights the JI’s continued focus on a domestic 
struggle – which its leaders believed would take a long time to achieve – but Sungkar’s salafist 
approach to understanding the implementation of hākimiyya. As Noah Salomon argues, salafis in 
contrast to Islamists believe that the purification of doctrine is fundamental to political work and 
as such, ‘transforming the social body’ must precede the transformation of the political system.867  
 
This idea of the need to purify society prior to developing an Islamic state finds its roots in writings 
of Sayyid Qutb. While these arguments by Islamists regarding the spiritual and moral decline of 
resulting in the failures of Muslim societies during the colonial period are well-trodden, Qutb’s 
work builds on this, introducing the concept of jāhiliyyah. Qutb argued that Muslims living in a 
non-Islamic state or a society had regressed morally and may as well be pagans having slipped so 
far from the tenants of Islam.868  
 
Given this state of affairs, an adherence to Islamic laws and values must be re-established to not 
only ‘control the animal desires’ of people, but to also give ‘full opportunities for the development 
and perfection of human characteristics’.869 While only the complete implementation of hākimiyya 
and the enforcement of shari’a can truly guarantee that man will be free from servitude and able to 
practice his faith as God intended, those who are truly committed Muslims should initially ‘separate 
[themselves] from the jāhilī society and become independent and distinct’ from that unit.870 As 
such, the first stage in the achievement of hākimiyya can only happen through a small group of 
individuals choosing to practice Islam ‘correctly’, and like the Prophet before them, performing a 
kind of hijrah and separating themselves from the godless heathens as best they can.  
 
Sungkar appeared to have taken on board these ideas. His priorities from attempting to create a 
state structure like the NII to building a social movement from the ground up shows how his 
thinking about hākimiyya evolved since joining the DI. Sungkar emphasised tarbīyah and dakwah in 
the building of his new community, thus rooting out and correcting un-Islamic practices and 
 
867 Salomon, ‘The Salafi Critique of Islamism’, p.151 
868 Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, p.181 
869 Qutb, Milestones, p.76 
870 Ibid, p.32 
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thoughts. In PUPJI, both are mentioned in the document calling for a ‘system of Islamic education’ 
to be implemented in the newly established community, which would include direct and indirect 
proselytisation with individuals required to speak with those within and outside the community 
one-to-one, lectures by senior members of the community, and the spread of the group’s message 
through ‘print and electronic mass media’.871  
 
It also echoes Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of how an Islamic state would be established in 
Indonesia during the colonial period. In his 1936 Sikap Hijdrah pamphlet, Kartosuwiryo advocated 
that every individual Muslim undertake a spiritual hijrah and participate in a non-violent, jihad to 
decolonise their minds. This process would not be guided by an institution or state, but rather 
done on from the ground up. While Kartosuwiryo never fully elaborated on the mechanism by 
which this would result in the overthrow of the Dutch, he too encouraged the building of a strong 
Muslim community through this process.  
 
Like Kartosuwiryo before him, Sungkar also adapted his ideology to the circumstances. Knowing 
that DI had struggled to make progress against the Indonesian Republic by preserving the NII’s 
state structure, these salafi ideas of requiring community purification before political action, suited 
him well at a moment where his organisation was new and weak.  
 
Alongside At Thoriq ila Jama’atil Muslimin and Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah, the 
book Mitsaq Amal Islami by the Egyptian GI, provided a practical guide for structuring this new 
community. Working alongside GI members in Afghanistan from 1990, Sungkar’s men gained 
assistance in military training matters as well as advice on organising their resistance movement in 
Indonesia.872 Like the Indonesians, GI members sought to return to Egypt to overthrow the 
military regime having gained the requisite skills in Afghanistan.873  
 
Citing an anonymous interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Solahudin writes that JI used the book 
as a foundational text such that it was ‘of the same form’ as GI.874 Indeed, PUPJI’s initial pages list 
out the ten principles for the basis of JI’s struggle, nine of which are wholly taken from Mistaq 
Amal Islami and ordered identically. This model was based on ‘adopting the jama’ah as the method 
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of struggle’, as opposed to a top-down state structure.875 In these small groups, members could 
conduct dakwah and live amongst other likeminded individuals, supporting each other’s efforts to 
become better Muslims and strengthening their commitment to the cause of an Islamic state. The 
effects of this book can clearly be seen in PUPJI again, which states that the formation of the 
jama’ah is the first step to the establishment of an Islamic state and calls for personal and territorial 




However, unlike Kartosuwiryo in the 1930s, Sungkar was not naïve enough to believe that the 
purification of individual thought and a small community’s behaviour would magically bring about 
an Islamic state. He believed that Jihad musallah (armed jihad) would have to be conducted alongside 
dakwah to ‘build strength’ in the community.877 In these initial stages, this would not entail direct 
confrontation with the enemies of Islam, but members of the community would have to train and 
prepare for such an eventuality.  
 
While PUPJI does not provide detailed descriptions of the activities that must be undertaken by 
those in the community to prepare for this armed struggle, it quotes liberally from the Qur’an to 
justify physical conflict in the name of Allah. This was emphasised in the classroom as well. 
Tarbiyah Jihadiyah remained a core text in the JI’s training programmes. Writing in the introduction 
to the text, Abu Rusydan (alias Thoriquidin), a former DI member who went to Afghanistan as 
part of the second batch of militants in 1986 and eventually became an instructor in the JI’s camps 
in the Philippines, reminded readers that ‘jihad [was] a way of life’ for Abdullah Azzam and 
encouraged them to follow his example through the creation of a ‘strong foundation’.878  
 
Sungkar’s commitment to the use of jihad as one of the primary tools for the achievement of 
hākimiyya had not changed, even with the establishment of this new organisation. Moreover, his 
decision to keep some of his followers, like Abu Rusydan and Nasir Abas, in Afghanistan even 
after the end of the conflict in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, suggests that although 
he believed the movement was not yet ready to take on the Indonesian state, he thought that 
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preparations for the physical struggle must occur concurrently with the building of his community, 
rather than being put off to a later date.879  
 
On a practical level, this set him apart from post-Kartosuwiryo DI leaders, who also believed that 
jihad was the key to attaining hākimiyya but do not appear to have had a concrete plan in place to 
train and equip their members to fight for it effectively. However, the belief in an armed struggle 
as the primary means of attaining an Islamic state is one of the long ideological continuities 
between DI and JI leaders. From Kartosuwiryo’s perang sabil in 1947 to Sungkar’s decision to send 
DI members to train in Afghanistan, leaders of the DI movement have remained largely 
committed to the idea that hākimiyya would be unattainable through peaceful means or that the 
participation in activities like elections, would compromise the essence of the movement. As such, 
the means by which hākimiyya was pursued mattered almost as much as the attainment of the 




 The breakup of the DI and establishment of the JI in 1993 highlighted both strong continuities 
in DI and JI leaders’ understanding of hākimiyya as well as significant differences in the methods 
by which it should be pursued. Abdullah Sungkar did not fundamentally add much to the content 
of the idea as it was first defined by Kartosuwiryo. He strongly believed that an Islamic state was 
necessary for the security and betterment of Muslims, but believed thatthe DI leadership was 
unwilling and unable to make the necessary changes to their organisational structure after decades 
of failure. Nevertheless, he fundamentally believed that hākimiyya would only be achieved, after 
much preparation, through jihad, as signalled by his willingness to send his followers to Afghanistan 
for protracted periods of time to gain the skills needed to fight the Indonesian state.  
 
Where he differed from his predecessors was his willingness to sacrifice the NII and the symbolism 
of Kartosuwiryo’s short-lived state for a new model, predicated on building up a small grassroots 
movement. This fundamentally salafi approach, set him apart from his Islamist predecessors, who 
believed that hākimiyya could be achieved from the top-down through the creation of the 
governance structures and institutions of an Islamic state, even though they lacked substantive 
power in practice. This difference of approach and belief was the primary driver of his decision to 
break away from the group and establish the JI.  
 
879 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 21 July 2018 
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As such, this chapter rejects an understanding of the DI’s fragmentation that prioritises the 
ideology of external figures such as Abdullah Azzam, or simple personality clashes between 
Sungkar and other DI officials. DI leaders were fundamentally responding to domestic 
considerations and ideological differences within their own movement. The Afghan conflict, while 
certainly a meaningful experience for the members that participated, did not fundamentally 






























From his cell in the Nusakambangan maximum-security prison in August 2014, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) ‘caliph’ Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, marking a new phase in 
the ideological evolution of militant Islamism in Indonesia. By that point, Abdullah Sungkar had 
been dead for nearly 15 years and the JI was a shadow of its former self. After the group had 
conducted a slew of deadly and high-profile attacks on civilian targets, often Western tourists, in 
the 2000s, security officials cracked down, arresting or killing many high-profile members. The 
network appears to be in a period of stasis – unable or unwilling to conduct attacks in service of 
their agenda – much like the DI after its insurgency was quashed. Nevertheless, members that 
have so remained at large continue to do dakwah – quietly – in the hopes of someday reviving their 
cause and eventually attaining hākimiyya through jihad.  
This thesis has demonstrated the importance and appeal of these ideas to the DI as conceptualised 
by its key leaders and ideologues from its early foundations to its eventual fracturing. While 
Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar emphasised different aspects of hākimiyya and jihad, the two concepts 
always formed the bedrock of the organisation’s ideology. This thesis’ most basic contention is 
that only through an examination of the DI’s ideological structure, and the process by which its 
leadership arrived at their respective understandings of the tenets that make up the ideology, can 
we fully understand the history of the movement.  
This history has been revealed through a distinctive methodology that combined an analytical 
framework rooted in intellectual history and a wide range of difference sources, including formal 
archives, interviews with participants, and reams of propaganda material shared on the internet. 
This study of the process by which ideology was constructed, interpreted, and applied by DI 
leaders in different periods has revealed their rich understanding of religious scripture and shrewd 
ability to borrow concepts that have roots in many countries and time periods. It thus 
demonstrates that the beliefs of the DI movement should be taken as seriously as an ideological 
project as that of groups based in the traditional centres of the Muslim world.  
As chapter one demonstrated, the scholarship of the Islamic Modernists had a considerable impact 
on the foundations of the movement’s conceptualisation of hākimiyya. From his beginnings as an 
activist in a Modernist political organisation, Kartosuwiryo argued that independence from 
colonial rule and Western influence was not sufficient for ensuring the freedom of Muslims in 
Indonesia. This was merely the necessary first step to ensure that Muslims could begin the process 
of securing political sovereignty for God. Kartosuwiryo called for the creation of an Islamic state 
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and the implementation of shari’a to ensure that Muslims were not subject to the tyranny of man-
made laws, but instead free to serve God completely. It was only through an Islamic state that man 
could live wholly as a Muslim in the way that God intended, thus ensuring salvation in the afterlife. 
The failure of the Indonesian Republic to implement shari’a and Islamic structures of governance 
thus put Muslims in danger of living in sin. These views were crucial in motivating Kartosuwiryo 
to form the DI and declare the independence of the NII.  
As Chapter 2 showed, the violence of the Indonesian Revolution had a radicalising effect on 
Kartosuwiryo, convincing him of the need to engage in an armed jihad to ensure the creation of 
an Islamic state. While Kartosuwiryo had previously adopted a broad, nuanced understanding of 
the meaning of jihad, the conflict with the Dutch and subsequently the Republican government led 
to a narrowing of his interpretation. Regardless of what form his conceptualisation of jihad took 
throughout his career, Kartosuwiryo consistently saw it as the single, most important tool of 
realising an Islamic state in Indonesia. In order to be successful, jihad thus required the 
participation of all Muslims in society, striving collectively to improve themselves spiritually or to 
physically remove the obstacles to the creation of their state.  
Chapter 3 explored how Kartosuwiryo belatedly adopted the ideas of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ 
to compliment jihad in the protection of the Islamic faith into the DI’s ideological framework. He 
saw these ideas primarily as useful tools to ensure political compliance from his supporters and 
those living within his territory as well as a means to demonise his enemies and justify the group’s 
continued struggle. His use of these two concepts, while not particularly innovative in his 
interpretations, show that the DI had begun to embrace some salafi and Wahhabi ideas prior to the 
rapid globalisation of Islamism in the 1960s and 1970s, and their popularisation by organisations 
like the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Steeped in these ideas from his days as an activist with the DDII, Abdullah Sungkar found a natural 
home inthe DI after giving up on peaceful resistance against an increasingly repressive Indonesian 
state. His understanding of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ was far deeper than Kartosuwiryo’s and his 
contribution to their development in the group’s ideological framework was to ensure their 
application to the everyday lives of DI members. Sungkar thus went further than Kartosuwiryo in 
defining numerous non-political acts as constituting disbelief and heresy, expanding the number 
of opportunities the group had to engage in jihad to purify Islam in Indonesia. This also had the 
effect of encouraging disavowal of all non-Islamic things, thus limiting the spheres in which his 
followers could engage with those outside of the DI. While embracing an expansive understanding 
of takfīr, Sungkar like Kartosuwiryo saw these ideas primarily as tools to build loyalty among 
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followers and ensure commitment in the fight to achieve an Islamic state.  
This expansive understanding of takfīr and al-walā’ wa-l-barā was fused with jihad during the years 
Sungkar spent in the DI’s top echelons. In seeing more actions as violations against the principles 
of Islam, the group conducted more attacks targeting civilians, believing this to be another just 
means of opposing the Indonesian Republic and its supporters. Additionally, Sungkar was subject 
to greater levels of government surveillance and repression, leading to a narrowing of his 
conceptualisation of jihad, much like Kartosuwiryo’s decades before. With no good options for 
Islamists to pursue their agenda through advocacy or the ballot box, Sungkar saw armed rebellion 
as the only way of attaining hākimiyya.  
To that end, the war between the Soviet Union and the Afghan mujahedeen provided an 
opportunity for his recruits to train and gain the necessary skills to eventually resist the Indonesian 
state. Chapter 5 makes the case that Sungkar was thus driven by a desire to secure hākimiyya in 
Indonesia rather than, as some argue, motivated by a larger pan-Islamic cause. Jihad was, once 
again, a means of achieving a tangible political goal.  
Given this revitalised commitment to jihad, Chapter 6 demonstrated that Sungkar came to see the 
NII and its claims to being a functional state as absurd and a hindrance to the group’s ultimate 
objective of securing hākimiyya. His willingness to sacrifice this historic institution showed that he 
had come to see the attainment of hākimiyya as a bottom-up process, which would require the 
purification of society rather than the imposition of state-led rules. His disillusionment with the 
NII led to conflicts with the DI leadership, and ultimately to his decision to leave and form the JI.  
Over the course of the five chapters, this thesis has demonstrated how the core concepts that 
make up the DI’s belief structure were formed by its key ideologues and how these ideas related 
to each other over time. Only through distilling the essence of each concept can the overarching 
ideology of the group be appreciated and thus this thesis provides a more thorough understanding 
of the DI’s worldview than has previously been attempted.  
It must be acknowledged that both key DI leaders contributed to each concept with different 
degrees of thoroughness and knowledge. As such, the development of these ideas has never truly 
been straightforward or resulted in improvements or clarifications to every belief. What is clear, 
however, is that when major shifts in understanding did occur, they came as a result of conflict – 
or at least the threat of it. This thesis has contended that it is the very flexibility embedded in each 
part of the DI’s ideology that has provided the group with the resiliency necessary to weather these 
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periods and endure in some form.  
Finally, this thesis has contributed to the nascent field of scholarship examining the ideology of 
terrorist and militant organisations. In using intellectual history to systematically examine each 
component of the DI’s ideology and explore their origins within the wider realm of Islamist 
literature, it demonstrates both the ingenuity of local actors as well as potential commonalities with 
Islamist groups operating in vastly different contexts. It demonstrates that ideology is an important 
lens through which these organisations should be examined, in addition to more conventional 
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